OPINION
PAUL PRESSLER, Justice.
Appellant was indicted for possession of a controlled substance, namely cocaine, weighing less than 28 grams by aggregate weight. Tex.Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(b). The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, contending that the cocaine was the product of a search pursuant to an illegal arrest. After a pretrial hearing, at which the arresting officer and a codefendant testified, the trial court denied the motion. The State had originally alleged two prior offenses as enhancements but dropped these allegations after the hearing. The appellant then waived trial by jury, entered a guilty plea, and confessed that the allegations contained in the indictment were true. The court found the appellant guilty as charged and, as recommended by the State, assessed punishment at fifteen years imprisonment. We affirm.
Appellant’s arrest arises out of a police narcotics operation in southeast Houston. A undercover Houston Police officer purchased cocaine from two black men who came up to his car. This purchase was observed by a second officer who relayed his observation to a group of six other officers (the “raid team”) waiting in a van some distance away. The officer who observed the purchase described two black males who were standing in front of a particular apartment building as the sellers of the cocaine. The six officers of the “raid team” then drove to the apartment building and saw the appellant and another man fitting the descriptions. A member of the team told the appellant he was under arrest “for selling narcotics”. The appellant responded that he purchased but did not sell “dope”. The officer then conducted a pat-down search of the appellant and discovered a “sharp shooter” 1 with a small amount of cocaine in it. It was later discovered that the appellant was not one of the men who had sold cocaine to the first officer.
In his sole point of error, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his pre-trial suppression motion. The appellant argues that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him and a search incident to an illegal arrest is invalid. The appellant relies upon the officer’s characterization of his initial contact with the appellant as an arrest and measures probable cause as of that moment. The standard of review governing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is whether the court clearly abused its discretion. Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). The trial judge is the sole finder of fact at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search, and the judge may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of a witness’ testimony. Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). The State erroneously argues that the stop of the appellant was pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The controlling issue concerning the denial of the motion to suppress is whether probable cause existed for appellant’s arrest.
A police officer may arrest an individual without a warrant only if (a) there is probable cause with respect to that individual, and (b) the arrest falls within one of the exceptions specified in Tex.Code Crim. Proc.Ann. art. 14.01-14.04. Lunde v. [339]*339State, 736 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The test for determining the existence of probable cause for a warrantless arrest has been stated as follows:
Whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which (he) had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (arrested person) had committed or was committing an offense.
Adkins v. State, 764 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Britton v. State, 578 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 435, 62 L.Ed.2d 328 (1979).
Thus, “the duty of the reviewing court is to look to the ‘totality of the circumstances’ to determine if there exists a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed at the time of the questioned action.” Angulo v. State, 727 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), citing inter alia, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified as to the events leading to appellant’s arrest. After the undercover officer had purchased cocaine from two individuals, a second officer (the “spotting officer”) radioed their descriptions and location to the arresting officer. At the time in question, the two drug sellers were thin black men 15 and 17 years old and approximately five feet six inches tall. One was wearing white pants and had no shirt, and the other wore blue jeans and a white tee shirt. The appellant is also a young black man with a similar appearance to the other suspects and was wearing a blue shirt and black pants.
The officer acted upon more than a mere hunch. The conduct and presence of the appellant at the location as well as the surrounding events reasonably tied him to criminal activity. The officer had reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to cause a prudent man to believe that the appellant had committed the offense. The arresting officer need not have had personal knowledge of all the facts to have probable cause so long as the sources upon which he relied were credible or reliable. Evans v. State, 530 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). Where several officers are involved, the sum of the information known to the cooperating officers is to be considered in determining probable cause. Garrison v. State, 726 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Probable cause existed here since the police officers had a specific location under surveillance and the description of the two men and the location where they were standing were given to fellow officers. The time which elapsed from the relay of the information by the spotting officer to the arrival of the raid van was only “a matter of seconds”. The van was parked behind the apartment complex. The appellant met the general description of the suspects and was at the location designated. Given all the facts presented, the requirements of Tex.Code Crim.ProC. Ann. art. 14.03(a)(1) were satisfied.
Any peace officer may arrest, without warrant: ... persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony or breach of the peace, ...
Suspicious places and circumstances were clearly indicated. “[F]ew, if any places are suspicious in and of themselves. Rather, additional facts available to an officer plus reasonable inferences from those facts in relation to a particular place may arouse justifiable suspicion.” Johnson v. State, 722 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
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OPINION
PAUL PRESSLER, Justice.
Appellant was indicted for possession of a controlled substance, namely cocaine, weighing less than 28 grams by aggregate weight. Tex.Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(b). The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, contending that the cocaine was the product of a search pursuant to an illegal arrest. After a pretrial hearing, at which the arresting officer and a codefendant testified, the trial court denied the motion. The State had originally alleged two prior offenses as enhancements but dropped these allegations after the hearing. The appellant then waived trial by jury, entered a guilty plea, and confessed that the allegations contained in the indictment were true. The court found the appellant guilty as charged and, as recommended by the State, assessed punishment at fifteen years imprisonment. We affirm.
