Rebekah Muriel, V. Jonathan Farris

Opinion

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

August 18, 2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

In the Matter of the Marriage of: No. 60903-7-II

REBEKAH MURIEL, Appellant,

and

JOHNATHAN DAVID FARRIS, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Respondent.

LEE, J. — Rebekah El-Asmar (formerly Muriel) appeals the February 7, 2025 parenting plan entered by the superior court following her petition for a major modification to a prior parenting plan. Specifically, Rebekah1 argues that the superior court abused its discretion when the court (1) failed to find that her former spouse, Jonathan Farris, had a history of domestic violence (DV); (2) ordered joint decision-making on certain decisions; (3) ordered Rebekah to continue mental health treatments; and (4) ordered Rebekah and Jonathan to pay for their own transportation costs.

We hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in its determination of Jonathan’s history of DV or in its decision relating to joint decision-making for extracurricular activities. Because Rebekah challenges her mental health counseling requirement for the first time

1 Much of the record on appeal refers to the parties by their first names. Additionally, Rebekah has since remarried and changed her surname. Thus, this opinion refers to the parties by their first names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.

on appeal, Rebekah has failed to preserve this issue for review. Finally, we hold that the superior court did not err when it ordered each parent to pay for their own transportation costs. Accordingly, we affirm the February 7, 2025 parenting plan.

FACTS

A. BACKGROUND Rebekah and Jonathan married in 2006. Rebekah and Jonathan have two children together, Z.F., born in 2014, and E.F., born in 2016. In September 2019, Rebekah filed for divorce. In November 2020, Rebekah and Jonathan agreed to a final parenting plan, and in December 2020, their divorce was finalized.

Based on the November 2020 parenting plan, Jonathan was the custodial parent. Jonathan and Rebekah had joint decision-making. The November 2020 parenting plan also provided for a reunification process between Rebekah and the children. B. FIRST PETITION FOR MAJOR MODIFICATION OF PARENTING PLAN In February 2021, Rebekah filed a petition for a minor change to the November 2020 parenting plan, and then in March 2021, filed a second petition requesting a major change to the November 2020 parenting plan. Rebekah’s petition for a major modification alleged that Z.F. and E.F.’s living situation with Jonathan was “harmful to their physical, mental, or emotional health.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 582. See generally RCW 26.09.260(2)(c).

On April 1, Jonathan was found in contempt for failing to obey the terms of the November 2020 parenting plan and December 2020 child support orders. Then, on April 7, the superior court commissioner found adequate cause to move forward with a full hearing regarding Rebekah’s request to change the November 2020 parenting plan.

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In June 2021, Jonathan was again found in contempt for failing to obey the terms of the November 2020 parenting plan, this time for engaging in “[d]erogatory communications with [Rebekah].” CP at 48. The commissioner also entered a temporary family law order allowing Rebekah, who resided in San Diego, to take Z.F. and E.F. out of Washington during her summer residential time with the children.

In October 2021, Jonathan brought a contempt motion against Rebekah. Following a contempt hearing, the commissioner found that “[Jonathan] brought this motion for the purpose of retaliation against [Rebekah], after having twice been found in contempt himself” and that “[Jonathan was not] credible on any of the issues he presents in this motion.” CP at 56.

In December 2021, following a hearing, the superior court denied Rebekah’s petition for a major modification. In its oral ruling, the superior court stated:

Here, [Rebekah] has the burden to show that the present environment is detrimental; she has not met that burden. Even if I believed everything she said—

which, for the record, I don’t; I did not find her credible on a lot of issues—there’s still no proof of detriment to the [children].

I will not change primary custody. Not to say that there isn’t a lot of conflict.

I have credibility concerns regarding [Jonathan], as well. And I have concerns, based on his demeanor and manner demonstrated, even when silent on the Zoom platform, that he expresses a great deal of frustration, which is a little bit concerning.

CP at 85.

The superior court also noted the level of conflict between Rebekah and Jonathan:

The amount of conflict is very apparent and it’s a big part of all the contempt motions, the trial and everything else, having dealt with in court. Since the Parenting Plan [from] November 2020, we’re on the third court file. The amount

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of pleadings has been astronomical. The current Parenting Plan is inherently unworkable. Now, and in the long run.

Here, we have two parents who cannot cooperate and get along for the best interest of the children. The majority of the evidence that was presented was about communication issues. And many of those were regarding the schedule, trying to set times or change times or dates. It definitely is a mutual conflict. There’s a lack of trust in each other.

CP at 86.

The superior court adjusted the November 2020 parenting plan, specifically regarding notice provisions, travel, and regular video calls with the nonresidential parent. The superior court then addressed Jonathan directly:

[Jonathan], there can be no more disparaging remarks. It is extremely troubling. It has been troubling to all the courts that have been hearing your case for the last two years. I understand that you hate [Rebekah], but she is the mother of your children. It has got to stop.

....

I would like things to calm down a little bit in the next few months.

And, [Jonathan], I will not hesitate to change custody on a temporary basis if the outward hostility, name calling, [and] disparaging remarks [do not] stop.

CP at 89-90.

The superior court also addressed claims regarding Rebekah and mental health issues. The superior court stated: “I’m not concerned with the previous potential diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. I am concerned with [Rebekah] continuing [her] therapy and with her medical management.” CP at 90.

On January 27, 2022, Rebekah and Jonathan appeared before the superior court for presentation of the updated parenting plan. Jonathan remained the custodial parent. Despite the

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superior court’s comment during its oral ruling regarding Rebekah continuing mental health counseling, the superior court declined to make a written finding imposing that requirement.

At the presentation hearing, Jonathan and Rebekah disputed several aspects of the parenting plan. During the remotely held hearing, the superior court muted Jonathan based on Jonathan’s interruptions of the court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the superior court judge exited the Zoom platform while the parties continued to argue.

The superior court entered the new final parenting plan in January 2022.2 The January 2022 parenting plan did not impose any RCW 26.09.191 limits on either Jonathan or Rebekah and ordered joint decision-making regarding Z.F. and E.F. for major decisions. The visitation schedule provided in part that Z.F. and E.F. would reside with Rebekah in the summer, for the months of July and August. C. EVENTS FOLLOWING JANUARY 2022 PARENTING PLAN 1. Death Threat and Petition for Modification On February 4, 2022, Rebekah went to Jonathan’s residence to pick up several items of her property, as agreed to during the divorce proceedings. The items included guns that had belonged to Rebekah’s late father. Rebekah’s fiancé (now husband) and Jonathan’s brother were present as third-party witnesses.

