2023 IL App (5th) 220144-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 04/28/23. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0144 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
TYLER REAKA, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 21-MR-61 ) CAPTAIN D’S, LLC, ) Honorable ) Julie K. Katz, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Welch and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition for entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, where defendant made full payment of the Commission’s final award prior to the filing of plaintiff’s petition.
¶2 Plaintiff, Tyler Reaka, appeals the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County that granted
his petition for enforcement of judgment, pursuant to section 19(g) of the Workers’ Compensation
Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2020)), and interest on the unpaid portion of his workers’
compensation award, pursuant to section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-1303 (West 2020)), arguing that the court erred by denying his requests for section 2-1303
interest on the total award from September 9, 2015, attorney fees, penalties, and to depose prior
counsel for defendant, Captain D’s, LLC. Defendant cross-appeals, arguing that the court erred by
1 ruling that defendant owed additional compensation when the court denied defendant’s motion to
dismiss, pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020)). Alternatively,
defendant argues that the court erred by ruling that it owed section 2-1303 interest. For the
following reasons, we reverse the court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss and vacate the
court’s judgment against defendant.
¶3 I. Background
¶4 The following procedural history and facts are derived from the pleadings and exhibits
contained in the record on appeal. We note that this case has a lengthy procedural history as a
result of multiple appeals and numerous filings in the section 19(g) proceedings. We recite only
those facts necessary to our resolution of this appeal.
¶5 On December 30, 2003, plaintiff filed an application for adjustment of claim, seeking
benefits under the Act for injuries he allegedly sustained to his neck, cervical spine, and left knee
while working for defendant on January 3, 2001. The matter ultimately proceeded to an arbitration
hearing on February 8, 2011.
¶6 On March 24, 2011, the arbitrator issued a decision denying plaintiff benefits for his
cervical spine injury but awarding him benefits for his left leg injury. Specifically, the arbitrator
awarded plaintiff medical expenses in the amount of $21,407.47, pursuant to section 8(a) of the
Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2010)), and permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits in the
amount of $51,615 ($516.15 per week for 100 weeks), representing 50% loss of the use of the left
leg, pursuant to section 8(e) of the Act (id. § 8(e)). The arbitrator also ordered defendant to pay
penalties in the amount of $10,859.49 under section 19(k) of the Act (id. § 19(k)) and attorney fees
in the amount of $4281.49 under section 16 of the Act (id. § 16), based on defendant’s
unreasonable and vexatious nonpayment of medical benefits related to plaintiff’s left leg injury. In
2 total, the arbitrator awarded plaintiff $88,163.45. The arbitrator further ordered defendant to pay
plaintiff interest, if any, at a rate of 0.15% under section 19(n) of the Act (id. § 19(n)).
¶7 Defendant did not file a petition for review of the arbitrator’s decision with the Illinois
Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission). Defendant instead paid plaintiff $88,163.45,
the total amount of the arbitrator’s award, on April 19, 2011.
¶8 Plaintiff filed a petition for review of the arbitrator’s decision with the Commission after
he received defendant’s payment. 1 The Commission issued a decision on February 2, 2012,
affirming and adopting the arbitrator’s decision. The Commission ordered defendant to pay
plaintiff interest under section 19(n) of the Act, if any. The Commission also ordered that
defendant “shall have credit for all amounts paid, if any, to or on behalf of [plaintiff] on account
of said accidental injury.”
¶9 Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the circuit court of St.
Clair County. The court entered an order on September 9, 2015, setting aside the Commission’s
decision and remanding the matter back to the Commission to award plaintiff benefits for his
cervical spine injury.
¶ 10 Defendant appealed the circuit court’s order to the workers’ compensation division of the
appellate court (appeal No. 5-15-0425WC). Plaintiff moved to dismiss defendant’s appeal,
asserting that the court’s September 9, 2015, order was interlocutory and not appealable. The
appellate court granted plaintiff’s motion and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on
March 3, 2016. 2
1 Plaintiff alleged in the petition for review that he placed the petition in the mail on April 27, 2011, and the petition was file-stamped by the Commission on June 9, 2011. 2 The appellate court did not issue a Rule 23 order or an opinion. 3 ¶ 11 On April 4, 2017, the Commission issued a decision and opinion on remand in accordance
with the circuit court’s September 9, 2015, order. Despite finding no basis in law or fact for the
court’s order, the Commission found that plaintiff’s cervical spine condition was causally
connected to his January 3, 2011, work accident. Accordingly, the Commission awarded plaintiff
PPD benefits in the amount of $103,230 ($516.15 per week for 200 weeks), representing 40% loss
of use of the person as a whole, pursuant to section 8(d)(2) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2) (West
2016)), and medical expenses in the amount of $147,961.17, pursuant to section 8(a) of the Act.
