Raymond Pitsick-Perez, on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public v. Southwest Airlines Co.; and Does 1-100

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03000
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 25-cv-03000-DMS-BLM RAYMOND PITSICK-PEREZ, on behalf

12 of himself, all others similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S and on behalf of the general public, 13 MOTION TO REMAND Plaintiffs, 14 v. [ECF No. 8] 15 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.; and 16 DOES 1-100, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand this case to San Diego 20 County Superior Court (“State Court”). (Mot., ECF No. 8.) Defendant filed a response in 21 opposition, (Opp’n, ECF No. 13), and Defendant filed a reply. (Reply, ECF No. 15.) The 22 matter is suitable for resolution without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 23 7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 16.) For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to 24 remand. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff originally filed this action in State Court on August 1, 2025, (Notice of 27 Removal, ECF No. 1, at 1, 6), alleging violations of California’s Private Attorney General 28 Act (“PAGA”), Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq., for failure to (1) pay regular rate wages for 1 all work performed; (2) pay wages due at termination and during employment; (3) comply 2 with itemized employee wage statements; and (4) pay employees two times per month. 3 (Id., Ex. 1, at 1.) On November 5, 2025, Defendant removed the case to federal court 4 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff now moves for remand 5 to State Court. 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power 8 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A suit filed in state court may be removed 10 to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit, based 11 on federal question or diversity of citizenship of the parties and an amount in controversy 12 that exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a), 1441(a). An action may be 13 removed based on diversity jurisdiction only where there is complete diversity between the 14 parties. See Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009). “If at any 15 time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 16 the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies 17 outside [the] limited jurisdiction [of the federal courts] and the burden of establishing the 18 contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (quoting 19 Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006)). “The ‘strong 20 presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden 21 of establishing that removal is proper,’ and that the [district] court resolves all ambiguity 22 in favor of remand to state court.” Id. (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th 23 Cir. 1992) (per curiam)). 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 A state-court action can be removed on diversity grounds only where there is 26 complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 27 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a). Defendant has met its burden of showing the parties are 28 diverse. Plaintiff is a resident and citizen of California, (Notice of Removal 8–9), 1 Defendant is incorporated in Texas with its principal place of business in Texas, (id. at 9), 2 and Doe Defendant citizenship is disregarded when determining removal jurisdiction. 28 3 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1). Therefore, complete diversity exists. 4 However, Defendant fails to meet its burden of showing the requisite amount in 5 controversy. Courts evaluate diversity jurisdiction, including the amount in controversy, 6 at the time of removal. Kenneth Rothschild Tr. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F. 7 Supp. 2d 993, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2002). “A court must assume that the allegations of the 8 complaint are true and assume that a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims 9 made in the complaint.” Id. at 1001 (citation modified) (citation omitted). “The failure of 10 the Complaint to specify the total amount of damages or other monetary relief sought by 11 Plaintiff does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction.” (Notice of Removal 10); Saulic v. 12 Symantec Corp., No. SA-CV-07-610, 2007 WL 5074883, *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2007). 13 “When the plaintiff’s complaint does not state the amount in controversy, the defendant’s 14 notice of removal may do so.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 15 U.S. 81, 84 (2014). “[W]hen a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the defendant’s 16 amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff 17 or questioned by the court.” Lindsey v. WC Logistics, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 3d 983, 991 (N.D. 18 Cal. 2022) (quoting Dart Cherokee Basin, 574 U.S. at 87). But if a plaintiff contests the 19 allegations, “both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the 20 evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. (quoting 21 Dart Cherokee Basin, 574 U.S. at 88). 