[522]*522STORCKMAN, J.
[518] Two cases involving the same question were consolidated for argument on appeal. Both cases involve the legality of a school tax levy. In one case the trial court decided in favor of the legality of the tax, and in the other case the decision was against its validity. One opinion on the merits will be written. In neither case are the .facts in dispute.
Briefly, the essential facts in this case are that at a special election in the defendant school district a proposition was submitted to [523]*523authorize an increase in the school levy for a period of one year. The revenue from the proposed levy was “to be used as a building fund for an elementary school and gymnasium.” The amount of increase submitted was in excess of the constitutional limit of one dollar which could be levied by the defendant school district without voter approval. The proposal carried by more than a majority, but received less than two-thirds of the votes cast. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin the collection of the tax and to have the levy declared void. Defendants have appealed from the judgment in plaintiffs’ favor.
Plaintiffs contend that § 11 (e) of Art. X of the 1945 Constitution, as amended, requires the approval of at least two-thirds, rather than a simple majority, of the qualified electors voting thereon in order to authorize a school levy in excess of the constitutional limitation of one dollar for the purpose of erecting school buildings.
Section 11 of Article X in its present form was adopted November 7, 1950, as an amendment to the 1945 Constitution. The amendment was proposed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3. Laws of Missouri 1949, pp. 642-644. The original § 11 of Art. X of the 1945 Constitution was repealed in its entirety and a new § 11 was adopted by the people; however, the only change or addition was in subsection 11(c). For convenient reference we will set out § 11(c), with the portion added by the amendment shown in italics. It is as follows:
“In all municipalities, counties and school districts the rates of taxation as herein limited may be increased for their respective purposes for not to exceed four years, when the rate and purpose of the increase are submitted to a vote and two-thirds of the qualified electors voting thereon shall vote therefor; provided in school districts the rate of taxation as herein limited may be increased for school purposes so that the total levy shall not exceed three times the limit herein specified and not to exceed one year, when the rate period of levy and the purpose of the increase are submitted to a vote and a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon shall vote therefor; provided in school districts in cities of 75,000 inhabitants or over the rate of taxation as herein limited may be increased for school purposes so that the total levy shall not exceed three times the limit herein specified and not to exceed two years, when the rate period of levy and the purpose of the increase are submitted to a vote and a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon shall vote therefor: Provided, that the rates herein fixed, and the amounts by which they may be increased, may be further limited by law; * * *.’1
The plaintiffs contend that the words “for school purposes” in the amendment were adopted from the Constitution of 1875 and that they have an adjudicated meaning that does not include the erection [524]*524of school buildings. First let us examine the rule for which they contend. It is stated in Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S.W. 196, 199, as follows: “The rule is firmly settled that the adoption in a later Constitution of the [520] words and context of another, which had been construed by a court of last resort, is presumed (in the absence of a contrary intention) to have been done to give the adopted words their adjudicated meaning'. ’ ’
First, it should be pointed out that the words in question could not have been adopted directly from the Constitution of 1875. The new constitution, as adopted by the people; in 1945, did not use these words in § 11 and there was a lapse or interval of five years before the words were brought in by the 1950 amendment. There is in this case a lack of continuity which uniformly exists where the rule is applied. The point is that, by reason of the lapse of time, it cannot be logically claimed that these words were adopted from the 1875 Constitution any more than from some other source. With much more reason it could be said that the words were taken from § 5 of Art. IX of the 1945 Constitution, where they are used without any restricted or limited meaning being expressed. This will be further discussed later in the opinion.
Further, the presumption can have no application where the context of the amended section is materially different. The cases cited by the plaintiffs in support of the rule are ones in which provisions from previous constitutions have been reincorporated directly into a later constitution in their entirety, or without material variation. Take, for example, the case of Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinek, supra, which was a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an income tax law on the ground that it violated § 4, Art. X, of the 1875 Constitution. This section in the 1875 Constitution was: “All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value.” 1 V.A.M.S. 249. This same provision, without material change, was § 30, Art. I of the 1865 Constitution, 1 V.A.M.S. 118. In the 1820 Constitution it was Art. XIII, § 19 (1V.A.M.S. 96). The court held, since the context was the same, the adjudicated meaning of the word “property,” acquired under the previous constitution, should not be disturbed.
