Red "C" Oil Manufacturing Co. v. Board of Agriculture
This text of 222 U.S. 380 (Red "C" Oil Manufacturing Co. v. Board of Agriculture) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
In view of the full reference to and the review of decided cases made by the district judge in the opinion by *390 him delivered, we content ourselves with a comparatively brief discussion of the questions pressed at bar.
These all come to two propositions, which are. thus stated by counsel:
“1. That the North Carolina Oil Inspection Act is unconstitutional and void in that, under the guise of exercising a police power, the General Assembly of North Carolina is really attempting to impose a revenue tax upon interstate commerce.
“2. That the said inspection act is unconstitutional, in that the General Assembly of North Carolina has attempted to delegate to the Board of Agriculture legislative powers.”
As to the first proposition, we append in the margin a clear and adequate summary of the act made by the judge below (p. 696): 1
*391 The bill, as we have stated, was filed when the statute had been in force but two days and when of necessity the result of its operations was conjectural. We are asked now to hold that, although the General Assembly declared in the statute that the charge -or tax authorized to be imposed was made “for. the purpose of defraying the expenses connected with the inspection, testing and analyzing of oils in this State,” the real purpose of the legislature was to levy a tax for revenue in violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution. Reading the statute as an entirety, or in connection with the supplemental legislation of March 9, 1909, we find no adequate reason for imputing to the General Assembly of North Carolina an attempt to do one thing under the guise or pretense of doing another. The mere designation of the exaction as a tax is not sufficient to warrant the deduction *392 that the charge authorized for the inspection was not one really for such purpose. We cannot lightly attribute improper motives to the law-making power. Florida &c. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471; Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S. 246. Putting out of view, therefore, questions of motive, two subsidiary contentions remain, viz., a, that oil is not a proper subject of inspection; and b, that the tax in question is so excessive on its face as to be unconstitutional. The conceded fact that in thirty-five States of the Union oil inspection laws are in force is sufficient to adversely dispose of the first of these contentions. As stated by the court below (p. 705):
“ While there is much diversity of opinion in respect to the danger of explosion from the use of kerosené oil and of the power to ascertain its ilhiminating capacity, it is evident that the question has not so far passed beyond the domain of debate, that the Legislature may not subject it *393 to reasonable inspection before permitting its sale in the State. The court cannot say that sueh a law has no reasonable relation to the public safety or welfare.”
The contention that the tax is so exéessive on its face as to conclusively evidence the unconstitutionality of the burden, if imposed as a mere inspection charge, is, we think, also without merit. Prima facie the charge must be deemed to be reasonable. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419. Again, as said by the court below (p. 710):
“It appears from an examination of the various oil inspection laws in force in the United States that the charges for inspection vary from one-half to one and one-half cents per gallon, and that in States wherein popu-. lation and other conditions are similar to those in this State the charge is about the same as that fixed by the act.”
Looking at the elements which may have possibly entered into the calculation of the General Assembly as to what would be a reasonable inspection charge, we cannot, to quote from the opinion in the Patapsco Guano Case, Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 354, “conclude that the charge is so seriously in excess of what is necessary for the objects designed to be effected, as to justify the imputation of bad faith and change the character of the act.”
In disposing of the.contention just stated we are not at liberty to travél outside of the record and take judicial notice of the operation of the act since the transcript of record was filed in this court. We here reiterate what was said in the case last cited (p. 354): “If the receipts are found to average largely.more than enoúgh to pay the expenses, the presumption would be that the legislature would moderate the charge.” If the trial made of the act establishes the fact to be as asserted, that the exaction in question is excessive, the presumption is that in the *394 orderly conduct of the . public business of the State the necessary correction will be made to cause the act . to conform to the authority possessed, which is to impose a fee solely to recompense the State for the expenses properly incurred in enforcing the authorized inspection. What relief should be awarded in the event the legislature of North Carolina failed in its positive duty in this particular is not a question open for consideration upon this record, as no such failure of duty on the part of the legislature had occurred or could possibly have happened when this suit was commenced, a few days after the passage of the act.
The remaining contention is that the act is repup' > ant to the state constitution because it attempts to delegate to the Board of Agriculture the exercise of legislative powers. The legislative requirement was that the illuminating oils furnished in North Carolina should be safe, pure and afford a satisfactory light, and it was left to the Board of Agriculture to determine what oils would measure up to these standards. We think a sufficient primary standard was established, and that the claim that legislative powers were delegated is. untenable. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 492; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506.
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222 U.S. 380, 32 S. Ct. 152, 56 L. Ed. 240, 1912 U.S. LEXIS 2189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/red-c-oil-manufacturing-co-v-board-of-agriculture-scotus-1912.