LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Randy T. Edmundson appeals the denial of relief from a decision by the United States Parole Commission that he serve out the seven year sentence he received following his February 1989 conviction on child pornography and weapons charges. Ed-mundson alleges that the Commission erred in departing from its parole guideline range because this was his second sex crime. The district court1 denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
I.
Edmundson is an admitted pedophile. He was convicted in 1982 for molesting several young nieces and served more than two years in state prison. In March 1987, following reports that Edmundson had recently brought “weird” photos involving young girls to a photoprocessing firm, postal authorities sent him an advertisement for “forbidden materials” as part of a broader operation aimed at customers of mail-order child pornography. Edmundson responded, expressing a preference for materials involving pre-teen girls and signing an affidavit that he would not reveal his purchases to any law enforcement agency. [512]*512Postal authorities then mailed him a magazine confiscated in a previous child pornography investigation, watched him take it home, and then executed a pre-approved search warrant, seizing the magazine and two firearms.
After a one-day bench trial in the Eastern District of Michigan, Edmundson was convicted of knowingly receiving a magazine that visually depicted minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of the Child Protection Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and of being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His conviction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Edmundson, 937 F.2d 609 (6th Cir.1991).
After serving seven months of his sentence, Edmundson received an initial parole determination pursuant to the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201 et seq.,2 and the Commission’s regulations. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1 et seq. Following a hearing, he was assigned an offense severity factor of four and a salient factor score of seven, which produced a parole guideline range of 20-26 months. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20. However, exercising authority to depart from the guidelines when warranted, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(c), (d), both examiners agreed that a decision above the guidelines was warranted because “this is his second conviction involving a sex crime and also he has a sentence which mandates above the guidelines.”3 One examiner recommended that Edmund-son’s presumptive parole date be set at 38 months, twelve months above the guideline range. The other recommended that he “continue to expiration” of his seven year term. The regional parole commissioner adopted the latter recommendation,4 stating:
a decision above the guidelines appears warranted because: you are a poorer risk than indicated in your salient factor score in that: this is your second conviction involving a sex crime.
The Commission’s National Appeals Board affirmed, stating: “The reasons given are specific and comply with 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 for decisions outside the guidelines.”
Edmundson then filed this petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the Parole Commission had mischaracterized his sentence as one for the sexual exploitation of children; that the Commission violated the “double counting” proscription of Briggs v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 736 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1984), by using his prior conviction to set his salient factor score and to justify the upward departure from its guidelines; and that the Commission violated its own internal rules in determining there was “good cause” for the departure. The district court rejected these arguments, and Edmundson appeals.
II.
We have limited jurisdiction to review Parole Commission determinations. Congress has expressly declared that the Commission’s decisions to grant or deny parole are “actions committed to agency discretion for purposes of [the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act].” 18 U.S.C. § 4218(d). In Jones v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 903 F.2d 1178, 1182-84 (8th Cir.1990), we held that this statute bars judicial review of the Commission's “substantive” parole decisions.5
[513]*513As we noted in Jones, the Commission’s substantive parole decisions are made in the context of numerous procedural mandates contained in the statute and the Commission’s implementing regulations. Adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539 (1986) (en banc), Jones held that federal courts retain jurisdiction “to review a Commission decision that violates an explicit requirement of the Act or the guidelines, [and] to review whether the Commission violated the Constitution.” Id. at 1184 n. 15. Although we are inclined to agree with those who predict that the Wallace test will prove unworkable, see 802 F.2d at 1560-1563 (Kozinski, J., concurring), that is not a problem in this case because Ed-mundson’s arguments are, in any event, without merit.
1. Edmundson is wrong in asserting that the Commission mischaracterized his crime as “sexual exploitation of children.” In their pre-hearing assessment, the parole examiners initially fixed Edmundson’s offense severity at category five, mistakenly concluding that his crime involved the sexual exploitation of children, as that term is defined for guidelines purposes. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, Ch. 13, Subch. B, par. 18. After Edmundson pointed out this mistake at the hearing, however, his offense severity was properly reduced to category four, the level for the firearms conviction. Thus, there was no error in determining Edmundson’s offense severity category.
Edmundson also complains because the Commission justified its guidelines departure by characterizing his crime as a “second sex crime,” when it should have recognized that the later offense of being a pornography customer was less serious than his earlier sexual assaults.
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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Randy T. Edmundson appeals the denial of relief from a decision by the United States Parole Commission that he serve out the seven year sentence he received following his February 1989 conviction on child pornography and weapons charges. Ed-mundson alleges that the Commission erred in departing from its parole guideline range because this was his second sex crime. The district court1 denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
I.
Edmundson is an admitted pedophile. He was convicted in 1982 for molesting several young nieces and served more than two years in state prison. In March 1987, following reports that Edmundson had recently brought “weird” photos involving young girls to a photoprocessing firm, postal authorities sent him an advertisement for “forbidden materials” as part of a broader operation aimed at customers of mail-order child pornography. Edmundson responded, expressing a preference for materials involving pre-teen girls and signing an affidavit that he would not reveal his purchases to any law enforcement agency. [512]*512Postal authorities then mailed him a magazine confiscated in a previous child pornography investigation, watched him take it home, and then executed a pre-approved search warrant, seizing the magazine and two firearms.
