Randal Dalavai v. the Regents

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 16, 2024
• Docket: 23-55412
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 16 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RANDAL JEROME DALAVAI, Successor No. 23-55412 in Interest to 'Decedent' Geetha Dalavai and Son of Geetha Dalavai, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-01992-CAB-WVG Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

THE REGENTS; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 14, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, BADE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Randal Jerome Dalavai appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his pro

se suit, as successor in interest to his deceased mother, alleging violations of the

Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). and California law against the Regents of the University of California (“the

Regents”) and the Elizabeth Hospice (“the Hospice”). We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount

them here. We affirm.

We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Jajati

v. U.S. Customs & Border Patrol, 102 F.4th 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2024). Further,

we review de novo both the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim,

Fort v. Washington, 41 F.4th 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2022), and for expiration of the

statutory limitations period, Gregg v. Hawaii, 870 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 2017).

“In assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must take all factual

allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party.” Murguia v. Langdon, 61 F.4th 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2023). We construe

pro se complaints liberally. Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th

Cir. 2017).

1. The district court properly dismissed Dalavai’s claims against the

Regents for failure to state a claim. Our precedent is clear that EMTALA liability

“normally ends when [an emergency room patient] is admitted for inpatient care.”

Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir 2002); see also

42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)(1)(ii) ( “[I]f the hospital admits the individual as an inpatient

for further treatment, the hospital’s obligation . . . ends.”). Because Dalavai’s

2 mother was brought to the University of California San Diego (“UCSD”) hospital

as an inpatient, not an emergency room patient, EMTALA liability does not apply

to the Regents. The district court thus properly held that Dalavai did not “allege

facts sufficient to establish [that] UCSD . . . violated the EMTALA.” Because we

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Dalavai’s claims against the Regents for

failure to state a claim, we need not assess his other argument that the district court

improperly dismissed his EMTALA claim based on expiration of the statutory

limitations period.

2. Because Dalavai did not contest the district court’s dismissal of his claim

against the Hospice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in his counseled opening

brief, he has forfeited any challenge to that decision. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,

94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is well established in this circuit that [t]he

general rule is that appellants cannot raise a new issue for the first time in their

reply briefs.” (quoting Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir.

1990))). But, even assuming Dalavai had not forfeited such a challenge, the

district court properly dismissed that claim because Dalavai, a California resident,

alleged only state law violations against the Hospice, also a California resident.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

3. Dalavai’s counseled opening brief also failed to contest the district

court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.

3 Dalavai therefore forfeited review of that decision. See Martinez-Serrano, 94 F.3d

at 1259. But, even if he had raised it, the district court was within its discretion to

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims after it had

dismissed all federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

AFFIRMED.