Ravine Run, L.L.C. v. Riverbend Homeowner's Assn., Inc.

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 25 CAE 11 0103
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Ravine Run, L.L.C. v. Riverbend Homeowner's Assn., Inc., 2026-Ohio-2629.]

IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO

RAVINE RUN, LLC Case No. 25 CAE 11 0103

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 25 CV H O6 0663 RIVER BEND HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC. Judgment: Affirmed

Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: July 9, 2026

BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: JOHN W. HILL, JR., RICHARD T. CRAVEN, GAIL C. HERSH, JR., JAMES E. SHIELDS, for Plaintiff-Appellee; W. BLAIR LEWIS, for Defendant-Appellant.

King, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, River Bend Homeowner's Association, Inc., appeals the

October 24, 2025 judgment entry of the Delaware County Common Pleas Court granting the

motion to disqualify counsel filed by Plaintiff-Appellee, Ravine Run, LLC. We affirm the

trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} On June 23, 2025, Ravine Run filed a complaint against River Bend for

declaratory judgment, injunction, and money damages. The dispute centers on private roads

owned by River Bend in a subdivision. A portion of the private roads permit ingress and

egress to an adjacent subdivision owned by Ravine Run. The action sought to compel River

Bend to recognize and not obstruct Ravine Run's use of the ingress/egress easement across the private roads so Ravine Run could access its property. The issue involves gate access to

use the private roads which is opened with a code and fees to use the code.

{¶ 3} On July 21, 2025, River Bend filed an answer and counterclaim for declaratory

judgment related to the private roads and unjust enrichment. Counsel for River Bend was

Michael W. Currie, Esq.

{¶ 4} On September 30, 2025, Ravine Run filed a motion to disqualify Attorney

Currie as counsel for River Bend. Ravine Run is owned 50% by Cugini and Capoccia

Builders, Inc. ("CCBI"). Paul Cugini is the sole shareholder of CCBI and the president of

Ravine Run. Attorney Currie previously represented a legal entity named River Run of

Powell LLC; this entity was owned in part by CCBI and Cugini. Attorney Currie filed the

complaint in that case fourteen years prior and the matter was concluded nine years ago. The

issue in that case centered on a private gated infrastructure installed by CCBI for its River

Run subdivision and the "use" of that infrastructure by another developer of an adjacent

subdivision. Ravine Run argued Cugini disclosed private and confidential information to

Attorney Currie that could now be used against him in this action; it cited Prof.Cond.R. 1.9

(Duties to Former Clients) in support. Ravine Run also alleged Attorney Currie was not

registered to practice law in Ohio. By judgment entry filed October 24, 2025, the trial court

granted the motion. The trial court found that the use of confidential information against

Ravine Run in the current dispute demonstrated the need to disqualify counsel; it also found

the registration issue was resolved.

{¶ 5} River Bend filed an appeal with the following assignment of error: I

{¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED

PLAINTIFF/APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTORNEY MICHAEL

CURRIE."

I

{¶ 7} In River Bend's sole assignment of error, it claims the trial court erred in

granting Ravine Run's motion to disqualify Attorney Currie. We disagree.

{¶ 8} Prof.Cond.R. 1.9(a) states: "Unless the former client gives informed consent,

confirmed in writing, a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that

person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client." Prof.Cond.R.

1.0(n) defines "substantially related matter" as "one that involves the same transaction or legal

dispute or one in which there is a substantial risk that confidential factual information that

would normally have been obtained in the prior representation of a client would materially

advance the position of another client in a subsequent matter."

{¶ 9} "The trial court has the inherent authority to supervise members of the bar

appearing before it, and this necessarily includes the power to disqualify counsel in specific

cases." Hollis v. Hollis, 124 Ohio App.3d 481, 484-485 (8th Dist. 1997). A trial court has wide

discretion to determine a motion to disqualify counsel. Id. at 485. Therefore, we will review

a trial court's decision on a motion to disqualify counsel for an abuse of discretion. 155 North

High Ltd. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 423, 426 (1995). "Abuse of discretion" means

an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc.,

19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87 (1985). Most instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary. AAAA

Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161

(1990). An unreasonable decision is one backed by no sound reasoning process which would

support that decision. Id. "It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue

de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of

countervailing reasoning processes that would support a contrary result." Id.

