Razo-Elizarraras v. Warden, FCC Beaumont Medium

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 15, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-00254
StatusUnknown

This text of Razo-Elizarraras v. Warden, FCC Beaumont Medium (Razo-Elizarraras v. Warden, FCC Beaumont Medium) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Razo-Elizarraras v. Warden, FCC Beaumont Medium, (E.D. Tex. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS BEAUMONT DIVISION GABRIEL RAZO-ELIZARRARAS § VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-cv-254 WARDEN, FCI BEAUMONT MEDIUM § REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Petitioner Gabriel Razo-Elizarraras, an inmate confined at the Federal Correctional Complex located in Beaumont, Texas, filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The above-styled action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the case. The Petition Petitioner brings this Petition challenging the BOP’s decision not to award him credit toward his sentence for time spent in the custody of the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) between September 19, 2019 and December 17, 2020. Alternatively, petitioner subsequently suggested that the timeframe should be July 27, 2019 through May 6, 2020. Petitioner also contends that the BOP should have designated a state facility, nunc pro tunc, as his official detention facility at which his federal sentence was to be served. The Response The Respondent was ordered to show cause why relief should not be granted. In response, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 10). The Respondent moves to dismiss the petition based on Petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies related to the claims which form the basis of his petition, the sentence is not correctly computed, and Petitioner’s claim for nunc pro tunc designation is now moot. Standard of Review Failure to State a Claim A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the factual allegations are not sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when the petitioner has failed to plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570). Petitioners must state enough facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570. In considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, all factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed favorably to the petitioner. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). However, conclusory allegations will not suffice to prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim. Id. Summary Judgment Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Instone Travel Tech Marine & Offshore v. Int’l Shipping Partners, 334 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2003). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Instone Travel Tech, 334 F.3d at 427. The party seeking summary judgment carries the initial burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 2003). “Before the non-moving party is required to produce evidence in opposition to the motion, the moving party must first satisfy its 2 obligation of demonstrating that there are no factual issues warranting trial.” Commander v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 978 F.2d 924, 927 n.4 (5th Cir. 1992). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the non-movant must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586- 87 (1986); Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2003). Because summary judgment is a final adjudication on the merits, courts must employ the device cautiously. Hulsey v. State of Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1991); Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986). In prisoner pro se cases, courts must be careful to “guard against premature truncation of legitimate lawsuits merely because of unskilled presentations.” Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1241 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Murrell v. Bennett, 615 F.2d 306, 311 (5th Cir. 1980)). Analysis Exhaustion Generally, a federal prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Skinner v. Wiley, 355 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1036 (2004); Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993). The exhaustion requirement applies to the computation of sentence credit awards. See, e.g. United States v. Gabor, 905 F.2d 76, 78 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990); Rodriguez v. Lamar, 60 F.3d 745, 747 (11th Cir. 1995).

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Related

Rourke v. Thompson
11 F.3d 47 (Fifth Circuit, 1993)
Fuller v. Rich
11 F.3d 61 (Fifth Circuit, 1994)
Malacara v. Garber
353 F.3d 393 (Fifth Circuit, 2003)
Skinner v. Wiley
355 F.3d 1293 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Darrell Jackson v. Warden Burl Cain
864 F.2d 1235 (Fifth Circuit, 1989)
United States v. Jean Paul Gabor
905 F.2d 76 (Fifth Circuit, 1990)
James Skip Hulsey v. State of Texas
929 F.2d 168 (Fifth Circuit, 1991)
Angel Cintron Rodriguez v. J.D. Lamer
60 F.3d 745 (Eleventh Circuit, 1995)

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Razo-Elizarraras v. Warden, FCC Beaumont Medium, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/razo-elizarraras-v-warden-fcc-beaumont-medium-txed-2024.