1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAMELLO D. RANDLE, Case No. 24-cv-00323-JSC
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 9
10 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CONFLICTS PANEL, et al., 11 Defendants.
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, an inmate in the Contra Costa County Jail who is proceeding without 14 representation by an attorney, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three 15 attorneys who were successively appointed to represent him in his criminal proceedings in Contra 16 Costa County Superior Court (Defendants Anthony Guy Ashe, Lawrence Steven Strauss, and 17 Matthew Fregi), the “Contra Costa County Conflicts Panel” (“Conflicts Panel”), and the Conflicts 18 Panel’s supervisor1 (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons explained below, the complaint is dismissed 19 because it does not state a claim that is capable of judicial review and determination. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff alleges between January and November 2023, the Conflicts Panel Supervisor 22 appointed Defendants Ashe, Strauss, and Fregi to represent him at different times in his criminal 23 proceedings.2 (ECF No. 1 at 9.) He alleges these attorneys did not provide him adequate 24 representation and were not qualified because they “never won a case with lying in wait,” a 25 26 1 Plaintiff only provides the supervisor’s first name, so the Court refers to her in this order as “the 27 Supervisor.” 1 murder special circumstance of which Plaintiff was charged. (Id. at 11.) He alleges they 2 “[r]efused to prepare a defense for my case. Refused to hire the proper experts needed for my 3 case. Refused to call favorable witnesses for my case. Refused to produce evidence that proves 4 my innocence,” and “refuse[d] to file critical motions.” (Id. at 9-10.) He alleges he had “critical 5 conflicts” with all of them, and he “had to threaten [his] attorneys/physically assault them to 6 remove them off my case.” (Id. at 9, 12.) He alleges the Conflicts Panel Supervisor and the trial 7 judge disregarded his complaints about his appointed attorneys. (Id. at 10-11.) He claims he has 8 “suffered racial discrimination, animus bias, defamation of character, mental abuse, deprivation of 9 right to a fair trial.” (Id. at 12.) He seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 14.) 10 According to the complaint in another civil rights case filed by Plaintiff in this Court, as 11 well as the docket in his state-court criminal case, he was convicted of first-degree murder on 12 March 22, 2024. See Randle v. Fregi, et al., No. C 24-2098 JSC (PR) (N.D. Cal.) (ECF No. 1 at 13 6); State of California v. Randle, No. 04002000347 (Contra Costa County Sup. Ct.) (docket entry 14 of March 22, 2024, https://odyportal.cc-courts.org/Portal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0).3 15 STANDARD OF REVIEW 16 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 17 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 18 1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 19 the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 20 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. 21 § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by unrepresented parties must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 22 Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 24 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 25 3 Courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 26 judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). Court orders and other court documents are proper 27 subjects of judicial notice, id., as are records of court proceedings, Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d 1 statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 2 which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to state 3 a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 4 provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 5 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 6 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 7 550 U.S. 544, 555 (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for 8 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 9 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 10 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 11 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 12 42, 48 (1988). 13 LEGAL CLAIMS 14 Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his three appointed defense attorneys, 15 Ashe, Strauss, and Fregi, are not capable of judicial determination. An appointed criminal defense 16 lawyer does not act under color of state law, an essential element of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 17 1983, when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions, such as entering pleas, making motions, 18 objecting at trial, cross-examining witnesses, and making closing arguments. Polk County v. 19 Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981); accord Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 93 (2009); see also 20 Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (attorneys in 21 private practice are not state actors). It is the nature and context of the function performed by the 22 defense attorney that is determinative under Polk County. Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 23 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding public defender did not act under color of state 24 law when performing traditional functions of criminal defense lawyer). Plaintiff alleges Ashe, 25 Strauss, and Fregi “refused” to “prepare a defense,” “hire the proper experts,” “call favorable 26 witnesses,” “produce evidence that proves my innocence,” and “file critical motions.” (ECF No. 1 27 at 9-10.) These are clearly traditional functions performed by a defense lawyer in criminal 1 color of state law, as is required to be liable under Section 1983, when they allegedly failed to 2 represent Plaintiff in the manner he describes.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAMELLO D. RANDLE, Case No. 24-cv-00323-JSC
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 9
10 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CONFLICTS PANEL, et al., 11 Defendants.
