FELDMAN, Vice Chief Justice.
Maricopa County and the Department of Revenue (“department”) petition this court to review a court of appeals decision holding that a deed restriction on property owned by Recreation Centers of Sun City, Inc. (“Rec Centers”) destroyed the property’s value for tax purposes. See Recreation Centers of Sun City, Inc. v. Marico-pa County, 162 Ariz. 277, 782 P.2d 1170 (App.1986). We granted review because issues pertaining to the proper method of assessing use restricted property are of [283]*283statewide importance. See Rule 23 Ariz. R.Civ.App.P. 17B A.R.S. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 5(3) and A.R.S. § 12-120.04.
I. FACTS
Prior to 1961, Del E. Webb Development Company (“Webb”) commenced the development of Sun City, a large, adult retirement community located northwest of Phoenix. Webb built various recreational facilities as part of the development. The record indicates that Webb had a consistent policy of conveying the recreation property to the homeowners’ organization as phases of the development were completed. See Warranty Deeds, Exhibits 1-6.
Webb conveyed the six parcels of land at issue (“property”) to Rec Centers with the following restrictive covenant:
[S]aid property shall be used only for the purposes presently set forth in the articles of incorporation of the grantee [Rec Centers] herein, i.e., said property shall be used for the purpose of operating and maintaining a community center and recreational facilities without pecuniary gain or profit, for the benefit of property owners in Sun City, Maricopa County, Arizona.
Id. Rec Centers is a nonprofit, homeowners corporation.
The properties at issue have various improvements, including recreation center complexes (each consisting of a swimming pool, social and meeting halls, auditorium, craft room, and other facilities), golf courses with pro shops, and a bowling alley. Rec Centers owns and operates all the facilities.
Sun City homeowners may become members of Rec Centers and obtain the right to use the recreational facilities by signing a facilities agreement and by paying annual dues. Articles of incorporation and bylaws govern the rights and obligations of members. Any Sun City homeowner may enforce the covenant if Rec Centers attempts to use the property in a manner inconsistent with the restriction. Pretrial Statement, filed Nov. 19, 1984.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Trial Court
The county assessor determined that the value of the property owned by Rec Centers was in excess of $11 million for the year 1981 and in excess of $12 million for 1982. He based the value of the land on sales of comparable commercial property without deed restrictions and used a cost basis to value the improvements.
Rec Centers challenged the 1981 and 1982 valuations in the board of tax appeals.1 Upon receiving adverse decisions from the board, it properly filed appeals in superior court that were consolidated by stipulation of the parties.
At trial, Rec Centers stipulated to the trial court that “if the property is to be valued without regard to the restriction, the values placed on it by the public authorities are the values to be followed in this case.” Reporter’s Transcript (RT), Nov. 20, 1984, at 5. The trial court suggested that the department stipulate that “[i]f the property is to be evaluated on a restricted use [the department had] no evidence that it [had] any value at all.” Id. at 6. The department agreed to Rec Centers’ stipulation, but had reservations about the court’s suggested addendum. The in-court dialogue is confusing, at best, but apparently the department agreed that the restricted property could be deemed valueless if Rec Centers made an offer of proof or adduced testimony that would so prove. Id. at 7. What this meant we cannot tell; it is possible to conclude from the record, however, [284]*284that the department did not agree that the property was valueless. The department stated, and the trial court agreed, that Rec Centers had the burden of going forward with the evidence.
Rec Centers introduced testimony from two witnesses who claimed the property had no value because the restrictions rendered it unmarketable. The department presented no witnesses. Finding the property to be valueless, the trial court concluded that Rec Centers was entitled to recover all taxes paid on the six parcels for 1981 and 1982. The department appealed.
