Raul Carranza Ambriz v. Sergio Albarran, et. al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAUL CARRANZA AMBRIZ, A 099- No. 1:26-cv-02230-DC-CKD 632-111 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et. al., 15 Respondents. 16

17 18 Petitioner Raul Carranza Ambriz is detained by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 19 (“ICE”) and seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This case is referred to 20 the undersigned by operation of Local Rule 302(c)(17) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the 21 court’s order dated May 28, 2026. (ECF No. 17). For the following reasons, the undersigned 22 recommends the petition be denied. 23 I. Background 24 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. ECF No. 1 at 5. He is married and has three 25 children. Id. His wife and stepson were granted asylum in 2024. Id. The other two children, age 26 16 and 9, are U.S. citizens. Id. Petitioner’s 17-year-old son has Pitt-Hopkins Syndrome, which 27 affects his brain development, rendering his insight and judgement currently similar to that of a 28 first grader. Id. The family suspects the 9-year-old may have the syndrome as well. Id. 1 Petitioner first attempted to enter the United States in 2008. ECF No. 1 at 5. He was 2 apprehended by agents of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) who forwarded 3 his case to the U.S. Attorney’s office for prosecution. Id. Petitioner pled guilty to one count of 4 transportation of illegal aliens and aiding and abetting pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(A)(1)(a)(ii) 5 and (v)(II). He was sentenced to 13 months in federal custody and removed to Mexico. Id. He 6 then returned to the United States without inspection in 2009. Id. He has lived in the United States 7 ever since, without further criminal arrests. Id. 8 On November 6, 2025, ICE detained petitioner and issued him a form I-871, Notice of 9 Intent to Reinstate a Prior Order. ECF No. 1 at 6. Petitioner requested and received a reasonable 10 fear interview and was placed in withholding-only proceedings before an Immigration Judge 11 (“IJ”). Id. On May 1, 2026, an IJ denied Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal. ECF 12 No. 15-1 at 1. Petitioner appealed the IJ’s decision, and the matter remains pending before the 13 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). ECF No. 12 at 3. 14 Throughout Petitioner’s time in ICE custody, his immigration attorney has attempted to 15 request his release pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, which requires DHS to periodically review the 16 custody of noncitizens who are subject to final orders of removal but have not yet been removed. 17 DHS conducted the first custody review after Petitioner had been in custody for 106 days. ECF 18 No. 1 at 7. Despite Petitioner’s counsel making various attempts to notify DHS of her 19 representation, DHS officials conducted a custody review without Petitioner’s counsel being 20 notified or present. Id. at 6-7. Three days later, DHS informed Petitioner of their decision to 21 continue to detain him. ECF No. 9-2. In the decision, DHS determined that Petitioner’s 22 smuggling conviction, which is classified as an aggravated felony, renders him a threat to public 23 safety and a flight risk, and that his removal is expected to be effectuated in the foreseeable 24 future. Id. They also timely notified him that they had scheduled another custody review 25 interview for March 26, 2026, at 9:00am. ECF No. 9-4 at 1. On March 26, 2026, a DHS officer 26 called Petitioner’s counsel at 7:30am rather than the scheduled 9:00am, causing Petitioner’s 27 counsel to attend the interview telephonically while standing outside of a transit station. ECF No. 28 10 at 8. The officer indicated that he did not receive documents in support of Petitioner’s request 1 for release, despite Petitioner’s attorney making multiple attempts to submit them prior to the 2 interview. Id. Counsel was, however, able to submit them to the interviewing officer promptly 3 after the interview. Id. The officer told Petitioner’s counsel that they would make a decision 4 within two to three weeks after the interview. Id. at 9. As of the date of the last filing in this 5 matter, Petitioner has not received a decision and continues to be detained at the Golden State 6 Annex facility. He states his physical and mental health continue to decline and that his wife 7 struggles to financially support the children due to his prolonged detention. ECF No. 13 at 3. 8 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for a temporary restraining 9 order on March 23, 2026. ECF No. 1, 2. Petitioner claims that DHS’ failure to follow its 10 procedures implementing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 violates the Administrative Procedures Act and is a 11 violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. Respondent argued that any 12 violation of the regulation was non-prejudicial and that ICE retains authority to detain Petitioner. 13 ECF No. 9. The district court judge assigned to this case denied the motion for temporary 14 restraining order on April 30, 2026, agreeing that Petitioner did not show that any violations of 8 15 C.F.R. § 241.4 were prejudicial to him and that Petitioner was therefore unlikely to succeed on 16 the merits of the petition. ECF No. 11. 17 On May 13, 2026, Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus and 18 motion for temporary restraining order. ECF 12, 13. The amended filings claim that Petitioner’s 19 prolonged detention – which had, by that time, exceeded six months – violates the Due Process 20 Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. Respondent argued in its opposition that no court has found a 21 due process violation where a noncitizen in withholding-only proceedings is detained during the 22 appeal process. ECF No. 15. On May 28, 2026, the district court judge assigned to this case 23 denied the renewed motion for temporary restraining order, finding that Petitioner was unlikely to 24 succeed on the merits of his petition. ECF No. 17. This matter was then referred to the Magistrate 25 Judge for further proceedings. Id. 26 II. Legal Standard 27 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 28 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 1 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner in 2 custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the 3 writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and 4 it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 5 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See 6 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 7 The detention of noncitizens subject to final removal orders is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 8 1231(a). This remains true when the noncitizen is pursuing withholding of removal. Padilla- 9 Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that reinstated removal orders are 10 administratively final for purposes of detention, even if there are ongoing withholding-only 11 proceedings). Noncitizens who have final removal orders “shall” be detained for the first 90 days 12 after their removal orders are finalized (known as the “removal period”). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). If 13 the Attorney General determines that such noncitizen would pose a risk to the community or be 14 unlikely to comply with the removal order, the noncitizen “may be detained beyond the removal 15 period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Procedures for continued detention beyond the removal period 16 are found at 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(h). 17 III. Discussion 18 A. Violations of detention review procedures do not require remedy 1. Violations of detention review procedures do not violate the 19 Administrative Procedures Act because the agency’s actions are not final 20 and did not prejudice Petitioner 21 Petitioner argues that DHS’ failure to conduct the custody review interview within 90 22 days and its failure to notify counsel of such interview violate its own regulations and procedures 23 and therefore violate the Administrative Procedures Act. ECF No. 10-13. 24 Administrative agencies must follow their own regulations, and their compliance may be 25 compelled by the courts if they fail to do so. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). The 26 Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) provides a right to judicial review of all “final agency 27 action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. In general, for an 28 agency action to be final, it must satisfy two conditions: (1) “the action must mark the 1 consummation of the agency's decision-making process,...it must not be of a merely tentative or 2 interlocutory nature”; and (2) “the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been 3 determined, or from which legal consequences will flow[.]” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177- 4 78 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 5 the agency action, i.e., failure to undertake the custody review required by 8 C.F.R. § 6 241.4 within 90 days, constitutes final agency action for purposes of the APA. 7 Moreover, violation of an agency’s regulation is only unlawful “if the violation prejudiced 8 the interests of the [noncitizen] which were protected by the regulation.” U.S. v. Calderon- 9 Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1979). Petitioner alleges that when DHS failed to complete 10 the detention review process within 90 days, it lost the authority to detain Petitioner. ECF No. 1 at 11 12-13. According to Petitioner, this alleged loss of authority created a liberty interest, the loss of 12 which was prejudicial to him. 1 Id. However, Petitioner cites no legal authority establishing any 13 such loss in detention authority or creation of liberty interest. 14 Additionally, despite DHS’ errors in the first review, Petitioner was provided another 15 post-order review of which he received proper notice. ECF No. 10 at 8-9. His attorney was able to 16 attend the second interview, albeit under inconvenient circumstances. Id. Petitioner was, 17 eventually, able to provide documentation supporting his claim for release. Id. Assuming 18 Petitioner receives a decision as to his continued custody within a reasonable amount of time, he 19 has received the process to which he is statutorily and constitutionally entitled. Though dilatory 20 and discourteous, DHS’ delays and errors did not prejudice Petitioner. Even if a custody review 21 determination had been made properly, it is unlikely the outcome of the review would have been 22 different, as the agency determined that Petitioner presents a danger to the community and a flight 23 risk if released. ECF No. 9-2 at 1. Petitioner has not established that the timing of the interview, 24 receipt of documents, or timely notice would have changed that determination. See Getu Tamrat 25 v. Hernandez, No. 26-cv-01169-MLP, 2026 WL 1113388, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2026) 26 (finding that petitioner was not entitled to release despite delayed post-order custody review 27 1 Petitioner’s additional assertion that the delayed process and alleged creation of liberty interest 28 constitute a due process violation is discussed in part III.A.2, infra. 1 because "even if a custody review determination had been made [timely], as contemplated by 2 both the regulations and the notice of custody review provided to Petitioner, it is unlikely the 3 outcome of the review would have been different given the ultimate conclusion that Petitioner 4 presented both a danger to the community and a flight risk if released.") 5 2. No legal authority supports Petitioner’s argument that delayed review 6 created a liberty interest 7 Petitioner argues that DHS’ delay of the custody review process created a liberty interest, 8 and he therefore should have received a pre-deprivation hearing before further detention. He 9 bases this argument on the premise that DHS no longer had authority to detain him once he had 10 been detained up to 72 hours beyond the 90-day post-removal order period. ECF No. 1 at 15. 11 While 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) states that a noncitizen who is not removed within the 12 removal period “shall be subject to supervision…” (emphasis added), subsection 1231(a)(6) 13 allows detention beyond the 90-day removal period for those who have been “determined by 14 the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of 15 removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (“…the 16 Director of the Detention and Removal Field Office or the district director may continue a[] 17 [noncitizen] in custody beyond the removal period described in section 241(a)(1) of the Act 18 pursuant to the procedures described in this section.”). 