The other case cited by plaintiffs is also a classic example of the application of the rule. In the case of Sanders v. St. Louis & N. O. Anchor Line, 97 Mo. 26, 10 S.W. 595, the court was concerned with the construction of Art. I, § 1, of the 1875 Constitution, which provided that ‘ ‘ The State shall have concurrent jurisdiction on the river Mississippi, and every other river bordering' on the State, so far as the said river shall form a common boundary to this State and any other State or States.” This same provision, in almost identical language, was contained in the Constitution of 1865 (§ 2, Art. XI), 1 V.A.M.S. 145, and the 1820 Constitution (§2, Art. X), 1 V.A.M.S. 93.
The parties differ with respect to the application of the rule. The touchstone of this point, and perhaps the whole case, is whether the [525]*525context” in § 11 of the 1945 Constitution, as amended, is the same as the context in which the words “for school purposes” were used in § 11 of the 1875 Constitution. Context is defined as: “The part or parts of a discourse preceding or following a ‘text’ or passage or a word, or so intimately associated with it as to throw light upon its meaning.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Edition.
The most significant and vital difference in the context of the two sections is the omission, in the new section, as amended, of all reference to the erection of buildings as a separate classification for voting purposes. The 1875 Constitution in effect provided that the annual rates for school purposes might be increased to an amount not to exceed $1.00 on the condition that a majority of the votes were cast in favor of the increase, except that for the purpose of erecting public buildings in school districts, the rate of taxation may be increased upon a two-thirds vote.
. The most vital part of § 11, Art. X of the 1875 Constitution that was abandoned entirely and not carried over into the new constitution or the 1950 amendment, reads as follows (1 Y.A.M.S. 251) : “For the pu-rpose of erecting public buildings in counties, cities or school districts', the rate of taxation herein limited may be increased when the rate of such increase [521] and the purpose for which it is intended shall have been submitted to a vote of the people, and two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county, city or school district, voting at such election, shall vote therefor.” There is no counterpart in the 1945 Constitution, as amended, of the above provision separately classifying the purpose of levying a tax for the erection of school buildings.
If § 11 of the 1875 Constitution had not expressly created the exception with respect to the vote necessary to create a tax for the erection of school buildings, or if such provision had been repealed, there would have been no occasion for the exclusion of the erection of school buildings from the term “school purposes” generally. See the first sentence of § 11 which gives the broad grant of power to tax “for school purposes.” This is further evident from the statement in the ease of State ex rel. Brown v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 83 Mo. 395, which appears to be the first case construing § 11, Art. X, of the 1875 Constitution as it relates to school taxes. The genesis of the classification ruling is probably in that case, wherein the court states, l.c. 397: “The plaintiff contends that all taxes relating to schools, school buildings and indebtedness on account of schools and school buildings are taxes for school purposes and but for the constitutional classification of these different taxes into taxes for school purposes, taxes for the purpose of erecting ptiblic buildings and taxes to pay an existing indebtedness there would be plausibility in the argument.”
• The purpose of erecting school buildings was expressly carved out and separated from other school purposes in the old constitution. [526]*526The context is not the same in the new section, and that removes the prop that held the meaning np. Obviously, affirmative negation is not necessary, and an intention contrary to the presumed use may be apparent from all the circumstances.