B. The Court of Appeals
The court of appeals affirmed, stating “that when the deed restriction is considered, the property has no value for tax purposes.” 162 Ariz. at 281, 782 P.2d at 1174. The court rejected the department’s argument that because the original owners voluntarily imposed the restriction it should be treated like any other voluntary encumbrance, for example, a lease or mortgage, and consequently be ignored. Acknowledging that it is well settled in Arizona that leases and mortgages will not be considered when determining market value for purposes of taxing real property, the court declined to apply the same rule to a deed restriction that “permanently encumbers the title to the property and severely restricts its use.” 162 Ariz. at 280, 782 P.2d at 1173.
We granted the department’s petition for review. We must therefore decide whether the assessor’s failure to consider the deed restriction resulted in an excessive valuation and whether the trial court and court of appeals were correct in holding that, considering all the terms of the restriction, the property had no value for tax purposes.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Property Tax
1. Constitutional Considerations
Our constitution states that “[t]he power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away.” Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 1. Such power is to be exercised for the public good. Id. Indeed, “the object of taxing property is to produce the revenues with which to conduct the business of the state____” State v. County of Maricopa, 38 Ariz. 347, 350, 300 P. 175, 176 (1931). Accordingly, only specific property may be exempt from taxation. Ariz. Const, art. 9, §§ 2, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. The purpose of these constitutional provisions is to ensure that all property in the state bears “its just burden of the taxes.” Bro-phy v. Powell, 58 Ariz. 543, 554, 121 P.2d 647, 652 (1942).
Legislative tax exemptions that force other taxpayers to bear increased tax burdens must foster legitimate social goals and comply with constitutional provisions. See Comment, Real Property Exemptions in Arizona, Law & Soc. Order 241 (1972). Therefore, the legislature may not exempt from ad valorem tax any property or class of property not specified in the constitution, and any law exempting property from taxation is to be strictly construed. Kunes v. Samaritan Health Serv., 121 Ariz. 413, 590 P.2d 1359 (1979). The legislature’s policy is that “all property in this state shall be taxed, excepting only the classifications permitted by the constitution.” See A.R.S. § 42-271(A)(l) to (17). Rec Centers’ property does not fall within any of the permitted exceptions.2
Of course, the arguments in this case are not based on a legislatively granted, constitutionally permitted exemption. However, unless the property actually has no value, its zero assessment effects a de facto exemption that reduces the state’s ability to raise revenue. Thus, in turning to analyze the effect of the deed restriction, we bear in mind the policy of the constitution: all property not exempted must bear its share of the tax burden.
2. Valuation: The Statutory Scheme
When imposing property taxes, the assessor must consider the property’s full [285]*285cash value, the assessment ratio, and the tax rate. See A.R.S. §§ 42-201(1), 42-227, and 42-304. In arriving at an accurate full cash value, the assessor is required to determine market value. A.R.S. § 42-227. Market value is synonymous with “full cash value” and is “that estimate of value that is derived annually by the use of standard appraisal methods and techniques or as provided by law.” A.R.S. § 42-201(4). Thus, property may be valued by the market data, cost, or income approach. County of Maricopa v. Sperry Rand Corp., 112 Ariz. 579, 581, 544 P.2d 1094, 1096 (1976).
A taxpayer may challenge the department’s assessment in superior court. A.R.S. § 42-178. The trial court, however, may not make an independent evaluation of full cash value until the taxpayer presents evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the valuation is correct. A.R.S. § 42-178(B) (“The valuation or classification as approved by the appropriate state or county authority shall be presumed to be correct and lawful”); Department of Property Valuation v. Trico Elec. Coop., Inc., 113 Ariz. 68, 546 P.2d 804 (1976). The trial court must determine that the valuation is either excessive or insufficient before it makes its own evaluation. Id.
The trial court in the present case considered the testimony of Rec Centers’ witnesses regarding the value of the property on the open market. One witness was the manager of a real estate brokerage firm, the other the manager of a realty appraisal firm. Addressing only the property’s value in the marketplace, they testified that the deed restriction quoted above destroyed marketability. In their opinion, no one would buy property that could not be operated on a for-profit basis. Based on the testimony that the property was not marketable while subject to the deed restriction, the trial court found the valuation excessive and concluded that the property had no value for tax purposes. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, filed Jan. 29, 1985.