2 Jonathan appealed the January 2022 parenting plan to this court. See generally In re Marriage of Muriel, No. 56723-7-II (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2024) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056723-7-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. However, before the appeal could be considered, several subsequent temporary family law orders had been entered and rendered Jonathan’s appeal moot. See generally id.

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Jonathan had placed several piles of items in the driveway for Rebekah to take. Rebekah disagreed that all the piles belonged to her, stating that there was a specific list of items that had been agreed to between their attorneys. Jonathan insisted that Rebekah take the piles of things before she loaded her specific items. Rebekah asked for her father’s firearms. Despite the fact that Rebekah legally owned her father’s firearms, Jonathan insisted that Rebekah sign a transfer of ownership form before he turned over the guns. Rebekah refused.3 Jonathan became angry and erratic as Rebekah loaded the items. She ultimately decided to leave without having obtained her father’s guns. Before she left, Jonathan said to Rebekah, “‘Your day is coming. Your time is up.’” CP at 69 (boldface omitted). Rebekah heard Jonathan say, “‘Your time is running out.’” CP at 4.

Rebekah viewed Jonathan’s comment as a death threat. According to Rebekah, she feared Jonathan would kill her. Three days later, Rebekah filed a report with the Lakewood Police Department. Rebekah informed the police department that she did not report the incident on the day it happened and instead reported the incident later in part because “her attorney informed her that the incident should have been documented.” CP at 4.

Following Rebekah’s report to the police department, the City of Lakewood charged Jonathan with harassment at Lakewood Municipal Court. The Lakewood Municipal Court entered a five-year DV no contact order against Jonathan based on the harassment charge. The no contact

3 Unbeknownst to Rebekah, an hour before she had arrived at Jonathan’s residence to pick up her belongings, Jonathan had taken her father’s guns to the Lakewood Police Department. Jonathan informed the police that he had found some guns among the belongings of a deceased friend and that he did not know what to do with them. The police were unable to determine the ownership history but took custody of the guns with the intention of destroying or auctioning them.

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order prevented Jonathan from coming within 500 feet of Rebekah. The matter proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found Jonathan guilty of harassment. However, the jury did not make a DV finding when it convicted Jonathan. Jonathan was sentenced to 60 days in custody.

In March 2022, based on the five-year no contact order, Rebekah filed a petition for a major change to the January 2022 parenting plan. Rebekah again alleged that the “children’s current living situation is harmful to their physical, mental, or emotional health.” CP at 611. Rebekah also requested that the superior court require Jonathan to complete mental health, DV, and anger management evaluations.

In April 2022, the court held an adequate cause hearing, and the commissioner found adequate cause for the petition to proceed to a full hearing. However, the commissioner did not find a need for major modifications at that time. Instead, the adequate cause order stated that “[t]he change in circumstances supports adequate cause for . . . minor modification only,” specifically as it pertained to exchanges of the children in light of the no contact order. CP at 618.

2. July 1, 2022 Airport Incident In late June 2022, prior to Z.F. and E.F.’s summer visitation with Rebekah, Rebekah and Jonathan discussed exchanging the children at the airport. Separately, Rebekah’s and Jonathan’s attorneys discussed the parameters of the exchange. The attorneys discussed recording the event and the possibility of signed receipts. Rebekah’s attorney later e-mailed Jonathan’s attorney, stating that Rebekah did not agree to be recorded. However, Jonathan’s attorney had left for vacation when the e-mail arrived and did not immediately receive it.

On July 1, 2022, Rebekah flew from San Diego to SeaTac Airport to pick up Z.F. and E.F.

Rebekah intended to fly back to San Diego with the children that same afternoon, and then on July

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3, she and the children planned to fly to the U.K., where her fiancé resided. As part of the exchange, Jonathan was required to provide the children’s passports.

Based on the no contact order, Jonathan’s girlfriend, Ivonne Perriera, facilitated the exchange inside the airport terminal. According to Rebekah, Perriera recorded the exchange against Rebekah’s wishes. Perriera gave Rebekah the passports and asked Rebekah to sign a letter from Jonathan. Rebekah refused. Consequently, according to Rebekah, Perriera grabbed the passports back and refused to turn them over until Rebekah signed the document. Perriera called Jonathan and left the airport with the passports.

Rebekah’s attorney came to the airport to assist and made several calls to Jonathan’s attorney, whom he was unable to reach. Jonathan’s attorney’s office ultimately contacted Jonathan, and they instructed Jonathan to return to the airport. Jonathan did so, and Rebekah’s attorney collected the passports, which he then provided to Rebekah.

3. San Diego Police Welfare Check Once Rebekah and the children arrived in San Diego, she had Z.F. and E.F. video call Jonathan to let him know they had arrived. Jonathan spoke briefly with the children and then handed the phone to Perriera. According to Rebekah, Perriera apologized for the events at the airport, but blamed Rebekah for what happened.

Rebekah took the phone from her children and informed Perriera that she “could speak to the kids all she wanted,” but not about the events of the airport exchange, which related to the terms of the parenting plan and which Jonathan and Rebekah were prohibited from discussing with Z.F. and E.F. CP at 179. According to Rebekah, Jonathan became enraged and began threatening Rebekah with legal action. Jonathan hung up the phone but then began calling Rebekah over and

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over again. Rebekah chose to not answer his calls based on his escalation and the need to put the children to bed.

Jonathan then called the San Diego Police Department and requested that a welfare check be conducted. In his report to the police, Jonathan stated that Rebekah had “ripped the phone from” Z.F. and E.F. and “started yelling.” CP at 190 (capitalization omitted). Jonathan told the police that Rebekah was bipolar and had borderline personality disorder and that she had a history of physical abuse against the children.

At 10:00 p.m., two officers went to Rebekah’s residence. Rebekah showed them the children, who were both asleep. The following day, Rebekah contacted the San Diego Police Department to report that Jonathan had violated the terms of the no contact order by making his call to the police. The San Diego Police Department found that Jonathan was attempting to contact and harass Rebekah based on his welfare check request.