After a one-day bench trial in the Eastern District of Michigan, Edmundson was convicted of knowingly receiving a magazine that visually depicted minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of the Child Protection Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and of being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His conviction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Edmundson, 937 F.2d 609 (6th Cir.1991).
After serving seven months of his sentence, Edmundson received an initial parole determination pursuant to the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201 et seq.,2 and the Commission’s regulations. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1 et seq. Following a hearing, he was assigned an offense severity factor of four and a salient factor score of seven, which produced a parole guideline range of 20-26 months. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20. However, exercising authority to depart from the guidelines when warranted, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(c), (d), both examiners agreed that a decision above the guidelines was warranted because “this is his second conviction involving a sex crime and also he has a sentence which mandates above the guidelines.”3 One examiner recommended that Edmund-son’s presumptive parole date be set at 38 months, twelve months above the guideline range. The other recommended that he “continue to expiration” of his seven year term. The regional parole commissioner adopted the latter recommendation,4 stating:
a decision above the guidelines appears warranted because: you are a poorer risk than indicated in your salient factor score in that: this is your second conviction involving a sex crime.
The Commission’s National Appeals Board affirmed, stating: “The reasons given are specific and comply with 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 for decisions outside the guidelines.”
Edmundson then filed this petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the Parole Commission had mischaracterized his sentence as one for the sexual exploitation of children; that the Commission violated the “double counting” proscription of Briggs v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 736 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1984), by using his prior conviction to set his salient factor score and to justify the upward departure from its guidelines; and that the Commission violated its own internal rules in determining there was “good cause” for the departure. The district court rejected these arguments, and Edmundson appeals.
II.
We have limited jurisdiction to review Parole Commission determinations. Congress has expressly declared that the Commission’s decisions to grant or deny parole are “actions committed to agency discretion for purposes of [the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act].” 18 U.S.C. § 4218(d). In Jones v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 903 F.2d 1178, 1182-84 (8th Cir.1990), we held that this statute bars judicial review of the Commission's “substantive” parole decisions.5
[513]*513As we noted in Jones, the Commission’s substantive parole decisions are made in the context of numerous procedural mandates contained in the statute and the Commission’s implementing regulations. Adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539 (1986) (en banc), Jones held that federal courts retain jurisdiction “to review a Commission decision that violates an explicit requirement of the Act or the guidelines, [and] to review whether the Commission violated the Constitution.” Id. at 1184 n. 15. Although we are inclined to agree with those who predict that the Wallace test will prove unworkable, see 802 F.2d at 1560-1563 (Kozinski, J., concurring), that is not a problem in this case because Ed-mundson’s arguments are, in any event, without merit.
1. Edmundson is wrong in asserting that the Commission mischaracterized his crime as “sexual exploitation of children.” In their pre-hearing assessment, the parole examiners initially fixed Edmundson’s offense severity at category five, mistakenly concluding that his crime involved the sexual exploitation of children, as that term is defined for guidelines purposes. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, Ch. 13, Subch. B, par. 18. After Edmundson pointed out this mistake at the hearing, however, his offense severity was properly reduced to category four, the level for the firearms conviction. Thus, there was no error in determining Edmundson’s offense severity category.
Edmundson also complains because the Commission justified its guidelines departure by characterizing his crime as a “second sex crime,” when it should have recognized that the later offense of being a pornography customer was less serious than his earlier sexual assaults. That issue is clearly beyond our jurisdiction, but we note that the Commission’s characterization was accurate, whereas Edmund-son’s underlying assertion—that the pornography customer is not engaged in a sex crime—is contrary to congressional intent as well as common sense.
2. The statute provides that the Parole Commission may depart from the guideline range “if it determines there is good cause for so doing,” and if the prisoner is furnished written notice containing a statement of reasons for the decision. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c). Edmundson argues that the Commission violated § 4206(c) when it used his prior conviction both to determine his salient factor score and to justify departing from the guidelines, contrary to dictum in Briggs, 736 F.2d at 450,6 that we followed in Caporale v. Gasele, 940 F.2d 305, 307 (8th Cir.1991), a post-Jones decision.
It is clear that the Commission did not engage in the double counting condemned in Briggs. While the fact of Edmundson’s prior conviction was used in calculating his salient factor score, it was the nature of that conviction—his first sex crime—that was used to justify a departure from the guidelines. This is not double counting under the guidelines. See Walker v. United States, 816 F.2d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir.1987); Castaldo v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 725 F.2d 94, 96 (10th Cir.1984); Stroud v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 668 F.2d 843, 847 (5th Cir.1982).
3. Edmundson’s other arguments are clearly without merit. First, he argues that the district court failed to review de novo the magistrate judge’s report. The district court expressly stated that it made a full review of the files and records in determining that the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions and recommendations were correct. We presume that the review was properly done. Edmundson relies sole[514]*514ly on the district court’s failure to recite that it had conducted de novo review. Thus, he has failed to make out a prima facie case of error. See United States v. Hamell, 931 F.2d 466, 468 (8th Cir.1991).
Second, Edmundson claims that the Commission violated its Rules and Procedures Manual in making its decision to depart from the guidelines. However, we have no jurisdiction to review the Commission’s compliance with its own internal rules. See Caporale, 940 F.2d at 306 (8th Cir.1991).
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is affirmed.