Raymond v. Hodgson

Appellate Court of Illinois

Raymond v. Hodgson

55 Ill. App. 423, 1894 Ill. App. LEXIS 443

DecidedDecember 6, 1894

StatusPublished

This text of 55 Ill. App. 423 (Raymond v. Hodgson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Raymond v. Hodgson, 55 Ill. App. 423, 1894 Ill. App. LEXIS 443 (Ill. Ct. App. 1894).

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Opinion

Mr. Justice Gary

delivered the opinion of -the Court.

September 1, 1891, the appellee demised a house to one Chapman, for a term ending April 30, 1894, and the appellant guaranteed to the appellee the performance of all covenants by the lessee, payment of rent and all, in the amplest form.

The lessee abandoned the premises, and the appellee gave to the appellant permission to sub-let (which the original lease prohibited unless with the written consent of the appellee) “ not, however, in any manner releasing or intending to release you (the appellant) as to your (appellant’s) obligation under said lease and guarantee.”

Rent being due and unpaid upon the original lease, the appellee has sued the appellant for it and recovered. We are now presented with some very abstruse arguments to convince us that the clear unmistakable intention of the parties should not be carried into effect. Since the Supreme Court, in 150 Ill. 150, affirmed the decision made by the majority of this court, in Kew v. Trainor, 50 Ill. App. 629,1 am more ready to concur with them that the intention of the parties should govern in construing their contracts, and therefore to affirm this judgment.

The technical matters assigned for error do not appear on the abstract and we will not go to the record to see if they appear there. Magner v. Trumbull, 33 Ill. App. 646. The judgment is affirmed.

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Mr. Justice Gary

delivered the opinion of -the Court.

September 1, 1891, the appellee demised a house to one Chapman, for a term ending April 30, 1894, and the appellant guaranteed to the appellee the performance of all covenants by the lessee, payment of rent and all, in the amplest form.

The lessee abandoned the premises, and the appellee gave to the appellant permission to sub-let (which the original lease prohibited unless with the written consent of the appellee) “ not, however, in any manner releasing or intending to release you (the appellant) as to your (appellant’s) obligation under said lease and guarantee.”

Rent being due and unpaid upon the original lease, the appellee has sued the appellant for it and recovered. We are now presented with some very abstruse arguments to convince us that the clear unmistakable intention of the parties should not be carried into effect. Since the Supreme Court, in 150 Ill. 150, affirmed the decision made by the majority of this court, in Kew v. Trainor, 50 Ill. App. 629,1 am more ready to concur with them that the intention of the parties should govern in construing their contracts, and therefore to affirm this judgment.

The technical matters assigned for error do not appear on the abstract and we will not go to the record to see if they appear there. Magner v. Trumbull, 33 Ill. App. 646. The judgment is affirmed.

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55 Ill. App. 423, 1894 Ill. App. LEXIS 443, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raymond-v-hodgson-illappct-1894.

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