The Commission also awarded plaintiff PPD benefits in the amount of $51,615 ($516.15 per week
for 100 weeks), representing 50% loss of use of the left leg, pursuant to section 8(e) of the Act.
The Commission ordered defendant to pay plaintiff interest under section 19(n) of the Act, if any.
The Commission further ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $125,595.58 as a penalty under section
19(k) of the Act, $10,000 as a penalty under section 19(l) of the Act (id.§ 19(l)), and $50,238.23
for attorney fees under section 16 of the Act. In total, the Commission awarded plaintiff
$488,639.98.
¶ 12 On April 27, 2017, defendant sought judicial review of the Commission’s April 4, 2017,
decision and opinion on remand before the circuit court. Plaintiff filed a motion to quash summons
and dismiss judicial review. The court subsequently denied plaintiff’s motion, finding sufficient
compliance with section 19(f) of the Act (id. § 19(f)) to perfect jurisdiction.
¶ 13 On April 26, 2018, the circuit court entered an order confirming the Commission’s April
4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand. Defendant appealed the court’s order to the workers’
compensation division of the appellate court (appeal No. 5-18-0288WC). Plaintiff filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the
Commission’s decision. The appellate court ordered that plaintiff’s motion be taken with the case.
4 ¶ 14 On May 30, 2019, the workers’ compensation division of the appellate court issued an
unpublished decision finding that defendant failed to strictly comply with the procedural
requirements set forth in section 19(f)(1) of the Act, and thus, failed to confer the circuit court with
subject-matter jurisdiction. Captain D’s, LLC v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2019
IL App (5th) 180288WC-U, ¶ 30. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the circuit court’s April
26, 2018, order confirming the Commission’s decision on remand was void. Id. Defendant filed a
petition for rehearing, which the appellate court denied on June 27, 2019.
¶ 15 Also, in June 2019, defendant issued various payments to plaintiff. Specifically, defendant
paid plaintiff $4998.07 on June 21, 2019, $185,833.51 on June 26, 2019, $147,961.17 on June 26,
2019, $103,030 on June 27, 2019, $55.71 on June 28, 2019, and $200.30 on June 28, 2019. In
total, defendant paid plaintiff $442,078.76 in June 2019.
¶ 16 On March 8, 2021, plaintiff filed a petition for enforcement of judgment and interest on
the Commission’s award pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act. Plaintiff attached to the petition a
certified copy of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand. Plaintiff
alleged that defendant made partial payment of the Commission’s award. Plaintiff further alleged
that he “requested full payment of the award and all accrued interest on the total award at 9%.”
Plaintiff requested that the circuit court enter judgment against defendant in the amount of $51,615
for PPD benefits awarded by the Commission, in addition to “interest at 9% on the total award
from September 9, 2015.” Plaintiff additionally requested that the court order defendant to pay
attorney fees, penalties, costs, and any other relief the court deemed appropriate for defendant’s
“knowingly and willfully improper and illegal appeals, responses, motions and petitions.”
¶ 17 On April 6, 2021, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the
Code. Defendant alleged in the motion that it tendered full payment of the Commission’s award,
5 and that its tender of full payment constituted a defense to a section 19(g) petition. Defendant
attached as an exhibit to the motion a copy of the arbitrator’s March 24, 2011, decision awarding
plaintiff $88,163.45 in benefits under the Act, including PPD benefits in the amount of $51,615
for his left leg. Defendant alleged that it paid plaintiff $88,163.45—the full amount awarded by
the arbitrator on March 24, 2011—on April 19, 2011, which included the $51,615 award of PPD
benefits for plaintiff’s left leg. Defendant further alleged that, after it unsuccessfully attempted to
appeal the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand, it paid plaintiff a total of
$442,048.76 in the following installments: $4998.07 on June 21, 2019; $185,833.51 on June 26,
2019; $147,961.17 on June 26, 2019; $103,000 on June 27, 2019; $200.30 on June 28, 2019; and
$55.71 on June 28, 2019.
