RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided December 4, 2015·No. 05-13-00948-CV·Published

Opinion

REVERSE and RENDER; and Opinion Filed December 4, 2015.

Court of Appeals

S In The

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-13-00948-CV

RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC, Appellant V.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., Appellee

On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-11-02034-D

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Evans, Brown, and Schenck 1 Opinion by Justice Brown

This dispute concerns an alleged 2001 oral contract in which RBC Capital Markets, LLC agreed to sell Highland Capital Management, LP seven promissory notes (“Notes”) having an aggregate face value of $45.4 million for 52 ½ cents on the dollar. Highland sued RBC for breach of contract asserting it reneged on its promise to sell Highland the Notes. Highland asserted it suffered $21.5 million in benefit of the bargain damages because the value of the Notes was their full face value.

The Notes were securities under New York law, which is also the law the parties agree we must apply in determining whether a contract existed. To show the contract existed,

1 The Honorable Justice David J. Schenck succeeded Justice Michael O’Neill, a member of the original panel, following Justice O'Neill's retirement. Justice Schenck has reviewed the briefs and record before the Court.

Highland relied on evidence that the parties agreed to the price in which they would exchange the Notes, thereby agreeing to “price and principal,” 2 which constitutes a securities trade, obligating RBC to deliver the Notes to Highland.

At the time of the agreement, RBC did not own the Notes, but was acting as an intermediary negotiating Highland’s acquisition from the owners. If successful, RBC would purchase the Notes from the owners and sell them to Highland. However, after Highland and RBC reached an agreement on price and principal, the owners of the Notes refused to sell them. Consequently, the trade never closed or settled. Shortly thereafter, the owners were paid the full face value of the Notes. Highland subsequently sued RBC seeking to recover the difference between the agreed upon sales price and the full face value of the Notes. Following a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Highland, awarding it over $21.5 million in actual damages plus prejudgment interest. On appeal, RBC asserts Highland failed to show a contract existed because Highland’s agreement to purchase the Notes was subject to other terms and conditions that had not occurred and remained to be negotiated. 3 RBC also asserts no contract was formed because the parties did not intend to be bound to an oral agreement. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment that Highland take nothing.

Background

In 2000, the McNaughton Apparel Group, Inc. delivered eight subordinate promissory notes with an aggregate face value of $69 million to Leonard Schneider and his three children for monies owed in connection with its acquisition of the Schneiders’ apparel business. The Notes

2 The agreement as to “price and principal” was also referred to as an agreement as to “price and size,” size meaning $45.4 million, the aggregate face value of the seven notes. Because the agreement was made in reference to seven discrete notes, we will use the phrase “price and principal,” understanding that by agreeing to principal, the parties agreed to size.

3 RBC raises four other issues, which we need not reach, complaining Highland presented no evidence of damages, Highland’s suit is barred by limitations, the trial court’s erroneous evidentiary rulings misled the jury, and the suit should have been abated.

were subordinate to McNaughton’s senior debt, which was substantial. In January 2001, the Schneiders retained Glen Rauch Securities to market the Notes, which were considered high- yield debt securities. Unable to locate a buyer on its own, Rauch enlisted the assistance of RBC, a securities broker-dealer that trades such securities over the counter on the secondary market.

RBC agreed to market the Notes, intending to act as a riskless principal. Specifically, if RBC found a willing buyer, it would purchase the Notes from the Schneiders and immediately thereafter resell them to the buyer for a slightly higher price, earning the spread between the two prices.

One of RBC’s clients, Highland, was already familiar with McNaughton, and expressed interest in the Notes. Beginning in January 2001, Highland discussed pricing and other conditions it would require if it purchased the Notes. Recordings of these discussions were presented in evidence. These recordings show that Highland notified RBC from the outset that any of its bids would be subject to various conditions due to the nature of the securities at issue, which were unique seller notes. Specifically, Highland informed RBC it would only bid on the Notes if it received representations from the Schneiders, and a specific written representation from McNaughton that there were no side letters concerning the Notes.

Because Highland would only purchase the Notes on certain conditions, it told RBC it could give a “subject to” bid, but suggested RBC first run it by the Schneider family to see if they would be willing to move forward on that basis. RBC responded it had already done so and that Highland’s conditions were worthy of discussion and further pursuance.

According to Highland, on March 12, it made a firm oral bid to purchase the Notes, which RBC orally accepted on March 14. By the time of trial, twelve years later, the individuals who made these communications had little independent memory of them. However, recorded calls show the parties’ negotiations between these dates.

To show it made a firm bid to purchase the Notes, Highland relies on a March 12 call.

On that call, Highland did not state it was making a firm bid or mention how many of the Notes it was bidding on. Instead, that call was devoted almost entirely to Highland communicating the conditions of its bid. Specifically, Highland began the conversation stating if they were to be finished at the 52 1/2 level, it would be subject to docs and reps, meaning that the trade would be documented and Highland would require representations and warranties about the Notes. Highland told RBC it did not know how many representations it would be, but they would include one from McNaughton.

Evidence at trial showed that the documentation the parties were referencing included a written trade confirmation. Highland also told RBC on that call it wanted language in the documents providing the trade would settle within ten days of reaching an agreement and for some sort of penalty if either side was dragging their feet. After RBC indicated it would take ninety plus days to settle, Highland explained it needed to settle quickly because it had reporting deadlines to meet.

On another call later that day, Highland told RBC it was already working with its lawyer on the documentation. Highland asked RBC, assuming they agreed on price and the various outs Highland had already mentioned, what RBC’s thoughts were on the appropriate way to document the transaction. They both agreed the documentation would not be standard and Highland would need to craft something to reflect all of its various concerns.

When the Schneiders had not yet responded to Highland’s offer by the following day, Highland told RBC that if the punitive language became a stumbling block to getting some answer that day, Highland would be willing to listen to the Schneiders’ or RBC’s suggestions as to some sort of general settlement.

On the afternoon of March 14, RBC called Highland and they again discussed the deal.

At the time of that call, both Highland and RBC acknowledged they were all in agreement on price. Nevertheless, RBC told Highland the Schneiders still wanted to talk to their lawyer before committing. RBC also told Highland that it believed that “subject to just about everything . . . they could imagine,” they would have a trade.

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RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).

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