B. The Arguments Under Arizona Case Law
1. The Department’s Argument: The Effect of Leases and Mortgages
The department contends that deed restrictions should be treated like leases and mortgages and ignored for valuation purposes. Under established Arizona law, property burdened by long term leases or mortgages is not appraised at its potentially restricted selling price, but is compared to similar property without such burdens. See Steinfeld v. State, 37 Ariz. 389, 294 P. 834 (1930); Magma Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Pima County, 128 Ariz. 291, 625 P.2d 354 (Ct.App.1981); Caldwell v. Dept. of Revenue, 122 Ariz. 519, 596 P.2d 45 (Ct.App. 1979). Even if such encumbrances make a particular property more or less desirable to a prospective buyer, the assessed value for tax purposes is not affected. Caldwell, 122 Ariz. at 521, 596 P.2d at 47. This rule obtains despite the obvious fact that such encumbrances affect the price the owner could obtain in the market. Id.3
The court of appeals declined to apply the rule for leases and mortgages, believing it premised on mere pragmatic considerations: “If the assessor were required to consider leases and mortgages in his calculations, the difficult business of fixing value would be rendered even more complex.” 162 Ariz. at 280, 782 P.2d at 1173. The majority of courts, however, has chosen to disregard the effect of leases and mortgages for more important reasons than the fear that the calculation would be too complex for the assessor. J. Youngman, Defining and Valuing the Base of the Property Tax, 58 Wash.L.Rev. 713, 718-19 (1983). Such encumbrances are ignored because taxes are assessed only against the property; “[t]he basis for [disregarding the [286]*286effect of leases] is that the tax is levied upon the land and is a tax upon all the interests into which the land might be divided— ” Swan Lake Moulding Co. v. Department of Revenue, 257 Or. 622, 478 P.2d 393, 395 (1970) (cited in Caldwell, 122 Ariz. at 521, 596 P.2d at 47, to support holding that leases do not affect full cash value for tax valuation). Thus, because the tax is against the property itself, the fee owner’s personal financial status is irrelevant. Youngman, supra, 58 Wash.L.Rev. at 719. The assessor is not concerned with whether the owner has borrowed funds to purchase the property, whether the owner has permitted a good or bad tenant to occupy it, or whether the owner’s business operation is profitable or unprofitable. See generally id. and cases cited therein.
2. Rec Centers’Argument: The Effect of Easements on Valuation
Rec Centers argues that the deed restrictions should be treated like easements and thus be considered in the assessed value of all Sun City property. See Arizona R.C. I.A. Lands, Inc. v. Ainsworth, 21 Ariz.App. 38, 41, 515 P.2d 335, 338 (1973); 1 J. Bonbright, Valuation of Property 496-97 (1937); Restatement of Property § 509 (1944). This argument is based on the testimony of one of Rec Centers’ witnesses that the right to use the recreational property had enhanced the value of the Sun City homeowners’ properties and had induced potential buyers to purchase homes in what had been an otherwise unattractive area at some distance from Phoenix. Thus, Rec Centers argues, the value of the recreational property has “flowed through” and is reflected in the value of the Sun City properties.
The court of appeals was persuaded by this theory and held that the deed restriction was similar to a recorded easement that burdens pne property and benefits another. 162 Ariz. at 281, 782 P.2d at 1174; see also Ainsworth, 21 Ariz.App. at 41, 515 P.2d at 338. Thus, the court concluded the value of Sun City property was enhanced by the right to use Rec Centers’ property. But Rec Centers introduced no specific evidence or market data concerning the amounts by which residential property within Sun City was increased in value because of a right to use Rec Centers’ property. The testimony of the witness was nothing more than his conclusion that the value of residential property in Sun City had been benefited to an unspecified degree by the proximity to and availability of the recreation property owned by Rec Centers.