¶ 18 In support of its allegations regarding payment, defendant attached the affidavit of Paula
Williams, the payment history records custodian for the third-party administrator of the workers’
compensation benefits for defendant in plaintiff’s claim. Williams attested that the payment history
records related to plaintiff’s claim revealed that the third-party administrator paid plaintiff
$88,163.45 on April 19, 2011, $4998.07 on June 21, 2019, $185,833.51 on June 26, 2019,
$147,961.17 on June 26, 2019, $103,000 on June 27, 2019, $200.30 on June 28, 2019, and $55.71
on June 28, 2019. Williams attached as exhibits to her affidavit redacted payment ledgers that
listed the payment amounts, payment dates, and corresponding check numbers. The exhibits
attached to the affidavit indicated that defendant paid plaintiff $88,163.45 for “Permanent
Disability” on April 19, 2011, and $103,0303 for “Permanent Disability” on June 27, 2019.
3 While defendant’s motion to dismiss and Williams’s affidavit indicated that defendant paid plaintiff $103,000 on June 27, 2019, the documents attached to Williams’s affidavit indicated that defendant paid plaintiff $103,030 on June 27, 2019. 6 ¶ 19 In addition, defendant alleged that plaintiff’s appeals following the arbitrator’s March 24,
2011, decision involved only the cervical spine injury. In support, defendant attached as an exhibit
to the motion a copy of plaintiff’s brief to the Commission, wherein plaintiff stated that his “appeal
involve[d] only the cervical spine injury and issues.” Defendant further alleged that counsel for
plaintiff confirmed during argument before the circuit court on December 18, 2017, that defendant
paid all benefits the arbitrator awarded on March 24, 2011, including the PPD benefits totaling
$51,615 for plaintiff’s left leg injury. In support, defendant attached as an exhibit a copy of the
transcript from the December 18, 2017, hearing, wherein counsel for plaintiff stated “when they
found out what the award was on the knee, they didn’t appeal or anything. They just paid it, all the
penalties and everything.” Thus, defendant argued that the court should deny plaintiff’s request
for PPD benefits of $51,615 for his left leg, because defendant satisfied its obligation regarding
the PPD benefits “long ago.”
¶ 20 Defendant also alleged that it paid the award in full in June 2019, including interest at a
rate of 0.15% pursuant to section 19(n) of the Act. Defendant claimed it owed $834.09 for section
19(n) interest through June 20, 2019, which was 0.15% of “$251,191.17 ($103,230.00 for [PPD]
benefits for the neck/cervical spine and $147,961.17 for medical benefits for the neck/cervical
spine).” Defendant claimed it paid $4998.07 on June 21, 2019, and $55.71 on June 28, 2019, for
section 19(n) interest. Thus, defendant argued that the circuit court should deny plaintiff’s request
for additional section 2-1303 interest because it overpaid the interest owed on the award.
¶ 21 On April 22, 2021, plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff
disagreed that defendant “satisfied its [PPD] obligation in the Remand Decision dated April 4,
2017, because it paid a PPD award in an earlier Arbitrator Decision dated March 24, 2011.”
Plaintiff asserted that the case involved two separate decisions issued six years apart, which were
7 based on different facts and circumstances. According to plaintiff, “the March 24, 2011, decision
was not a final decision” and the payments for that award were not before the circuit court.
(Emphasis in original.) Plaintiff maintained that his section 19(g) petition pertained to the
Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand, which was “a separate, new and
distinct decision from the March 24, 2011, decision and it has not been paid in full.” (Emphasis in
original.) Plaintiff noted that defendant appeared “to imply the Commission erred by awarding the
same PPD in the April 4, 2017, Remand Decision that the Arbitrator awarded in the March 24,
2011, decision.” According to plaintiff, defendant should have requested that the Commission
recall and correct the decision or raised the issue before the circuit court, as permitted by section
19(f) of the Act. Plaintiff further asserted that defendant waived review of the issue by failing to
raise the issue in the prior proceedings.
¶ 22 In addition, plaintiff argued that he was entitled to interest at a rate of 9% of the total
amount of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand, pursuant to section
2-1303 of the Code, from the date of the circuit court’s September 9, 2015, order. Thus, plaintiff
requested that the court deny defendant’s motion to dismiss and allow him to proceed with his
section 19(g) petition. Plaintiff also requested that the court allow him to depose prior counsel for
defendant on the issue of penalties and sanctions.