Appellant’s arrest arises out of a police narcotics operation in southeast Houston. A undercover Houston Police officer purchased cocaine from two black men who came up to his car. This purchase was observed by a second officer who relayed his observation to a group of six other officers (the “raid team”) waiting in a van some distance away. The officer who observed the purchase described two black males who were standing in front of a particular apartment building as the sellers of the cocaine. The six officers of the “raid team” then drove to the apartment building and saw the appellant and another man fitting the descriptions. A member of the team told the appellant he was under arrest “for selling narcotics”. The appellant responded that he purchased but did not sell “dope”. The officer then conducted a pat-down search of the appellant and discovered a “sharp shooter” 1 with a small amount of cocaine in it. It was later discovered that the appellant was not one of the men who had sold cocaine to the first officer.
In his sole point of error, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his pre-trial suppression motion. The appellant argues that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him and a search incident to an illegal arrest is invalid. The appellant relies upon the officer’s characterization of his initial contact with the appellant as an arrest and measures probable cause as of that moment. The standard of review governing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is whether the court clearly abused its discretion. Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). The trial judge is the sole finder of fact at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search, and the judge may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of a witness’ testimony. Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). The State erroneously argues that the stop of the appellant was pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The controlling issue concerning the denial of the motion to suppress is whether probable cause existed for appellant’s arrest.
A police officer may arrest an individual without a warrant only if (a) there is probable cause with respect to that individual, and (b) the arrest falls within one of the exceptions specified in Tex.Code Crim. Proc.Ann. art. 14.01-14.04. Lunde v. [339]*339State, 736 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The test for determining the existence of probable cause for a warrantless arrest has been stated as follows:
Whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which (he) had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (arrested person) had committed or was committing an offense.
Adkins v. State, 764 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Britton v. State, 578 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 435, 62 L.Ed.2d 328 (1979).
Thus, “the duty of the reviewing court is to look to the ‘totality of the circumstances’ to determine if there exists a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed at the time of the questioned action.” Angulo v. State, 727 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), citing inter alia, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified as to the events leading to appellant’s arrest. After the undercover officer had purchased cocaine from two individuals, a second officer (the “spotting officer”) radioed their descriptions and location to the arresting officer. At the time in question, the two drug sellers were thin black men 15 and 17 years old and approximately five feet six inches tall. One was wearing white pants and had no shirt, and the other wore blue jeans and a white tee shirt. The appellant is also a young black man with a similar appearance to the other suspects and was wearing a blue shirt and black pants.
The officer acted upon more than a mere hunch. The conduct and presence of the appellant at the location as well as the surrounding events reasonably tied him to criminal activity. The officer had reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to cause a prudent man to believe that the appellant had committed the offense. The arresting officer need not have had personal knowledge of all the facts to have probable cause so long as the sources upon which he relied were credible or reliable. Evans v. State, 530 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). Where several officers are involved, the sum of the information known to the cooperating officers is to be considered in determining probable cause. Garrison v. State, 726 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Probable cause existed here since the police officers had a specific location under surveillance and the description of the two men and the location where they were standing were given to fellow officers. The time which elapsed from the relay of the information by the spotting officer to the arrival of the raid van was only “a matter of seconds”. The van was parked behind the apartment complex. The appellant met the general description of the suspects and was at the location designated. Given all the facts presented, the requirements of Tex.Code Crim.ProC. Ann. art. 14.03(a)(1) were satisfied.
Any peace officer may arrest, without warrant: ... persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony or breach of the peace, ...
Suspicious places and circumstances were clearly indicated. “[F]ew, if any places are suspicious in and of themselves. Rather, additional facts available to an officer plus reasonable inferences from those facts in relation to a particular place may arouse justifiable suspicion.” Johnson v. State, 722 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Where persons fitting the general description of drug suspects are at the location only seconds after the radio transmission to fellow officers, the location becomes suspicious and the police must use appropriate caution as they make a further investigation. See Rysiejko v. State, 782 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d).
The United States Supreme Court has frequently questioned whether excluding evidence can have any deterrent effect when the offending officer acted in an objectively reasonable belief that his conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. [340]*340See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 452, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3031, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976); and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). The Court has stated its position as follows:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which had deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit the evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2365, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) (emphasis added); and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2318, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975).
[where the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable], “excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that ... the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.”
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-540, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3073-3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (WHITE,. J., dissenting); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-921, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3418-3419, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). See also Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971).
Leon sets forth a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule only in cases where a warrant is present, but its intent as to overt police misconduct is clear. The exclusion of evidence should not be used to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity. See Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at 918-919, 104 S.Ct. at 3418. Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that it will look at any mistaken search or arrest to determine whether it was taken in the reasonable, good-faith belief of being proper, United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846 (5th Cir. en banc 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127, 101 S.Ct. 946, 67 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981), the present facts do not warrant the expansion of the good-faith exception to warrantless arrests. Here, the officers acted upon probable cause and in the reasonable belief that the appellant was the man who had sold cocaine to the undercover officer. There is no overt police misconduct that could be remedied by exclusion of the evidence found on the appellant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s sole point of error is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.