Recant v. DeSales Assisted Living Corp.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 25, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-08330
StatusUnknown

This text of Recant v. DeSales Assisted Living Corp. (Recant v. DeSales Assisted Living Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Recant v. DeSales Assisted Living Corp., (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ROBIN RECANT, Plaintiff, -against- 24-CV-8330 (LTS) DE SALES ASSISTED LIVING CORP; VISTA ASSISTED LIVING; NICOLE ATANASIO & ORDER OF DISMISSAL JOHN HILL RN; NYC HOUSING COURT WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD JUDGE FRANCIS ORTIZ; NY STATE DEPT OF HEALTH, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. She alleges that the events giving rise to her claims occurred at her assisted living residence, Vista on 5th (“Vista”). Named as Defendants are Vista; Vista CEO, Nicole Atanasio; Vista Director of Nursing, John Hill; the De Sales Assisted Living Corporation (“De Sales”); New York City Housing Court Justice Francis Ortiz; and the New York State Department of Health (“DOH”). By order dated January 21, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint, with 30 days’ leave to replead. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v.

1 The Court had originally denied Plaintiff’s IFP application, but after she submitted documentation showing that she could not afford the fees, the Court granted the application. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,

474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims concern Plaintiff’s living conditions in her Vista apartment; she alleges these events occurred from September 2024 to the present day. Plaintiff claims violations of “warrant of habitability; tenant aggravated harassment; no repair of utilities; failure to maintain apt. in livable condition.”2 (ECF 1, at 2.) Plaintiff does not include any facts in her complaint but rather refers the Court to her “order to show cause,” where Plaintiff complains about the conditions of her Vista apartment. In that document, Plaintiff states that she has received threats of great physical harm, been abused . . . physically & mentally no toilet – x5 wks, or nonworking thermostat no heat or 95 [degrees]. Staff residents entering my apartment with keys without my invitation. Clothing shoes & jewelry taken, no hot water. Spilling sharp objects & white powder on the floor capsules of various sizes on the floor, stolen keys & removes stolen. (ECF 9, at 1.) She also indicates in this document that “the police have done nothing despite reports.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks money damages and a “[r]estraining order to keep tenant from harassment by staff & other residents.” (ECF 1, at 6.)

2 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. Plaintiff attaches to her complaint documents from her state court proceedings in Civil Court of the City of New York, Housing Part, where Plaintiff complains of the conditions of her Vista apartment. (See id. at 57-58.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff brings this action without stating facts supporting her claims. She also names

defendants who either cannot be sued under federal law or are immune from liability in this action. The Court therefore dismisses Defendants on these grounds. The Court also grants Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to state facts showing that any named defendant is liable, as is required under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A. Claims against De Sales, Vista, Vista CEO Atanasio and Vista Director of Nursing Hill Because Plaintiff invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties generally are not liable under Section 1983. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). Although there are limited circumstances in which a nominally private actor can be deemed a state actor for Section 1983 purposes, it is well established that receipt of government funding,

“no matter how extensive, is insufficient to transform otherwise private conduct into state action.” Young v. Halle Hous. Assoc., L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 355, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see, e.g., Aponte v. Diego Beekman M.H.A. HFDC, No. 16-CV-8479 (JPO), 2019 WL 316003, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2019) (dismissing Section 1983 claims based on “entwinement” theory where plaintiffs alleged that landlord “receive[d] public funds and tax exemptions in exchange for providing low-income housing,” and holding that entities do not become state actors “simply because those entities receive state funding for providing a public service” (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982))).

Plaintiff sues De Sales, Vista, Vista CEO Atanasio, and Vista Director of Nursing Hill, all of whom are private parties. De Sales and Vista are private entities that do not qualify as state actors, and Atanasio and Hill do not work for any state or other government body. Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a viable Section 1983 claim against these defendants, and the Court dismisses the claims against them for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). B.

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Bluebook (online)
Recant v. DeSales Assisted Living Corp., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/recant-v-desales-assisted-living-corp-nysd-2025.