4. Second Petition for Modification and Change of Custody On August 12, 2022, Rebekah filed another petition for a major modification to the January 2022 parenting plan based on the events of July 1, among other issues. Rebekah requested that she maintain custody of Z.F. and E.F. in San Diego after their summer visitation ended. Rebekah argued: “Because of Jonathan’s unrelenting abusive use of conflict, parental alienation, unilateral decision making, and domestic violence, the Court should find Jonathan’s behavior has harmed and is likely to further harm the children’s psychological development and emotional wellbeing.” CP at 185.

On August 29, the superior court held an adequate cause hearing on Rebekah’s second petition for a major modification of the January 2022 parenting plan. The commissioner found

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adequate cause to move forward with a full hearing on the petition. In its oral ruling, the commissioner noted that Jonathan’s behavior “appear[ed] to be escalating.” CP at 285. The commissioner determined that Z.F. and E.F. would remain with Rebekah in San Diego and ordered that Jonathan complete a DV assessment with collateral input from Rebekah. The commissioner also ruled that Jonathan’s future communications with the children would require professional supervision. The commissioner included in its ruling that Rebekah must continue her individual counseling.4 In September 2022, the commissioner entered a temporary family law order based on its oral rulings.

5. Subsequent Orders and Rebekah’s Request to Move to the United Kingdom Over the next year and more, Rebekah and Jonathan engaged in contentious litigation following various instances of conflict.5 This included motions for revision, new temporary family

4 The record suggests that Rebekah was participating in regular individual counseling sessions based on “PTSD from being married to [Jonathan],” and that back in March 2022, Rebekah had filed a letter with the superior court stating she had completed six therapy sessions and that she was generally stable. CP at 283. 5 Rebekah’s attorney and the attorney’s receptionist each also filed petitions for anti-harassment orders against Jonathan. On August 30, 2022, the day following Jonathan’s loss of custody of Z.F. and E.F., Jonathan arrived at Rebekah’s attorney’s office unannounced. He waited for the receptionist to exit the office suite, met her in the hallway, and gave her a handwritten note. The note stated:

After 2 years of constant slander against me with no evidence, [Rebekah’s attorney’s] abusive litigation & corrupt [influence] in the court had my children taken from me yesterday and given to my abuser. If there is anything you are willing to tell me that can expose [Rebekah’s attorney’s] corruption, I promise to be . . . discreet. But I won’t promise to not encourage you to find an employer who deserves you.

Ex. 32. The superior court issued both Rebekah’s attorney and the attorney’s receptionist protection orders against Jonathan.

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law orders, and motions for contempt, among other things. Jonathan was found in contempt twice more for failure to follow child support orders and violation of the parenting plan.

In January 2023, Rebekah sent Jonathan a letter informing him that she had remarried and requesting that he agree to her taking Z.F. and E.F. to reside in the U.K. Rebekah subsequently petitioned the superior court for permission to relocate with the children. Jonathan objected to Rebekah’s move. At the time, Rebekah and Jonathan were subject to the temporary family law order entered in September 2022.

In April 2023, the superior court appointed a Guardian ad Litem (GAL).6 The GAL was ordered to investigate (1) the parenting ability of both parties, (2) the detrimental environment of Jonathan, (3) the abusive use of conflict by Jonathan, (4) Jonathan’s mental health, and (5) Jonathan’s domestic violence.

Meanwhile, in June 2023, the superior court commissioner entered a new temporary family law order granting Rebekah’s request to move to the U.K. with Z.F. and E.F. D. FEBRUARY 2025 FINAL PARENTING PLAN 1. Jonathan’s Mental Health Evaluation and GAL Report In December 2023, a licensed clinical and forensic psychologist filed a mental health evaluation with a DV component for Jonathan. The psychologist had interviewed individuals connected to Jonathan and Rebekah, as well as Jonathan and Rebekah themselves, and reviewed several documents arising from the course of litigation between them.

6 Two years prior, the superior court had appointed a different GAL. However, during the December 2021 hearing, the superior court expressed concern about the GAL’s bias and determined that the GAL’s report was not helpful to the court.

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The psychologist concluded that Jonathan exhibited features of “Adjustment Disorder,”

“Unspecified Personality Disorder,” and major depression, among other diagnoses. Ex. 123, at 20. The psychologist opined that much of Jonathan’s maladaptive behavior and emotional dysregulation was the result of severe stress due to the ongoing litigation. Based on the assessment, the psychologist stated that Jonathan posed a low to moderate risk for “future risk of harm to others as a perpetrator of domestic violence.” Ex. 123, at 23. The psychologist made several recommendations, including that Jonathan should continue individual counseling to address his anger and anxiety. The psychologist also made the following note of the relationship between Jonathan and Rebekah:

The records suggest a dynamic between [Rebekah] and [Jonathan] that highlights desperate attempts to control and or hurt the other party, for differing, but unclear reasons. Both sides have made the issue about their perceptions of the other, versus what is in the best interest of the children. The addition of the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) will likely help to manage this pattern. Moreover, also related to the patterns of the records in addition to the parties’ reports, the communication conflicts observed across both sides seem to be interpreted and described by the opposite party as an attack or demand, even when clearly neutral. This serves as an example of neither responding in the most adaptive ways over their own feelings in the moment; however, whether this is entirely done by either one of them intentionally, maliciously, or subconsciously is unclear at this time and regardless of how it is done can mislead the Court.

Ex. 123, at 22.

In September 2024, the GAL filed her report with the superior court. Based on Jonathan’s conviction for harassment at Lakewood Municipal Court, Jonthan’s December 2023 mental health evaluation, and the GAL’s review of transcripts for various hearings, the GAL determined that there was evidence of DV. The GAL also noted: “It cannot be said that Rebekah’s behavior has been perfect throughout this process” and there were instances where Rebekah could have

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deescalated a situation but did not. CP at 41. The GAL recommended that Z.F. and E.F. remain with Rebekah.