We note that to prove an increase in value of the homeowners’ properties, Rec Centers would have to overcome a number of obstacles. First, each member of Rec Centers is burdened with the obligation of contributing to Rec Centers’ maintenance. The effect of that burden as weighed against the benefit of membership is speculative; the record is silent respecting the value of the use of Rec Centers’ facilities as offset by the homeowners’ payment of monthly dues. Second, if Rec Centers wished to rely on its claim that Webb increased the price of Sun City homes to offset its improvement cost, it should have demonstrated that the increase made the homes more valuable than any other home in an equally desirable location in the vicinity. Purchasers of Sun City properties may have had other reasons for locating in the area, such as the atmosphere of a retirement community or the proximity of medical care or convalescent homes. Third, Rec Centers had to show how each of the homes benefited from the exclusive use-availability of the facilities.4 This case differs from others cited by Rec Centers in which the property at issue was surrounded by a discrete number of homes that had [287]*287the exclusive privilege of use of the recreational area. We are here confronted with an entire community.
Moreover, even granting that the conclusion is correct, and property located near a golf course, with the right to use the course for a fee, may be worth more than similar property that has no such right,5 we fail to see the relevance of this point. The question is not the assessed value of all Sun City residential property but rather the value of the recreational properties.
Nor does case law support Rec Centers’ “flow through” theory. The property burdened with an easement must be valued for tax purposes as its use is affected by the easement, just as the property benefited by the easement must be valued as its use is enhanced by the easement. See Alvin v. Johnson, 241 Minn. 257, 63 N.W.2d 22, 26 (1954). A similar arrangement existed in Locke Lake Colony v. Town of Barnstead, 126 N.H. 136, 489 A.2d 120 (1985) (restrictions on the use of a property, incorporated in the deeds and by-laws of a homeowners’ association, created a right akin to an easement; held that the assessor had properly added the value of the servient estates to the value of the dominant estates).6
Rec Centers has not offered evidence that the restriction created a quantifiable increase in value in any specific Sun City property. The taxable value of the servient property cannot merely evaporate, and the likelihood of even an actual easement rendering a servient property valueless is remote. See Lake County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 91 Ill.App.3d 117, 46 Ill.Dec. 451, 414 N.E.2d 173 (1980) (simply because property benefits others does not mean the property has no value); In re Appeal of Neptune Township, 86 N.J.Super. 492, 207 A.2d 330 (1965) (even land subject to severely limited uses has some value — but that valuation should be determined on the basis of the restricted use).7
Undoubtedly the restrictions in question affect value even if an easement has not been created. Thus, the question is whether the specific effect of the restrictions must be recognized by the assessor, and, if so, in what manner.
C. The Deed Restrictions
Although the court of appeals based its decision on the deed “restriction” imposed, we believe two deed restrictions exist: one that requires the owner to operate the facility on a nonprofit basis for the benefit of Sun City homeowners, and one that limits the use of the property to recreational purposes.
[288]*2881. The Nonprofit Restriction and the Lack of Marketability
The nonprofit restriction for the benefit of Sun City homeowners affects the financial operation of the owner’s business, but does not impact the type of use to which the property may be put. The essence of Rec Centers’ argument is that the value of the recreational property has been transferred to those who have the right to use it while denying the owner a profit. The property tax, however, is levied upon the land itself and not the interests in the land or its profitability. See Carlson v. Assessment Appeal Bd. I, 167 Cal.App.3d 1004, 213 Cal.Rptr. 555, 559 (1985) (deed restriction ignored; separate legal interests in property do not affect manner of assessment, therefore “it is not the profitableness of the property to the present owner” that is relevant so long as property itself has value); Lake County (where the owner is not exempt, tax is on value of property, not the value of the owner’s interest); In re Neptune Township (where witnesses testified that property could not be sold and thus had “zero” value, deed restriction — including provision prohibiting profit — should be ignored because “[t]he law requires an assessment of the value, not of the owners’ title, but of the land; the assessed value represents the value of all interests in the land”); Swan Lake Moulding (long term leases); Hoover v. State Bd. of Equalization, 579 S.W.2d 192 (Tenn.App.1978) (for property tax purposes, value attaches to the property itself, not to the interest of the party in possession, thus alienation restrictions preventing sale were not to be considered in assessing value).
