ROBERTS, Justice.
[¶ 1] Both cases in this consolidated appeal from decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Board raise issues concerning the applicable law in successive injury cases. In the first case, Carland Construction, Inc., contends that the Board erred by basing an award of compensation on Donald P. Ray’s average weekly wage at the time of the first injury and including an inflation adjustment pursuant to former 39 M.R.S.A § 55-A (Supp.1987), repealed and replaced by P.L. 1987, ch. 559, part B, §§ 29, 30, codified at 39 M.R.S.A. § 55-B (1989). In the second case, Denyse Pelletier contends that the Board erred in applying 39-A M.R.S.A § 213 (Supp.1996) to determine her incapacity benefits when 50% of her incapacity was attributable to a pre-1993 injury governed by former 39 M.R.S.A § 55-B (1989), repealed by Maine Workers’ Compensation Act of 1992, P.L.1991, ch. 885, § A-7 (effective January 1, 1993). We vacate the decision of the Board in Ray, and affirm in part1 the Board’s decision in Pelletier.
Ray v. Carland Construction, Inc.
[¶ 2] Donald P. Ray suffered his first injury to his back on November 4, 1987, while employed at Carland Construction. His average weekly wage was $455.59. After two months, Carland discontinued its voluntary payment of benefits. Ray suffered a second back injury on November 8, 1993, while employed by Zachau Construction Co., where his average weekly wage was $447.16. In 1994 and 1995, Ray filed petitions for award and further compensation relating to both injuries. In granting the petitions, the Board found that 60% of Ray’s incapacity was attributable to the 1987 injury and 40% to the 1993 injury, and that his benefits should be calculated according to the average weekly wage at the time of his first injury.2 The Board also concluded that Ray was entitled to the inflation adjustment that was in effect at the time of the 1987 injury, even though the adjustment had been repealed by the time of the 1993 injury.
[¶3] Carland filed a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, contending that Ray’s benefits should have been based on the average weekly wage at the time of the second injury unless the second wage was lower as a result of the first injury. McDonald v. Rumford School Dist., 609 A.2d 1160, 1161 (Me.1992). Without expressly determining whether Ray’s earnings at the time of the second injury were lower as a result of the first injury, the Board denied the motion stating that, unlike McDonald which involved two injuries that contributed equally to the employee’s incapacity, the greater portion of the responsibility (60%) was attributable to Ray’s first injury and therefore his benefits should be calculated according to his average weekly wage at the time of the first injury. We granted Car-land’s petition for appellate review pursuant to 39-A M.R.S.A § 322 (Supp.1996).
[¶ 4] Carland raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the Board properly calculated Ray’s benefits according to the average weekly wage at the time of his first injury and (2) whether Ray’s entitlement to an inflation adjustment is governed by the law in effect at the time of his first injury in 1987 or the law in effect at the time of his 1993 injury, which does not provide an adjustment for inflation or deflation. We conclude that both issues are controlled by our decision in McDonald, 609 A2d at 1161. In that case McDonald suffered a work-related [650]*650back injury in 1986 and, after returning to full-time work, suffered a second compensa-ble back injury in 1988. Id. at 1160. The law in effect at the time of the of the first injury provided an immediate inflation adjustment for total incapacity benefits. 39 M.R.S.A. § 54-A (Supp.1987), repealed and replaced by P.L.1987, ch. 559, part B, §§ 26, 27 (codified at 39 M.R.S.A. § 54-B (1989)). The law at the time of McDonald’s second injury, however, delayed the application of the inflation adjustment until three years after the injury. 39 M.R.S.A. § 54-B (1989), repealed and replaced by P.L.1991, ch. 885, §§ A-7, A-8 (codified at 39-A M.R.S.A. § 212 (Supp.1996)). Because it was impossible to determine the exact contribution of each injury to McDonald’s continuing incapacity, the former Workers’ Compensation Commission divided the responsibility equally between the two injuries. McDonald, 609 A.2d at 1161. The Commission concluded further that McDonald was entitled to the inflation adjustment and to the average weekly wage in effect on the date of his first injury. Id. We vacated the Commission’s decision, concluding, in part, that the Commission should have computed McDonald’s benefits based on his average weekly wage at the time of his second injury. Id. Contrary to the Board’s conclusion in this ease, the fact that McDonald’s injuries were “equally contributing” was not the controlling factor on the issue of the applicable average weekly wage. Id. The controlling factor in McDonald was that the employee’s earnings at the time of the second injury were not reduced as a result of his first injury. Id. Recognizing that the purpose of the average weekly wage formula is to provide a fair estimate of the employee’s future earning capacity in the absence of an injury, we concluded that if the employee has no incapacity at the time of the second injury, the second average weekly wage will most accurately reflect the employee’s pre-injury earning capacity. Id.; Warren v. H.T. Winters Co., 537 A.2d 583, 585 (Me.1988). We therefore agree with Carland Construction that it was error for the Board to calculate Ray’s benefits according to the average weekly wage at the time of his 1987 injury without first determining whether his earnings at the time of his 1993 injury were reduced as a result of the 1987 injury. Moreover, Ray conceded at oral argument that there is no evidence that the 1987 injury caused a loss of earning capacity at the time of the 1993 injury. Accordingly, his benefits should have been calculated according to his 1993 average weekly wage.
