Rasor v. Massanari

201 F. Supp. 2d 976, 2001 WL 1862802
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedAugust 30, 2001
Docket1:00CV 77 DDN
StatusPublished

This text of 201 F. Supp. 2d 976 (Rasor v. Massanari) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rasor v. Massanari, 201 F. Supp. 2d 976, 2001 WL 1862802 (E.D. Mo. 2001).

Opinion

201 F.Supp.2d 976 (2001)

Karen S. RASOR, Plaintiff,
v.
Larry G. MASSANARI,[1] Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 1:00CV 77 DDN.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division.

August 30, 2001.

*978 Samuel M. Coring, Reynolds And Gold, Springfield, MO, for plaintiff.

Nicholas P. Llewellyn, Office Of U.S. Attorney, St. Louis, MO, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

NOCE, United States Magistrate Judge.

This action is before the court for judicial review of the final decision of the defendant Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. Oral argument was heard on June 21, 2001. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Karen Rasor filed an application for disability insurance benefits on April 20, 1998, alleging disability due to pulmonary fibrosis with an onset date of April 2, 1994. (Tr. 81-85). Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 53-54, 66-69, 71-73a).

Following a hearing on December 8, 1998, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that plaintiff was not disabled under *979 the Act at a time when she met the insured status requirements and denied benefits. (Tr. 12-20). Additional evidence was submitted to the Appeals Council (Tr. 318-43), but the Council denied plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's determination. (Tr. 3-5). Thus, the decision of the ALJ becomes the final decision of the Commissioner.

Relevant to the issues presented herein, the ALJ determined in her decision of January 29, 1999, that:

1. Plaintiff met the disability insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on April 2, 1994, the date she stated she became unable to work, and continued to meet them through September 30, 1996.

2. Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 2, 1994.

3. The medical evidence establishes that prior to September 30, 1996, plaintiff had allergic sinusitis "and/or" allergic bronchitis, but that she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equivalent to one listed in the Commissioner's List of Disabling Impairments.

4. Plaintiff's allegations and testimony of symptoms precluding the full range of sedentary work prior to September 30, 1996, were not fully credible to the extent alleged for the reason that they are not fully supported by, or consistent with, the medical and other evidence.

5. Plaintiff had no nonexertional limitations and had the residual functional capacity to perform the physical exertion requirements of work, including the full range of sedentary work except for prolonged standing and walking and lifting more than ten pounds.

6. Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work.

7. Guideline Rules 201.27 and 201.28 direct a conclusion that considering the plaintiff's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, she was not disabled prior to September 30, 1996.

8. Consequently, plaintiff was not disabled under the Act.

(Tr. 18-19).

The court must affirm findings of the ALJ that are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wilcutts v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir.1998). Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient quality that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir.2000). In reviewing the record, the court may not make its own findings of fact or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir.1992). Nevertheless, when the court reviews the record for substantial evidence, it must review the entire record and consider whatever detracts from the weight of the evidence invoked by the ALJ. Singh, 222 F.3d at 451; Piercy v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 190, 191 (8th Cir.1987). See also Wilcutts v. Apfel, 143 F.3d at 1136-37. Thus, substantial evidence on the record as a whole requires the court to "take into consideration the weight of the evidence in the record and apply a balancing test to evidence which is contradictory." Wilcutts, 143 F.3d at 1136 (quoting Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir.1987)). However, reversal is not proper just because there is substantial evidence which might have supported an opposite result. Boyd v. Sullivan, 960 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir.1992).

*980 Evidence Before the ALJ

At the hearing conducted on December 8, 1998, plaintiff complained of disability from pulmonary fibrosis and bone pain in her legs. She testified that her chief complaints were not having "enough wind, enough energy" and bone pain in her legs. (Tr. 34). She estimated that the problems started in about 1993 with episodes of uncontrollable coughing. (Tr. 36, 38). She was diagnosed with pulmonary fibrosis in 1995. (Tr. 37). She testified that she stopped working after the birth of her youngest daughter in 1994 and was a homemaker. (Tr. 25-26, 37). She has three children ages 3 to 14 and is married. (Tr. 32). She has a high school education. (Tr. 33).

Plaintiff testified that she worked in a floral shop from approximately January 1998 through April 1998 but she had to quit because she was so tired. She worked every other day and it would take her a day to recuperate from a day at work. (Tr. 29). She said that the work was hard and physical; it required a lot of lifting and carrying. (Tr. 30, 47). She was able to keep pace with the other employees, but she had "no energy to spare." (Tr. 46). She never imagined that this job involved so much physical work when she took it. (Tr. 47). She had to quit when she could no longer speak above a whisper. Id. Additionally, mold and aerosol sprays used at her place of employment aggravated her condition. (Tr. 33).

She also testified that, over the course of her working life, she has worked in department stores as Christmas help, as a factory worker, as a cashier, as a stocker, and as a sales worker. (Tr. 48). She testified that she did not believe she could currently work as a cashier, because standing in one spot "kills [her] legs." (Tr. 48).

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Baldeo K. Singh v. Kenneth S. Apfel
222 F.3d 448 (Eighth Circuit, 2000)
Gavin v. Heckler
811 F.2d 1195 (Eighth Circuit, 1987)

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201 F. Supp. 2d 976, 2001 WL 1862802, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rasor-v-massanari-moed-2001.