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, an inmate in the Contra Costa County Jail who is proceeding without 14 representation by an attorney, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three 15 attorneys who were successively appointed to represent him in his criminal proceedings in Contra 16 Costa County Superior Court (Defendants Anthony Guy Ashe, Lawrence Steven Strauss, and 17 Matthew Fregi), the “Contra Costa County Conflicts Panel” (“Conflicts Panel”), and the Conflicts 18 Panel’s supervisor1 (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons explained below, the complaint is dismissed 19 because it does not state a claim that is capable of judicial review and determination. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff alleges between January and November 2023, the Conflicts Panel Supervisor 22 appointed Defendants Ashe, Strauss, and Fregi to represent him at different times in his criminal 23 proceedings.2 (ECF No. 1 at 9.) He alleges these attorneys did not provide him adequate 24 representation and were not qualified because they “never won a case with lying in wait,” a 25 26 1 Plaintiff only provides the supervisor’s first name, so the Court refers to her in this order as “the 27 Supervisor.” 1 murder special circumstance of which Plaintiff was charged. (Id. at 11.) He alleges they 2 “[r]efused to prepare a defense for my case. Refused to hire the proper experts needed for my 3 case. Refused to call favorable witnesses for my case. Refused to produce evidence that proves 4 my innocence,” and “refuse[d] to file critical motions.” (Id. at 9-10.) He alleges he had “critical 5 conflicts” with all of them, and he “had to threaten [his] attorneys/physically assault them to 6 remove them off my case.” (Id. at 9, 12.) He alleges the Conflicts Panel Supervisor and the trial 7 judge disregarded his complaints about his appointed attorneys. (Id. at 10-11.) He claims he has 8 “suffered racial discrimination, animus bias, defamation of character, mental abuse, deprivation of 9 right to a fair trial.” (Id. at 12.) He seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 14.) 10 According to the complaint in another civil rights case filed by Plaintiff in this Court, as 11 well as the docket in his state-court criminal case, he was convicted of first-degree murder on 12 March 22, 2024. See Randle v. Fregi, et al., No. C 24-2098 JSC (PR) (N.D. Cal.) (ECF No. 1 at 13 6); State of California v. Randle, No. 04002000347 (Contra Costa County Sup. Ct.) (docket entry 14 of March 22, 2024, https://odyportal.cc-courts.org/Portal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0).3 15 STANDARD OF REVIEW 16 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 17 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 18 1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 19 the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 20 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. 21 § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by unrepresented parties must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 22 Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 24 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 25 3 Courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 26 judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). Court orders and other court documents are proper 27 subjects of judicial notice, id., as are records of court proceedings, Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d 1 statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 2 which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to state 3 a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 4 provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 5 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 6 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 7 550 U.S. 544, 555 (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for 8 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 9 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 10 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 11 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 12 42, 48 (1988). 13 LEGAL CLAIMS 14 Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his three appointed defense attorneys, 15 Ashe, Strauss, and Fregi, are not capable of judicial determination. An appointed criminal defense 16 lawyer does not act under color of state law, an essential element of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 17 1983, when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions, such as entering pleas, making motions, 18 objecting at trial, cross-examining witnesses, and making closing arguments. Polk County v. 19 Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981); accord Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 93 (2009); see also 20 Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (attorneys in 21 private practice are not state actors). It is the nature and context of the function performed by the 22 defense attorney that is determinative under Polk County. Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 23 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding public defender did not act under color of state 24 law when performing traditional functions of criminal defense lawyer). Plaintiff alleges Ashe, 25 Strauss, and Fregi “refused” to “prepare a defense,” “hire the proper experts,” “call favorable 26 witnesses,” “produce evidence that proves my innocence,” and “file critical motions.” (ECF No. 1 27 at 9-10.) These are clearly traditional functions performed by a defense lawyer in criminal 1 color of state law, as is required to be liable under Section 1983, when they allegedly failed to 2 represent Plaintiff in the manner he describes. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against these 3 Defendants under Section 1983 for failing to adequately represent him in his criminal proceeding 4 are not capable of judicial determination. 5 Plaintiff also sues the Supervisor of the Conflicts Panel for assigning Ashe, Strauss, and 6 Fregi to Plaintiff when these lawyers had not previously “won a case” in which a defendant was 7 charged with the special circumstance of lying in wait. It is not clear from the allegations in the 8 complaint whether the Supervisor is a state official, but even if she is, she simply assigned him 9 attorneys; she did not represent him. The Court is aware of no authority and none is cited by 10 Plaintiff, that an official who assigns a lawyer to a criminal defendant violates that defendant’s 11 constitutional rights when the lawyer renders ineffective assistance. Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 12 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (providing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees effective 13 assistance of counsel by the attorney represents the criminal defendant). Nor is there any authority 14 of which the Court is aware providing the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant a defense 15 lawyer who has previously won a case involving the same charges being brought against the 16 defendant. Consequently, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against the Supervisor that is capable of 17 judicial determination. 18 Plaintiff also names the Conflicts Panel as a Defendant. Plaintiff has not alleged whether 19 this panel is an entity that may be sued independently from the Conflict Panel’s Supervisor. Even 20 if it is, the same analysis applies to this claim as to the claim against the Supervisor of the 21 Conflicts Panel. 22 Leave to amend should not be granted if amendment of the pleading would be futile. See 23 Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2010). It is clear from the allegations in 24 the complaint Plaintiff intends to sue the attorney Defendants for their actions in representing 25 Plaintiff in his criminal proceedings, actions that were not under color of state law under Section 26 1983. It is also clear from the allegations in the complaint that Plaintiff intends to sue the 27 Supervisor and the Conflicts Panel for assigning him those lawyers, which does not implicate his 1 || judicial review and determination under Section 1983. Accordingly, leave to amend will not be 2 allowed. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the case is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim that is 5 capable of judicial review and determination. The dismissal is without leave to amend and with 6 || prejudice. 7 The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 8 This order terminates docket number 2. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Dated: May 28, 2024
JAQQUELINE SCOTT CORL 12 United States District Judge
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