Randolph v. Eastman Chemical Co.

180 S.W.3d 552, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedMay 9, 2005
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 180 S.W.3d 552 (Randolph v. Eastman Chemical Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Randolph v. Eastman Chemical Co., 180 S.W.3d 552, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Opinion

OPINION

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court, in which

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., and PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JJ., joined.

Charles W. Randolph, II, (“Plaintiff’) is an engineer employed by TesTex, Inc. (“TesTex”). Eastman Chemical Company (“Eastman” or “Defendant”) entered into a contract with TesTex for TesTex to conduct non-destructive electromagnetic test *553 ing on heat exchangers located at Eastman’s Kingsport facility. The testing was to occur during a plant shutdown which lasts for twenty days and which occurs every two years. Plaintiff was on Eastman’s premises to conduct the electromagnetic testing when he was injured while boarding an elevator. Plaintiff filed a negligence lawsuit against Eastman. Eastman asserted that it was Plaintiffs statutory employer pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-1 IB and, therefore, Plaintiff was prohibited from filing a negligence claim because of the exclusive remedy rule contained in the workers’ compensation law. After a trial, the Trial Court agreed with Eastman and held that Plaintiffs negligence claim was barred. We affirm.

Background

On May 14, 2001, Plaintiff was on Eastman’s premises to begin conducting the non-destructive electromagnetic testing. Plaintiff and other TesTex employees were directed to board a particular elevator which, according to Plaintiff, had two horizontally opposed doors, “one top and one bottom, that meet in the middle.” Plaintiff claims that as he was entering the elevator, the top door on the elevator suddenly and without warning forcefully dropped down striking him on the head and knocking him to the ground. Plaintiff claims he suffered serious and permanent injuries as a result of the accident.

In May of 2002, Plaintiff filed a tort action against Eastman alleging negligence by Eastman and/or its employees. 1 Eastman answered the complaint and denied that it or any of its employees engaged in any negligent conduct or that it otherwise had any tort liability to Plaintiff. Eastman also claimed that it was Plaintiffs “statutory employer” pursuant to TenmCode Ann. § 50-6-113 and, therefore, Plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred by the exclusive remedy rule contained in the workers’ compensation law, TenmCode Ann. § 50-6-108. In light of Eastman’s answer, Plaintiff amended his complaint to add, alternatively, that he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits if Eastman was Plaintiff’s statutory employer.

Eastman filed a motion for summary judgment claiming the undisputed material facts demonstrated that it was Plaintiff’s statutory employer and, therefore, Plaintiffs negligence claim was barred by the exclusive remedy rule. 2 After Plaintiff responded to Eastman’s motion, the -Trial Court denied the motion after concluding there were genuine issues of material fact.

Even though Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied, the issue of whether Eastman was Plaintiff’s statutory employer thus barring a negligence claim remained a critical issue which impacted the remaining course of the proceedings. For example, Plaintiff had requested a trial by jury on his tort claim, but a jury trial is not available in a workers’ compensation claim. Other practical distinctions between tort claims and workers’ compensation claims were recently *554 discussed by our Supreme Court as follows:

[Although] workers’ compensation claims and tort claims may arise from one injury, involve the same plaintiff and proceed simultaneously, they may not be combined into one lawsuit. To do so would confuse the fault-based liability of tort with the statutorily imposed “no fault” liability of workers’ compensation. The justifications for imposing liability upon an employer are entirely separate and distinct from those supporting imposition of liability upon a third party tort-feasor. Accordingly, an employer cannot allocate fault to a third party and neither may an employee combine workers’ compensation and tort claims in one action. In these instances, fault may not be compared and apportioned between the employer and tortfeasor, and any such claims must be brought in two separate actions....

Curtis v. G.E. Capital Modular Space, 155 S.W.3d 877, 883-84 (Tenn.2005).

In an attempt to prevent potentially unnecessary litigation costs, attorney fees, etc., the parties and the Trial Court wisely agreed to conduct a mini-trial on the sole issue of whether Eastman was Plaintiffs statutory employer. After this mini-trial was completed, the Trial Court concluded Eastman was Plaintiffs statutory employer and, therefore, Plaintiffs negligence claim was barred by the exclusive remedy rule. The Trial Court then transferred Plaintiffs surviving workers’ compensation claim to its non-jury docket. Pursuant to Ténn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, the Trial Court stated that there was no just reason for delay and designated its judgment on the statutory employer issue as final. 3

Plaintiff appeals claiming the Trial Court erred when it concluded that Eastman was his statutory employer and, as a result of this ruling, then dismissed Plaintiffs negligence claim because it was barred by the exclusive remedy rule.

Discussion

The factual findings of the Trial Court are accorded a presumption of correctness, and we will not overturn those factual findings unless the evidence preponderates against them. See Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tenn.2001). Cf. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2). With respect to legal issues, our review is conducted “under a pure de novo standard of review, according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. Of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn.2001).

Most of the underlying facts in this case are undisputed or uncontested. The first of only two witnesses called at trial was Eric M. Kniedler (“Kniedler”), a chemical engineer employed by Eastman for twenty-three years. Kniedler testified that Eastman manufactures a multitude of different chemicals, plastics and fibers. Eastman has a coal gasification facility which is comprised of two departments, a gasification department and an acetic anhydride department. Kniedler is the superintendent for the acetic anhydride department and manages its day-to-day operations and the roughly 100 employees who work in *555 that department. The gasification department makes carbon monoxide and a synthetic gas called Syngas out of the coal.

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180 S.W.3d 552, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/randolph-v-eastman-chemical-co-tennctapp-2005.