¶ 23 On August 6, 2021, after receiving additional filings from both parties, the circuit court
entered an order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss in part and granting the motion in part.
Relying on Patel v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 103217, and Estate of Burns v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 2015 IL App (5th) 140503, the court found that it lacked discretion to
modify the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision, and that it lacked authority to award defendant
credits or offsets. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss to the extent it
8 alleged that plaintiff’s section 19(g) petition should be dismissed because defendant tendered full
payment of the award. However, the circuit court dismissed the portion of plaintiff’s section 19(g)
petition that requested “interest at the rate of 9% per annum from any date prior to the entry of
judgment herein, pursuant to section 19(g).” In doing so, the court found that the appropriate
interest rate was 0.15%, pursuant to section 19(n) of the Act, and that the 0.15% interest rate
applied to the unpaid PPD benefits. The court also dismissed plaintiff’s request for penalties and
sanctions, noting that section 19(g) allowed it to award reasonable costs and attorney fees, not
additional penalties or sanctions. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff’s request to depose prior
counsel for defendant on the issue of penalties and sanctions. The court set the matter for a status
conference on September 17, 2021.
¶ 24 On September 17, 2021, following the status conference, the circuit court entered an order
directing the parties to submit argument and supporting documentation that addressed the issues
left unresolved by the court’s August 6, 2021, order, including the appropriate amounts of interest,
attorney fees, and costs.
¶ 25 On October 8, 2021, plaintiff filed his argument in support of the section 19(g) petition.
Regarding the issue of interest, plaintiff again argued that he was entitled to section 2-1303 interest
at a rate of 9% on the entire amount of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision from September
9, 2015, to June 30, 2019. Plaintiff further argued that he was entitled to 9% interest on the unpaid
amount of the Commission’s decision from June 30, 2019, to the date of the court’s “final 19(g)
Order.” In addition, plaintiff again argued that he was entitled to sanctions and penalties for
defendant’s actions after the proceedings before the Commission. Plaintiff also requested that the
circuit court “reconsider” its denial of his request to depose prior counsel for defendant.
9 ¶ 26 On October 29, 2021, defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s argument supporting the
section 19(g) petition. Defendant asserted that plaintiff improperly sought reconsideration of the
circuit court’s August 6, 2021, order, which was beyond the scope of the court’s September 17,
2021, order. Defendant argued that the court properly determined that section 19(n) interest at a
rate of 0.15% applied, and that such interest applied to the unpaid portion of the award from April
4, 2017. Defendant claimed it owed approximately $354.23 in section 19(n) interest (0.15%
interest on $51,615 from April 4, 2017, through October 29, 2021). Defendant maintained,
however, that it previously overpaid interest and owed no additional interest to plaintiff. Defendant
maintained that it did not owe the $51,615 in PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg but, assuming it
owed that amount, “and further assuming judgment is eventually entered by this Court pursuant to
Plaintiff’s 19(g) Petition, then [it] would owe approximately $21,254.07 in interest at the time the
judgment is entered by this Court pursuant to Plaintiff’s 19(g) petition (9% interest on $51,615.00
from April 4, 2017 through October 29, 2021 is $21,254.07, before deducting any overpayment of
the 19(n) interest outlined above).” Defendant further asserted that the court should deny plaintiff’s
request for attorney fees and costs, because plaintiff failed to provide a specific amount and
documentation in support of his request.
¶ 27 On November 4, 2021, following a hearing, the circuit court entered an order directing the
parties to submit proposed orders consistent with the court’s prior rulings. The court noted that if
plaintiff submitted a fee petition with his proposed order, defendant would have 30 days to respond
and “no judgment to be entered without any fee petition being responded to by Defendant.”
¶ 28 On December 3, 2021, defendant filed a motion to supplement the record. Defendant
alleged in the motion that it tendered a check to plaintiff in the amount of $51,967.65 on November
23, 2021. According to defendant, the check represented payment for 50% loss of the use of
10 plaintiff’s left leg ($51,615) and section 19(n) interest ($361.65). As such, defendant asserted that
it paid all compensation owed to plaintiff. Thus, defendant requested that the circuit court grant its
motion to supplement the record, find that it paid all compensation due and owing, and grant any
other relief the court deemed proper.
