Reddoch v. Parish of Plaquemines

134 So. 3d 683, 2013 La.App. 4 Cir. 0788, 2014 WL 1257526, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 832
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 26, 2014
DocketNo. 2013-CA-0788
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 134 So. 3d 683 (Reddoch v. Parish of Plaquemines) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reddoch v. Parish of Plaquemines, 134 So. 3d 683, 2013 La.App. 4 Cir. 0788, 2014 WL 1257526, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 832 (La. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

TERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

11 This appeal arises from damage awards to eighteen plaintiffs for mold exposure and health problems suffered therefrom while working in the Plaque-mines Parish 911 center between 1998 and 2002. The building housing the 911 center was owned by the Plaquemines Parish Government. The Plaquemines Parish Government asserts that the trial court erred, alleging that the plaintiffs failed to prove a causal link between its alleged tortious conduct and the alleged subsequent injuries. The Plaquemines Parish Government contends that the lack of medical evidence at trial mandates a reversal. We find that the trial court did not err in awarding the eighteen plaintiffs damage awards after weighing their testimony and the scientific evidence presented at trial. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Brenda Reddoch and Lettie Marinovich (“Plaintiffs”) filed a Class Action Petition for Damages, seeking certification, as potential class representatives against Plaquemines Parish, Plaquemines Parish Council, and ABC Insurance Company. The Plaintiffs alleged that they suffered health problems as a result of working in a hazardous, mold-infested building (“Building”) owned by the Plaquemines Parish Government (“PPG”) from 1998-2002, which housed the 911 |acenter and jail. The trial court found that the Plaintiffs failed to establish commonality and denied the request for class certification. Supplemental and amended petitions for damages were then filed to include additional plaintiffs.

Prior to trial, a majority of the Plaintiffs and all of the defendants1 were dismissed [685]*685except for PPG. Twenty-five Plaintiffs remained. At trial, eighteen Plaintiffs testified or were represented by testimony from their heirs, if the plaintiff was deceased at the time of trial. The trial court found that the eighteen Plaintiffs established that they were exposed to mold in PPG’s building. As a result, they suffered damages from health problems caused by the exposure to mold. The trial court awarded damages as follows:

June Isaacs $20,000

Lynn Sanger $25,000

Dorothy Barnie $25,000

Michael Hudson $15,000

Albert Perry $15,000

Melissa Buras $25,000

S.E. Roberts $15,000

Mary Ann Bell $ 5,000

Danyl Cosse $ 5,000

Aretha Etienne $25,000

Michael S. Etienne, Jr. $ 5,000 Marie Etienne $ 5,000

Michael Etienne, Sr. $15,000

Arthur Reddick $15,000

Sandra Ritchey $ 5,000

Morris Roberts $10,000

Thomas Reddoch $25,000

Jaunh Dorsey $25,000

PPG then filed a Motion for a New Trial, and the Plaintiffs’ opposition noted that the trial court’s judgment omitted two Plaintiffs. The trial court denied the Motion for New Trial and held that the Plaintiffs did not file a motion for new trial to 13address the two allegedly omitted Plaintiffs. PPG’s suspensive appeal followed.

PPG asserts that the trial court erred because no causal link between the alleged tortious conduct regarding the mold and the alleged subsequent injury was proven and that it is entitled to a judgment of reversal based upon La. G.C.P. art. 2164.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review is utilized when appellate courts review findings of fact. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989). The Louisiana Supreme Court has established “a two-part test for the reversal of a factfinder’s determinations.” Stobart v. State through Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). First, “[t]he appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court.” Id. Second, “the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous).” Id.

“[WJhere there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.” Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844. “[T]he court of appeal may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” Id. If two reasonable views of the evidence exist, then the factfinder cannot be manifestly erroneous. Id. When findings of fact “are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact’s findings” because “only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding and 14belief in what is said.” Id.

“However, if a legal error interdicts the fact finding process, the manifest error standard of review is no longer applicable, and, if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court should make an independent de novo review of the record and determine which party should prevail.” [686]*686Chambers v. Vill. of Moreauville, 11-898, p. 4 (La.1/24/12), 85 So.3d 593, 597. Questions of law are also reviewed using the de novo standard of review. Thibodeaux v. Donnell, 08-2436, p. 3 (La.5/5/09), 9 So.3d 120, 122.

TRIAL TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFFS June Isaac

June Isaac worked for the Plaquemine’s Parish Sheriffs Office (“Sheriffs Office”) as a 911 dispatcher from December 1999 until March 2002. Ms. Isaac viewed mold on the ceiling tiles and the vents and stated that “the smell was really bad.” Ms. Isaac began to suffer from headaches, congestion, breathing problems; and her asthma was exacerbated by the mold. While working in the Building, Ms. Isaac had to increase the frequency of her asthma inhaler refills and took Claritin every day. “The longer I [Ms. Isaac] worked in the building it [health problems] got progressively worse.” However, Ms. Isaac’s health improved when she was not at work and after the 911 center moved out of the Building. Ms. Isaac worked next to Ms. Reddoch.

Lynn Sanger

Lynn Sanger was also a 911 dispatcher from 1998 — 2002, while the Sheriffs Office housed the 911 center in the Building. Ms. Sanger saw mold on the ceiling tiles and the carpet and stated that “the equipment room flooded several times ... and you could smell like, it smelled musty when you went in there, it | Bnever smelled fresh.” Ms. Sanger and other dispatchers complained about the mold to PPG. Some of the ceiling tiles were replaced several times and other remediation attempts were made. However, Ms. Sanger suffered from an irritated throat and headaches and had to begin taking over the counter medications to try to alleviate her symptoms. When the 911 dispatchers were removed from the Building, Ms. Sanger’s symptoms improved.

Dorothy Barnie

Dorothy Barnie worked as a 911 dispatcher with the Sheriffs Office in the Building from 1998-2002. Ms. Barnie “started with all kind of allergies which is sneezing, coughing, runny nose, fever.” She did not suffer from these problems prior to working in the building and her symptoms worsened the longer she worked in the Building. Further, Ms.

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134 So. 3d 683, 2013 La.App. 4 Cir. 0788, 2014 WL 1257526, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 832, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reddoch-v-parish-of-plaquemines-lactapp-2014.