Raysor v. Police Officer Troy Ann Safi

E.D. New York

Raysor v. Police Officer Troy Ann Safi

District Court, E.D. New York·Decided January 30, 2020·No. 1:19-cv-06265·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------------- FTEMA RAYSOR,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER 19-CV-6265 (PKC)(VMS) - against -

CITY OF NEW YORK; POLICE OFFICERS TROY ANN SAFI, SORELY NUNEZ, and MICHAEL GARGANO; POLICE OFFICERS UNKNOWN; and KIESHA MUMPREY,

Defendants. -------------------------------------------------------------- PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action against the City of New York (the “City”) and Police Officers Safi, Nunez, and Gargano, alleging a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights and a federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242. By Order dated November 20, 2019, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint because it failed to state a plausible claim for relief, but granted Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her Complaint to raise a plausible § 1983 claim. Plaintiff now files an Amended Complaint that names two additional defendants, Kiesha Mumprey and “Police Officers Unknown.” For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. However, Plaintiff is granted one final opportunity to submit a second amended complaint. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s statement of claim in her Complaint reads, in full:

November 2, 2017 at Brooklyn Borough Hall Loss of Liberty, confinement, serious personal and bodily injuries, mental anguish and emotional distress, and loss of earnings. As a result of the foregoing, Claimant has necessarily been caused out of pocket expenses including loss of earnings. (18 U.S.C. § 242) 14th Amendment, police brutality; misconduct, unreasonable search & seizure, sexual misconduct. (Complaint, Dkt. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff’s requested remedy was “one hundred million dollars for lost wages due to psychological disability expen[s]es.” (Id. at 6.) The Amended Complaint states that the events giving rise to her claim occurred at Brooklyn Borough Hall on November 2, 2017, at “approximately 9 a.m.” The statement of the facts underlying her claim, in its entirety, reads: I was handled in result of mis conduct by defendant. This is the different element a tape is needed from result of mistrail with settlement offer and other witnesses and facts. Yes and identies not known based on not having access to evidence. Witness and stectnology which is being held based on mistrail.

(Amended Complaint, Dkt. 7, at 5 (all spelling and grammatical errors in original).) Plaintiff’s requested remedy is “one hundred million for [royalties] from brand neglect due to action of event on November 2, 2017.” (Id. at 6.) STANDARD OF REVIEW A pleading must provide “a short, plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To avoid dismissal, such a statement must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim will be considered plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Similarly, a complaint is insufficient to state a claim “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A district court shall also dismiss an in forma pauperis action if the action: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “[A] pro se plaintiff is not exempt from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” McCrary v. County of Nassau, 493 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.36 (1975)). At the same time, “document[s] filed pro se [are] to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). If a liberal reading of a pro se complaint “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,” a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). “When a complaint does not comply with the [Rule 8] requirement that it be short and plain, the court has the power, on its own initiative or in response to a motion by the defendant, to strike any portions that are redundant or immaterial, or to dismiss the complaint.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo,

861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). The Second Circuit has “repeatedly emphasized that Rule 8 reflects ‘liberal pleading standards,’ simply requiring plaintiffs to ‘disclose sufficient information to permit the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.’” Riles v. Semple, 763 F. App’x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (quoting Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000)). However, the Second Circuit has noted that dismissal of claims is “usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42. DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, like her original Complaint, does not satisfy Rule 8 and does not plead sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. While Plaintiff lists municipal employees as defendants and identifies a municipal building as the location where the events giving rise to her claim allegedly occurred,

the Court is unable to discern the substance of these claims even with a liberal eye and broad construction. Despite alleging that an incident occurred on November 2, 2017, at Brooklyn’s Borough Hall, the Amended Complaint still fails to “disclose sufficient information to permit the defendant[s] ‘to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a basis for recovery.’” Kittay, 230 F.3d at 541 (quoting Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991)). Indeed, the Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations regarding what happened during the alleged incident on November 2, 2017 or who was involved in that incident.

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