Rankin v. Cooper

149 F. 1010, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4924
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Arkansas·Decided January 16, 1907·No. No. 1,162·Published·Cited by 19 cases

Opinion

FINKFFNBURG, District Judge.*

This suit was originally brought on the 19th day of June, 1895, by Sterling R. Cockrill, the predecessor of George C. Rankin, the present receiver of the First National Bank of Fittle Rock, against 16 directors of said bank, to recover losses alleged to have been sustained by said bank by reason of alleged negligence and violations of the laws of the Ünited States governing the management of national banks. In the course of its prolonged history four of the original defendants have dropped out of the case by deaths and failure to revive, and by dismissals for other causes, so that at present there are but 12 left, who are as follows: Gus. Blass, John W. Goodwin, H. G. Fleming, James Joyce, Mark M. Cohn, Charles T. Abeles, P. K. Roots, and the estates of Nick Kupferle, Henry M. Cooper, William Farrell, Fogan H. Roots, and C. M. Taylor. The case has been prolonged by the interposition of numerous motions and demurrers, and by an appeal from a decision sustaining one of those demurrers, which decision .was afterwards reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, as will more fully appear from the report of that decision under the name of Cockrill v. Cooper,. 86 Fed. 7, 29 C. C. A. 529, to which reference is hereby made for further statements of facts. In 1900, after the case had been reversed and remanded, the taking of testimony was begun before a master in chancery under an order of reference, and the case was finally heard and submitted on the merits in February, 1906. The testimony is very voluminous, embracing several thousand pages, there are over 100 exhibits, and the questions involved are complicated. I have given the.matter much consideration —all the consideration which other pressing duties would permit since the case was submitted — and I realize now that a decision ought not to be delayed any longer.

At the threshold of this case it must be said that the testimony does hot show that any of the defendants in this proceeding gained or intended to obtain any pecuniary advantage or to make any improper personal gain out of the various transactions involved. So far as the evidence shows, the defendants were men in good standing in the community, and many of them active business men of high standing. Nor does it appear that they were guilty of knowingly assenting to or participating in the malversations of funds by the president of the bank which .wrecked this one-time flourishing financial institution. The question rather is ,whether they were guilty of neglect in not knowing or ascertaining these things and in not taking steps to prevent or remedy them — such culpable neglect as would make them liable under. the general principles of the common law governing the duties of bank directors which apply to national banks as well as all other banks, and also under section 5145, Rev. St. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3463] — the national bank law — which provides that the affairs' of such banks shall be managed by not less than five directors, and section 51á7, [1013] which makes it incumbent on every such director to diligently administer the affairs of such banks.

Briefly summarized, I understand the law on this subject to be as follows: (1) Directors are charged with the duty of reasonable supervision over the affairs of the bank. It is their duty to use ordinary diligence in ascertaining the condition of its business, and to exercise reasonable control and supervision over its affairs. (2) They are not insurers or guarantors of the fidelity and proper conduct of the executive officers of the bank, and they are not responsible for losses resulting from their wrongful acts or omissions, provided they have exercised ordinary care in the discharge of their own duties as directors. (3) Ordinary care, in this matter as in other departments of the law, means that degree of care which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under similar circumstances. (4) The degree of care required further depends upon the subject to which it is to be applied, and each case must be determined in view of all the circumstances. (5) If nothing has come to the knowledge to awaken suspicion that something is going wrong, ordinary attention to the affairs of the institution is sufficient. If, upon the other hand, directors know, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have known, any facts which would awaken suspicion and put a prudent man on his guard, then a degree of care commensurate with the evil to be avoided is required, and a want of that care makes them responsible. Directors cannot, in justice to those who deal with the bank, shut their eyes to what is going on around them. (6) Directors are not expected to watch the routine of every day’s business, but they ought to have a general knowledge of the manner in which the bank’s business is conducted, and upon what securities its larger lines of credit are given, and generally to know of and give direction to the important and general affairs of the bank. (7) It is incumbent-upon bank directors in the exercise of ordinary prudence, and as a part of their duty of general supervision, to cause an examination of the condition and resources of the bank to be made with reasonable frequency. I have drawn the foregoing propositions largely from the leading cases of Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 11 Sup. Ct. 924, 35 L. Ed. 662, Gibbons v. Anderson (C. C.) 80 Fed. 345, Martin v. Webb, 110 U. S. 7, 3 Sup. Ct. 428, 28 L. Ed. 49, Warner v. Penoyer, 91 Fed. 588, 33 C. C. A. 222, 44 L. R. A. 761, Cockrill v. Cooper, 86 Fed. 7, 29 C. C. A. 529, and the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Mason v. Moore, 76 N. E. 932.

In applying the foregoing rules to the present case, I will first speak of the directors collectively, leaving any discriminations to be made between them for subsequent consideration. Briefly stated, it appears from the evidence that up to June 19, 1890, when H. G. Allis was elected president of the First National Bank of Little Rock, it had been a successful and prosperous institution; that soon after Alb's assumed charge of its affairs he began to divert the proceeds of the bank partly in the form of improvident, excessive, and improper loans to himself, and partly in the shape of improvident, excessive, and improper loans to other persons and corporations with whom he was affiliated and engaged in speculative enterprises, notably the City Electric Street Railway Company of Little Rock, the McCarthy-Joyce Com[1014] pany, a- mercantile company of Little Rock, the Press' Printing Company, a corporation of Little. Rock, and a number of other corporations and individuals which will be hereafter more particularly referred to. This diversion and misappropriation of the funds of the bank continued from June 19, 1890, until February '1, 1893, when the bank closed in an utterly insolvent condition, and a receiver was appointed to wind up its .affairs. It appears that after realizing what could be realized on the assets of the bank, and after an ássessment on the stockholders, there still remained a balance of $300,000 due and unpaid.

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Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4924 (circtwdar 1907).

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