[¶ 5] McDonald is also controlling on the issue of the applicable inflation adjustment. 609 A.2d at 1161. We held that McDonald’s benefits must be adjusted according to the inflation provision in effect at the time of his second injury. We stated:
As an employee who has suffered successive equally contributing injuries, McDonald’s rights “cannot be determined until the time of the second injury, since it is not until that time that both injuries combine to cause the incapacity.” Warren, 537 A.2d at 586. The legislature, in an effort to curtail the costs of workers’ compensation, was free to limit the inflation adjustment of the average weekly wage, and to provide that it apply to all injuries occurring after the effective date of the legislative change.
Id. As was the case for the average weekly wage, the fact that McDonald’s injuries contributed equally to his incapacity had no relevance to our decision on the inflation adjustment. Recognizing that the Legislature sought to reduce costs in the workers’ compensation system by requiring a three-year waiting period for the adjustment of total benefits, we concluded that the waiting period was intended to apply to all successive injuiy cases when the most recent injury occurs after the effective date of the statute. Id.
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ROBERTS, Justice.
[¶ 1] Both cases in this consolidated appeal from decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Board raise issues concerning the applicable law in successive injury cases. In the first case, Carland Construction, Inc., contends that the Board erred by basing an award of compensation on Donald P. Ray’s average weekly wage at the time of the first injury and including an inflation adjustment pursuant to former 39 M.R.S.A § 55-A (Supp.1987), repealed and replaced by P.L. 1987, ch. 559, part B, §§ 29, 30, codified at 39 M.R.S.A. § 55-B (1989). In the second case, Denyse Pelletier contends that the Board erred in applying 39-A M.R.S.A § 213 (Supp.1996) to determine her incapacity benefits when 50% of her incapacity was attributable to a pre-1993 injury governed by former 39 M.R.S.A § 55-B (1989), repealed by Maine Workers’ Compensation Act of 1992, P.L.1991, ch. 885, § A-7 (effective January 1, 1993). We vacate the decision of the Board in Ray, and affirm in part1 the Board’s decision in Pelletier.
Ray v. Carland Construction, Inc.
[¶ 2] Donald P. Ray suffered his first injury to his back on November 4, 1987, while employed at Carland Construction. His average weekly wage was $455.59. After two months, Carland discontinued its voluntary payment of benefits. Ray suffered a second back injury on November 8, 1993, while employed by Zachau Construction Co., where his average weekly wage was $447.16. In 1994 and 1995, Ray filed petitions for award and further compensation relating to both injuries. In granting the petitions, the Board found that 60% of Ray’s incapacity was attributable to the 1987 injury and 40% to the 1993 injury, and that his benefits should be calculated according to the average weekly wage at the time of his first injury.2 The Board also concluded that Ray was entitled to the inflation adjustment that was in effect at the time of the 1987 injury, even though the adjustment had been repealed by the time of the 1993 injury.
[¶3] Carland filed a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, contending that Ray’s benefits should have been based on the average weekly wage at the time of the second injury unless the second wage was lower as a result of the first injury. McDonald v. Rumford School Dist., 609 A.2d 1160, 1161 (Me.1992). Without expressly determining whether Ray’s earnings at the time of the second injury were lower as a result of the first injury, the Board denied the motion stating that, unlike McDonald which involved two injuries that contributed equally to the employee’s incapacity, the greater portion of the responsibility (60%) was attributable to Ray’s first injury and therefore his benefits should be calculated according to his average weekly wage at the time of the first injury. We granted Car-land’s petition for appellate review pursuant to 39-A M.R.S.A § 322 (Supp.1996).