The construction of the old section resorted to over the years related primarily to what items should go into each of the two classes established by § 11 of Art. X of the 1875 Constitution. The plaintiff taxpayers cite a number of cases, all decided while the 1875 Constitution was in effect, in support of their contention that the words “for school purposes ’ ’ do not include the erection of new buildings or classrooms. It might be questioned whether actually there was, under the 1875 Constitution, a construction such as that for which the plaintiffs contend. In referring to this matter, it was stated in the case of Harrington v. Hopkins, 288 Mo. 1, 231 S.W. 263: “The language of the section just quoted is too plain to need construction. ’ ’ The Harrington case as well as Jacobs v. Cauthorn, 293 Mo. 154, 238 S.W. 443, and State ex rel. Marlowe v. Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber Co., 332 Mo. 379, 58 SW.2d 750, all involved the question of whether alterations, repairs, improvements or the furnishing of existing buildings were included within the term ‘ ‘ erecting buildings, ’ ’ and it was held’ they were not. In Hudgins v. Mooresville Consol. School Dist., 312 Mo. 1, 278 SW. 769, it was held that the expense of equipping new buildings could he included in the cost thereof and was not a school purpose which must be paid out of annual revenue. In Peter v. Kaufmann, 327 Mo. 915, 38 S.W.2d 1062, an attack was made upon a bond issue levied for the purpose of completing a schoolhouse. This was held to be a separate and distinct tax and a valid levy. The case of Russell v. Frank, 348 Mo. 533, 154 S.W.2d 63, held that a levy could not be made for payment into the building fund when no buildings were contemplated by the funds to be later transferred to the fund for the payment of general operating expenses of the school system. This was held void as an obvious evasion of the limits imposed by the constitution.
In each instance where the term “for school purposes” has been construed not to include building purposes, it has been because of an express constitutional or statutory provision. For instance, the ease of Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People ex rel. Wood, 163 Ill. 616, 621, 45 N.E. 122, 123, twice cited in Missouri cases, is based upon [522] an Illinois statute which authorizes a tax annually upon the taxable property of the district, of “not to exceed two per cent, for educational, and three per cent, for building purposes.” In the State of Georgia there is no constitutional or statutory classification, and in the case of Board of Commissioners of Roads & Revenues of Twiggs County v. Bond, 203 Ga. 558, 47 S.E.2d 511, 512, the court held: “On the other hand, the term, ‘for educational purposes,’ is broad enough to cover all things necessary or incidental to the furtherance of education, [527]*527which would include the construction of schoolhouses, the only limitation being the one fixed by the Constitution itself, to wit, that the levy of a direct tax for educational purposes should not exceed fifteen mills. ’ ’
The "constitutional classification” has been abandoned in the new section, as amended, and in this changed situation the controlling rule is: "With the disappearance of the reason, the thing disappears; when the reason for a rule of law fails, the rule fails. When the reason for a definition of a legal term ceases, the definition is oh solete. ” State ex inf. Norman v. Ellis, 325 Mo. 154, 28 S.W.2d 363, 367. The reason for the definition was that the 1875 Constitution expressly required it. That reason having been removed by the enactment of § 11 of Art. X of the 1945 Constitution, as amended, the previous definition became obsolete.
In the case of State ex rel. Crow v. Hostetter, 137 Mo. 636, 39 S.W. 270, it was contended that only males were eligible for the office of clerk of the county court. The basis of this contention was that the constitution provided that a public officer must be a citizen of the United States and that he must have resided in the state for one year "next preceding his election or appointment.” The court pointed out that the omission of limiting words was significant, and stated, on page 649:
"The dropping of the word ‘male/ in describing the qualifications for such offices, has value as a guide to the legislative purpose in enacting the- present law on this subject. Can there be any doubt as to the intended effect of such a change of the statute on the particular question before us?