22 Here, the Complaint does not specify a total damages sum. Defendant argues the 23 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, based on the following calculations: 24 Basis Amount in Controversy 25 Attorneys’ Fees Through Trial Exceeds $100,000 26 PAGA Penalties—Failure to Pay Straight $6,100 ($100 initial violation + ($200 27 Wages subsequent violations * 30 pay periods)) 28 1 PAGA Penalties—Failure to Pay Wages $6,100 ($100 initial violation + ($200 Upon Termination subsequent violations * 30 pay periods)) 2 PAGA Penalties—Failure to Provide $3,600 (($100 initial violation * 31 pay 3 Accurate Wage Statements and Payroll periods) + $500) Records 4 PAGA Penalties—Failure to Pay Wages $6,100 ($100 initial violation + ($200 5 Twice per Month subsequent violations * 30 pay periods)) 6 Total Exceeds $121,900 7 8 (Notice of Removal 12–15). In its Opposition, (Opp’n 8), Defendant changes the 9 calculation of the amount in controversy as follows: 10 Basis Amount in Controversy 11 Attorneys’ Fees Through Trial $88,125 12 PAGA Penalties—Failure to Pay Straight $7,100 ($100 initial violation + ($200 13 Wages subsequent violations * 35 pay periods)) PAGA Penalties—Failure to Pay Wages $7,100 ($100 initial violation + ($200 14 Upon Termination subsequent violations * 35 pay periods)) 15 PAGA Penalties—Failure to Provide $4,100 (($100 initial violation * 36 pay Accurate Wage Statements and Payroll 16 periods) + $500) Records 17 PAGA Penalties—Failure to Pay Wages $7,100 ($100 initial violation + ($200 18 Twice per Month subsequent violations * 35 pay periods)) Plaintiff’s Service Award $12,500 19 20 Total $126,025 21 22 “The amount in controversy includes the amount of damages in dispute, as well as 23 attorney’s fees, if authorized by statute or contract.” Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 24 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005). PAGA provides that “[a]ny employee who prevails in any action 25 shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(k)(1). 26 Plaintiff argues this Court should calculate attorneys’ fees by utilizing a percentage 27 method and points to several district courts in PAGA cases that calculate attorneys’ fees at 28 25 percent of the plaintiff’s individual PAGA penalties. (Mot. 15); see, e.g., Evers v. La- 1 Z-Boy Inc., No. 22CV578, 2022 WL 4379311, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2022); Coffin v. 2 Magellan HRSC, Inc., No. 19-CV-2047, 2020 WL 773255, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020); 3 Mendoza v. Movement Mortg., LLC, No. 24-CV-03479, 2025 WL 1646897, at *5 (E.D. 4 Cal. June 11, 2025). Defendant argues that because PAGA is a fee-shifting statute, the 5 Court must utilize the lodestar method. (Opp’n 10); Cacon v. Litke, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214, 6 233 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting the California Supreme Court has “reaffirmed the primacy of 7 the lodestar method for all fee-shifting statutes”); Steenhuyse v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 317 8 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (holding PAGA’s fee-shifting statute requires a 9 lodestar calculation when determining attorneys’ fees). Other courts exercise “discretion 10 to choose between the lodestar and percentage method in calculating fees.” Evers, 2022 11 WL 4379311, at *3 (citing In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 992 12 (9th Cir. 2010)). Regardless of the method used, Defendant fails to meet its burden. 13 A. Lodestar Method 14 “The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing 15 party reasonably expended on the litigation (as supported by adequate documentation) by 16 a reasonable hourly rate for the region and for the experience of the lawyer.” In re 17 Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations 18 omitted). Defendant argues that, when applying an estimate of 150 hours at rates of $650 19 and $525 per hour (assuming a 50/50 split of hours between the rates), the request for 20 attorneys’ fees amounts to $88,125. (Opp’n 11–12.) Plaintiff argues that “only Plaintiff’s 21 pro-rata share of the attorney’s fees is attributable to the amount in controversy.” (Mot. 15 22 (citing Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d 845, 850 n.2 (9th Cir. 2020) and Cohen 23 v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-00770, 2025 WL 1860286, at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 24 2025)).) Even so, Defendant argues: (1) courts have recognized that an attorney handling 25 an individual wage and hour case “typically spends far more than 100 hours on the case[,]” 26 and (2) Plaintiff’s counsel, David Mara, previously submitted a declaration in Los Angeles 27 Superior Court, stating that he and associate Matthew Crawford spent a total of 156 hours 28 litigating a wage and hour case (82 and 74 hours), at rates of $800 and $600 per hour, 1 respectively. (Opp’n 11–12; id., Decl. of Andrew B. Dizon in Supp. of Opp’n (“Dizon 2 Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. A, at 15–16.) Defendant argues that applying a “conservative estimate of 3 150 hours associated with litigating Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim,” and “reduced 4 rates” of $650 and $525 per hour (derived from Ott v. Cooper Interconnect, Inc. A Corp., 5 No. 2:23-cv-04501, 2023 WL 5530028, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2023)), the request for 6 fees amounts to $88,125.1 (Opp’n 11–12.) The Court does not find these arguments 7 persuasive. 