Rankin-Fulcher v. Duane Morris, LLP

48 Misc. 3d 302, 5 N.Y.S.3d 833
CourtCivil Court of the City of New York
DecidedMarch 27, 2015
StatusPublished

This text of 48 Misc. 3d 302 (Rankin-Fulcher v. Duane Morris, LLP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Civil Court of the City of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rankin-Fulcher v. Duane Morris, LLP, 48 Misc. 3d 302, 5 N.Y.S.3d 833 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Katherine A. Levine, J.

Plaintiff Elizabeth Rankin-Fulcher commenced this action against her former employer Duane Morris LLP for reimbursement in the amount of $2,756.40 for payments she made to continue coverage under the Duane Morris health insurance plan (plan). Plaintiff claims that the payments were unnecessary and that it was defendant’s duty to inform her, upon her termination, that she was eligible for Medicare, which cost less than continuation coverage under the plan. Defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that it had no duty to provide posttermination notice of her eligibility for Medicare, but that in any event, plaintiff was in fact provided with such notice.

This case raises the issue of whether an administrator of an employee benefit plan sponsored by a law firm, and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 USC § 1001 et seq., as amended), must notify an employee aged 65 or older, upon termination, that she is eligible for Medicare.

Rankin-Fulcher was employed as a legal assistant from December 2008 until August 29, 2012, when Duane Morris terminated her employment for reasons other than gross misconduct. Plaintiff was 66 years old when she began her employment. As part of her benefits package at Duane Morris, plaintiff had medical insurance coverage with the Oxford Health Plan (NY), a group plan governed by the ERISA. This coverage ended on August 31, 2012.

On September 4, 2012, five days after she was terminated, plaintiff signed a “Severance Agreement and Release” (agreement), which provided she would receive 10 weeks of severance pay in consideration for her release, waiver, and discharge of all claims that she had against defendant at the time of termination, including claims related to her employment with the firm, termination, and unknown claims. The agreement contained plaintiff’s acknowledgment that the firm had ad[304]*304vised her to consult an attorney prior to signing the agreement. When plaintiff sent the signed agreement to defendant, she included a cover letter requesting that defendant’s benefit manager, Catherine E. Stasky, send her “information regarding COBRA, DM’s pension benefits due me and other benefits/ compensation due to me,” as she was “particularly concerned” that she was “uninsured and uninformed about my COBRA options” since she had been undergoing knee rehabilitation treatments. Plaintiff received 10 weeks of severance pay.

Upon receipt of plaintiffs request, defendant sent plaintiff a “Notice of Right to Elect Continuation Coverage under the Duane Morris LLP Health and Welfare Plan” (COBRA notification), dated September 4, 2012. This notification included the following provisions:

“The maximum amount of continuation coverage available when a second qualifying event occurs is 36 months. Such second qualifying events may include . . . the covered employee’s becoming entitled to Medicare benefits (under Part A, Part B, or both) . . . These events can be a second qualifying event only if they would have caused the qualified beneficiary to lose coverage under the Plan if the first qualifying event had not occurred. You must notify the Plan within 60 days after a second qualifying event occurs if you want to extend you continuation coverage.”

Plaintiff never questioned Stasky as to the meaning of the COBRA notification. She sent defendant an executed “COBRA Continuation Coverage Election Form” on September 13, 2012, to reinstate her health and dental insurance coverage with Oxford, together with her first monthly payment of $918.80, and a letter requesting confirmation that her insurance had been reinstated. Plaintiff continued to pay the monthly dues in October and November of 2012, and Oxford paid medical claims for her during that time.

Plaintiff claims that in December 2012, she discovered that she had been eligible for Medicare at the time her employment terminated and stopped making COBRA payments.1 In October 2013, plaintiff requested reimbursement from defendant in the amount of $2,756.40 for the COBRA payments that she made “unnecessarily.” Defendant denied her request. Plaintiff [305]*305contends that “common sense dictates” that defendant had a duty to inform her regarding her Medicare eligibility when she was terminated because had she known that she was eligible for Medicare, she would not have chosen to pay $2,756.40 for continued insurance under COBRA as opposed to the “more affordable Medicare monthly premium.”

Defendant contends that the firm had no duty under ERISA or COBRA to notify plaintiff upon her termination that she was eligible for Medicare, but that in any event, plaintiff “had every reason to believe that she, like any other United States citizen who reaches age 65, understood that she was eligible to enroll in Medicare.” Stasky avers that plaintiff, in particular, should have known that she was eligible for Medicare because the firm mailed to her and other Medicare-eligible employees annual creditable coverage disclosure notices (CCD notices) in 2009, 2010 and 2011, in accordance with 42 CFR 423.56 (c),2 with a cover letter stating that the “enclosed CCD Notice is being provided to you because you are, or will soon become, a Medicare eligible beneficiary.” Plaintiff replies that she does not recall ever receiving information about Medicare eligibility and that the attached cover letter appears to be an “unaddressed merged letter.”

Stasky further avers that following receipt of plaintiff’s signed form electing COBRA continuation coverage, she sent plaintiff an email dated September 24, 2012, informing her that

“because of the loss of your employer-sponsored coverage, you are now in an eight month special enrollment window period for signing up for Parts A and B of Medicare. COBRA coverage is disregarded for Medicare enrollment purposes. If you wait until after April 30, 2013 to sign up for Parts A and B of Medicare, you may have to pay extra, and may also have to wait a certain period of time before your Medicare coverage takes effect.
‘You can go to www.medicare.gov for more information. You can also sign up for Medicare at www.ssa.gov or by calling 1-800-772-1213.”

[306]*306Again, plaintiff contends that she does not recall receiving the email.

At the outset, this court notes that defendant provided sufficient information in its COBRA notification dated September 4, 2012, to alert plaintiff that she might be eligible for Medicare. Indeed, the notice listed eligibility for Medicare benefits under parts A and B as a second qualifying event which could affect her continuation coverage under COBRA. Further, given both the “merged letter” that the employer sent out for three years, combined with the email, the court finds that defendant alerted plaintiff about Medicare.

Furthermore, benefits managers of private group health plans covered by ERISA do not have a fiduciary or other statutory or common-law obligation to provide specific notice to employees aged 65 or older upon termination that they are eligible for Medicare as a preferable alternative to continuing their insurance coverage under the group plan.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
48 Misc. 3d 302, 5 N.Y.S.3d 833, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rankin-fulcher-v-duane-morris-llp-nycivct-2015.