. "It is always allowable in interpreting statutes to consider the prior law as compared with the present, in endeavoring to reach the true intent of the legislature which, when found, is the spirit of the law that the courts should enforce. ’ ’
Plaintiffs are, in effect, asking us to imply an exception where none exists under the express terms or plain intendments of the constitutional provision. The law is well settled that it is the duty of the court, in construing the constitution, to give effect to an express provision rather than an implication. In the case of State ex rel. Scott v. Dircks, 211 Mo. 568, 111 S.W. 1, the question involved was the eligibility of the relator to serve as sheriff where the constitutional provision with respect to tenure had been amended. The court refused to construe an' exception where -none was expressed, applying this rule (111 S.W., l.c. 4) : "But, however that may be, it must be borne in mind that, in endeavoring to reach the meaning of the provision under consideratifih, there is a vrell-settled rule of interpretation, to wit: ‘Where no exceptions are made in terms, none will be made by mere implication or construction.’ ”
[528]*528The fact that a word, term or phrase in a different context and under different circumstances may have a changed meaning is well demonstrated by the ruling in Towne v. Eisner, 38 S.Ct. 158, 159, wherein Mr. Justice Plolmes stated: “But it is not necessarily true that income means the same thing in the Constitution and the Act. A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. ’ ’
There are other differences in the context, but the ones we have pointed out [523] are sufficient without more to distinguish the present use of the words from the use in the 1875 Constitution. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the words “for school purposes” were adopted from the former constitution so as to foreclose an inquiry into their meaning as used in the amended section.
If construction is needed, the court should approach the construction of § 11 of Art. X of the 1945 Constitution, as amended, from the standpoint of accepted rules of construction, the compulsion of the previous definition having been removed. As stated in Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920, 931: “It is of course fundamental that where the language of a statute is plain and admits of but one meaning there is no room for construction.” This rule applies with equal force to constitutional provisions.
If there is a conflict or ambiguity in the section that requires construction, it can only arise between the term “school purposes,” as used in the amendment, and the term “respective purposes” appearing in the first part of § 11(c), which reads: “In all municipalities, counties and school districts the rates of taxation as herein limited may be increased for their respective purposes * * *.” The word “respective,” as used in this connection, means “relating to particular persons or things, each to each; particular; several; as, their respective homes.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Edition. Obviously, the use of the word “respective,” in this instance, is to indicate a several, and not a joint, purpose. It is used for convenience to avoid repeating the words municipal, county and school or school district as modifiers of “purposes.” We consider the meaning to be the same as if the drafters of the provision had stated “in all municipalities, counties and school districts, the rate of taxation as herein limited may be increased for municipal, coimty and school district (or school) purposes, respectively * * *.” The only question that can be raised is whether the term “school district purposes” should be construed to have a meaning that includes new buildings, while the term “school purposes” should be construed to have a limited meaning exclusive of building purposes. Certainly there is no distinction or classification expressly created, nor do we believe that any can reasonably be read into the section by implication. Such a construction would be strained and fanciful.
[529]*529Neither "respective purposes,” "school district purposes” nor "school purposes” are technical words or phrases. Technical words are those "of or pertaining to the useful or mechanical arts, or any science, business, profession or sport, or the like.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Edition. Therefore these terms must be given their plain or ordinary meaning unless such construction will defeat the manifest intent of the constitutional provision. State ex inf., Rice ex rel. Allman v. Hawk, 360 Mo. 490, 228 S.W.2d 785, 788.
We cannot agree that it is necessary, as plaintiffs contend, to treat the term "school purposes” as surplusage if it does not have the meaning for which they contend. It might as well be contended that the phrase "respective purposes,” occurring in §§ 11(b) and 11(c), is surplusage in one or both places it is used. Unless limited by the constitution, the legislature could extend to school districts the power to tax for purposes beyond its usual realm. The limitation results only because the constitution so provides. There could be n.o objection if the constitution permitted by failure to restrict or even provided that school districts could tax, for example, to build roads and bridges in the district. It appears to be good draftsmanship and entirely logical to mention "respective purposes” and "school purposes,” as they occur in the section, in order to make it clear that the intent is to keep each political subdivision in its own traditional field.
Nor can we find any logical basis for the contention that building purposes [524] are excluded by the majority requirement and included in the two-thirds provision. With equal logic any other item of educational purpose might be excluded or included. We consider that the limitations in the amendment of a rate "not to exceed three times” the primary constitutional limit, and the period of "not to exceed one year” as to duration of the levy, indicate an intent to include all purposes in each instance. These added safeguards or limitations are designed to compensate for lowering the required majority.