This court,.too, has recognized the general principle that the tax is levied against the property and not the owner when deciding a case involving the interest of an adverse possessor. We stated:
The owner does not owe the tax levied against his property. The whole proceeding to collect taxes is in rem. Under our system, it is the property that owes the tax, and not the owner.
Santos v. Simon, 60 Ariz. 426, 429, 138 P.2d 896, 897 (1943).
As a pragmatic matter, property that may be used only for nonprofit purposes does, in the “real world,” have value. Standard real estate practice permits the appraiser to value the property of nonprofit organizations to determine appropriate mortgage loans. See Encyclopedia of Real Estate Appraising 614 (1959). The appraiser deems property similar to the one at issue (country clubs) as a “special purpose” property. Id. Generally, such properties operate on a nonprofit basis. Id. The appraiser ignores the nonprofit status in making his evaluation. The fact that the property has enough value to satisfy a lender, despite its owner’s nonprofit status, is probative of its value for tax purposes.
The nonprofit limitation for the benefit of Sun City residents does not destroy the value of the property. The holder of title, Rec Centers, may share the value of the land’s use with those having the right to enforce its use on a nonprofit basis. This does not make the land valueless; it merely divides its value between the operator/owner and those having the right to use it. The tax, however, is on the total value of the land, not on the fractional personal interests that share its value. See Santos, Lake County, In re Neptune Township, Hoover.
Arizona courts have specifically addressed challenges to tax valuation by nonprofit enterprises. See Graham County v. Graham County Elec. Coop., Inc., 109 Ariz 468, 512 P.2d 11 (1973). In Graham County, as in the present case, the trial court accepted the taxpayer’s low valuation of the property. This court held that the appraiser’s use of the income approach was improper because the taxpayer was a nonprofit corporation that set its rate with the deliberate intention of not making a profit. We noted that the task of establishing value for some property is difficult but declined to hold that simply because property was not saleable, it had no cash value. Id.8
[289]*289This brings us, finally, to the question of marketability. Rec Centers insists that the assessor must consider the “realities of the market place” and may not “create a mythical sale in accordance with the definition of market value.” Appellee’s Answering Brief at 10 (citing Department of Revenue v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 117 Ariz. 26, 29, 570 P.2d 797, 800 (1977)).
We believe this argument confuses the concept of marketability with that of value. The statutes do not impose a tax on “market value” but on “full cash value.” They equate full cash value with market value (see A.R.S. § 42-227(A)), but provide that any of the standard appraisal methods may be used in the determination, thus contemplating that where market value is not the best indicator of value, other approaches, such as a cost or income approach, may be used to fix value. See A.R.S. § 42-201(4). Thus, although a particular restriction may destroy marketability, the property may have value in use to the owner and should therefore be assessed and taxed. Arizona has recognized this principle. See Sperry Rand, 112 Ariz. at 581, 544 P.2d at 1096 (special purpose building with little or no value on the market but having great value in use to the owner should not be assessed by use of the market technique but, instead, by a cost less depreciation method); Graham County (use of income approach improper, because taxpayer was nonprofit electric cooperative).
These principles have been long recognized in states other than Arizona. See New York Stock Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Cantor, 221 A.D. 193, 223 N.Y.S. 64 (1927), aff'd mem., 248 N.Y. 533, 162 N.E. 514 (1928) (stock exchange building, which could be used only by stock exchange, had no value on the market and was to be assessed at reproduction cost less depreciation; owner’s argument for zero valuation rejected); see also Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Review, 281 N.W.2d 821 (Iowa 1979) (when market value cannot be determined by sales price, “other factors” approach is to be used); Joseph F. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Tax Comm’n, 18 A.D.2d 109, 238 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 314, 251 N.Y.S.2d 460, 200 N.E.2d 447 (1964) (Seagram’s building, designed and built as an architectural landmark, on completion was worth on the market only one-half its construction cost; nevertheless, it should be valued at cost of construction and not market value). These cases all stand for the proposition that property that has little or no marketability may still be of great value in use to the owner and must bear its “just burden of taxes.” Brophy, 58 Ariz. at 554, 121 P.2d at 652.
