Recordak Corp. v. United States

325 F.2d 460, 163 Ct. Cl. 294
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 13, 1963
DocketNo. 455-59
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 325 F.2d 460 (Recordak Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Recordak Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 460, 163 Ct. Cl. 294 (cc 1963).

Opinion

Davis, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In this tax refund suit, we are asked to hold that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue improperly denied Re-cordak Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Eastman Kodak, capital gains treatment on the sale of certain microfilming equipment in 1954,1955, and 1956. The critical question, once again, is whether this property was “held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of * * * [its] trade or business.” Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231.

Plaintiff has long been engaged in renting microfilming equipment on a month-to-month basis; it has also serviced the machines and supplied and developed the film necessary for their operation. From 1928 (or 1929) to 1950 this rental and servicing activity produced almost all the company’s income.1 In 1950 there was a change in operation. To obtain working capital, plaintiff decided that as of July 31, 1950, it would sell as well as rent all of its stock of micro-filmers. The need for working capital ended in 1953, but the company has continued to give users the option to buy or rent its equipment. Since July 31, 1950, all microfilmers have been available either for sale or for rental. The plaintiff says that it continued this policy because in 1953 it developed the new model RM microfilmer which was more economical and faster in its operation than any of the older devices. It was expected that, once the RM was known to [296]*296be available,2 the company’s regular customers would return the older models for replacement by the newer-type equipment. This forecast proved correct. In the taxable years (1954r-1956) an increasing number of older-type microfilmers were sent back by rental customers. In that period, plaintiff attempted to sell the older equipment for “stand-by” use by previous customers and also tried to interest new users who would not need the advantages of the improved model. It was successful in disposing of most of the pre-RM machinery by sales to consumers, under the one-year guarantee ivhich is standard in the industry; some of the sales, however, were made in “bulk” and plaintiff would provide only limited servicing. All of the machines sold in the taxable years were bought as microfilmers, but after 1956 much of the remaining pre-RM equipment was dismantled and sold for scrap or junk.

In the three taxable years, Recordak treated as long-term capital gain its income from sales of pre-RM machines first installed on rental more than six months prior to the date of sale. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed all capital gain3 on the sales and assessed deficiencies on the basis that ordinary income had been realized. Plaintiff paid the deficiencies and filed claims for refund which were similarly rejected. This suit was then timely brought to recover $922,721.28 with interest, said to be the difference between a tax at ordinary income rates and one at the capital gains level.

Of the five pre-conditions to capital gains treatment (under Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954) for profits from sales of property, it is common ground that plaintiff can be assumed for this case to have met four (use of the property in trade or business, depreciability of the property, six months holding period, non-inventory property). The dispute is whether the machines sold in 1954AL956 were [297]*297“held * * * primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of * * * trade or business.” Plaintiff’s basic contention is that its business was a rental business and that its sale of pre-RM microfilmers was merely the non-recurrent liquidation of outmoded and obsolete equipment. The Government answers that since 1950 the company has had the regular policy of offering its devices either for sale or for rental and that they were therefore held in the taxable years for the purpose of sale.4

A basket-full of cases has applied this protean standard of Section 1231 (and its predecessors) to a string of varying situations. We know that there is no single test, that differences in the circumstances can be quite significant, and that a fair number of separate factors have been thought relevant (though none decisive in itself). See Oahu Sugar Co., Ltd. v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 546, 552, 300 F. 2d 773, 776-77 (1962);5 Lazarus v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 541, 545-52, 172 F. Supp. 421, 423-28 (1959). Some courts have explicitly defined “primarily” (in the phrase “property held * * * primarily for sale,” etc.) as meaning, not “chiefly” or “predominantly,” but merely “substantially” or “essentially.” American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F. 2d 604 (C.A. 2, 1963); Greene-Haldeman v. Commissioner, 282 F. 2d 884 (C.A. 9, 1960); Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 263 (C.A. 9, 1951); S.E.C. Corp. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 241 F. 2d 416 (C.A. 2), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 909 (1957). Others have found it unnecessary or unhelpful to draw that particular distinction. E.g., Meridian, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 A.F.T.R. 2d 5535 (C.A. 6, 1963); Tomlinson v. Dwelle, 318 F. 2d 60 (C.A. 5,1963); Hillard v. Commissioner, 281 F. 2d [298]*298279, 283 (C.A. 5, 1960) ; Philber Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 F. 2d 129, 131 (C.A. 3, 1956). Almost always, a major concern, expressed or understood, lias been to determine the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s business so as to discover whether the disputed sales were a part of, or outside, that normal stream. Business enterprise profits are to be taxed, as usual, at ordinary rates; property gains classed as separate from the main-stream of the enterprise will receive more lenient treatment. “Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the everyday operation of a business be considered as ordinary income or loss rather than capital gain or loss. The preferential treatment provided by * * * [the capital assets provisions of the Code] applies to transactions on property which are not the normal source of business income.” Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955).

This steady focus on the demarcation of the taxpayer’s business suggests that the statutory standard — whatever else it may or may not embrace — does forbid capital gains treatment for sales which form an accepted part of the taxpayer’s regular business. If the purchasers are properly considered customers of that regular business, the taxpayer’s dealings with them results in ordinary income. For the present case we can concentrate on this theme.

Since July 1950, plaintiff’s regular business has been the distribution of its microfilm machines through sale or rental. At that time it changed its previous policy of refusing to sell, announced to its customers that its microfilmers would be available for either lease or sale, and declared that “this sales policy applies not only to the machines which you are now using but also to Becordak products manufactured in the future.” (Finding 11(c).) Advertisements were run in the bank journals to this effect, and plaintiff continued through the taxable years to offer the equipment either for lease or rental. (Finding 11(d).) The sales organization handled rentals and sales indiscriminately.

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325 F.2d 460, 163 Ct. Cl. 294, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/recordak-corp-v-united-states-cc-1963.