RED RIVER LUMBER COMPANY v. United States

139 F. Supp. 148, 134 Ct. Cl. 444, 49 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 676, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 12
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 6, 1956
Docket50060
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 139 F. Supp. 148 (RED RIVER LUMBER COMPANY v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
RED RIVER LUMBER COMPANY v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 148, 134 Ct. Cl. 444, 49 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 676, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 12 (cc 1956).

Opinion

LARAMORE, Judge.

The plaintiff sues to recover Federal corporate income taxes paid for the calendar year 1945. The primary issue presented is the gain derived by plaintiff on the sale of certain property in, 1945, which in turn involves a determination of the fair market value of certain property owned by plaintiff on March 1, 1913.

The plaintiff duly filed its income tax return for 1945 and paid the tax shown thereon. In this return plaintiff reported a long-term capital gain in the amount of $1,246,822.61, realized on the sale of certain assets to the Pacific Gas & Electric Company.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined, assessed, and collected a deficiency for 1945 in the amount of $265,115.43, with $27,688.22 interest thereon.' The deficiency was predicated on certain adjustments made by the Commissioner reducing plaintiff’s basis for the property sold, thereby increasing the gain on the sale to $2,321,822.61, and adjustments with respect to gain or loss on the sale of certain scrap, equipment, and used parts. A timely claim for refund was filed, rejected, and this suit followed.

The defendant now concedes that the Commissioner’s adjustments with respect to the scrap, equipment, and used parts were erroneous and that plaintiff is entitled to recover the tax resulting from their correction.

In 1945 plaintiff sold certain property to the Pacific Gas & Electric Company for $2,524,000. The plaintiff’s tax return, claim for refund, and amended claim for refund, stated that the selling price was $2,564,000, or $40,000 more. The plaintiff’s petition alleged that the selling price was $2,524,000, and the record shows that this was the actual selling price.

The defendant contends that the actual selling price cannot be used in determining the amount of plaintiff’s refund because plaintiff did not state in its claims for refund, as a ground for recovery, that the selling price reported on its tax return was erroneous. This contention is without merit. In order to determine the amount of plaintiff’s recovery on the ground presented to this court, the actual selling price must be ascertained. As we stated in Midvale Co. v. United States, Ct.Cl., 138 F.Supp. 269, it is settled that a taxpayer cannot recover in court on a ground different from that asserted in the claim for refund, unless there is some action of the Commissioner which amounts to. a waiver or estoppel. When a ground set forth in the claim for a refund is sufficient to support recovery, the reason for'this rule has been satisfied. The Commissioner has had his opportunity to consider the ground and dispose of the case administratively. If the Commissioner fails to allow the refund and the case comes to court, we see no reason: why: errors which do not affect the right of recovery,-but *150 only the amount of recovery, should be perpetuated.

One of the grounds for recovery set forth in plaintiff’s claims for refund was that the basis of the property sold to Pacific Gas & Electric Company was incorrectly reported by plaintiff and incorrectly determined by the Commissioner. If this ground is sufficient to support recovery, and we find that it is, the actual selling price must be used in determining the amount of gain on the sale.

The properties sold to Pacific Gas & Electric Company are described below. 1 The parties have agreed upon the basis of the properties sold except for the Hat Creek property and the Mountain Meadow Reservoir property.

The Hat Creek property was acquired by plaintiff in 1920. At that time, plaintiff and Mt. Shasta Power Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Pacific Gas & Electric Company, entered into an agreement whereby plaintiff agreed to convey to Mt. Shasta certain riparian lands and water rights on the Pit River and Fall River, and such easements and rights-of-way over other lands of plaintiff as Mt. Shasta selected within a 5-year period, and Mt. Shasta agreed to build and convey to plaintiff two hydroelectric power plants on Hat Creek, to be leased back by plaintiff to Mt. Shasta for a rental in perpetuity of 9,500 hp. of electrical energy. The effect of the transaction was that plaintiff transferred its Pit and Fall River rights and granted a 5-year right-of-way selection in exchange for the Hat Creek property, which was an agreement to provide plaintiff with 9,-500 hp. of electrical energy, free of charge, in perpetuity, secured by legal title to the power facilities.

The parties have agreed that this was a nontaxable exchange and that the basis of the Hat Creek property is the same as the basis of the Pit and Fall River rights and 5-year selection rights. The parties have also agreed that the basis of the Pit and Fall River rights and selection rights, for the purpose of determining gain on the 1945 sale, is their fair market value on March 1, 1913.

The plaintiff contends that the fair market value of the Pit and Fall River rights, as of March 1, 1913, was $1,800,-000 and the selection rights was $100,000 because of their value for hydroelectric power purposes. The defendant contends that the value of the Pit and Fall River rights was $90,000 and that the selection rights were valueless, because neither had any value for hydroelectric power purposes.

The plaintiff was engaged primarily in lumber and timber operations. By March 1, 1913, plaintiff had acquired over a half-million acres of timber properties in northern California, principally in Lassen and Shasta Counties. These properties included the Pit and Fall River lands and water rights. Prior to March 1, 1913, plaintiff was making plans for the development of its properties by the installation of sawmills, re-manufacturing facilities, logging railroads, paper pulp manufacturing facilities, and various auxiliary activities.

The plaintiff started actual development of these properties in 1912 by the construction of plants in a town now known as Westwood. Arrangements were also made by plaintiff for the construction of a branch railroad to West-wood. The town had about 300 people in 1913 and about 7,000 by 1918. The railroad to Westwood was completed in 1914. The expanding need for electric power at Westwood, and the need for power in connection with its proposed development of its other properties in northern California, led to the develop *151 ment of its hydroelectric resources at Westwood and influenced the development of hydroelectric power on the Pit and Fall Rivers during the decade following March 1, 1913.

On March 1, 1913, there was a steadily increasing market for hydroelectric power in northern California. There was an expected market in the immediate vicinity of plaintiff’s land and the power could have been transmitted to San Francisco. Hydroelectric power was being transmitted such distances at that time. Also, the power companies carrying on development work in this area at that time would not have done so unless there was a potential market for the power.

On March 1, 1913, a promoter was attempting to assemble lands and water rights for the development of a large power project which would have required the use of plaintiff’s lands and water rights. At that time most of the electric power utilities in northern California were projecting, planning, acquiring, and actually developing additional hydroelectric power sources.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Free-Pacheco v. United States
117 Fed. Cl. 228 (Federal Claims, 2014)
Computervision Corp. v. United States
62 Fed. Cl. 299 (Federal Claims, 2004)
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States
39 Fed. Cl. 197 (Federal Claims, 1997)
Mok Partners v. United States
673 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Illinois, 1987)
Ottawa Silica Company v. The United States
699 F.2d 1124 (Federal Circuit, 1983)
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. United States
525 F.2d 1380 (Court of Claims, 1975)
First National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States
329 F. Supp. 1147 (W.D. Oklahoma, 1971)
Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. United States
444 F.2d 677 (Fifth Circuit, 1971)
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. The United States
389 F.2d 437 (Court of Claims, 1968)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
139 F. Supp. 148, 134 Ct. Cl. 444, 49 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 676, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 12, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/red-river-lumber-company-v-united-states-cc-1956.