The restriction to use* by Sun City homeowners presents a similar issue. A restriction to beneficial use by a limited number of people does not affect the manner in which the land may be used; rather, it limits the class of individuals entitled to use the land. It does not limit the value of [290]*290the land as land but only divides or assigns the value as between a specified class of owners. We do not believe either the framers of our constitution, or the legislature that implemented its provisions in mandating that all property be taxed, contemplated that such a limitation would provide an exemption or reduction of taxes. If Webb wished to create a private park for the benefit of homeowners in its development, that private park must nonetheless bear its burden of taxation.
Thus, we conclude that from the standpoint of valuation for tax purposes, the nonprofit restriction for the benefit of Sun City homeowners does not affect the value of the property. It may divide its value in use between the owner and those having the right to use it, but the tax is on the property as a whole and not on any fractionalization of the owner’s interest or profits. The restriction may indeed turn the property into a special purpose property, of limited marketability, but one nevertheless valuable and subject to tax despite the owner’s inability to sell it. The restriction to nonprofit status is a personal interest that actively affects the value of the owner’s title; therefore, it cannot provide an exemption neither sanctioned by the legislature nor permitted by our constitution. The voluntarily imposed restriction, actually made for the overall benefit of the commercial enterprise, cannot be permitted to remove valuable property from the tax rolls. We hold that the assessor may not consider the restrictions limiting profitability or the class of users to be benefited in determining the assessed value of the property.
2. Restriction to Recreational Use
Our conclusion regarding the nonprofit restriction does not preclude the assessor from considering the effect of the portion of the restriction that limits the use of the land to recreational activity. The restriction to recreational use does not divide value between different users but affects the value of the whole property. Just as with zoning and subdivision restrictions that limit the use of land, the recreational use restriction has an undoubted effect on value, whether the value be measured by any appraisal method. See A.R.S. § 42-141(A)(5). The property cannot be valued as if it were property to be used for residences, apartments, retail stores, or industry; the land is not and cannot be so used even though it may be now properly located and zoned. The limitation on use does not divide value between those who have the right to use; it limits the value in use of all users. We deal with golf courses and bowling alleys, not industrial parks.
The department must consider “current usage” when valuing property. A.R.S. § 42-141(A)(5); Golder v. Dept. of Revenue, 123 Ariz. 260, 599 P.2d 216 (1979);9 see also Lochmoor Club v. City of Grosse Pointe Woods, 3 Mich.App. 524, 143 N.W.2d 177 (1966) (assessor erred in valuing property for residential use when he ignored restriction to country club and park purposes). Whatever the approach to valuation, the department must therefore consider the recreational use.10
IV. CONCLUSION
Deed restrictions limiting the profitability of an owner’s use of the property or the class of permitted users are personal in nature. They divide the value between owner and user. They may create special purpose property and destroy marketability, but they do not destroy value. Therefore, the assessor may not consider them when valuing property; limitations on marketability of land that has value in use do not justify removing property from the tax rolls.
[291]*291Land use restrictions, on the other hand, affect the inherent value of the land as an entire property in use. Limitations restricting use to recreational activities therefore must be considered in the valuation formula. The assessor may utilize any appraisal approach or hybrid method of appraisal that takes the principles explained in this opinion into consideration.
The judgment is reversed. The opinion of the court of appeals is vacated. Given the ambiguous nature of the stipulation made by the parties, the case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
GORDON, C.J., and MOELLER and CORCORAN, JJ., concur.