Assuming, however, that there is "room for construction,” there are well-recognized rules for the guidance of the court. "The fundamental purpose in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it.” 16 C.J.S. 51, § 16. This is the rule in Missouri: Graves v. Purcell, 337 Mo. 574, 85 S.W.2d 543; State ex rel. Aquamsi Land Co. v. Hostetter, 336 Mo. 391, 79 S.W.2d 463, 468; State ex inf. Norman v. Ellis, 325 Mo. 154, 28 S.W.2d 363; State ex rel. Lashly v. Becker, 290 Mo. 560, 235 S.W. 1017, 1020; State v. Adkins, 284 Mo. 680, 225 S.W. 981. In this instance the framers are the General Assembly of Missouri, since § 11 in its entirety was repealed and a ■new section adopted in lien thereof, as shown by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3. Laws of Missouri 1949, p. 642.
[530]*530Consideration should be given to the purpose of the constitutional provision in question and a reasonable interpretation should be made of the language used. State ex rel. Lashly v. Becker, supra. The language used in § 11 (c), as amended, presents no obvious conflict. The words “school purposes” are general words and the meaning of the term must be construed broadly and in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning, unless some good reason, consistent with the purpose of the constitutional provision, otherwise appears.
A principle of construction that should be kept in mind is that while the construction of constitutional provisions should be neither liberal nor strict, it is quite generally held that in arriving at the intent and purpose the construction should be broad and liberal rather than technical, and the constitutional provision should receive a broader and more liberal construction than statutes. State ex rel. Lashly v. Becker, supra; 16 C.J.S. 54, § 16; 11 Am. Jur. 670-671, § 59. The reason is, a constitution is expected to be effective over a longer period of time, and its method of revision or amendment is more cumbersome than the legislative process.
The unfettered term, “school purposes,” connotes an all-inclusive meaning and there are numerous circumstances that support that interpretation. The amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 used the term “school taxes” in its title, which indicates an intent that all kinds of school taxes be embraced in the language used. The title reads (Laws of Missouri 1949, p. 642) : “Repealing and reenacting Section 11, Article X, Missouri Constitution, and in addition providing school laxes may be increased not to exceed three times constitutional limitation by majority vote for period of two years in districts in cities of 75,000 or over and one year in other school districts. ’ ’ This throws light upon our problem and may be considered according to the rule stated in 16 C.J.S. 65, § 23, as follows: “Although the title to an act of the legislature proposing an amendment to the constitution is not necessary to the validity of the act, nevertheless such title may be resorted to when construing and interpreting the section of the constitution to which it relates.” “School taxes” are not distinguishable from taxes “for schools,” and this latter term was held to include “all sorts and kinds of taxes.” See St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gracy, 126 Mo. 472, 29 S.W. 579, wherein the court stated (126 Mo., l.c. 481) : “It is evident that the -words ‘for schools,’ in such a connection, -were not employed with reference to the details of any scheme of taxation * * *, but, in a wider, larger sense, to describe all sorts and kinds of [525] taxes, sanctioned by the constitution and law’s, for the support of schools. ”
The term “school purposes” appears in § 5 of Art. IX of the 1945 Constitution, as originally adopted. This section of the article on education relating to the public school fund provides: “.The proceeds of all certificates of indebtedness due the state school fund, [531]*531and all moneys, bonds, lands, and other property belonging to or donated to any state fund for public school purposes” shall be paid into the state treasury and invested and preserved as a public school fund, the annual income of which shall be faithfully appropriated “for establishing and maintaining free public schools.” The 1875 Constitution (Art. XI, § 6) had used the phrase, “for purposes of education,” but this was changed to “public school purposes” in Art. IX, §.5, of the 1945 Constitution. One of the rules for interpreting the meaning of words in a constitution is that: “In the absence of a contrary intention, the same meaning attaches, or is presumed to attach, to a given word or phrase repeated in a constitution, wherever it occurs therein.” 16 C.J.S. 60, § 19(b). The fact that the term “school purposes” was in the 1945 Constitution at the time the 1950 amendment was adopted indicates that we should look to the meaning as there used rather than the meaning claimed to have been intended in a former constitution which had been superseded more than five years previously.