[¶ 4] Carland raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the Board properly calculated Ray’s benefits according to the average weekly wage at the time of his first injury and (2) whether Ray’s entitlement to an inflation adjustment is governed by the law in effect at the time of his first injury in 1987 or the law in effect at the time of his 1993 injury, which does not provide an adjustment for inflation or deflation. We conclude that both issues are controlled by our decision in McDonald, 609 A2d at 1161. In that case McDonald suffered a work-related [650]*650back injury in 1986 and, after returning to full-time work, suffered a second compensa-ble back injury in 1988. Id. at 1160. The law in effect at the time of the of the first injury provided an immediate inflation adjustment for total incapacity benefits. 39 M.R.S.A. § 54-A (Supp.1987), repealed and replaced by P.L.1987, ch. 559, part B, §§ 26, 27 (codified at 39 M.R.S.A. § 54-B (1989)). The law at the time of McDonald’s second injury, however, delayed the application of the inflation adjustment until three years after the injury. 39 M.R.S.A. § 54-B (1989), repealed and replaced by P.L.1991, ch. 885, §§ A-7, A-8 (codified at 39-A M.R.S.A. § 212 (Supp.1996)). Because it was impossible to determine the exact contribution of each injury to McDonald’s continuing incapacity, the former Workers’ Compensation Commission divided the responsibility equally between the two injuries. McDonald, 609 A.2d at 1161. The Commission concluded further that McDonald was entitled to the inflation adjustment and to the average weekly wage in effect on the date of his first injury. Id. We vacated the Commission’s decision, concluding, in part, that the Commission should have computed McDonald’s benefits based on his average weekly wage at the time of his second injury. Id. Contrary to the Board’s conclusion in this ease, the fact that McDonald’s injuries were “equally contributing” was not the controlling factor on the issue of the applicable average weekly wage. Id. The controlling factor in McDonald was that the employee’s earnings at the time of the second injury were not reduced as a result of his first injury. Id. Recognizing that the purpose of the average weekly wage formula is to provide a fair estimate of the employee’s future earning capacity in the absence of an injury, we concluded that if the employee has no incapacity at the time of the second injury, the second average weekly wage will most accurately reflect the employee’s pre-injury earning capacity. Id.; Warren v. H.T. Winters Co., 537 A.2d 583, 585 (Me.1988). We therefore agree with Carland Construction that it was error for the Board to calculate Ray’s benefits according to the average weekly wage at the time of his 1987 injury without first determining whether his earnings at the time of his 1993 injury were reduced as a result of the 1987 injury. Moreover, Ray conceded at oral argument that there is no evidence that the 1987 injury caused a loss of earning capacity at the time of the 1993 injury. Accordingly, his benefits should have been calculated according to his 1993 average weekly wage.
[¶ 5] McDonald is also controlling on the issue of the applicable inflation adjustment. 609 A.2d at 1161. We held that McDonald’s benefits must be adjusted according to the inflation provision in effect at the time of his second injury. We stated:
As an employee who has suffered successive equally contributing injuries, McDonald’s rights “cannot be determined until the time of the second injury, since it is not until that time that both injuries combine to cause the incapacity.” Warren, 537 A.2d at 586. The legislature, in an effort to curtail the costs of workers’ compensation, was free to limit the inflation adjustment of the average weekly wage, and to provide that it apply to all injuries occurring after the effective date of the legislative change.
Id. As was the case for the average weekly wage, the fact that McDonald’s injuries contributed equally to his incapacity had no relevance to our decision on the inflation adjustment. Recognizing that the Legislature sought to reduce costs in the workers’ compensation system by requiring a three-year waiting period for the adjustment of total benefits, we concluded that the waiting period was intended to apply to all successive injuiy cases when the most recent injury occurs after the effective date of the statute. Id.
[¶ 6] We see no reason to adopt a different holding with respect to the 1992 Act. As we have stated, a major purpose of the new Act was to reduce costs in the workers’ compensation system. Bowie v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 661 A.2d 1128, 1131, n. 2 (Me.1995). Moreover, the Legislature is presumed to be aware of our decision in McDonald. See Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Me.1994). Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature intended the 1992 Act to apply to awards of benefits in successive injury cases [651]*651when the most recent injury occurs after the effective date of the Act.3 See Bureau v. Staffing Network, Inc., 678 A.2d 583, 588 (Me.1996) (‘“In the absence of clear and explicit statutory language showing that the legislature intended a statute to modify case law, we will not interpret a statute to effect such a modification.’”) (quoting Caron v. School Admin. Dist. No. 27, 594 A.2d 560, 563 (Me.1991)); Tripp v. Philips Elmet Corp., 676 A.2d 927, 930-31 (Me.1996). We conclude, therefore, that the Board erred by applying the inflation adjustment in this case.
