Recinos v. Washington State

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided December 7, 2023·No. 3:23-cv-06108·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT TACOMA TIFFANY RECINOS, CASE NO. C23-6108 BHS Plaintiff, ORDER v. COMMISSIONER, et al., Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on pro se plaintiff Tiffany Recinos’s most recent application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 1, supported by her proposed complaint, Dkt. 1-1. This is the 38th case Recinos has filed in this District, this year. It is the twelfth such case she has filed in the past 30 days. This time, Recinos seeks sue Washington State and “unknown individuals who settled her cases without her consent.” Dkt. 1-1 at 1. The legal basis for her claim is the “Pursuit of Happiness.” Id. at 3. Recinos seeks “$3.25 million USD in lies and false contracts.” Id. at 5. In support of this claim, Recinos alleges that “Illegal contract settled claims illegally, causing chain reactions to upper and lower courts that all need to be reversed and righted.”

A district court may permit indigent litigants to proceed in forma pauperis upon completion of a proper affidavit of indigency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court has broad discretion in resolving the application, but “the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis in civil actions for damages should be sparingly granted[.]” Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963). A person is eligible to proceed in forma pauperis if they are unable to pay the costs of filing and still provide the necessities of life. See

Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 203 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). Even if a plaintiff is indigent, a court should “deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.” Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th

Cir. 1987) (citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous if “it ha[s] no arguable substance in law or fact.” Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370 (citing Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984). A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but like any other

complaint it must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Ordinarily, the Court will permit pro se litigants an opportunity to amend their complaint in order to state a plausible claim. See United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.”) Recinos has again failed to meet this standard. She has not identified any defendant, or any person who settled any of her numerous claims. She has not plausibly

alleged that her claims were settled, at all, much less without her consent or knowledge. Indeed, the vast majority of her claims have already been dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim. Recinos appears to be referring to this Court’s December 1, 2023, Notice of Intent to Issue a Bar Order, which has been filed in each of her cases (except those that she has

filed since that date). It is attached to, and incorporated into, this Order as Appendix A. That Order has nothing to do with any class action, and it has nothing to do with any settlement of any of Recinos’s cases. Instead, it addresses the fact that Recinos has filed more than three dozen frivolous, baseless, repetitive, abusive cases in this District, this year. And it informs Recinos that, unless she demonstrates that it should not, the

Court intends to enter an Order barring her—preventing her, stopping her—from continuing her abusive litigation tactics in this Court, by precluding her from filing any new frivolous cases, like this one, in this District. It is a vexatious litigant order, not a class action settlement order. Recinos’s proposed complaint in this case is precisely the sort of frivolous, abusive litigation the Court intends to stop. Recinos is wasting her time, and the Court’s.

Recinos has failed to plausibly allege that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her claim against unknown defendants for secretly settling her cases. She has failed to state a plausible claim, and she cannot amend her complaint to do so, as a matter of law. Recinos’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED. The case is DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend. The Court will not

entertain further filings in this case, other than a notice of appeal of this Order. The Clerk shall enter a JUDGMENT and close the case. The Court will enter the Bar Order if Recinos does not respond to it in writing by December 22, 2023. Dated this 7th day of December, 2023. A BENJAMIN H. SETTLE United States District Judge

Appendix A

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON CASE NO. C23-5097 BHS Plaintiff, v. NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENTER BAR ORDER WASHINGTON STATE INSURANCE Defendant.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on its own motion. Pro se plaintiff Tiffany Recinos has filed 36 civil cases in this District since February 2023. Twenty-five of the cases have already been dismissed as duplicative, frivolous, or otherwise without merit. The 11 remaining cases are Recinos’s most recent filings, and they appear to be similarly deficient as a matter of law. Each will be addressed in a separate order. In the meantime, for the reasons discussed below, this Order informs Recinos of the Court’s intention to enter an Order barring her from commencing similar vexatious litigation in this District. This is a brief overview of each of the 25 cases Recinos has filed in this District this year that have been dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim: 1. Recinos v. Washington State Insurance Commissioner, et al., Cause No. 23-cv-5097 BHS, filed February 6, 2023. Recinos sued Washington Insurance Commissioner Mike Kreidler and her home insurer (Nationwide) following water damage to her home. Though her claims against the Commissioner were dismissed in March, Dkt. 90, Recinos steadily filed various motions, requests, notices, reports,

affidavits, amendments, petitions, and other nonsensical and improper documents related to her claims against Commissioner Kreidler (and other non-parties). She made no effort to serve or otherwise pursue her claims against her insurer. The case was dismissed for failure to prosecute and to otherwise comply with Court Orders in September 2023. Dkt. 223. 2. Recinos v. Washington State Insurance Commissioner, et al., Cause No.

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