¶ 29 On December 8, 2021, plaintiff filed an objection to defendant’s motion to supplement the
record. Plaintiff alleged that, during a prior hearing before the circuit court, defendant agreed that
it owed $51,615 and interest at a rate of 9% per annum pursuant to section 2-1303 from the date
of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision to the date of payment, which totaled approximately
$21,500. Plaintiff asserted that it was unnecessary for the court to find defendant paid all
compensation due and owing on a motion to supplement, that defendant’s request amounted to an
admission it owed compensation since April 4, 2017, and that defendant’s motion served no
purpose where both parties previously submitted proposed orders to the court. Thus, plaintiff
requested that the court deny defendant’s motion to supplement the record.
¶ 30 On December 9, 2021, defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s objection. Defendant
asserted that plaintiff’s objection included multiple misstatements of defendant’s “positions and
arguments regarding the 50% of the left leg ($51,615.00) and interest owed.” Defendant claimed
it never conceded that it was liable for 50% of the left leg and any additional section 19(n) interest
awarded in the April 4, 2017, decision on remand. Defendant further claimed it never conceded
that it was liable for section 2-1303 interest at a rate of 9% per annum, “unless and until this
Honorable Court enters judgment on any unpaid amounts.” (Emphasis in original.) Defendant
clarified its position that only section 19(n) interest applied, and section 19(n) interest only applied
to unpaid PPD and medical benefits. Defendant maintained that the court’s August 6, 2021, order
required it to pay PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg ($51,615) and section 19(n) interest ($361.65)
11 from April 4, 2017, through December 3, 2021. Defendant claimed that it issued a check to plaintiff
for those amounts and, thus, it paid all compensation due and owing. Thus, defendant argued that
the court should dismiss plaintiff’s section 19(g) petition with prejudice “because there is nothing
to award Plaintiff in this 19(g) proceeding.”
¶ 31 On December 10, 2021, plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s response. Plaintiff alleged
that defendant was required to show it made full payment of the award prior to the filing of the
section 19(g) petition. Plaintiff asserted that defendant “agree[d] the award of 50% of a leg and
Section 19(n) interest was unpaid on March 8, 2021, the date the 19(g) Petition was filed.” Plaintiff
disagreed with defendant’s claim that it could avoid section 2-1303 interest by paying the unpaid
balance of the award at any time before the circuit court entered a final order on the petition.
¶ 32 On February 4, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on all pending matters. The court
entered an order allowing defendant time to respond to caselaw provided by plaintiff. The court
indicated that the matter would be taken under advisement after it received defendant’s response.
¶ 33 On February 18, 2022, the circuit court entered a written order that addressed all issues left
unresolved by the August 6, 2021, order. In the order, the court declined plaintiff’s request to
reconsider its ruling on the issue of penalties and sanctions. The court also declined plaintiff’s
request to reconsider its denial of the request to depose prior counsel for defendant. However, the
court reconsidered its prior ruling on the issue of interest and ordered defendant to pay plaintiff an
additional sum for interest, finding that plaintiff was entitled to section 2-1303 interest at a rate of
9% per annum on the unpaid portion of the award ($51,615) from the date of the Commission’s
April 4, 2017, decision to the date defendant made payment. The court also granted defendant’s
motion to supplement the record and found that defendant paid section 19(n) interest in the amount
of $361.65 on November 23, 2021. Accordingly, the court credited defendant the amount of
12 interest paid and ordered defendant to pay interest in the amount of $21,313.14 ($21,674.79 -
$361.65) within 30 days of the entry of the order. The court denied plaintiff’s request for attorney
fees and costs, finding a good-faith disagreement existed as to the amount owed.
¶ 34 On March 11, 2022, defendant filed a second motion to supplement the record. Defendant
alleged in the motion that it tendered a check to plaintiff in the amount of $23,023.12 on March 9,
2022, representing “9% interest on $51,615.00 from April 4, 2017, through March 18, 2022.”
Defendant indicated that it “need[ed] the record to reflect all the payments made to Plaintiff.”
¶ 35 On March 14, 2022, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s February 18,
2022, order. On March 17, 2022, defendant filed a notice of cross-appeal.
¶ 36 II. Analysis
¶ 37 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred by denying his requests for section
2-1303 interest on the total award, attorney fees, penalties, and to depose prior counsel for
defendant. On cross-appeal, defendant argues that the court erred by denying its section 2-619
motion to dismiss and granting the section 19(g) petition because it paid the full amount of the
Commission’s award. Defendant also argues that the court erred by ordering it to pay section 2-
1303 interest on the Commission’s award.