2. November 2024 Hearing and February 2025 Parenting Plan In November 2024, the superior court held a full hearing on Rebekah’s petition for a major modification to the parenting plan.7 In her trial brief, Rebekah argued that Jonathan’s hatred towards her alone justified the modification, and overall, his domestic violence against her and his behavior made co-parenting impossible and was detrimental to the children. Rebekah also requested that the superior court include RCW 26.09.191 findings against Jonathan, “find[ing] that Jonathan is Rebekah’s domestic violence abuser” and asking the court to “substantially restrict Jonathan’s time with the children.” CP at 540.

During the hearing, Rebekah testified to many of the events described above.8 Rebekah argued, in part, that Jonathan’s mental health issues prevented him from making decisions for the children.

7 The record suggests various delays, primarily on Jonathan’s end, that caused the full hearing on Rebekah’s petition for a major modification to not occur until two years later. For instance, the GAL’s report was originally due on June 1, 2023; however, the GAL was unable to file her report until September 6, 2024. This was in part due to the fact that Jonathan did not undergo his ordered mental health evaluation until March and May of 2023, and the report was not available until December 2023. Then, in May 2024, Jonathan was sentenced to 60 days in jail for his harassment conviction at the Lakewood Municipal Court. 8 We note that Rebekah failed to designate the entire hearing transcript for the record on the appeal; rather, Rebekah designated only excerpts of her own testimony. The record shows that several witnesses testified. Jonathan supplemented the record by designating several of the hearing exhibits, but he did not designate the remainder of the hearing transcript.

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Jonathan agreed it was in Z.F. and E.F.’s best interest to remain with Rebekah in the U.K.

However, he advocated for joint decision-making and an immediate, unsupervised reunification with the children, as opposed to the gradual process Rebekah recommended.9 a. Oral ruling

In January 2025, the superior court issued an oral ruling. The superior court noted the degree of animosity between Rebekah and Jonathan, stating: “While both parents clearly love their children, their animosity toward one another is preventing them from effectively co-parenting.” 4 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 1506. The superior court also stated:

I have put an enormous amount of thought into this ruling. I have considered the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits admitted into evidence.

I have reviewed and read every single exhibit that was offered into evidence, sometimes multiple times, and my trial notes more than once.

I have also made credibility determinations, keeping in mind that [the prior judge] previously found [Rebekah] not credible and had concerns about [Jonathan’s] credibility and demeanor.

4 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 1506-07.

The superior court then acknowledged that Rebekah sought a DV finding against Jonathan, and the court detailed the events between the parties since January 2022, when the last parenting plan had been entered. The superior court expressed concerns about Rebekah’s testimony regarding the February 2022 death threat:

I have reviewed the evidence related to this event, including the police report, the criminal trial transcript, [Rebekah’s] subsequent [d]eclarations in the family law trial related to this incident, and the parties’ testimony during our court proceedings. I have some concerns.

9 At the time of the hearing, Jonathan had not seen Z.F. or E.F. in person for two and a half years.

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. . . [Rebekah] waited three days to report the threat. And her reasons for the delay varied from that her attorney recommended that she document it to that she didn’t think anyone would believe her.

. . . [W]hile [Rebekah] asserts that she was in fear for her safety following the alleged threat, the parties continued to communicate via Talking Parents—

that’s Exhibit 167, specifically at [p]age[s] 114 and 125—during the time between the alleged threat and the report to the police. Those communications do not appear to reflect a consistent or heightened state of fear, which raises questions about the veracity of the claim regarding [Rebekah’s] emotional response and fear at the time.

Indeed, [Rebekah] was communicating with [Jonathan] via Talking Parents regarding co-parenting matters just one hour before she made the police report, in which she claimed to be terrified for her life and afraid that [Jonathan] was going to kill her.

4 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 1508-09. The superior court also discussed the airport incident when Perriera withheld the children’s passports from Rebekah. The superior court stated:

Again, I have some concern. This incident was presented to the Court as [Jonathan] being unreasonable and demanding and placing barriers where there shouldn’t have been. But Exhibits 209 and 211, which are the e-mails between the attorneys, show that the issue of recording and signed receipts was discussed and was agreed on between the parties.

It was later e-mailed to [Jonathan’s] attorney that [Rebekah] did not agree to be recorded, but per his testimony, that was after his attorney had left for vacation.

The situation appears to the Court to have been a miscommunication between the attorneys and the parties and [Perriera] and does not appear, by this Court, to be a deliberate attempt by [Jonathan] to withhold the [p]assports or a limitation on movement that [Rebekah] is making it out to be.

4 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 1510-11.

The superior court also considered Jonathan’s December 2023 mental health evaluation and the GAL’s report, stating:

Additional considerations: The mental health and domestic violence evaluation that was submitted. [Jonathan] has undergone a thorough mental health

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evaluation which indicated that while he does not suffer from psychopathy, he does have anger issues that are likely connected to stress and anxiety. The evaluation found that he is not a risk to his children, though his anger issues need to be addressed.

The guardian ad litem report. The GAL report was detailed and thorough.

She interviewed witnesses, reviewed various sources of information. The recommendations made in the report were reasonable and aligned with the best interest of the children.

4 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 1514-15.

The superior court found that Jonathan has an “emotional problem that may impact his ability to parent if not adequately treated.” 4 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 1516. The superior court further found that “[w]hile [Jonathan’s] behavior certainly impacts his relationships with others and how he is perceived by those around him, there wasn’t evidence directly related to his behavior harming the children.” 4 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 1516.

The superior court declined to make DV finding. The superior court reasoned:

I am not making a finding of domestic violence. The Court does not find a history of acts of domestic violence. The term “history of acts of domestic violence” is intended to exclude isolated de minimis incidents which could technically be defined as domestic violence.

These parents co-parented for several years and have had two Parenting Plans in this case: One agreed and one entered after trial in which both parties were represented by counsel. Neither Parenting Plan included findings of domestic violence.

The first allegation of domestic violence that arose in this case was the incident on February 4th of 2022, in reference to [Jonathan’s] claim, something to the effect of your time will come.

I don’t want to minimize the impact that this had on [Rebekah], but absent additional evidence of domestic violence and considering the concerns I raised above, . . . this incident does not meet the threshold required by law to establish a history of domestic violence.

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4 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 1516-17.

