Rapp v. NaphCare Inc

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided January 24, 2023·No. 3:21-cv-05800·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA JOHN RAPP, et al., CASE NO. 3:21-cv-05800-DGE Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART v. AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO NAPHCARE INC. et al., COMPEL Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to compel regarding Defendant NaphCare Inc. (Dkt. No. 81.) NaphCare opposed Plaintiffs’ motion. (Dkt. No. 83.) Having reviewed the motion, all supporting materials, and the record, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion to compel. Plaintiff served its first set of interrogatories and requests for production on NaphCare on January 14, 2022. (Dkt. No. 81 at 2.) Plaintiff moves to compel NaphCare’s responses to Interrogatories 12, 15, and 16, and Requests for Production 9, 12, 18, 22, 23, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34. (Id. at 3, 7–8.) Plaintiffs’ counsel conferred with NaphCare’s counsel on October 14, 2022 before moving to compel. (Dkt. No. 82 at 2.) Therefore, the parties have fulfilled the meet and confer requirement of Local Civil Rule 37(a).

A. Legal Standard “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). If requested discovery is not answered, the requesting party may move for an order compelling such discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). The party that resists discovery has the burden to show why the discovery request should be denied. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp.,

519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). B. Plaintiffs’ Monell Claim As a threshold issue, many of NaphCare’s objections hinge on its contention that Plaintiffs have not alleged a § 1983 claim against NaphCare or “specific facts concerning a particular NaphCare policy that was the moving force behind the alleged violation of § 1983.” (Dkt. No. 83 at 11.) Plaintiffs argue, under their Sixth Cause of Action, NaphCare knew of and callously disregarded the excessive risk to inmate health and safety caused by its inadequate formal and informal policies and established practices that put profit ahead of care. (Dkt. No. 81 at 5) (citing Dkt. No. 63 at 54). Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged Nick Rapp was informed he

would be required to pay for mental health assistance (Dkt. No. 63 at 20), and NaphCare’s medical director relied on LPNs (Licensed Practical Nurses) to make independent assessments and treatment decisions (id. at 21–22) and was not qualified for the position (id. at 43).1 In essence, NaphCare argues Plaintiffs fail to state a claim. The Court questions

NaphCare’s decision to raise this argument in a discovery motion instead of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Indeed, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss but did not touch upon Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against NaphCare. (See generally Dkt. No. 66.) Thus, NaphCare’s arguments are misplaced. Notwithstanding the procedural posture of NaphCare’s arguments, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ factual allegations adequately state a Monell claim against NaphCare. C. Discovery Requests Related to NaphCare’s Financial Condition “A defendant’s net worth and financial condition is relevant to the issue of punitive damages.” Dawson v. S. Corr. Entity, No. C19-1987RSM, 2021 WL 843141, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2021) (citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462

(1993)). Punitive damages are available under § 1983 if the defendant is not a municipality. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.13 (1985). Because NaphCare is a private entity, punitive damages are available. See Zeigler v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, No. 2:11-CV-01301-JAD, 2015 WL 355422, at *7 (D. Nev. Jan. 27, 2015). Further, “[n]o specific prayer for . . . punitive damages is needed.” Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Eklund v.

1 It would have been easier to review the Monnell claim had the 55-page Second Amended Complaint simply summarized these factual allegations together in one section labeled “Facts supporting Monell claim against Naphcare” (or some other similar title). City of Seattle, No. C06-1815Z, 2009 WL 1916066, at *6 (W.D. Wash. June 30, 2009), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 628 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 2010). NaphCare objects to all discovery requests concerning its financial status, arguing “the facts within the § 1983 claim are not against NaphCare, but against individuals who worked for

NaphCare, who are then individually named as subject to punitive damages.” (Dkt. No. 83 at 11.) NaphCare points to the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) “Relief Requested” section, which states “Plaintiff requests a judgment against all Defendants . . . [p]unitive damages[.]” (Id. at 10) (referencing Dkt. No. 63 at 55.) NaphCare argues “Plaintiffs cannot seek discovery against NaphCare solely based on a ‘relief requested’ section of their Complaint.” (Id. at 11.) NaphCare further argues “[a]t no point in the SAC do Plaintiffs allege specific facts concerning a particular NaphCare policy that was the moving force behind the alleged violation of § 1983.” (Id.) NaphCare’s arguments fail for two reasons. First, although Plaintiffs do not specify which Defendants are subject to punitive damages in its “Relief Requested” section, no specific

prayer is required. See Cancellier, 672 F.2d at 1319. Second, as discussed above, a motion to dismiss, not a discovery motion, would be the appropriate place for NaphCare to argue Plaintiffs’ SAC lacks specific facts concerning a particular NaphCare policy. Therefore, Plaintiffs allege a live Monell claim and NaphCare’s financial condition is relevant. However, the Court agrees with NaphCare that Plaintiffs’ discovery requests for financial information are overly broad given they contain no time limit. In their motion to compel, Plaintiffs state: In an effort to compromise, Plaintiffs are willing to limit this request to financial statements provided to banks or other lenders to establish eligibility for a loan or line of credit, statements demonstrating the company’s solvency, and tax returns for the current fiscal year. (Dkt. No. 81 at 4.) Accordingly, NaphCare need not reply to Interrogatories 15 and 16, and Requests for Production 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34. NaphCare shall provide Plaintiffs a full and complete response to their revised request for financial documents. D. Discovery Requests Related to NaphCare’s History of Inmate Mental Health Treatment

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