¶ 38 Because the issue is dispositive, we consider only whether the circuit court erred by
denying defendant’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss. Defendant maintains that the court
incorrectly ruled that it owed the additional PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg injury. Defendant
asserts that it paid plaintiff the full amount of the PPD benefits awarded for his left leg injury prior
to the filing of the section 19(g) petition. We agree.
¶ 39 This court reviews the circuit court’s ruling on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss de novo.
Patel, 2012 IL App (1st) 103217, ¶ 8 (citing Simmons v. Homatas, 236 Ill. 2d 459, 477 (2010)).
13 Our resolution of this issue also requires us to construe section 19(g) of the Act, which presents a
question of law subject to de novo review. Id. (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 386 Ill. App. 3d 522,
534 (2008)).
¶ 40 A section 2-619 motion to dismiss raises affirmative matters that negate a claim and does
not challenge the allegations set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Provenzale v.
Forister, 318 Ill. App. 3d 869, 878 (2001)). “This motion admits the legal sufficiency of a
complaint, but asserts affirmative matters that avoid or defeat the allegations contained in the
complaint.” Id. (citing Miner v. Fashion Enterprises, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 405, 413 (2003)).
¶ 41 Section 19(g) of the Act provides that “either party may present *** a certified copy of the
decision of the Commission when the same has become final, *** whereupon the court shall enter
a judgment in accordance therewith.” 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2020). “When an employer fails
or refuses to pay a final award, section 19(g) provides a statutory remedy for a claimant to reduce
the award to an enforceable judgment in the circuit court.” Estate of Burns, 2015 IL App (5th)
140503, ¶ 17 (citing Aurora East School District v. Dover, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1054 (2006)).
Section 19(g) is “designed to permit speedy entry of judgment on an award, and the requirements
for the court’s subject matter jurisdiction are strictly construed.” Aurora East School District, 363
Ill. App. 3d at 1055. The circuit court’s inquiry in such proceedings is limited to determining
whether the requirements of section 19(g) have been met. Ahlers v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 73 Ill. 2d
259, 268 (1978). The court cannot question the jurisdiction of the Commission, question the
legality of the Commission’s actions, review the Commission’s decision, or “otherwise construe
the Act, even if the decision appears too large on its face.” Aurora East School District, 363 Ill.
App. 3d at 1055. “The only defense to a section 19(g) petition is full payment of the final award.”
14 Dallas v. Ameren CIPS, 402 Ill. App. 3d 307, 312 (2010) (citing Aurora East School District, 363
Ill. App. 3d at 1055).
¶ 42 In the present case, the arbitrator issued a decision on March 24, 2011, denying plaintiff
benefits for his cervical spine injury but awarding him benefits for his left leg injury. The arbitrator
awarded plaintiff a total of $88,163.45, which included an award of PPD benefits in the amount of
$51,615. The arbitrator also ordered defendant to pay interest at a rate of 0.15% under section
19(n) of the Act. Defendant paid plaintiff $88,163.45 on April 19, 2011. The Commission
subsequently affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision. The circuit court thereafter reversed
the Commission’s decision and remanded the matter back to the Commission to award plaintiff
benefits for his cervical spine injury. The Commission ultimately issued a decision and opinion on
remand on April 4, 2017, awarding plaintiff benefits totaling $488,639.98. The Commission’s
decision awarded plaintiff $147,961.17 in medical expenses and $103,230 in PPD benefits for his
cervical spine injury, in addition to the $51,615 in PPD benefits for his left leg injury. The
Commission also ordered defendant to pay interest pursuant to section 19(n) of the Act, if any. In
June 2019, following an unsuccessful attempt to appeal the Commission’s decision and opinion
on remand, defendant paid plaintiff $442,078.76. Defendant paid plaintiff a total of $530,242.21
from April 19, 2011, to June 28, 2019.
¶ 43 Plaintiff filed a section 19(g) petition on March 8, 2021, alleging that defendant failed to
pay the full amount awarded by the Commission in its April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on
remand. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to pay $51,615 in PPD benefits for his
left leg injury, as well as interest at a rate of 9% per annum on the total award from September 9,
2015. Defendant filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, asserting that it tendered full payment of
the final award. Defendant claimed it paid plaintiff $88,163.45, which included the $51,615 in
15 PPD benefits, on April 19, 2011, after the arbitrator issued a decision on March 24, 2011.
Defendant further asserted that it overpaid interest under section 19(n) of the Act when it tendered
full payment of the award in June 2019.
