Rawson v. United Steelworkers of America

726 P.2d 742, 111 Idaho 630, 1986 Ida. LEXIS 514, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2305

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: September 4, 1986
• Docket: 15338
• Status: Published

Opinions

BAKES, Justice,

dissenting:

For the reasons set out below, I would affirm the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the respondent United Steelworkers of America.

I

I believe that this action is preempted by federal law. When this case was before this Court previously in Dunbar et al. v. United Steelworkers of America et al., 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 (1979), I then wrote that the preemption issue should not be decided on a motion to dismiss, as had been in that case, but that it should “await a full factual development of the legal issues raised under our state tort law.” After the Court in Dunbar remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, extensive discovery was conducted, resulting in a more complete factual evaluation of the plaintiffs’ claims. Also, in the interim the United States Supreme Court had again spoken, I believe definitively, in the case of Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). Based upon that record, I now believe that federal law requires us to affirm the decision of the district court.

In Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, supra, the Supreme Court determined that Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 27 U.S.C. § 185(a), requires state courts to apply federal law when resolving a state tort claim which is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. In order to understand the Court’s decision in Allis Chalmers, it is necessary to understand Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.

Section 301(a) states:

“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and the labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

Although on its face Section 301(a) simply gives the federal district courts jurisdiction over suits for violation of certain specified types of contracts, the statute’s import has been extensively analyzed by the United States Supreme Court. In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 783 (1962), the Court recognized that in enacting Section 301(a) Congress intended that both state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over contracts made by labor organizations. In exercising this concurrent jurisdiction, the federal courts are authorized to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of such agreements. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457, 77 S.Ct. 912, 918, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). The application of state law is preempted because uniformity in this area of the law is particularly important since,

“The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements. Because neither party could be certain of the rights which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the same meaning under two or more systems of law which might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the collective bargain was made, the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as to its interpretation. Indeed, the existence of possibly conflicting legal concepts might substantially impede the parties’ willingness to agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of disputes.” Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04, 82 S.Ct. 571, 577, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962) (footnote omitted).

Thus, “[i]n enacting Section 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules.” Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 104, 82 S.Ct. at 577, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962).

Section 301 preemption, which gives the state concurrent jurisdiction but mandates that the state courts apply federal substantive law, is distinct from the sort of preemption discussed in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), and its progeny. Garmon preemption is concerned with protecting the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra. See also Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213-14, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1912-13, n. 9, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985); Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders, 468 U.S. 491, 502-503, 104 S.Ct. 3179, 3186 (1985). Section 301 preemption does not stem from concern for the National Labor Relations Board’s primary jurisdiction. Rather, Section 301 preemption reflects Congress’s concern that collective bargaining agreements be interpreted under a uniform federal labor law.

Stressing this need for uniformity, the Court in the recent Allis Chalmers decision extended the preemptive effect of Section 301 beyond suits merely alleging contract violations. The court stated:

“Questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort. Any other result would elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade the requirements of Section 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of contract.” Allis Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211, 105 S.Ct. at 1911. (Emphasis added.)

The Court’s extension of Section 301 is not surprising given the close relationship between contract actions and tort actions arising out of contract. See generally Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, §§ 92, 93 (1984).

In determining whether Section 301(a) applies to a tort claim, the focus is on “whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract. If the state’s tort law purports to define the meaning of the contract relationship, that law is preempted.” Allis Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213, 105 S.Ct. at 1912. The characterization of an action as a tort action is not sufficient to avoid preemption under Section 301(a).

Application of the preemption test articulated in Allis Chalmers to the facts of the wrongful death action now before this Court is complicated by limiting language¹ in Allis Chalmers. However, considering the specific facts set forth in Allis Chalmers, I can find no basis for distinguishing Allis Chalmers from the case at bar.

