Ranney v. Barlow

Supreme Court

Ranney v. Barlow

112 U.S. 207, 5 S. Ct. 104, 28 L. Ed. 662, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1871

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedNovember 3, 1884

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 112 U.S. 207 (Ranney v. Barlow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ranney v. Barlow, 112 U.S. 207, 5 S. Ct. 104, 28 L. Ed. 662, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1871 (1884).

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Opinion

Mr. Justice Woods

delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:

We think there was error in the charges complained of. To test their correctness we must assume the truth of the facts which the testimony submitted to the jury tended to prove. It was the duty of the court to submit to the consideration of the jury the testimony adduced by the defendant to sustain the defences set up in his answer, and the charge should have been based on the hypothesis that the defences which the testimony tended to prove were proven. The evidence tended to show that no fraud was practised by the defendant in procur *215 ing the power of attorney; in fact, the charge proceeds on this assumption; it tended to show that the plaintiffs, after full conference Avith the defendant, consented that he might secretly conduct the negotiations for the sale, that he might manage the sale of the property in his OAArn way, and that he should be free to dispose of his oavtl half as he pleased •' that, in case he sold their half for $200,000, he might sell his own half for any price he could get. • If the plaintiffs gave their consent in ad-Arance of any sale, it was immaterial to them Avhat price the defendant got for his share of the land, and he Avas under no obligation'to disclose the price to the plaintiffs and ask-their consent to retain it. The effect of the charge of the court Avas to withdraw from the jury all the evidence tending to show the antecedent assent of the plaintiffs, fairly obtained, to the sale mado by the defendant, and to instruct the jury that nothing but their subsequent assent could be effectual. This was error. Adams v. Roberts, 2 How. 486; Reese v. Beck, 24 Ala. 651; Grube v . Nichols, 36 Ill. 92; Chappell v. Allen, 38 Missouri, 213, 220.

The charge having assumed that there Avas no fraud in the procuring of the poAver of attorney, and the defendant having submitted testimony tending to show that there Avas no fraud in his doings after the poAver of attorney Avas procured, but that Avhatever Avas subsequently done by him in making the sale was done Avith the consent of the plaintiffs given in advance, it was error to charge the jury that the plaintiffs Avere entitled to recover, unless the defendant informed the plaintiffs at Avhat price he could sell or had sold his share, and they reneAved their consent that he might retain it.

For the error indicated

The judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to grant a new trial; and it is so ordered.

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Mr. Justice Woods

delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:

We think there was error in the charges complained of. To test their correctness we must assume the truth of the facts which the testimony submitted to the jury tended to prove. It was the duty of the court to submit to the consideration of the jury the testimony adduced by the defendant to sustain the defences set up in his answer, and the charge should have been based on the hypothesis that the defences which the testimony tended to prove were proven. The evidence tended to show that no fraud was practised by the defendant in procur *215 ing the power of attorney; in fact, the charge proceeds on this assumption; it tended to show that the plaintiffs, after full conference Avith the defendant, consented that he might secretly conduct the negotiations for the sale, that he might manage the sale of the property in his OAArn way, and that he should be free to dispose of his oavtl half as he pleased •' that, in case he sold their half for $200,000, he might sell his own half for any price he could get. • If the plaintiffs gave their consent in ad-Arance of any sale, it was immaterial to them Avhat price the defendant got for his share of the land, and he Avas under no obligation'to disclose the price to the plaintiffs and ask-their consent to retain it. The effect of the charge of the court Avas to withdraw from the jury all the evidence tending to show the antecedent assent of the plaintiffs, fairly obtained, to the sale mado by the defendant, and to instruct the jury that nothing but their subsequent assent could be effectual. This was error. Adams v. Roberts, 2 How. 486; Reese v. Beck, 24 Ala. 651; Grube v . Nichols, 36 Ill. 92; Chappell v. Allen, 38 Missouri, 213, 220.

The charge having assumed that there Avas no fraud in the procuring of the poAver of attorney, and the defendant having submitted testimony tending to show that there Avas no fraud in his doings after the poAver of attorney Avas procured, but that Avhatever Avas subsequently done by him in making the sale was done Avith the consent of the plaintiffs given in advance, it was error to charge the jury that the plaintiffs Avere entitled to recover, unless the defendant informed the plaintiffs at Avhat price he could sell or had sold his share, and they reneAved their consent that he might retain it.

For the error indicated

The judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to grant a new trial; and it is so ordered.

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Bluebook (online)

112 U.S. 207, 5 S. Ct. 104, 28 L. Ed. 662, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1871, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ranney-v-barlow-scotus-1884.

Opinion

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