¶ 44 After carefully reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the circuit court
erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the section 19(g) petition, where the record reveals
that defendant paid the full amount of the final award prior to the filing of the petition. As an initial
matter, we note that plaintiff did not allege in the section 19(g) petition that defendant failed to
pay section 19(n) interest. Plaintiff alleged only that defendant failed to pay $51,615 in PPD
benefits and requested section 2-1303 “interest at 9% on the total award from September 9, 2015.”
As plaintiff recognizes in his brief to this court, “[i]f the employer pays the full award and all 19(n)
interest to the claimant before the claimant files a section 19(g) petition, the employer does not
owe any interest under section 2-1303.” See Dobbs Tire & Auto v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation
Comm’n, 2018 IL App (5th) 160297WC. Because plaintiff did not allege that defendant failed to
pay section 19(n) interest, we consider only whether defendant failed to pay the $51,615 in PPD
benefits prior to the filing of the section 19(g) petition.
¶ 45 We again note, and plaintiff does not dispute, that defendant paid plaintiff $88,163.45 on
April 19, 2011, which included a sum of $51,615 for PPD benefits awarded for claimant’s left leg
injury. Despite this, plaintiff maintains that defendant failed to pay the full amount of the
Commission’s April 4, 2017, award. Although difficult to discern, plaintiff appears to assert that
defendant’s prior payment of PPD benefits pertained to the arbitrator’s March 24, 2011, decision
and did not pertain to the benefits awarded in the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and
opinion on remand. Plaintiff also appears to assert that defendant failed to properly raise the issue
16 of its prior payment as provided in section 19(f) of the Act and that it is precluded from raising the
issue in a section 19(g) proceeding. We disagree with plaintiff’s assertions.
¶ 46 We reject plaintiff’s claim that this case involves “two final awards.” As noted, the
arbitrator issued a decision on March 24, 2011, denying plaintiff benefits for his cervical spine
injury but awarding plaintiff benefits for his left leg injury, including an award of PPD benefits in
the amount of $51,615. Plaintiff filed a petition for review of the arbitrator’s decision with the
Commission; thus, the arbitrator’s decision was not a final decision. See 820 ILCS 305/19(b)
(West 2020) (providing that an arbitrator’s decision becomes the final decision of the Commission
unless a party files a petition for review within 30 days of receiving the arbitrator’s decision). The
Commission issued a decision affirming and adopting the arbitrator’s decision on February 2,
2012. Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the circuit court; thus, the
Commission’s February 2, 2012, decision was not a final decision. See id. § 19(f)(1) (providing
that the Commission’s decision becomes final and conclusive unless reviewed by the circuit court).
¶ 47 The circuit court entered an order on September 9, 2015, setting aside the Commission’s
decision and remanding the matter back to the Commission to award benefits for plaintiff’s
cervical spine injury. Defendant sought to appeal the court’s decision, but the workers’
compensation division of the appellate court dismissed the appeal because the circuit court’s order
remanding the matter back to the Commission was not a final and appealable order. See Pace Bus
Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1066 (2003) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction
where the circuit court’s order remanding the case back to the Commission was not a final,
appealable order). The Commission issued a decision and opinion on remand on April 4, 2017,
reversing its prior decision affirming and adopting the arbitrator’s March 24, 2011, decision in
accordance with the circuit court’s September 9, 2015, order. The Commission awarded plaintiff
17 benefits for his cervical spine injury, including PPD benefits, in accordance with the court’s order
in addition to the PPD benefits awarded for his left leg injury. The Commission’s April 4, 2017,
decision and opinion on remand became the sole final decision and award after defendant failed to
successfully appeal the decision as provided under section 19(f) of the Act. Thus, contrary to
plaintiff’s assertion, the present case involves only one final decision and award.
¶ 48 Next, we reject plaintiff’s assertion that he is entitled to a windfall on a technicality,
because defendant failed to properly address the issue of its prior payment before the Commission
and circuit court as required by section 19(f) of the Act. It appears from the record that defendant
did not raise an issue regarding its prior payment of benefits because both parties agreed that
defendant paid all benefits related to plaintiff’s left leg injury, and that the only remaining issues
related to plaintiff’s cervical spine injury. Notably, plaintiff’s petition for review filed with the
Commission indicated that he only sought review of the arbitrator’s denial of benefits for his
cervical spine injury. Moreover, counsel for plaintiff agreed that defendant paid all benefits
relating to plaintiff’s left leg injury at a subsequent hearing before the circuit court. Under these
circumstances, we find it proper to consider the payment defendant made prior to the issuance of
the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand.