{¶ 10} As noted by the trial court, "'disqualification of an attorney is a drastic measure'

to be imposed only when the representation violates ethics rules and would result in

'significant risk of trial taint.' In re McCauley, 2012-Ohio-4709, ¶¶ 43-46 (5th Dist.)." Judgment

Entry filed October 24, 2025.

{¶ 11} The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit established a three-part test that

trial courts should use when determining whether counsel should be disqualified: "(1) a past

attorney-client relationship existed between the party seeking disqualification and the

attorney it seeks to disqualify; (2) the subject matter of those relationships was/is substantially

related; and (3) the attorney acquired confidential information from the party seeking

disqualification." Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut., 900 F.2d 882, 889 (6th Cir. 1990).

{¶ 12} In the prior litigation concluded some nine years ago, Attorney Currie

represented a legal entity named River Run of Powell LLC; this entity was owned in part by

CCBI and Cugini. Appellant's Brief at 3. In its motion to disqualify, Ravine Run argued

confidential information garnered by Attorney Currie from this prior litigation related to

Cugini's finances and his "tolerance for and/or litigation strategies." Motion to Disqualify

Counsel filed September 30, 2025. Ravine Run argued Attorney Currie could use this

information against Ravine Run in his representation of River Bend. {¶ 13} The trial court disqualified counsel based on the third prong ("the attorney

acquired confidential information from the party seeking disqualification"); the trial court did

not address prongs one and two. We can only assume the trial court found prongs one and

two applied, otherwise it would have never determined prong three. Henry Filters, Inc. v.

Peabody Barnes, Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 255, 260 (6th Dist. 1992) ("If there is no current or past

attorney-client relationship, the motion to disqualify should be denied"). However, we note

after finding prongs one and two to apply, prong three is presumed ("'[T]he general rule in

disqualification cases has been that, upon proof of a former attorney-client relationship

concerning substantially related matters, disclosure of confidences is presumed'"). Wynveen

v, Corsaro, 2017-Ohio-9170, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.), quoting Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating

Co., 440 F.Supp. 193, 209 (N.D. Ohio 1976); accord Kreis v. Dollings, 2025-Ohio-1329, ¶ 34

(5th Dist.); Brick v. McCoun, 2020-Ohio-4371, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.).

{¶ 14} In granting the motion to disqualify Attorney Currie, the trial court stated:

"Prior to the complaint being filed, Currie sent Cugini a letter on behalf of Defendant. Currie

identified information he learned while representing Cugini's prior company. He argued this

information is relevant to arguments for Defendant in this identical dispute against Cugini's

current company." October 24, 2025 Judgment Entry at 2. In the letter dated February 13,

2025, specifically addressed to "Paul Cugini," Attorney Currie reminded Cugini of their prior

attorney-client relationship and informed Cugini that "I have now been retained by the HOA

to address a remarkably similar situation where a developer, with no right to do so, has tied

into the private gated infrastructure of an adjoining development." See Exhibit A, attached to

September 30, 2025 Motion to Disqualify Counsel. Attorney Currie went on to draw parallels

between the two cases and encouraged Cugini to contact him to discuss a resolution as "[i]t seems that this should be relatively straight forward given the positions which you previously

advanced" in the prior case. Id. Attorney Currie's own letter supports a finding that prong

one (attorney-client relationship) and prong two (substantially related subject matter) of the

Dana test were met. Because these two prongs were met, prong three is presumed:

Only where an attorney himself represented a client in matters substantially

related to those embraced by a subsequent case he wishes to bring against the

former client, is he irrebuttably presumed to have benefitted from confidential

information relevant to the current case. In such limited situations there is no

necessity to demonstrate actual exposure to specific confidences which would

benefit the present client.