8 First, Mr. Mara’s declaration was submitted in support of a motion for approval of a 9 PAGA settlement. (Id., Dizon Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A, at 6.) Many of the tasks Mr. Mara includes 10 when determining the hours spent litigating the case were undoubtedly performed on behalf 11 of the entire PAGA class, such as “revising mediation brief and mediation damage and 12 exposure model”; “review[ing] and revis[ing] the settlement agreement and the notice to 13 the aggrieved employees”; “reviewing and revising PAGA settlement approval motion and 14 supporting papers”; and “review[ing] Settlement Administrator’s declaration.” (Id., Dizon 15 Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A, at 15–16.) Thus, Mr. Mara’s declaration alone is insufficient to prove the 16 attorneys’ fees amount to $88,125 for Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim. 17 Defendant also argues that counsel in an individual wage and hour case “typically 18 spends far more than 100 hours on the case[,]” citing Swans v. Fieldworks, LLC, No. 19 22CV07250, 2023 WL 196918, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2023) (emphasis added); see also 20 Hernandez v. Aramark Food & Support Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-CV-03633, 2020 WL 21 5496172, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2020) (similar); Lippold v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 22 No. C 10-00421, 2010 WL 1526441, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2010) (similar). However, 23 those cases are distinguishable from the present case. Swans involved “nine causes of 24 action alleging a wide range of wage and hour violations.” Swans, 2023 WL 196918, at 25 *1. Similarly, Hernandez involved eight causes of action, including failure to pay 26

27 1 Defendant assumes a 50/50 split of hours between Messrs. Mara and Crawford based on representations 28 1 overtime, provide meal and rest breaks, and reimburse necessary business expenses—all 2 separate and distinct Labor Code violations. See Hernandez, 2020 WL 5496172, at *1. 3 And, Lippold involved eight causes of action, including unpaid overtime, meal and rest 4 break violations, and failure to timely pay wages during employment and upon 5 termination.2 In contrast, Plaintiff argues the “the issues in this case are incredibly narrow” 6 in that “[t]he case centers on whether Defendant was required to pay for time aggrieved 7 employees spent waiting for and taking the shuttle to and from a remote parking lot,” and 8 the three remaining claims are derivative. (Reply 5.) Defendant does not sufficiently show, 9 either through the cited cases or other evidence, that the circumstances of this case are such 10 that this is the “typical” individual wage and hour action that requires 150 hours or more 11 of work. Because the Court must “resolve all ambiguity in favor of remand,” Hunter, 582 12 F.3d at 1042, Defendant has failed to show a Lodestar attorneys’ fees calculation in this 13 case would approximate $88,125. 14 B. 25% Benchmark 15 When determining the amount in controversy in a PAGA case, the percentage 16 method calculates attorneys’ fees by taking 25% of the total potential liabilities for PAGA 17 penalties. See Coffin, 2020 WL 773255, at *5–6. Even using Defendant’s highest civil 18 penalty estimate of $25,400, the amount in controversy with attorneys’ fees would be 19 $31,750 ($25,400 for Defendant’s penalty estimation + $6,350 for attorney’s fees (i.e., 25% 20 of $25,400) = $31,750).3 (Reply 4.) This falls well short of the $75,000 threshold. 21 22 23

24 25 2 Lippold also attributed all of the attorneys’ fees, for individual and class-wide damages, to the named plaintiff alone. See Mitchell v. Grubhub Inc., No. CV1505465, 2015 WL 5096420, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26 28, 2015) (finding the defendant’s reliance on Lippold unpersuasive when calculating attorneys’ fees to determine the amount in controversy). 27 3 Even considering Plaintiff’s representative service award—which Plaintiff disputes applies—the amount 28 1 Regardless of the method used for calculating attorneys’ fees, Defendant has not met 2 ||its burden of establishing the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. 3 || The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to remand and 6 || REMANDS this action to the State Court. 7 || Dated: January 15, 2026 2» 8 Jn Yn « 9 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28