Reading Hardware Co. v. Commissioner

7 B.T.A. 337, 1927 BTA LEXIS 3198
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedJune 15, 1927
DocketDocket No. 5059.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 7 B.T.A. 337 (Reading Hardware Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reading Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 337, 1927 BTA LEXIS 3198 (bta 1927).

Opinions

[347]*347OBINION.

Littleton :

The errors assigned by the petitioner are:

(1) Failure to make proper adjustment in its invested capital for 1917, 1918, and 1919 on account of a “ loss on Keystone Hardware Co. stock ” which was taken by the petitioner as a deduction from gross income in 1916, but' not allowed by the Commissioner until 1918.

(2) Elimination of $500,000 for good will restored by a charge against capital stock instead of a charge against surplus in determining invested capital for 1917, 1918,1919, and 1920.

The Commissioner filed a plea in bar to the right of the petitioner to maintain this proceeding as to the year 1917 on the ground that [348]*348“ the adjustment in the tax liability lor the said year, against which the taxpayer appeals, is a refund and not a deficiency.”

The position of the Commissioner is well taken in so far as it applies to a consideration of the amount of refund which may be due for 1917. Appeal of Cornelius Cotton Mills, 4 B. T. A. 255. It should be noted, however, that the appeal comes before the Board on a notice of deficiencies for 1918 and 1920 and the major item on account of which the appeal is taken carries through for all years. Section 274(g), Revenue Act of 1926 provides:

The Board in redetermining a deficiency in respect of any taxable year shall consider such facts with relation to the taxes for other taxable’ years as may be necessary correctly to redetermine the amount of such deficiency, but in so doing shall have no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the tax for any other taxable year has been overpaid or underpaid.

We said in the Appeal of Cornelius Cotton Mills, supra:

In determining the correct amount of the deficiency, we may consider such facts with relation to taxes for other taxable years as may be necessary correctly to redetermine the amount of the deficiency involved; for example, in determining the invested capital for the year for which the deficiency against a corporation has been determined, we may determine what was the tax liability during a preceding year.

The plea of the Commissioner is, therefore, overruled in so far as a consideration of 1917 may be necessary for a correct determination of the deficiencies for 1918 and 1920.

At the hearing the petitioner and respondent filed a Joint Exhibit marked “ Exhibit A” in which they agreed as to the adjustment which should be made on account of the first error assigned above, and therefore this point will not be considered further.

Before considering the other point raised, we find it necessary to go beyond the pleadings and consider the real issue in the case, an issue not raised either in the petition or in the answer by the Commissioner, but one on account of which almost the entire evidence was presented and one which is fundamental in a determination of the petitioner’s invested capital, viz., the amount of the surplus or deficit at the time good will was increased by $500,000, which, in turn, involves the effect on invested capital of a financial reorganization in 1911.

The facts relative to what took place in 1911 are quite complicated and the evidence with respect thereto is not very clear. We are handicapped in the first instance by the failure of the petitioner to submit the original plan of reorganization, and we have had to rely on the amendments to the original plan and secondary evidence presented to show what was agreed as the complete plan of bringing the four allied companies together. Further, the evidence is incomplete [349]*349in many particulars which would have been helpful in tracing the detailed steps in the consummation of the plan.

Petitioner’s counsel states in his brief filed after the hearing, with respect to the additional point which we find it necessary to consider, as follows:

The invested capital of the taxpayer for the year 1917 and subsequent years must be based on the amount of capital stock of Reading Hardware Company issued by it under the reorganization plan effected in 1911, subject only to proper additions and deductions for later years.

In this we can not concur. The above position is evidently based upon the proposition that there was such a change of status of the allied corporations in 1911 that it would be considered that their assets were paid in to the petitioner at this time as contemplated by section 207, Revenue Act of 1917 and section 326, Revenue Act of 1918. In 1911 there was a revaluation of the assets of the petitioner, the Keystone Company and such assets of the Brass Company as had been taken from that plant and intermingled with the assets of the petitioner. On the basis of the surplus which was shown by setting up this valuation on the books of the petitioner and by setting up certain securities which came to the petitioner through the financial reorganization plan of July 1, 1910, as modified by the amended plan dated May 1, 1911, a stock dividend was declared on September 26, 1911, of $897,000, par value of common stock of the petitioner, wdiich, together with the capital stock already outstanding and the surplus remaining after the declaration of the stock dividend, the petitioner contends should be the starting point for invested capital purposes.

Before considering the question of the correctness of the valuation on which petitioner’s invested capital is based, we must determine whether there was a basis for such valuation in 1911, i. e., whether the assets of the allied companies on which the valuations were placed can be considered as having been “ paid in ” in 1911 as contemplated by the provisions of the statutes heretofore referred to.

In the first place, were the assets which were owned by the petitioner prior to 1911 again paid in to the petitioner in 1917? The question answers itself in the negative when we consider that the corporation with which we are here dealing is the same legal entity which came into being in 1886, and its legal existence was not changed in the slightest by what took place in 1911 and 1912. It has the same charter in the taxable years under consideration with which it began business in 1886. There were changes in stock ownership during the period of its existence, but this did not affect the ownership of its assets. That the ownership of stock and ownership of assets are not identical and that changes of ownership in stock may [350]*350occur without affecting the ownership of the assets has been so long recognized that it hardly admits of questioning. See United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156; Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U. S. 176; and Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134.

In Appeal of Regal Shoe Co., 1 B. T. A. 896, the Board said:

We need not dwell upon tlie well recognized distinction between a corporation and its stockholders, nor repeat what so frequently has been said to the effect that the ownership by a corporation is not the ownership of its stockholders, and that the rights and liabilities of the former are separate from those of the latter.

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Related

Guantanamo Sugar Co. v. Helvering
85 F.2d 252 (D.C. Circuit, 1936)
Reading Hardware Co. v. Commissioner
7 B.T.A. 337 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1927)

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Bluebook (online)
7 B.T.A. 337, 1927 BTA LEXIS 3198, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reading-hardware-co-v-commissioner-bta-1927.