Ranger v. ICAO

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0364
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0364 Ranger v ICAO 06-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0364 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 34277-2024

Shawn Ranger,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,

Respondent.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division A Opinion by JUDGE BERGER* Román, C.J., and Martinez*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 26, 2025

Shawn Ranger, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 In this unemployment benefits case, Shawn Ranger seeks

review of an order dismissing his appeal to the Industrial Claim

Appeals Office (Panel). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Ranger worked as a security engineer for Charter

Communications, LLC (Charter) until he resigned from his position

in July 2023. He applied for unemployment benefits, but a deputy

with the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) determined

he was disqualified from receiving benefits under section

8-73-108(5)(e)(I), C.R.S. 2024 (precluding benefits for claimants who

resigned based on dissatisfaction with standard working

conditions). After reviewing evidence regarding the reason Ranger

separated from Charter, a hearing officer reached the same

conclusion as the deputy. Accordingly, on January 16, 2025, the

hearing officer issued an order disqualifying Ranger from receiving

benefits. That order expressly advised Ranger that he could file an

appeal with the Panel “within 20 calendar days from the date the

[hearing officer’s] decision was mailed.” (emphasis omitted). The

hearing officer’s decision was mailed to Ranger on the same day,

making the appeal deadline February 5, 2025. Ranger filed an

1 appeal with the Panel on February 13, 2025 — eight days past the

deadline. The Panel dismissed Ranger’s appeal, finding that he

failed to demonstrate good cause for the untimely filing.

II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶3 The Panel must receive a claimant’s appeal of a hearing

officer’s decision within twenty calendar days after the claimant is

notified of that decision. § 8-74-104(1), C.R.S. 2024. The Panel

may review an untimely appeal only upon finding good cause for the

late filing. Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Reg. 12.1.3.3, 7 Code Colo. Regs.

1101-2.

¶4 In determining whether a claimant has shown good cause, the

Panel considers (1) “whether the party acted in the manner that a

reasonably prudent individual would have acted under the same or

similar circumstances”; (2) whether the Division committed an

“administrative error”; (3) whether the claimant “exercised control

over the untimely action”; (4) the length of delay in filing;

(5) whether the delay prejudiced “any other interested party”; and

(6) “whether denying good cause would lead to a result that is

inconsistent with the law.” Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Reg. 12.1.8, 7

Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2. Generally, the Panel has discretion to

2 weigh the foregoing factors, and we will not disturb its ruling absent

an abuse of that discretion. Nguyen v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,

174 P.3d 847, 848-49 (Colo. App. 2007).

III. Analysis

¶5 Ranger raises two arguments — one challenging the merits of

the hearing officer’s decision and one restating his alleged good

cause for filing a late appeal. At this stage in the proceedings, the

merits of the hearing officer’s decision are not properly before us

because the Panel never reached those issues. See § 8-74-107,

C.R.S. 2024 (granting appellate court jurisdiction to review only the

Panel’s decision); People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (An

appellate court generally reviews only matters ruled on in the order

being appealed.). We review the sole issue the Panel addressed —

whether Ranger demonstrated good cause to accept his late appeal.

Id.

¶6 On appeal, Ranger merely restates the argument he raised to

the Panel regarding the reason for his delayed filing — that he

simply failed to notice the error until after the twenty-day appeal

deadline passed. The Panel expressly considered this argument

and found that the hearing officer’s order plainly advised Ranger of

3 the appeal deadline and that a reasonably prudent claimant would

not have made the same error. Ranger neither challenges this

finding nor the evidence the Panel cited to support its

determination. Nor does he otherwise explain why the Panel’s order

is incorrect. In short, Ranger provides no reason to set aside the

Panel’s order, and we cannot consider arguments not raised. See

Minshall v. Johnston, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 21 (a court may not invent

arguments for pro se litigants); Middlemist v. BDO Seidman, LLP,

958 P.2d 486, 495 (Colo. App. 1997) (noting an appellant’s

obligation to identify specific errors and legal authorities supporting

reversal). Consequently, we will not disturb the Panel’s order on

review.

IV. Disposition

¶7 We affirm the Panel’s order.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.