Ransone v. Craft

170 S.E. 610, 161 Va. 332, 1933 Va. LEXIS 322
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedSeptember 21, 1933
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 170 S.E. 610 (Ransone v. Craft) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ransone v. Craft, 170 S.E. 610, 161 Va. 332, 1933 Va. LEXIS 322 (Va. 1933).

Opinion

Hudgins, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

S. K. Craft and O. H. Ridgeway, barbers, filed their hill in equity, challenging the validity of an ordinance1 adopted July 15, 1932, by the Roanoke city council, regulating the trade or operation of barbers and beauty culturists within the city. The allegations of the bill are rather vague, but the material charges seem to be (1) that complainants on January 1, 1932, obtained a license from [335]*335the city for the purpose of conducting a barber’s shop therein for the year 1932, and that the city had no right in the license year to change the manner or method of operating the business; (2) that the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive; (3) that the passage of the ordinance was ultra vires—i. e., the city council was without authority to adopt such regulations.

Respondent C. B. Ransone, health officer of the city of Roanoke, filed an answer to the bill denying the material allegations and averring that the city of Roanoke had full authority and power to pass the ordinance in question. Depositions of several witnesses in support of the allegations in the bill and the answers were duly taken and filed. The court declared the ordinance invalid and void and by decree perpetually enjoined the city health officer from enforcing any of its provisions. From that decree, respondent obtained this appeal.

The compláinants below filed no brief in this court, [336]*336hence we have been denied the benefit of the views of their counsel. Under these circumstances, we have confined our consideration of the case to the two grounds upon which the trial court in its written opinion based its conclusion. These grounds are:

(1) That the State Board of Health, under the general power conferred upon it by the legislature, had made rules and regulations on the same subject, with which the ordinance in question was in conflict and therefore void. The bill of complaint does not allege that the ordinance is in conflict with any rule or regulation adopted! by the State Board of Health, and there is nothing in the record on which to base the statement in the opinion of the trial judge that the tw!o are in conflict. Under these circumstances, the finding of the trial court on the point is not sustained.

(2) That the legislature had passed no general law empowering municipalities to adopt such regulations, [337]*337and that the ordinance in question was a private, special and local law and within the inhibition of section 65 of the Virginia Constitution.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the trade, science or profession which is sought to be regulated by the ordinance deals with the treatment of the persons of the patrons by direct application with the hands or mechanical instruments manipulated by the operator. Careless, or unsanitary practice in this trade may induce or spread contagious or infectious diseases, hence such trades or callings are subject to reasonable rules and regulations by the legislative branch of the government. See State v. Reeve (Fla.) 139 So. 817, 79 A. L. R. 1119; State v. Zeno, 79 Minn. 80, 81 N. W. 748, 48 L. R. A. 88, 79 Am. St. Rep. 422; State v. Armeno, 29 R. I. 431, 72 Atl. 216; Hanzal v. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App.) 221 S. W. 237, 239.

The charter of the city of Roanoke, among other things,, empowered its council:

[338]*338“To provide for the preservation of the general health of the inhabitants of said city, make regulations to secure the same; * * * * prevent introduction or spread of contagious or infectious disease, and prevent and suppress disease generally; to provide for the organization of a department of health to have the powers of a board of health, for said city, with the authority necessary for the prompt and efficient performance of its duties, with power to invest any or all the officers or employees of such department of health with such powers as the police officers of the city have; * * * *

“To do all things whatsoever necessary or expedient for promoting or maintaining the general welfare, comfort, education, morals, peace, government, health, trade, commerce or industry of the city or its inhabitants. * * * *

“To make and enforce all ordinances, rules and regulations necessary or expedient for the purpose of carrying into effect the powers conferred by this charter or by any [339]*339general law, and to provide and impose suitable penalties for the violation of such ordinances, rules or regulations, or any of them, by fine not exceeding $500, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both. The enumeration of particular powers in this charter shall not be deemed or held to be exclusive, but in addition to the powers enumerated herein, implied thereby, or appropriate to the exercise thereof, the said city shall have and may exercise all other powers which are now or may hereafter be possessed or enjoyed by cities under the Constitution and general laws of this State.” See section 2, subsections 28, 31 and 32.

It appears from these provisions, if valid, of the city charter, that the city council had express authority to pass an ordinance regulating such trade or calling. However, it was held by the trial court that the General Assembly was prohibited by section 65 of the Virginia Gonstitu[340]*340tion from delegating any such authority to the municipality except by general law, and that the legislature had passed no general statute on the subject. In other words, that the provisions of the city charter quoted above constituted “local and special legislation,” applicable only to the city of Roanoke, and for that reason such grant of power was within the prohibition of section 65. It has been repeatedly held by this court that charters of municipal corporations, or amendments thereto, conferring rights and powers different from, and in addition to, those conferred by general statutes are authorized by the Constitution when enacted in accordance with article 4 (sections 40-68) and section 117 of the Constitution. See Miller v. Pulaski, 109 Va. 137, 63 S. E. 880, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 552; Town of Narrows v. Giles County, 128 Va. 572, 105 S. E. 82; City of Portsmouth v. Weiss, 145 Va. 94, 133 S. E. 781; [341]*341McClintock v. Richlands Corp., 152 Va. 1, 145 S. E. 425, 61 A. L. R. 1033.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a prima facie presumption that the charter or an amendment thereof was enacted in the manner required by the Constitution, and that the rights and powers conferred are within the legislative power to grant. There is not a suggestion in the record tending to show that the charter of the city of Roanoke was not enacted in the manner required by article 4 and section 117 of the Constitution.

The charge that the provisions of the ordinance are harsh, unreasonable and arbitrary is made in very general terms and with no proof offered to support the allegation. It seems that the ordinance was adopted with the full consent and approval of a great majority of the men and women engaged in these operations within the city.

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Bluebook (online)
170 S.E. 610, 161 Va. 332, 1933 Va. LEXIS 322, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ransone-v-craft-va-1933.