Ray Rasmussen v. John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of the United States of America

374 F.2d 589, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 7159
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedMarch 9, 1967
Docket9006
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 374 F.2d 589 (Ray Rasmussen v. John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of the United States of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ray Rasmussen v. John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of the United States of America, 374 F.2d 589, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 7159 (10th Cir. 1967).

Opinion

SETH, Circuit Judge.

The appellant made application under the Social Security Act, based on the earning record of his deceased wife, for lump sum death benefits (42 U.S.C.A. § 402(i)), and for benefits on behalf of their three children (42 U.S.C.A. § 402 (d)). The applications were denied for the reason that the deceased wife was not an insured person at the time of her death. An administrative hearing was thereafter held, and the hearing examiner also held that the applications should be denied. Administrative review of the decision was denied, and appellant sought relief in the United States *592 District Court. Both parties asked for summary judgment, and the court entered judgment for the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on his motion. Appellant then took this appeal.

The deceased needed twelve quarters of coverage under the Social Security Act to be fully insured. The appellant claims eight quarters of coverage of his deceased wife derived from the earnings of the Robinson Hotel which he and his wife owned and operated in 1960 and 1961. The appellant was unsuccessful during the course of the administrative proceedings or in the District Court in his claim that part of the earnings were applicable to his wife’s account. If these earnings are applied to her account she would qualify as having been fully and currently insured under the Act. The issue on appeal relates to this enterprise, and whether under the Social Security Act a part of the earnings from its operation could be credited to the account of appellant’s wife (42 U.S.C.A. § 411(a)).

The appellant and his deceased wife were married in 1941. After their marriage appellant and his wife engaged in a business in which they both worked. In 1944 the appellant and his wife bought the Robinson Hotel in Oklahoma City, using money they had earned in their prior business. The deed to the hotel was executed in the names of appellant and his wife as tenants in common, not as joint tenants, and they both signed a mortgage. The hotel had thirty-two guest rooms, and there were five business offices on the ground floor.

Joint income tax returns were filed by appellant and his wife for the years 1960 and 1961 during which the question here arises. However, the income from operation of the hotel was reported solely as the appellant’s earnings from self-employment for purposes of crediting his earnings account in the Social Security Administration. No income for 1960 and 1961 was reported as self-employment income for the deceased wife. After the appellant’s wife died, and upon suggestion of an employee of the Social Security Administration, appellant amended the 1960 and 1961 income tax returns to show that one-half the earnings from operation of the hotel should be credited to his wife’s earnings account as self-employment income. The appellant’s wife was employed by the Salvation Army in Oklahoma City from August 1962 until her death in June 1963.

The operation of the hotel as a “family enterprise” by the appellant and his wife is described in the following excerpt from the hearing examiner’s decision :

“The record further reveals the claimant and his wife, the wage earner, operated a hotel which they purchased on August 14, 1944. That both the claimant and the wage earner took an active part in the operation of the hotel. That the wage earner rented rooms, took care of numerous services, such as laundry and cleaning, and also wrote checks in payment of any of the bills, and that the claimant also performed these duties; that neither of them had any particular time to perform these duties or any particular duties to perform, but either of them performed the duties when they were available and the necessity arose. * * * ”

The examiner however found no partnership to exist between the husband and wife, and no other basis whereby the wife derived earnings from the hotel. Thus the claim was denied.

Although the appellant testified generally that he assumed his accountant had prepared the tax returns to give his wife credit for self-employment income, the examiner’s decision indicates that little, if any, credence was given to the appellant’s explanation of why the tax returns failed to apportion the self-employment income equally between the appellant and his wife, as the appellant now contends should have been done. The credibility of the appellant’s testimony relating to the tax returns may be weighed by the hearing examiner. Celebrezze v. Warren, 339 F.2d 833 (10th Cir.); Kirby v. Gardner, 369 F.2d 302 *593 (10th Cir.). However, we attach little significance to the form of the tax returns or to the fact that the appellant later amended the returns.

Self-employment income is credited to earnings accounts in accordance with information reported in Schedule C of the federal income tax returns. Thus it appears that the Secretary makes no initial inquiry to determine whether the income so reported is in fact or in law self-employment income. It appears that unreported self-employment income may be credited retroactively to an individual’s earnings account if the facts show that the income in question was self-employment income under the Act. Even if we were to assume that the appellant deliberately claimed all self-employment income for his earnings account, this is no more than an assertion of the appellant’s position, a position that may or may not be sustained when the facts and circumstances of the case are reviewed in the legal context of the applicable statutes. See, e. g., Conklin v. Celebrezze, 319 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.); Hudson v. Celebrezze, 220 F.Supp. 738 (E.D.N.C.). If the facts and circumstances indicate that a claimant is entitled to the benefits, he should not be penalized by his former position, which may be nothing more than a misapprehension of the law. It should also be borne in mind that a portion of the claim here made is for the children’s benefit. Their position should be determined by what the facts really were relative to their parents’ earnings, and not by the opinion of one of them.

The appellant does not contend that he and his wife entered into a formal partnership. The appellant’s contention is that he and his wife individually earned self-employment income by participating in the operation of the hotel, and also that general principles of property law provide a basis for dividing the earnings of the hotel equally between the two cotenants.

As mentioned above, the hearing examiner found no partnership to exist, and after so concluding he apparently decided that a division of the hotel income on any other basis would be contrary to statute or the policies of the Social Security Administration. The examiner’s decision first says:

“In the absence of any specific or implied partnership agreement between the husband and wife, for social security purposes, the self employment income is creditable to either the husband or wife.

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Bluebook (online)
374 F.2d 589, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 7159, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ray-rasmussen-v-john-w-gardner-secretary-of-health-education-and-ca10-1967.