Randall Lowell v. Angi Inc.

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 RANDALL LOWELL, CASE NO. C25-1702-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 9 v. MOTION TO COMPELL ARBITRATION WITHOUT PREJUDICE 10 ANGI INC.,

11 Defendant(s).

12 Plaintiff Randall Lowell (“Lowell”) filed this putative class action against Angi Inc. 13 (“Angi”), the company that operates angi.com, alleging that Angi violated state and federal law by 14 initiating or assisting in the transmission of unwanted commercial text messages and phone calls. 15 Angi moves to compel arbitration, arguing that Lowell consented to a binding arbitration 16 agreement when he submitted service requests through Angi’s mobile application. Lowell denies 17 ever using Angi’s platform or submitting the requests. 18 Because the parties genuinely dispute whether Lowell submitted the requests and thereby 19 assented to the arbitration agreement, the Court will deny Angi’s motion and direct the parties to 20 proceed with discovery into whether they ever formed a binding agreement. Upon completing this 21 limited discovery, Angi may renew its motion to compel or, if necessary, the parties may proceed 22 to a jury trial on the issue of arbitrability. 23

24 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Angi operates a platform under the brands Angi, HomeAdvisor, and Handy, for connecting 3 home service professionals (referred to by Angi as “Pros”) with consumers. Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 4.7–

4 4.8; Dkt. No. 22-1 ¶ 4. Through its website, Angi enables consumers to research, match with, hire, 5 and review Pros across a variety of service categories. Dkt. No. 22-1 ¶ 4. Lowell alleges that, 6 between 2019 and 2025, he received dozens of unwanted commercial solicitations via text and 7 phone from Angi or its Pros despite having placed his phone number on the national do-not-call 8 registry. Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 4.61–4.62, 4.126. 9 In August 2025, Lowell sued Angi in state court seeking to represent a class of individuals 10 who were sent similar unwanted solicitations, which he claims violates the federal Telephone 11 Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and two Washington statutes: the Commercial Electronic 12 Mail Act (“CEMA”) and Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”). Id. ¶¶ 5.1–8.3. Angi removed the

13 case to this Court (Dkt. No. 1) and then moved to compel arbitration (Dkt. No. 22). Angi also 14 separately filed motions to dismiss the TCPA claims and to strike the Complaint’s class action 15 allegations. Dkt. Nos. 17, 18. 16 Along with its motion to compel arbitration, Angi filed a declaration by Joseph Puccio, 17 Angi’s Senior Vice President of Product Management. Dkt. No. 22-1 ¶ 2. Puccio states that, 18 according to Angi’s records, Lowell visited angi.com several times and made service requests, 19 thereby accepting Angi’s terms, which include an arbitration clause.1 Id. ¶¶ 10, 18, 20–25. 20 Attached to his declaration are printouts of the service requests, which list Lowell’s name, email 21 22 23 1 According to Puccio, Angi’s customer agreement is titled the Angi Project Advisor, Book Now Services, and Project Submission Customer Agreement. Dkt. No. 22-1 ¶ 8, Dkt. No. 22-2 at 46. The Court refers to this 24 agreement as “Angi’s terms” or simply the “terms.” 1 address, physical address, and phone number, as well as descriptions of the requested tasks, such 2 as repairing asphalt, painting, repairing a gas furnace, and replacing siding. Dkt. No. 22-3. 3 Puccio states that Angi’s system would only generate a service request after a consumer