In Allis Chalmers, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had determined that the plaintiff’s action for bad faith handling of an insurance claim, arising from a claim made under a disability plan included in a collective bargaining agreement, was not preempted. The Wisconsin court’s conclusion was based upon application of the balancing test enunciated in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 245, 79 S.Ct. 773, 779 (1959). Using the Garmon analysis, the Wisconsin court held that the administration of disability claim procedures under collective bargaining agreements was only of peripheral concern to federal labor law, but that the bad faith insurance tort was of substantial significance to the State of Wisconsin. This analysis was rejected by the Supreme Court. The Court stated:

“So called Garmon preemption involves protecting the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB, and requires a balancing of state and federal interests. The present tort suit would allow the state to provide a rule of decision where Congress has mandated that federal law should govern. In this situation, the balancing of state and federal interests required by Garmon preemption is irrelevant, since Congress, acting within its power under the commerce clause, has provided that federal law must prevail.” Allis Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 214, n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1913 n. 9.

The Garmon-type analysis is simply not applicable if the asserted claim is “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” If the asserted claim is “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract,” Section 301 mandates that federal substantive law be applied.

In our prior decision in Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America, 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 (1979), which was decided prior to Allis Chalmers, the Court addressed only the question of whether this action is preempted because it would infringe upon the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The Court today continues to adhere to the views expressed in Dunbar insofar as the Garmon preemption analysis may be applied to claims unrelated to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from that agreement. However, in Dunbar we did not consider whether the Section 301 preemption of Allis Chalmers, which requires that our state courts apply uniform federal law, applies in this wrongful death action. If this wrongful death action is “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract,” as was the bad faith tort alleged in Allis Chalmers, we must apply federal substantive law as mandated by Section 301(a).

Having fully considered the record, I conclude that Section 301(a) applies here. Any duty which the union owed to its members, and which might form the basis of the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, arose through the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. It was the collective bargaining agreement which provided for the formation and membership of the Safety Committee and set forth the duties of the Safety Committee. Whether the terms of the collective bargaining agreement imposed a duty on the union or merely gave the union the right to participate in the selection of the safety committee is a question “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.”

The majority’s attempt to characterize the duty that the union owed to its members as arising from the union’s constitution and the actions of the union’s officers toward its members are unpersuasive. Through the negotiation process, the union and the company worked out the collective bargaining agreement which not only outlined the union's responsibilities in regard to the Safety Committee, but also limited the union’s right to interfere in the operation of the mine. Any duty which the union had to its members to preserve safe conditions within the mine could only be fulfilled through the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, because consideration of issues related to the union’s duty is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the collective bargaining agreement, we cannot ignore the Supreme Court’s mandate. The plaintiffs’ negligence claim must be treated as a Section 301 claim, and federal law applied.

A survey of federal law indicates that the only duty which the union owes to its members under federal law is the duty of fair representation.² The duty of fair representation is breached only when the conduct of the union is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 916, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 84 S.Ct. 363, 11 L.Ed.2d 370 (1964). Due care has not been incorporated into the union’s duty of fair representation. Mere negligence does not generally constitute a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation. Condon v. Local 2944, United Steelworkers, 683 F.2d 590 (1st Cir.1982). Dente v. International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, Local 90, 492 F.2d 10 (9th Cir.1973). Since the plaintiffs here have not alleged that the union’s conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, the appellants have not made out a cause of action. Accordingly, the district court was correct in granting the union’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the negligence issues.³

II

Even if state tort law, rather than federal law, applied, the majority’s analysis of the negligence issues under state tort law and its effort to distinguish our recent case of Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America, 107 Idaho 717, 692 P.2d 361 (1984), is difficult to comprehend. That case involved a substantially similar contract and substantially similar facts. The majority attempts to distinguish this case from Carroll stating that in Carroll the safety committee failed to perform protective actions, but that

“in the instant case, by contrast, the safety committee did inspect the mine and the miners allege not that the Union members of the safety committee failed to inspect but that they actually performed the duty of inspection in a negligent manner and failed to report what should have been obvious safety problems, the duty to report necessarily flowing from the act of inspection. Hence, the instant case does not present a situation of non-feasance but one of malfeasance.” Ante at 636, 726 P.2d at 748.