The superior court ordered that Jonathan restart or continue his individual therapy sessions to address his anger issues and that Rebekah should also remain in treatment. The superior court granted Rebekah primary custody of Z.F. and E.F. and stated that the parenting plan would provide for a five-phase reunification between Jonathan and the children. The first three phases required supervised visitations between Jonathan and the children. The completion of each phase was contingent upon Jonathan successfully completing mental health treatment and providing proof of compliance. The superior court also designated Rebekah as the sole decisionmaker “due to the distance and the parties’ history of the inability to make joint decisions.” 4 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 1525.

The parties agreed that the superior court did not miss any topics or requests related to the parenting plan in its oral ruling.

b. Presentation of order In February 2025, the parties appeared before the superior court. The superior court had drafted the final parenting plan and order itself and had sent the plan to the parties to provide them with an opportunity to ask questions or request clarification.

Jonathan requested that the superior court include a finding regarding Rebekah’s mental health treatment. The superior court stated: “I did reference and I did intend to include that [Rebekah] should continue to provide quarterly proof of attendance and compliance with her own mental health. So that will be included in the Final Order, as well.” 5 VRP (Feb. 7, 2025) at 2007- 08.

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In response, Rebekah’s attorney then requested an expiration date on Rebekah’s requirement of mental health counseling:

[REBEKAH’S COUNSEL]: . . . Could there be an expiration date on that, because [Rebekah has] been doing that successfully for two-and-a-half years? Her counselor testified glowingly about her care and mental health, and none of that was an issue here in this case. It was all about [Jonathan’s] mental health.

....

[COURT]: . . . Let’s do it through—let’s do it for a period of two more years. I know that’s a long time, but I think based on just the history of this case and what I know about mental health struggles, really for both parents, I think two years is appropriate. Let’s do it through 2027, quarterly. So eight more reports.

5 VRP (Feb. 7, 2025) at 2008.

Rebekah also requested that language be added requiring Jonathan to reimburse her for her own transportation expenses when traveling back and forth between the U.S. and the U.K. with the children. The superior court denied Rebekah’s request:

This is a difficult one. [Rebekah] is the one who moved to the United Kingdom so she does need to incur some of the costs of that. I also am keenly aware that [Jonathan’s] actions have resulted in the need for supervised visitation.

It’s not an easy decision, but I think I’m going to keep it as is. I’m denying the request to have [Jonathan] reimburse for [Rebekah’s] travel.

5 VRP (Feb. 7, 2025) at 2012-13.

Following the presentation hearing, the superior court entered the final parenting plan.

While Rebekah was the sole decisionmaker for Z.F. and E.F., the February 2025 parenting plan also provided:

If [Rebekah] expects [Jonathan] to contribute to extracurricular activities or private school, the activity and/or school shall be a joint decision; otherwise, [Rebekah]

may enroll child in activity without [Jonathan’s] approval so long as she pays 100% of the activity.

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CP at 667.

Rebekah appeals.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Rebekah argues that the superior court abused its discretion when it (1) failed to making a DV finding against Jonathan under RCW 26.09.191, (2) failed to award sole decision- making to her, (3) ordered Rebekah to continue and submit proof of mental health treatment, and (4) ordered that Rebekah and Jonathan are responsible for their own transportation costs when transporting the children between the U.S. and U.K. We disagree.10 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW A court may modify a parenting plan if there has been a substantial change in the circumstances and the modification is in the best interests of the child. RCW 26.09.260. We review challenges to parenting plans for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of French, 32 Wn. App. 2d 308, 314, 557 P.3d 1165 (2024). An abuse of discretion “‘occurs when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.’” In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014) (quoting In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1090 (2013)). “A decision is based on

10 Jonathan makes a “preliminary procedural argument,” claiming that Rebekah failed to submit a complete record, in violation of RAP 9.2. Br. of Resp’t at 2 (formatting omitted). Accordingly, Jonathan contends that we should “dismiss or deny this appeal” and find that Rebekah “intentionally filed her appeal in bad faith.” Br. of Resp’t at 2.

Jonathan previously raised this issue with this court in a motion to dismiss. We denied Jonathan’s motion, stating that Jonathan may supplement the record with additional information he believed was missing. Jonathan later supplemented the record with several trial exhibits. Thus, we decline to address Jonathan’s preliminary argument as the issue has already been addressed.

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untenable grounds or reasons if it is factually unsupported or was reached by applying an incorrect legal standard.” French, 32 Wn. App. 2d at 314-15. B. RCW 26.09.191 LIMITATIONS 1. Legal Principles “RCW 26.09.191 governs restrictions and limitations in parenting plans.” In re Marriage of Mishko, 23 Wn. App. 2d 571, 577, 519 P.3d 240 (2022). Under RCW 26.09.191(1), “[w]hen a parent acts contrary to the health and well-being of the parent’s child, or engages in conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of harm to a child, the court may, and in some situations must, impose limitations intended to protect the child from harm.”

Restrictions on a parent’s decision-making and residential time are required if the trial court finds that the parent has a history of domestic violence. French, 32 Wn. App. 2d at 315; RCW 26.09.191(4)(a)(iii). Further, if the trial court finds that one parent has a history of domestic violence, “the court shall order sole decision making and no dispute resolution other than court action.” RCW 26.09.191(5). Domestic violence includes coercive control and unlawful harassment. RCW 7.105.010(10). “‘Coercive control’” is “a pattern of behavior that is used to cause another to suffer physical, emotional, or psychological harm, and in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(a).

RCW 26.09.191 also provides for discretionary limitations that a trial court may impose in a parenting plan. See generally RCW 26.09.191(4)(c)-(d). The parental conduct that may result in such a limitation includes parental neglect, long-term physical or emotional impairments that interfere with parenting functions, abusive use of conflict, among “[s]uch other factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the best interests of the child.” RCW 26.09.191(4)(c).

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These limitations must be “reasonably calculated to protect a child from the physical, sexual, or emotional abuse or harm that could result if a child has contact with the parent requesting residential time.” RCW 26.09.191(4)(d). Limitations include supervised visitation, evaluation or treatment, or no contact with the child. RCW 26.09.191(4)(d).

“‘Findings of fact are reviewed under a substantial evidence standard, defined as a quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is true.’” In re Marriage of DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d 39, 48, 509 P.3d 832 (2022) (quoting Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879, 73 P.3d 369 (2003)). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court’s, weigh evidence, or determine witness credibility. Id.