Phillips v. Haidet, 119 Ohio App.3d 322, 325 (3d Dist. 1997).

{¶ 15} Therefore, it can be presumed Cugini and Attorney Currie discussed

confidential matters in the prior case and Cugini would not want that information shared with

River Bend or be used against him in the current case. Kreis at ¶ 35.

{¶ 16} Further, Cugini presented a report by Charles J. Kettlewell, an expert on legal

ethics and compliance with the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. See Exhibit B, attached

to September 30, 2025 Motion to Disqualify Counsel. Kettlewell opined "Mr. Currie's

representation of River Bend HOA in the present manner is not permitted under the Ohio

Rules of Professional Conduct, absent informed consent from CCBI and Cugini." Id. River

Bend did not contest Kettlewell's expertise. {¶ 17} We find the trial court properly applied the Dana test and we cannot find the

trial court's decision to disqualify Attorney Currie was unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable; we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying Attorney

Currie from representing River Bend in this case.

{¶ 18} The sole assignment of error is denied.

{¶ 19} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the

Delaware County Common Pleas Court is AFFIRMED.

{¶ 20} Costs to Appellant.

By: King, P. J. and

Popham, J. concur.

Gormley, J. concurs separately.

Gormley, J., concurring in judgment only

{¶ 21} Had I been the trial judge in this case, I might very well have reached a different

outcome. After all, attorney Currie’s client in the earlier case — River Run of Powell LLC

— is not a party to this case, let alone a party with interests adverse to Currie’s current client.

In fact, Ravine Run LLC — the entity seeking Currie’s disqualification in this case — was

never a Currie client and did not come into existence until years after all litigation in that

earlier case had ended.

{¶ 22} Even apart from that arguable shortcoming under the first prong of the three-

pronged test from Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of N. Ohio, 900 F.2d 882, 889 (6th

Cir. 1990) — which the court rightly employs in its analysis today — the second prong, too,

arguably tilts in Currie’s (and his current client’s) favor. After all, can we rightly say that the subject matter of Currie’s work on the earlier case overlaps with his proposed work in this

case, given that the earlier case involved a different easement in a different residential

subdivision? I have a hard time agreeing that a case about one particular easement is — in

the words of the Dana decision, 900 F.2d at 889 — “substantially related” to a case involving

a different easement in a different place.

{¶ 23} To be sure, there are not-insubstantial countervailing arguments that the party

seeking attorney Currie’s disqualification makes. Longtime homebuilder Paul Cugini is the

president of the corporate party that is adverse to Currie’s current client in this case, and

Cugini was also the president of the entity represented by Currie in the earlier case. And the

two cases arguably are in fact related, given that Ohio Professional Conduct Rule 1.0(n)

defines a “[s]ubstantially related matter” as one in which there is a “substantial risk” that

“confidential factual information” that would “normally have been obtained” by a lawyer in

the prior representation would “materially advance” the position of that lawyer’s different

client later in a different case.

{¶ 24} As for the Dana test’s third prong — which asks whether an attorney, in an

earlier matter, “acquired confidential information from the party seeking disqualification”

(Dana, 900 F.2d at 889) — both parties to this case make not-unreasonable arguments on each

side of that question, though I acknowledge, as the court notes today, that we presume that

confidential information was in fact shared if we find that an attorney in a current case

formerly represented a now-adverse client on a substantially related matter. See Wynveen v.

Corsaro, 2017-Ohio-9170, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 25} In the end, it is our deferential standard of review that leads me to concur in

today’s judgment. See Goebel v. Hopkins, 2024-Ohio-194, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.) (“An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to disqualify for an abuse of discretion”);

Reo v. Univ. Hosp. Health Sys., 2019-Ohio-1411, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.) (same).

{¶ 26} No matter how I might have viewed this case had I been the trial judge, I sit in

a different chair today. Because I cannot say that the trial judge’s decision to disqualify

attorney Currie was unreasonable or arbitrary, I concur in today’s judgment affirming that

trial-court decision.