4 affirmatively consents to Angi’s terms. Dkt. No. 22-1 ¶ 25. To create a service request, a 5 consumer must visit Angi’s website, a partner website, or the Angi mobile app; enter their name, 6 zip code, phone number, and information about the requested service; and click a “View Matching 7 Pros” button. Id. ¶ 6. Immediately below that button is a disclosure that states: 8 By clicking View Matching Pros, I agree to Angi’s Terms and Privacy Policy, and that Angi and its service professionals, or parties acting on their behalf, may use 9 automated technology and prerecorded messages to deliver marketing calls or texts regarding my project and future projects to the number I provided. Consent is not 10 a condition of service. Id. ¶ 7 (underline in original denoting hyperlink). 11 If the consumer clicks on the hyperlinked “Angi’s Terms” text, they are taken to a webpage 12 containing the full terms. Id. ¶ 23. Since 2021, those terms have included an arbitration clause, 13 which provides in relevant part: 14 To expedite resolution and reduce the cost of any dispute, controversy or claim, 15 past, present, or future, between you and Angi, including without limitation any dispute or claim related to or arising out of this Agreement (“Dispute”), you and 16 Angi may attempt to negotiate any Dispute informally (the “Informal Negotiations”) before initiating any arbitration or court proceeding. 17 If a Dispute is not resolved through Informal Negotiations, you and Angi agree to 18 resolve any and all Disputes (except those Disputes expressly excluded below) through final and binding arbitration (“Arbitration Agreement”). This Arbitration 19 Agreement shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and evidences a transaction involving commerce. The arbitration will be commenced and 20 conducted before a single arbitrator under the Commercial Arbitration Rules (the “AAA Rules”) of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) and, where 21 appropriate, the AAA’s Supplementary Procedures for Consumer Related Disputes (“AAA Consumer Rules”), both of which are available at the AAA website …. 22 Additionally, the arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, 23 applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Arbitration Agreement. 24 1 Dkt. No. 22-2 at 71. Lowell submitted his own declaration in response to Angi’s motion, disputing that he has 2 ever used Angi’s services or consented to its terms. Dkt. No. 28. According to Lowell, he has 3 never used Angi’s List, downloaded Angi’s mobile app, or used Angi’s website to submit a service 4 request. Id. ¶¶ 2–4. In fact, he does not recall ever visiting Angi’s website. Id. ¶ 4. Lowell 5 specifically contends he did not submit any of the dozen service requests attached to Puccio’s 6 declaration. Id. ¶ 6. And he attaches records to his declaration that he claims show he was engaged 7 in other activities when many of the services were requested. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11–14. Lowell claims he 8 had never seen Angi’s terms until he reviewed Puccio’s declaration during this litigation. Id. ¶ 17. 9 Angi’s motion to compel arbitration is fully briefed, neither party has requested oral 10 argument, and the motion is now ripe for consideration. 11 12 II. ANALYSIS 13 A. Legal Standard The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, makes arbitration agreements 14 “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 15 revocation of any contract[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Accordingly, courts place arbitration agreements on 16 “equal footing with other contracts,” and recognize “a federal policy in favor of arbitration[.]” Cir. 17 City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002). The party seeking to compel 18 arbitration bears “the burden of proving the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a 19 preponderance of the evidence.” Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1283 20 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014)). 21 If the existence of an arbitration agreement is “in issue,” the FAA provides that “the court 22 shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. In applying this procedure, Courts 23 rely on the summary judgment standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Hansen v. LMB 24 1 Mortg. Servs., Inc., 1 F.4th 667, 670 (9th Cir. 2021). Thus, a court will only “decide as a matter 2 of law that the parties did or did not enter into” an arbitration agreement if “there is no genuine 3 issue of fact concerning the formation of the agreement[.]” Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F.

4 Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Par–Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge 5 Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 1980)). The party denying the existence of an agreement 6 receives “the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences that may arise.” Id. (quoting Par– 7 Knit Mills, 636 F.2d at 54); see also Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 742 8 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “presumption in favor of arbitrability” applies only where the scope 9 of an agreement to arbitrate is ambiguous: “If the parties contest the existence of an arbitration 10 agreement, the presumption in favor of arbitrability does not apply.”). 11 The FAA’s procedure for resolving disputes over the existence of an arbitration agreement 12 “mirrors the three phases of federal civil lawsuits: a motion to compel arbitration akin to a motion

13 to dismiss; followed by optional discovery before summary judgment, if the motion is denied; 14 followed by a mini-trial, if necessary.” Knapke v. PeopleConnect, Inc., 38 F.4th 824, 833 (9th Cir. 15 2022) (citing Hansen, 1 F.4th at 670). If neither party carries its initial burden to show the 16 existence or absence of a binding agreement, courts have interpreted Knapke as allowing limited 17 discovery into arbitrability, followed by a renewed a motion to compel and, if necessary, a trial. 18 See, e.g., Tu v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 24-CV-1221-WQH-MSB, 2025 WL 1134612, at *9 19 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2025) (collecting cases). 20 B. Genuine issues of fact warrant discovery and, potentially, a trial on arbitrability 21 Here, the Court cannot decide as a matter of law whether Lowell assented to Angi’s terms 22 because the parties genuinely dispute whether he, or someone else, made the service requests