2. Superior Court Did Not Abuse Discretion When It Did Not Enter DV Finding Against Jonathan

Rebekah argues that the “substantial weight of evidence produced at trial requires a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Jonathan has a history of acts of domestic violence.” Br. of Appellant at 18.

Here, the superior court did not make a DV finding against Jonathan. However, the superior court still placed limitations on Jonathan: the superior court found that Jonathan has a long-term emotional impairment that may interfere with his parenting ability. Based on that long- term emotional impairment, the superior court ordered Jonathan to participate in therapy to address his anger issues, provide proof of compliance, and be subjected to a five-phased, highly regimented visitation schedule that limited his residential time with Z.F. and E.F. and requires supervision in the first three phases. In the order, the superior court also wrote: “If [Jonathan] does not follow

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the evaluation or treatment requirements above, then [Jonathan] will return to/remain in Phase 1 of the parenting plan,” which is the most restrictive of the visitation phases. CP at 662.

Moreover, the record shows that after weighing the evidence, the superior court directly addressed several of Rebekah’s claims of Jonathan’s coercive control and/or domestic violence. For instance, the superior court expressed concerns regarding Rebekah’s credibility about the death threat. The superior court identified Exhibit 167 in support of its reasoning. A review of Exhibit 167 supports the superior court’s reasoning—indeed, as the superior court noted, an hour before Rebekah reported the death threat to the Lakewood Police Department, she sent Jonathan a message inviting him to communicate with her on parenting matters. Furthermore, we defer to the superior court in matters of credibility and weight given to the evidence. DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 48.

The superior court also noted that certain incidents, such as the airport incident with the children’s passports, were miscommunications between the parties and their attorneys or mistaken perceptions. Indeed, the record shows there was no actual contact between Jonathan and Rebekah during the airport incident and there clearly was miscommunication regarding the airport exchange.

The superior court also addressed Rebekah’s allegations that Jonathan engaged in stalking behaviors, such as breaking into her apartment and taking photos of her journal. The superior court stated that it had insufficient evidence to determine whether Jonathan actually broke into Rebekah’s apartment. However, the superior court acknowledged that the record contains evidence of concerning conduct from Jonathan, such as his false call to the San Diego police, his several contempt orders, his general poor judgment and impulse control, and his emotional

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outbursts. Nevertheless, the vast majority of Rebekah and Jonathan’s conflicts appear to arise from an inability to communicate with one another, which was also what the psychologist who conducted Jonathan’s mental health evaluation concluded:

The records suggest a dynamic between [Rebekah] and [Jonathan] that highlights desperate attempts to control and or hurt the other party, for differing, but unclear reasons. Both sides have made the issue about their perceptions of the other, versus what is in the best interest of the children. . . . Moreover, also related to the patterns of the records in addition to the parties’ reports, the communication conflicts observed across both sides seem to be interpreted and described by the opposite party as an attack or demand, even when clearly neutral. This serves as an example of neither responding in the most adaptive ways over their own feelings in the moment; however, whether this is entirely done by either one of them intentionally, maliciously, or subconsciously is unclear at this time and regardless of how it is done can mislead the Court.

Ex. 123, at 22 (emphasis added).

The superior court also referenced the records of supervised calls between Jonathan, Z.F., and E.F., noting that they “showed a father who interacts lovingly and appropriately with his children. While there were allegations that [Jonathan] used abusive use of conflict with the children, I did not find evidence of that in the supervisor’s notes.” 4 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 1515. The record further shows that Jonathan generally interacts well with his children. Thus, the record supports the superior court’s statement regarding the lack of evidence of abusive use of conflict.

The purpose of RCW 26.09.191 limitations are to protect and preserve “the health and well-being of [the] minor children.” RCW 26.09.191(1) (emphasis added). The superior court noted, and the record shows, that Rebekah and Jonathan’s relationship likely strictly qualifies as one of domestic violence. However, while this court in no way minimizes that dynamic, the overarching consideration within parenting plans is the best interests of the child. RCW 26.09.002; .191(1). Other than Rebekah’s naked claims, there is no evidence in the record that shows any

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domestic violence Jonathan may have perpetrated against Rebekah has extended to their children or affected the safety and well-being of the children.

Rebekah requests this court to reweigh the evidence, reverse the superior court, and remand for the entry of DV findings against Jonathan, and for the superior court to impose “appropriate restrictions . . . in accordance with” RCW 26.09.191. Br. of Appellant at 26. But Rebekah does not elaborate on what those “appropriate restrictions” should be or how they would differ from the extensive restrictions the superior court already imposed against Jonathan based on the emotional impairment finding.

We review parenting plans for abuse of discretion. French, 32 Wn. App. 2d at 314. Based on the record and the thorough ruling made by the superior court, it cannot be said that its decision to not make a DV finding against Jonathan was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Chandola, 180 Wn.2d at 642. Accordingly, we hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion.

3. Joint Decision-Making Rebekah argues that the superior court abused its discretion when it ordered “joint decision making” regarding certain activities for Z.F. and E.F. Br. of Appellant at 28. Specifically, Rebekah argues that under RCW 26.09.191,11 if a trial court finds that a party has engaged in domestic violence, it cannot require mutual decision-making. Rebekah asserts that the joint decision-making forces her “to engage with her abuser and provide him with additional

11 In her brief, Rebekah cites the former version of RCW 26.09.191. Former RCW 26.09.191 (2021). The mandatory restrictions Rebekah references are now found under RCW 26.09.191(5).

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opportunities to harass, intimidate, and annoy her. This all happens at the children’s expense.” Br. of Appellant at 28.

The record shows that the superior court granted Rebekah sole decision-making on major decisions for Z.F. and E.F. The superior court also included a provision which stated:

If [Rebekah] expects [Jonathan] to contribute to extracurricular activities or private school, the activity and/or school shall be a joint decision; otherwise, [Rebekah]

may enroll child in activity without [Jonathan’s] approval so long as she pays 100% of the activity.

CP at 667.

Thus, Rebekah’s contention is belied by the record. The superior court did not order her to engage in joint decision-making with Jonathan. Rather, if Rebekah “expects [Jonathan] to contribute” financially to the children’s extracurricular activities or private school, then the activity or private school must be a joint decision. CP at 667. The superior court order explicitly states that Rebekah need not consult Jonathan about any activity or request Jonathan’s approval so long as she pays for the activity without any financial contribution from Jonathan.

Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it did not enter a DV finding against Jonathan. Therefore, because there was no DV finding against Jonathan, the superior court was not required to order sole decision making under RCW 26.09.191. RCW 26.09.191(5). Accordingly, we hold the superior court did not abuse its discretion.

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4. Rebekah’s Mental Health Treatment Rebekah argues that the superior court did not make any findings against Rebekah under RCW 26.09.191, and therefore, the court did not have any authority to require her to continue her mental health counseling. We hold that Rebekah has failed to preserve this challenge for review.

“Generally, appellate courts will not entertain issues raised for the first time on appeal.”

River House Dev. Inc. v. Integrus Architecture, P.S., 167 Wn. App. 221, 230, 272 P.3d 289 (2012); RAP 2.5(a). “‘[T]he purpose of the error preservation requirement is to allow the trial court an opportunity to correct the error by bringing it to the court’s attention.’” Peterhans v. Univ. of Wash., 34 Wn. App. 2d 745, 751, 571 P.3d 322 (alteration in original) (quoting Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 168 Wn.2d 664, 671 n.2, 230 P.3d 583 (2010)), review denied, 5 Wn.3d 1020 (2025) .

Here, the record shows that Rebekah had been required by the superior court to participate in mental health counseling for several years. The record does not show that Rebekah ever challenged this requirement. During the superior court’s oral ruling, the court ordered Rebekah to continue her mental health treatment. Rebekah did not object.

Then, during presentation of the order—during which the superior court offered the parties opportunity to review the parenting plan, ask questions, and clarify or make requests—Rebekah again did not challenge the inclusion of her mental health counseling requirement. Instead, Rebekah asked that the requirement include an expiration date, which the superior court granted. Thus, because Rebekah could have challenged the requirement, but did not, we hold Rebekah has failed to preserve the issue for review.12

12 To the extent that Rebekah disputes the form of the parenting plan, insofar as the superior court did not include an explicit finding regarding her need for mental health counseling, the record

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C. TRANSPORTATION COSTS 1. Legal Principles Certain expenses, such as “long-distance transportation costs to and from the parents for visitation purposes,” “are considered extraordinary expenses not accounted for in the basic child support obligation.” RCW 26.19.080(1), (3); In re Yeamans, 117 Wn. App. 593, 599, 72 P.3d 775 (2003). Generally, these extraordinary expenses “shall be shared by the parents in the same proportion as the basic child support obligation.” RCW 26.19.080(3). This language is mandatory. Yeamans, 117 Wn. App. at 600.

However, a trial court has the discretion to “determine the necessity for and the reasonableness of all amounts ordered in excess of the basic child support obligation.” RCW 26.19.080(4); Yeamans, 117 Wn. App. at 599. Furthermore, while “RCW 26.19.080(3) explicitly requires allocation of travel expenses incurred ‘to and from’ the location,” it does not require “all costs associated with long-distance visitation.” In re Marriage of McNaught, 189 Wn. App. 545, 567, 359 P.3d 811 (2015), review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1005 (2016).

2. No Abuse of Discretion Rebekah argues that the superior court’s order that each parent is responsible for their own travel costs is contrary to the statutory requirements of RCW 26.19.080(3). Specifically, Rebekah

shows that the superior court provided an explanation for its decision during presentation of the order. 5 VRP (Feb. 7, 2025) at 2008 (“[L]et’s do it for a period of two more years. I know that’s a long time, but I think based on just the history of this case and what I know about mental health struggles, really for both parents, I think two years is appropriate.”). Copper Creek (Marysville) Homeowners Ass’n v. Kurtz, 1 Wn.3d 711, 724, 532 P.3d 601 (2023) (stating that “‘[i]n the absence of a written finding on a particular issue, an appellate court may look to the oral opinion to determine the basis for the trial court’s resolution of the issue’” (quoting In re Marriage of Griffin, 114 Wn.2d 772, 777, 791 P.2d 519 (1990))).

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argues that her travel costs must be shared in the same proportion as the basic child support obligation and that the superior court did not enter specific findings supporting its “deviation.” Br. of Appellant at 37. We disagree.

The February 2025 parenting plan detailed the transportation arrangements for each phase of visitation. Rebekah and Jonathan were each required to pay their proportional share for Z.F.’s and E.F.’s travel expenses based on their child support order. The parenting plan also stated: “Each parent is responsible for their own transportation costs, if flying with the children.” CP at 669.

During the presentation of the parenting plan, Rebekah requested that her individual travel expenses be included as a necessary expense of the children’s long-distance transportation costs. The superior court declined to do so, reasoning:

This is a difficult one. [Rebekah] is the one who moved to the United Kingdom so she does need to incur some of the costs of that. I also am keenly aware that [Jonathan’s] actions have resulted in the need for supervised visitation.

It’s not an easy decision, but I think I’m going to keep it as is. I’m denying the request to have [Jonathan] reimburse for [Rebekah’s] travel.

5 VRP (Feb. 7, 2025) at 2012-13.

Thus, the superior court, in weighing the evidence, determined that Rebekah’s individual travel expenses were neither necessary nor reasonable to be included as an amount in excess of the basic child support obligation. The superior court has discretion to make that determination. RCW 26.19.080(4); McNaught, 189 Wn. App. at 567. Moreover, the parenting plan does not require Rebekah to travel with Z.F. and E.F., both of whom appear old enough to fly on their own. Thus, we hold the superior court did not abuse its discretion.

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D. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL Rebekah requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to RAP 18.1 and RCW 26.09.140, as well as based on this court’s inherent authority to award fees against a party for bad-faith litigation and intransigence. Jonathan requests an award of fees pursuant to RAP 18.1, RAP 18.9, and RCW 26.09.140.

We deny Johathan’s request for attorney fees on appeal. However, we award appellate attorney fees to Rebekah for time spent reviewing and responding to Jonathan’s response brief.

