Raymond Ladaniel James v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 6, 2008
• Docket: 14-07-00274-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 6, 2008

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 6, 2008.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-07-00274-CR

RAYMOND LADANIEL JAMES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 262nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1071604

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

Appellant, Raymond Ladaniel James, appeals his conviction for the murder of Ivan Picazo, for which a jury sentenced him to life in prison.  In his sole point of error, appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to defeat his self-defense claim.  We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Ivan Picazo died after being fatally shot by appellant as he was exiting his apartment with his girlfriend, Denise Barrera.  Prior to the shooting, appellant and Picazo had a brief confrontation.  According to Barrera, she and Picazo were walking in his apartment complex toward his apartment, when Picazo noticed appellant and a group of people sitting at a table outside staring at Barrera.  Picazo asked appellant Awhat are you looking at.@  Appellant and his friends responded by moving aggressively toward Picazo.  Barrera pulled Picazo away and persuaded him to return to his apartment with her.  Barrera and Picazo returned to his apartment for about ten minutes to ready themselves for outside dinner plans.  Barrera testified that after the two exited the apartment and while Picazo was locking the door, she heard about six to eight gunshots and saw Picazo fall to the ground.  Though Barrera saw the gun that fired the shots, she did not see the shooter.  Picazo died the following day from the gunshot wounds.

Vanessa Jiminez, a neighbor in the same apartment complex, testified at trial that she heard the gunshots as well.  Jiminez testified that she heard about five gunshots, and shortly thereafter observed three men, including appellant, going into appellant=s downstairs apartment.  According to Jiminez, appellant was holding a Abig gun.@

The State also introduced a videotape interview at trial between Sergeant Bobby Roberts of the Houston Police Department and appellant.  In the videotape interview, appellant acknowledged the initial brief confrontation with Picazo and admitted to shooting Picazo.  Appellant, however, indicated that he shot Picazo in self-defense.  According to appellant, after the initial confrontation, Picazo went to his apartment to retrieve a handgun, returned to the table where appellant was sitting, and pointed the gun at appellant.  Appellant stated that Picazo then left and appellant gave his .380 caliber handgun to his friend, retrieved his .30 caliber rifle from his own apartment, and waited for Picazo to leave his apartment.  As Picazo was leaving his apartment, appellant and his friend fired the guns at Picazo.   

The jury found appellant guilty of murder as alleged in the indictment and assessed punishment at life in prison.  In one point of error, he contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction because the evidence established self-defense.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

In a legal sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a trier of fact could not have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating that in a legal sufficiency review on the issue of self-defense, the reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to see if any rational trier of fact could have found (1) the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt).  The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony.  Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  Reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive province of the jury.  Id.  We must resolve any inconsistencies in the testimony in favor of the verdict.  Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

In a factual sufficiency review, we review all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party.  Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  We then ask (1) whether the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the jury=s verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or (2) whether, considering conflicting evidence, the jury=s verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.  Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414‑15, 417; Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In appellant=s sole point of error, he complains that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction because the evidence established self-defense.  A person commits murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual or intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 19.02(b) (Vernon 2003).  Furthermore, a person is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believed the deadly force is immediately necessary to (1) protect the actor against the other=s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force, or (2) prevent the other=s imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 9.32(a) (Vernon 2003); Act of May 16, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 235, ' 1, sec. 9.32, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2141 (amended 2007) (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 9.32(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007)).  The use of force against another is neither justified in response to verbal provocation alone, nor if a reasonable person in the actor=s situation would have retreated.  Id. at '' 9.32(a), 9.31(b); Act of May 12, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 190, ' 1, sec. 9.31(b), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 1919 (amended 2007) (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 9.31(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007)).^[1]

A review of the evidence adduced at trial supports the jury=s verdict and rejection of appellant=s self-defense claim.  First, Barrera testified that during the initial confrontation when appellant moved aggressively towards Picazo, Picazo retreated to his apartment.  Barrera testified that Picazo did not have a gun, that he did not return to the table to threaten appellant with a gun, and that he did not leave the apartment between the time of the initial confrontation and the shooting.  Second, Jiminez testified that she observed appellant holding a Abig gun@ while going into his downstairs apartment after the gunshots were fired.   Third, and most compelling, appellant admitted to shooting Picazo. Appellant stated that he gave his .380 caliber handgun to his friend, retrieved his .30 caliber rifle from his own apartment, waited for Picazo to leave his apartment, and shot him as he was leaving his apartment.  There is also uncontroverted evidence that Picazo=s back was turned when appellant shot him.  These facts were sufficient to find the elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 19.02(b). 

Moreover, a jury could have reasonably concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was not justified in using deadly force because a reasonable person would not have believed deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself against Picazo.  The jury could have also reasonably concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that deadly force was not justified because appellant=s acts were in response to a verbal provocation alone.^[2]  Id. at 9.31(a).  While appellant claimed that after the initial confrontation Picazo threatened him with a gun, justifying his use of deadly force, the jury was free to disbelieve his account of events and believe the testimony of Barrera and Jiminez.  Hull v. State, 871 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ ref=d); see also Valdez v. State, 841 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ ref=d) (stating that self-defense is a fact issue to be determined by a jury).  The only evidence produced supporting his claim of self-defense was appellant=s own statements, which is insufficient to prove self-defense as a matter of law.  See Hull, 871 S.W.2d at 789.  Despite appellant=s argument otherwise, the presentation of defensive evidence will not necessarily render the State=s evidence insufficient since the credibility determination of such evidence is solely within the jury=s province, and the jury is free to accept or reject the defensive evidence.  Id. at 790; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913-14.

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and to support the jury=s implicit finding against appellant on the claim of self-defense.  See Valdez, 841 S.W.2d at 43-44.  Appellant=s sole point of error is overruled.

We affirm the trial court=s judgment.

/s/      Adele Hedges

Chief Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed March 6, 2008.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson and Boyce.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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^[1]  Although sections 9.31 and 9.32 have since been amended, the offense for which appellant was convicted occurred before the effective date of the September 1, 2007 amendments.  Therefore, the offense is governed by the previous version of the statute.  See Act of March 21, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1, '' 5, 6, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 2 (codified as an amendment of Tex. Penal Code Ann. '' 9.31, 9.32).

^[2]  It is also important to note the burdens of the parties when reviewing a self-defense issue.  The State is not required to affirmatively produce evidence to refute a self-defense claim, but must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Valdez v. State, 841 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ ref=d).  The State has the burden of persuasion in disproving evidence of self-defense.  Saxton, 804 S.W.3d at 913.  This is not a burden of production; rather, it is a burden requiring the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 913.  A jury verdict of guilty is an implicit finding rejecting the defendant=s self-defense theory. Id. at 914. Here, the record contains sufficient evidence that would allow a rational trier of act to conclude that the State met its burden of proof on all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, which implicitly rejects appellant=s self-defense claim.