23 attached to Puccio’s declaration. Lowell denies having ever visited Angi’s website, used its 24 services, or submitted any of the requests. And he presents various receipts, emails, and other 1 records indicating where he was located or what he was doing at the times the requests were made. 2 Dkt. No. 28 ¶¶ 8–9, 11–14. Lowell claims he does not know how Angi got his name or phone 3 number, but his brief speculates it is possible “he is a victim of one or more companies that compile

4 lead lists by scraping websites for contact information.” Dkt. No. 26 at 6 n.1. 5 Angi argues it is “implausible” that anyone other than Lowell could have obtained his 6 personal information and submitted service requests to Angi without his knowledge. Dkt. No. 38 7 at 2. But unless Angi can show there is no genuinely disputed issue concerning contract formation, 8 that question is for a jury to decide—or, at least, the Court upon a renewed motion after discovery. 9 And on this record, the Court cannot agree with Angi that Lowell has presented only “a self-serving 10 declaration” without “specific facts or corroborating evidence” to support his position. Id. at 3. 11 To the contrary, Lowell’s sworn declaration unequivocally disclaims having submitted 12 each of the twelve service requests, contends he “was not seeking anyone to perform the services

13 described in the requests” on the relevant dates, and presents specific facts and evidence to support 14 his contention. Dkt. No. 28 ¶¶ 6, 9–16. For instance, Lowell disputes that he submitted service 15 requests for repairs to a gas furnace or for landscaping, explaining he does not own a gas furnace 16 and does not live at, or know anyone who lives at, the address associated with the landscaping 17 request. Id. ¶¶ 12, 16. He also submits a screenshot of his email inbox from one of the relevant 18 time periods and claims he was “engaged in a series of nonstop emails and back-to-back phone 19 calls with attorneys and experts about a friend’s wrongful death suit” when one of the service 20 requests was made. Id. ¶ 9. And he claims he was driving in traffic or at a coffee shop at the time 21 of two other requests (id. ¶¶ 11, 13); that he sent a business email at the exact time another request 22 was submitted (id. ¶ 12); and that he was told by Pros they had received service requests from an

23 Apple device even though he does not own an Apple device (id. ¶ 8). 24 1 Drawing all inferences in Lowell’s favor, as the Court must at this stage, a reasonable 2 factfinder could determine on this record that Lowell did not submit the service requests and thus 3 did not consent to Angi’s terms. Because Angi has not yet carried its burden to show mutual assent

4 to an arbitration agreement, the Court will direct the parties to proceed to discovery on the issue 5 of arbitrability followed by an optional renewed motion to compel and, if necessary, a mini-trial. 6 See Knapke, 38 F.4th at 833. Consistent with both parties’ demands, any trial on arbitrability shall 7 be by jury. Dkt. No. 22 at 18, Dkt. No. 26 at 11. 8 Accordingly, the parties should meet and confer and submit a joint status report by May 9 27, 2026, proposing a schedule for completing discovery into arbitrability and a deadline for Angi 10 to file any renewed motion to compel arbitration. In the event Angi elects to proceed directly to 11 trial after discovery, or if its renewed motion is denied, the Court will at that time direct the parties 12 to propose a trial date on the issue of arbitrability in coordination with the Courtroom Deputy.

13 Finally, if Angi succeeds in establishing the existence of a binding arbitration agreement, 14 the arbitrator will be tasked with resolving the issues raised in Angi’s motion to dismiss and motion 15 to vacate the Complaint’s class action allegations. See Dkt. Nos. 17, 18. Accordingly, the Court 16 will stay both motions and direct the Clerk to terminate them without prejudice to being reinstated 17 in the event this case does not proceed to arbitration. 18 III. CONCLUSION 19 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that: 20 1) Angi’s motion to compel arbitration (Dkt. No. 22) is DENIED without prejudice. Angi 21 shall be permitted to file a renewed motion following completion of limited discovery 22 into arbitrability.

23 24 1 2) Angi’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 17) and motion to strike class action allegations 2 (Dkt. No. 18) are STAYED and the Clerk is directed to terminate both motions. Angi 3 may request that its motions be reinstated upon resolution of the arbitrability issue.

4 Dated this 13th day of May, 2026. 5 A 6 Kymberly K. Evanson 7 United S tates District Judge

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