1. Legal Principles Under RAP 18.1, we may award a party reasonable attorney fees or expenses if applicable law grants the party the right to recover. RAP 18.1(a). RCW 26.09.140 provides that an appellate court may “order a party to pay for the cost to the other party of maintaining the appeal and attorneys’ fees in addition to statutory costs.” Under RCW 26.09.140, “[t]he primary considerations in awarding fees . . . are ‘the need of the party requesting the fees, the ability to pay of the party against whom the fee is being requested, and the general equity of the fee given the disposition of the marital property.’” In re Marriage of Davison, 112 Wn. App. 251, 259, 48 P.3d 358 (2002) (quoting In re Marriage of Van Camp, 82 Wn. App. 339, 342, 918 P.2d 509, review denied, 130 Wn.2d 1019 (1996)). Courts may also consider the merits of an appeal. Id. at 260.

Under RAP 18.9(a), we may impose sanctions for a frivolous appeal.

“An appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues on which reasonable minds might differ and it is so totally devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal. All doubts as to whether the appeal is frivolous should be resolved in favor of the appellant. An appeal that is affirmed simply because the arguments are rejected is not frivolous.”

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In re Custody of A.T., 11 Wn. App. 2d 156, 171, 451 P.3d 1132 (2019) (quoting In re Marriage of Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. 634, 644, 316 P.3d 514 (2013), review denied, 180 Wn.2d 1010 (2014)).

Intransigence may also form the basis for an award of fees, separate from RCW 26.09.140 or RAP 18.9. In re Parenting & Support of E.J.S., 16 Wn. App. 2d 776, 785-86, 483 P.3d 110 (2021). Courts may “‘award one party attorney fees based on the other party’s intransigence if the other party engages in foot-dragging and obstruction.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Pennamen, 135 Wn. App. 790, 807, 146 P.3d 466 (2006)). Intransigence may also be demonstrated by litigious behavior, bringing excessive motions, or discovery abuses. In re Marriage of Larson, 178 Wn. App. 133, 146, 313 P.3d 1228 (2013), review denied, 180 Wn.2d 1011 (2014).

Finally, the court’s inherent equitable powers authorize an award of attorney fees in cases of bad faith. Copper Creek (Marysville) Homeowners Ass’n v. Kurtz, 1 Wn.3d 711, 724, 532 P.3d 601 (2023). A bad faith, or “baseless,” filing includes filings that are not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the alteration of existing law. West v. Wash. Ass’n of County Offs., 162 Wn. App. 120, 135, 252 P.3d 406 (2011).

2. Jonathan’s Request Jonathan argues that Rebekah’s appeal is frivolous “as it attempts to re-litigate credibility findings and statutory interpretation in the face of a deliberate, one-sided record.” Br. of Resp’t at 20. He further asserts that Rebekah’s appeal was in bad faith based on her filing of an insufficient record and her intransigence.

We agree that Rebekah designated only excerpts of the November 2024 and January 2025 parenting plan hearing for the record on appeal; however, Jonathan had the opportunity to

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supplement the record and the record was sufficient for this court’s review. Moreover, Jonathan fails to demonstrate that the appeal was devoid of any debatable issues on which reasonable minds might differ. A.T., 11 Wn. App. 2d at 171. Finally, the record shows that both parties have engaged in extremely contentious and litigious behavior; thus, it cannot be said that Rebekah has exhibited a level of intransigence that justifies a fee award. Larson, 178 Wn. App. at 146. Therefore, we decline to award fees to Jonathan.

3. Rebekah’s Request Rebekah argues that “[l]ooking at the vast amount of litigation, ancillary matters, and appeals filed by Jonathan there is significant support for a finding of substantial bad-faith and an award of fees.” Br. of Appellant at 40. Rebekah further asserts that she has incurred an “overwhelming amount of fees and costs” in litigation related to Jonathan and that he has failed to pay over $100,000 in past judgments. Br. of Appellant at 40.

We decline to award Rebekah fees based on “the vast amount of litigation, ancillary matters, and appeals.” As stated above, the record shows that both parties have engaged in extremely contentious and litigious behavior, such that an award of fees based on Jonathan’s intransigence is not justified here—particularly as Rebekah was the party who filed this appeal.

We also decline to award Rebekah fees pursuant to RCW 26.09.140. Our primary considerations include “‘the need of the party requesting the fees, the ability to pay of the party against whom the fee is being requested, and the general equity of the fee given the disposition of the marital property.’” Davison, 112 Wn. App. at 259 (quoting Van Camp, 82 Wn. App. at 342). We may also consider the merits of an appeal. Id. While we are sympathetic to Rebekah’s frustrations regarding Jonathan’s unpaid judgments, we are also cognizant of the contentious and

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litigious behavior on both sides and that Rebekah’s appeal here fails. Davison, 112 Wn. App. at 259. Moreover, an award of fees under RCW 26.09.140 is discretionary. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion and decline to award Rebekah appellate attorney fees pursuant to RCW 26.09.140.

However, we award appellate attorney fees to Rebekah under RAP 18.9(a) for her time spent reviewing and responding to Jonathan’s response brief. Here, Jonathan’s brief twice cites to Marriage of Sanjuan to support his arguments, but as Rebekah points out in her reply brief, no such case exists. We surmise that Jonathan used artificial intelligence (AI) to assist in writing his brief, which resulted in an “AI hallucination.”13 While Jonathan is entitled to use AI to write his response brief, he is still required to conduct a reasonable inquiry and confirm that the claims he advances are well-grounded in fact and in law. In re Estate of Little, 9 Wn. App. 2d 262, 274 n.4, 444 P.3d 23 (stating that “[w]e hold a pro se litigant to the same standard as an attorney”), review denied, 194 Wn.2d 1006 (2019). In citing to a hallucinated case, Jonathan has submitted a frivolous filing that “is so totally devoid of merit.” A.T., 11 Wn. App. 2d at 171.

Accordingly, we award Rebekah appellate attorney fees for time spent reviewing and responding to Jonathan’s response brief in an amount to be determined by the commissioner pursuant to RAP 18.1(f).

CONCLUSION

We affirm the superior court’s February 7, 2025 parenting plan.

13 “AI hallucinations are when a language model generates content that sounds right but is factually wrong, invented, or contradicts its source material.” AI Hallucination Examples: 12 Real Cases (2024-2026), OPEN (May 13, 2026), https://www.open.cx/blog/ai-hallucination-examples.

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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Lee, J.

We concur:

Maxa, P.J.

Che, J.