19 Here, the agency determined after its review that Petitioner poses a threat to public safety 20 and a risk of flight, and that continued detention is therefore warranted. ECF No. 9-2 at 1. The 21 undersigned acknowledges that the agency did not make this determination until Petitioner had 22 been detained for 106 days – that is, beyond the 90-day removal period – and that Petitioner was 23 not given 30-days’ notice of the review, as is required under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(h)(1),(2). However, 24 Petitioner did not cite any binding or persuasive legal authority that states that such policy 25 violation requires release or creates a liberty interest.2 26 2 Petitioner cites Ramirez-Clavijo v. Kaiser, 25-cv-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263 (N.D.Cal.) 27 and Enamorado v. Kaiser, 25-cv-04072-NW, 2025 WL 1382859 (N.D. Cal.) in support of his argument that a pre-deprivation hearing is required where there is an acquired liberty interest, but 28 these cases are distinguishable. In both cases, ICE initially released the petitioners then re- 1 B. Prolonged detention is lawful while removal order is under appellate review 2 In an amended petition filed after Petitioner had been detained for over six months, 3 Petitioner argued that such prolonged detention violates the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 12 at 4. 4 8 USC § 1231(a)(6) does not limit the length of time a noncitizen may be detained beyond the 90- 5 day removal period, but the Supreme Court has held that detention should only continue for a 6 period reasonably necessary to bring about the noncitizen’s removal from the United States. 7 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). The Supreme Court deemed six months to be the 8 presumptive limit of a reasonable time period, and “once removal is no longer reasonably 9 foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute” Id. at 699, 701. Petitioner 10 contends that his removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable because he has appealed the IJ’s 11 denial of his application for withholding of removal. 12 Several circuits have determined that Zadvydas relief is not available to noncitizens 13 subject to final orders of removal where the only impediment to their removal is their appeal of 14 the removal order. See Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F.4th 750, 757-58 (4th Cir. 2024) ("[O]ngoing 15 withholding-only proceedings, even lengthy ones, simply do not present the same risk of 16 'indefinite and potentially permanent detention' at issue in Zadvydas. Stated differently, ongoing 17 withholding-only proceedings do not, standing alone, cast doubt on the foreseeability of an alien's 18 removal in the future."). See also G.P. v. Garland, 103 F.4th 898, 902 (1st Cir. 2024); Martinez v. 19 Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2020). The Ninth Circuit has also held, in the context of 20 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), that ongoing litigation of a removal order does not place 21 someone in the same “removable-but-unremovable limbo” as were the petitioners in Zadvydas. 22 Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008).3 Although the Ninth Circuit has not 23 detained them. In the instant case, ICE has never made a determination that Petitioner should not 24 be detained. 3 Petitioner noted that Prieto-Romero involved detention under § 1226(a) whereas Petitioner’s 25 detention is governed by § 1231. ECF No. 16 at 5. However, the Ninth Circuit addressed the distinction at length before concluding that neither § 1226(a) nor § 1231(a)(6) authorize indefinite 26 detention. Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008). “It would be incongruous 27 for us to conclude, in the absence of clear evidence, that Congress intended other detention statutes to authorize the indefinite detention of [noncitizens], where such detention would clearly 28 pose the same constitutional concerns.” Id. This is therefore a distinction without a material 1 decided this issue within the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) specifically, district courts within 2 the Ninth Circuit have agreed with the above-referenced circuit decisions. See, e.g., Paez v. Scott, 3 No. 2:26-cv-01144-LK, 2026 WL 1396111 at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2026) ("The stay 4 resulting from [Petitioner's] ongoing appeal does not create a 'removable-but-unremovable limbo' 5 because 'ongoing withholding-only proceedings alone are insufficient to demonstrate that removal 6 is no longer reasonably foreseeable.... To reach a contrary result would be to go against the clear 7 weight of authority.") (citations omitted). 8 As in Paez, Petitioner is not stuck in a removable-but-unremovable limbo. Petitioner has 9 not alleged any reason why he would not be immediately removable if his appeal is not 10 successful. Nor has he demonstrated that the ongoing litigation was the result of “bad faith or 11 undue delay by the agency.” See GP v. Garland,103 F.4th 898 (1st Cir. 2024). While Petitioner 12 highlighted the IJ’s omission of a ruling on Petitioner’s application for relief under the 13 Convention Against Torture – an omission which will likely result in a remand – he did not allege 14 that specific error was the sole reason for the appeal. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s 15 detention remains lawful for the duration of the appellate process. 16 IV. Recommendation 17 In accordance with the above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 18 1. Petitioner RAUL CARRANZA AMBRIZ’s (A 099-632-111) application for a writ of 19 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be DENIED. 20 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 21 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within seven (14) days 22 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 23 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 24 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 25 objections shall be filed and served within seven (14) days after service of the objections. The 26 parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 27

28 difference. 1 || appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 2 | Dated: June 10, 2026 Card ft 4 by — 3 CAROLYNK.DELANEY 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 5 6 || 3 carr2230.far 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28