¶ 49 We also reject plaintiff’s assertion that it was “unlawful” to raise the issue of whether
defendant paid all compensation due and owing under the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision
and opinion on remand before the circuit court or this court. Plaintiff’s assertion is premised upon
his distortion of defendant’s arguments. According to plaintiff, defendant’s argument that it made
a full payment of the award “seem[ed] to imply the Commission erred by awarding the same PPD
in the April 4, 2017, Remand Decision that the Arbitrator awarded in the March 24, 2011 decision.”
However, defendant did not argue that the Commission erred, it merely argued that it paid the full
18 amount awarded by the Commission—the sole defense to a section 19(g) petition. See Dallas, 402
Ill. App. 3d at 312 (“The only defense to a section 19(g) petition is full payment of the final
award.”).
¶ 50 We find the cases cited by plaintiff and the circuit court inapplicable to the present case.
See Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469 (1994) (holding that an employer cannot seek
to recover the amount of an overpayment of benefits by filing a claim under section 19(g) of the
Act); Patel, 2012 IL App (1st) 103217 (holding that an employer cannot apply credit for
overpayment of TTD benefits to avoid entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act);
Estate of Burns, 2015 IL App (5th) 140503 (holding that the employer was not entitled to offset
the amount of a federal claim against the state workers’ compensation benefits under section 19(g)
and that the employer was not entitled to offset the amount of the Commission’s award pursuant
to an alleged oral settlement agreement). In the instant case, defendant has not filed a section 19(g)
petition seeking to recover the amount of an overpayment, nor has it sought to apply credit for
overpayment of TTD benefits to avoid entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g). In addition,
defendant has not asserted that it is entitled to an offset for the amount of a federal claim or that it
is entitled to offset the amount of the Commission’s award pursuant to an oral settlement
agreement. Defendant instead asserts that it made full payment of the final award—a proper
defense to a section 19(g) proceeding—when it paid plaintiff $51,615 in PPD benefits for his left
leg injury. In our view, the caselaw does not prohibit consideration of this payment in determining
whether defendant made full payment of the final award in a section 19(g) proceeding.
Accordingly, we find it proper to consider the $51,615 payment defendant made to plaintiff on
April 19, 2011, in determining whether defendant made a full payment of the Commission’s final
award.
19 ¶ 51 We find our decision consistent with public policy and the purpose of the Act. Specifically,
the employee should not receive a windfall at the employer’s expense due to the employer’s
prompt payment of benefits. See Messamore v. Industrial Comm’n, 302 Ill. App. 3d 351, 359
(1999) (“In drafting the Act, the legislature was careful to protect injured workers and to encourage
employers to make prompt payments before the amount of liability is certain.”). Denying an
employer the ability to assert that it made payments of benefits prior to the issuance of a final
decision of the Commission in a section 19(g) proceeding would encourage delays as employers
attempt to resolve every ambiguity before paying benefits.
¶ 52 In sum, the record reveals that the Commission awarded plaintiff benefits totaling
$488,639.98 in its April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand. The record also reveals that
defendant paid plaintiff a total of $530,242.21 from April 19, 2011, to June 28, 2019. 4 Defendant’s
payments included a payment of $51,615 for PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg on April 19, 2011.
Plaintiff does not dispute that he received such payments from defendant prior to filing his section
19(g) petition. Thus, the record demonstrates that defendant tendered full payment of the final
award prior to the filing of the section 19(g) petition.
¶ 53 Because the record demonstrates that defendant tendered full payment of the final award
prior to the filing of the section 19(g) petition, we hold that the circuit court erred by denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition. It follows that the court should not have reached
the additional issues raised by the parties regarding section 2-1303 interest, attorney fees, and
penalties.
4 The record also reveals that defendant made additional payments to plaintiff during the section 19(g) proceedings. 20 ¶ 54 III. Conclusion
¶ 55 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the St. Clair County circuit court’s order denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss and vacate all orders entered by the court following its denial of the
motion to dismiss.
¶ 56 Reversed.