The report of the constitutional convention committee indicates an intent to use the term in a broad sense. The committee on Taxation, Levy, Assessment and Collection, No. 10' of the 1943-1944 Constitutional Convention, considered and reported on the section in question. The majority report of this committee, in its explanatory comment or “Remarks” on § 11 (File No. 19, pp. 8, 11), refers to “school purposes.” It states: “Experience has demonstrated the need of somewhat higher rates for school purposes, and this has been taken care of in the new Section.” The majority report used the term “respective purposes” in the text of the section, and in that form it was adopted by the convention. The minority report employs the term “school purposes” which also shows an intent to get away from the distinction and classification of the section of the former constitution.
It should be carefully noted that the amended portion of the section follows with meticulous care the language used in the original provision for increase of the levy. For instance, both provisions require that “the rate and purpose of the increase” must be submitted to the voters. Here again, there is no limitation on the purpose of the increase when there was an opportunity to limit the purposes if the framers (the legislature) had so desired. If the General Assembly, in redrafting § 11 for reenactment, had intended to limit the application of amendment to “the usual and ordinary expenses of maintaining and operating schools” or “school district purposes excluding the erection of buildings,” it could have easily clarified the situation by the use of some such expression. In order to give the words the construction contended for by the plaintiffs, we must assume that the General Assembly used a devious and round-about method of expression where a plain, simple, intelligible way was available to express the [532]*532meaning for which the plaintiffs contend. See State ex rel. Crow v. Hostetter, 137 Mo. 636, 39 S.W. 270, wherein the court stated (137 Mo., l.c. 648) : “If the lawmakers had regarded sex as determining eligibility, it seems to us that they would have expressed themselves plainly to that effect, as they did in former years. They have so expressed themselves in other statutes; * *
On each occasion that the General Assembly had an opportunity to express itself it treated “school purposes,” “district purposes” and “respective purposes” as synonymous. That the legislature did not intend to limit the meaning of the words “school purposes” is evident from its activities in connection with implementing both the 1945 Constitution and the 1950 amendment as regards § 11. The titles to both the 1945 Act and the 1951 Act used the term “school purposes.” The 1945 Act, after reciting the sections to be repealed, stated: “all relating [526] to taxation for school purposes, and to enact in lieu of said sections three new sections relating to the same subject * * Laws of Missouri 1945, p. 1629. Senate Bill 208, approved January 25, 1946. Senate Bill 5, approved on March 15, 1951, after the 1950 amendment, in its title stated this was an act ‘ ‘ to amend Section 165.080, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1949, relating to increases in tax levies for school purposes * * Thus, in each instance the General Assembly treated the subject matter of these two acts all as “school purposes” — the first being before it had proposed the 1950 amendment.
Furthermore, the resulting statute, which is now § 165.080, RSMo 1949, draws no distinction between the purposes for which a two-thirds vote is required and those purposes for which a simple majority is sufficient. Plaintiffs undertake to connect the term “necessary majority” with the purposes for which school taxes can be voted. There is nothing in the language of the constitution or the statute to encourage such a belief. It is plain that the words “necessary majority” do not relate to the purpose of the tax, but to the amount of the tax and its duration. A school tax voted by a two-thirds majority may be in an unlimited amount and may be effective for not to exceed four years. A tax carried by a simple majority, however, must be limited to three times basic limit of one dollar and can be effective for one year only. This statute and the manner in which it was enacted further confirms the fact that the only distinction or classification made by the legislature related to the amount of the increase and the period for which the levy was voted.
