Raymond P. Zajac and Helen Ann Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul

909 F.2d 1181, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12932, 1990 WL 106743

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: July 31, 1990
• Docket: 88-5353ND
• Status: Published

Opinions

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

Raymond P. and Helen Ann Zajac appeal from a district court order dismissing their lawsuit against the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul (the Bank) to enforce borrowers’ rights provisions of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 (the Act). See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2202-2202a (1988). In Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 878 F.2d 1172, 1173 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied,—U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 867, 107 L.Ed.2d 951 (1990), the Ninth Circuit held the Act does not provide an implied private right of action for farmer-borrowers. After the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in Harper, the Tenth Circuit embraced the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Griffin v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 902 F.2d 22, 24 (10th Cir.1990). We now join in the holdings of Harper and Griffin and affirm the decision of the district court.

The Zajacs contend the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 implies a private right of action permitting them to enforce the Act’s borrowers’ rights provisions. The Zajacs correctly recognize that, “[i]n implied right of action cases, we employ the [tests announced in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), ] to determine ‘whether Congress intended to create [a] private remedy.’ ” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n,—U.S.-,n. 9, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 2517 n. 9, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990) (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15, 100 S.Ct. 242, 245, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979)). Since the Ninth Circuit in Harper also recognized Cort as controlling, 878 F.2d at 1174, we consider the Zajacs’ contention in the framework of the Harper decision.

The Zajacs first argue farmer-borrowers comprise a class “ ‘for whose especial benefit the [Act] was enacted.’ ” Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088 (emphasis and quoted citation omitted). Although the Bank conceded at oral argument that farmer-borrowers represent a class intended to benefit from the Act, the Ninth Circuit has concluded Congress addressed the Act primarily to the financial crisis in the Farm Credit System, Harper, 878 F.2d at 1174-75. We need not decide which of these views should prevail because the Zajacs cannot make the other showings required by Cort. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 388, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1844, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982) (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1783, 68 L.Ed.2d 101 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).

The Zajacs next argue the Act’s legislative history supports an implied private right of action even though “an express private right of action was proposed in both houses of Congress,” Harper, 878 F.2d at 1176, and the conference committee considering the House and Senate bills chose to delete the private right of action provision from the final version of the Act, see H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 178, reprinted in 1987 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2956, 2973. We disagree. The conference committee’s report stating that the committee deleted the private right of action provision “ ‘represents the final statement of the terms agreed to by both houses.’ ” Harper, 878 F.2d at 1176 (quoting Demby v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C.Cir.1981)). “ ‘[N]ext to the statute itself it is the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent.’ ” Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 811 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir.1987). The Zajacs nevertheless contend congressional statements made during floor debate on the House and Senate versions of the Act show the private right of action provision was deleted by the conference committee because some members of Congress mistakenly believed farmers already had the right to bring suit in federal court. This contention is misplaced. Nothing in the conference committee’s report suggests the committee gave any weight to the congressional statements. Indeed, “[t]o permit [the Act’s final version] to be materially altered by [these] colloquies, which [took] place before the [Act] ha[d] achieved its final form, would open the door to the inadvertent, or perhaps even planned, undermining of the language actually voted on by Congress and signed into law by the President.” Harper, 878 F.2d at 1176 (quoting Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 3035, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984)).

The Zajacs also argue the comprehensive administrative remedies provided by the Act do not show Congress intended to withhold private enforcement of the borrowers’ rights provisions. Again, we disagree. “ ‘The presumption that a [private] remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.’ ” Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 3093, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985) (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1583-84, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981)). In this instance, the Act provides what the Zajacs themselves consider “a series of detailed and precise procedural rights[,] all of which are ... phrased in mandatory terms.” We thus agree with Harper that “Congress intended administrative review to be the exclusive remedy” for violations of the Act. 878 F.2d at 1176.

Finally, the Zajacs argue the rights Congress created in the Act address the exclusively federal concern of keeping farmers on their land. We cannot ignore, however, the section of the Act that restricts foreclosure proceedings. See 12 U.S.C. § 2202a(b)(3). Because foreclosure is an area “traditionally controlled by state law,” Harper, 878 F.2d at 1177, “it would be inappropriate to infer a [private] cause of action based solely on federal law,” Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088.

Having carefully considered all of the Zajacs’ arguments, we agree “the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane is correct.” Griffin, 902 F.2d at 24. We thus join the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in holding there is no implied private right of action available to enforce the Act, and affirm the district court.