Without stating it, the majority is applying a respondeat superior doctrine to the union for the alleged malfeasance of a safety committee, only some members of which they had the responsibility of appointing. The majority has failed to recognize that the union, and the safety committee which failed to inspect or inspected in a negligent manner, are not one and the same. Rather, under the collective bargaining agreement, as the majority points out, the union was to appoint three members of the safety committee, and management was to appoint three members of the committee. For all that this record shows, the union did perform its contractual obligation and did appoint its members to the safety committee, as did management. However, the safety committee was not the alter ego of the union, nor is there anything in the record from which a triable issue of fact arises concerning whether or not the union had a right to direct the manner in which the safety committee carried out its inspections. The majority opinion merely assumes that any negligence of the safety committee, which was composed of both management and union designees, was, perforce, misconduct of the union and thus actionable. The majority assumes respondeat superior liability on behalf of the union for an organization which the record does not reflect it had any authority to control. This is clearly reflected in its opinion, ante at 750, when it states, “In light of the above record, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the Union owed no duty to exercise due care in performance of the inspections once its personnel undertook them.” However, those personnel were members of a committee composed of both management and labor representatives. The majority does not even discuss, much less support in the record and by authorities, the proposition that the union, which appointed representatives to the safety committee pursuant to provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, would then be responsible if one of its appointees did not exercise due care in performing the safety committee’s inspection function. The appellants have not pointed out any such facts or law to support respondeat superior liability under those circumstances and, accordingly, the district court’s judgment should be affirmed on that issue.

Furthermore, the majority opinion states, ante at 750, “Moreover, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the Union owed no duty to bring to the attention of the members of the safety committee the safety problems that existed in the Sunshine Mine.” However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that, apart from the knowledge gained by those appointees to the safety committee who may have conducted inspections, the “union” ever had any knowledge of safety problems that existed in the Sunshine Mine.

Finally, the majority states, ante, at 750, that “[bjecause the Union, pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, had contracted to inspect and, in fact inspected the mine, it owed the (minimal) duty to its members to exercise due care in inspecting and in reporting the findings of its inspection.” Again, the collective bargaining agreement did not impose upon the union a duty to inspect the mine, but merely to appoint representatives to the safety committee who, along with the management representatives, would inspect the mine. The union carried out its responsibility under the collective bargaining agreement by appointing the members. However, assuming that the appointees negligently carried out their responsibilities, there is no showing in fact or law that the union is responsible for their conduct under a respondeat superior theory. The majority is plainly incorrect when it concludes that, under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, the union “had contracted to inspect and, in fact inspected the mine____” Accordingly, I believe the summary judgment granted by trial court should be affirmed.

1 . In Allis Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), the Court noted: "It is perhaps worth emphasizing the narrow focus of the conclusion we reach today. We pass no judgment on whether the suit also would have been preempted by other federal laws governing employment or benefit plans. Nor do we hold that every state lawsuit asserting a right that relates in some way to a provision in a collective bargaining agreement, or more generally to the parties to such an agreement, necessarily is preempted by Section 301. The full scope of the preemptive effect of federal labor contract law remains to be fleshed out on a case by case basis. We do hold that when resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a Section 301 claim, see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968), or dismissed as preempted by federal labor contract law."

2 . In Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America, 107 Idaho 717, 692 P.2d 361 (1984), we recognized that other duties may arise under state law. Quoting from Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America, 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 (1979), we reiterated the view that there is

"no authority ... which insulates a union for its negligence and tortious conduct toward one of its members, Le., if a member of a union was struck by a motor vehicle owned by the union and operated by one of its officials during the course of his employment with the union, we cannot believe the union would be insulated from liability on the basis that the only duty it owed toward its members was that of fair representation.”

3 . Where an order of a lower court is correct, albeit based on a different theory than that found to be dispositive by the Supreme Court, the lower court order will be affirmed. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7, 655 P.2d 895, 901 (1982).