Pelletier v. Maine Medical Center
[¶ 7] Denyse Pelletier injured her right shoulder on December 7, 1992, while employed as a special care nurse at Maine Medical Center and concurrently employed at Mercy Hospital. She returned to light-duty employment at Maine Medical Center, earning less than her pre-injury wage. Maine Medical voluntarily paid partial benefits pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 55-B, calculated at two-thirds the difference between her gross earnings before and after the injury.4 In 1994 Pelletier reinjured her shoulder and Maine Medical Center unilaterally altered Pelletier’s benefits pursuant to the current partial incapacity statute, 39-A M.R.S.A. § 213, to reflect the difference between her “after tax” earnings before and after the injury.5
[¶ 8] In 1994 and 1995 Pelletier filed petitions for review and for restoration for the 1992 injuiy; Maine Medical Center filed petitions for review relating to both injuries. The parties agreed that because her earnings were lower at the time of the 1994 injury as a result of her first injury, her average weekly wage should be based on her earnings at the time of the earlier 1992 injury. Relying on our decision in McDonald, 609 A.2d at 1161, the Board concluded that because the 1992 and 1994 injuries contributed equally to her incapacity, Pelletier’s entitlement to ongoing partial benefits is governed by the law at the time of her second injury, 39-A M.R.S.A. § 213. We granted Pelletier’s petition for appellate review pursuant to 39-A M.R.S.A. § 322.
[¶9] By its plain language, section 213 increases partial benefits from two-thirds the difference in pre- and post-injury wages to 80% of that difference. Unlike former section 55-B, section 213 is based on the after-tax wages, not on the gross wages. Section 213 also reduces the number of weeks that partial benefits are available in cases where the total body impairment is less than 15%. Section A-10 of the implementing Act provides, in pertinent part: “So as not to alter benefits for injuries incurred before January 1, 1993, for matters in which the injury occurred prior to that date, all the provisions of this Act apply, except that ... Title 39-A, sections 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 221, 306, and 325 do not apply.” Maine Workers’ Compensation Act of 1992, P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-10 (effective January 1, 1993) (emphasis added). We have held that because section 213 is expressly listed as prospective in application, it does not apply to pre-1993 injuries. Dumond v. Aroostook Van Lines, 670 A.2d 939, 941 n. 1 (Me.1996); Marchand v. Eastern Welding Co., 641 A.2d 190, 191, n. 1 (Me.1994). Accordingly, section 213 does not apply to Pelletier’s 1992 injury. Pelletier contends that it was error for the Board to apply section 213 to compute her ongoing benefits, when 50% of her incapacity was attributable to the 1992 injury. She argues that all of her benefits are governed by former section 55-B.
[652]*652[¶ 10] We agree with the Board that this ease is governed by McDonald, 609 A.2d 1160, and, notwithstanding the Board’s incorrect reliance on the fact that the 1992 and 1994 injuries contributed equally to Pelletier’s incapacity, we conclude that the result reached by the Board in this ease is correct. We stated in McDonald that because McDonald’s injuries did not combine to produce his resulting back condition until after the effective date of the repeal of the inflation waiting period, that waiting period applied to the determination of McDonald’s entire award of benefits, even though his first injury preceded the effective date of the statute. Id. at 1161. In this case, like McDonald, Pelletier’s injuries did not combine to produce her resulting shoulder incapacity until after the effective date of section 213. A major purpose for the enactment of section 213 was to reduce workers’ compensation costs by reducing partial incapacity benefits in cases where the total body impairment is less than 15%. Report of Blue Ribbon Commission to Examine Alternatives to the Workers’ Compensation System and to Make Recommendations Concerning Replacement of the Present System, Findings of the Majority of the Blue Ribbon Commission 2 (August 31, 1992). Moreover, the presumption that the Legislature acted with knowledge of our opinion in McDonald leads us to conclude once again that the Legislature intended section 213 to. apply to successive injury cases when more than one injury contributes to an incapacitating condition. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision to apply section 213 to determine Pelletier’s entire award of benefits, notwithstanding the fact that her first injury occurred prior to the effective date of title 39-A.
The entry is:
In Ray v. Carland Construction, Inc., WCB-95-746: Decision vacated. Remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with the decision herein.
In Pelletier v. Maine Medical Center, WCB-96-9: Decision vacated with respect to the employee’s petition for award for her 1994 injury. Remanded to the Board for an order granting the petition for award for the 1994 injury pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.