A contemporaneous legislative construction is entitled to and will be given serious consideration by the court in determining the meaning of an ambiguous constitutional provision, both as a matter of policy and also because it may be presumed to represent the true intent of the instrument. State ex rel. City of Carthage v. Hackmann, 287 Mo. 184, 229 S.W. 1078, 1081; State ex rel. O’Connor v. Riedel, 329 [533]*533Mo. 616, 46 S.W.2d 131; State ex rel. Wayland v. Herring, 208 Mo. 708, 106 S.W. 984. The General Assembly, in framing the 1950 amendment and the act to implement it, as well as the 1945 constitutional provision, must be presumed to have known the problems presented which indicated the desirability of an amendment, and to have drawn the amendment in a way to prevent or remedy the difficulty. Koontz v. City of St. Louis, (Mo.), 84 S.W. 2d 131; Lovins v. City of St. Louis, 336 Mo. 1194, 84 S.W.2d 127; State ex rel. City of Boonville v. Hackmann, 293 Mo. 313, 240 S.W. 135; State ex rel. City of Carthage v. Hackmann, 287 Mo. 184, 229 S.W. 1078, 1080; 16 C.J.S. 52, 53, § 16.
The General Assembly, unless restrained by the constitution, is vested, in its representative capacity, with all the primary power of the people. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S.W. 196, 197. In view of this fact, great deference should be had for the fact that the legislature made no distinction between “school purposes” and “district purposes” at any time when dealing with this section. In considering contemporaneous legislative construction, this court, in the case of State ex rel. O’Connor v. Riedel, supra, held (46 S.W.2d, l.c. 134) : “Though not conclusive, such interpretation is entitled to great weight and should not be departed from unless manifestly erroneous. ’ ’
Also, we have been reminded' of the well-established rule of construction that an interpretation of a statute by public officers charged with its execution, while not controlling upon the courts, is entitled to consideration. State ex rel. Barrett v. First Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 297 Mo. 397, 249 S.W. 619; Automobile Gasoline Co. v. City of St. Louis, 326 Mo. 435, 32 S.W.2d 281, 283. It is claimed by the school districts that the commissioner of education and others in his department interpret the term “school purposes” as including erection of buildings. However, we do not think the matter of such interpretation is properly before us, and we have [527] reached our conclusions apart from any such consideration.
Plaintiffs also complain of the representations that were made or facts that were not disclosed by the proponents during the campaign for the adoption of the 1950 amendment. Such a construction, even if it were proven, which it is not, is entitled to no consideration. In the case of State ex rel. Russell v. State Highway Commission, 328 Mo. 942, 42 S.W.2d 196, 202, this court considered public utterances of the advocates of an amendment to the constitution. This court, after referring to an Arkansas case that “disregarded altogether” evidence of this sort, held, l.c. 202: “Without going that far in this case, and not forgetting the return alleges the people did believe and rely on the statements made to them, we hold it is neither conclusive nor persuasive evidence that the particular clause of the amendment [534]*534here Tinder consideration has the particular meaning' respondent attributes to it. ”
Unless the meaning of the terms employed is not clear, ques^ tions as to the wisdom, expediency or justice of the constitutional provision should play no part in the construction thereof. Further constitutional restrictions should not be held to apply if any reasonable doubt as to their repugnance can exist in the judicial mind. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S.W. 196. There is nothing inherently wrong in permitting the voters in a school district to tax themselves by a majority vote in a limited amount for a limited time for any educational purpose. The rule of the majority is so much a part of our political system and, in fact, of our way of life, that it should not be denied to the people unless the law clearly so provides. Tanner v. Lindell R. Co., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155, 158. Long term levies and bonded indebtedness are covered by other constitutional provisions. An annal levy for building purposes would seem to present no more cause for alarm than an annual levy for maintenance and operations. Both are vitally necessary for the successful operation of our school system.
We should keep in mind that § 11(c) gives the legislature the power to further limit the rates fixed by the constitution and the amounts by which they may be increased. This indicates an intent to vest the power of further safeguarding the people against their own acts, so to speak, in the General Assembly rather than in the courts. This fact should contribute to a liberal construction of the constitutional limitations.
We believe, and so hold, that the only reasonable and harmonious construction of the term "school purposes” is that it includes within its meaning construction of a building or additional classrooms. Accordingly the judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
Leedy, G.J., Hollingsworth and Hyde, JJ., concur; Eager, J., dissents in separate opinion; Westhues, J., and Ruarh, Special J., dissent, and concur in separate dissenting opinion of Eager, J.