Ramon Ruiz v. City of Miami Beach, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedNovember 10, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-22822
StatusUnknown

This text of Ramon Ruiz v. City of Miami Beach, et al. (Ramon Ruiz v. City of Miami Beach, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ramon Ruiz v. City of Miami Beach, et al., (S.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-22822-WILLIAMS/Elfenbein

RAMON RUIZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, et al,

Defendants. _____________________________________/

ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Pro se Plaintiff Ramon Ruiz’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on Appeal (the “IFP Motion”), ECF No. [82]. The Honorable Kathleen M. Williams referred this case to me for “all discovery disputes and non-dispositive pretrial motions.” ECF No. [25]. For the reasons below, the IFP Motion, ECF No. [82], is DENIED. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 governs motions for leave to proceed IFP on appeal. Relevant here, that Rule provides: [A] party to a district-court action who desires to appeal in forma pauperis must file a motion in the district court. The party must attach an affidavit that: (A) shows in the detail prescribed by Form 4 of the Appendix of Forms the party’s inability to pay or to give security for fees and costs; (B) claims an entitlement to redress; and (C) states the issues that the party intends to present on appeal.

Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1). The Advisory Committee Notes that follow Rule 24 make clear that the Rule is intended to be applied in tandem with 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Fed. R. App. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment (noting that, although “the Committee has not attempted to incorporate into Rule 24 all of the requirements of the current version of 28 U.S.C. §1915” because “future legislation regarding prisoner litigation is likely,” it has amended the Rule “to eliminate an apparent conflict with the” Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995); accord 16AA Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3970 (5th ed. 2019) (“Rule 24, then, is meant to work in tandem with Section 1915.”).

Under § 1915, a party who wishes to proceed in forma pauperis must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets” he “possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor” and also states “the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.” See 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1).1 Once a party has filed an IFP motion, the Court must screen the motion to ensure it complies with the statute’s requirements. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2). Specifically, the statute directs the Court to dismiss the case “at any time if” it determines that “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or “the action or appeal” is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The statute further provides that an “appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial

court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). When evaluating whether an appeal is taken in “good faith,” the Court looks to whether the party “seeks appellate review of any issue not frivolous.” See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445

1 Though the plain language of the statute appears to make its provision applicable only to prisoners, “[t]he screening process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 applies to non-prisoner pro se litigants who are proceeding in forma pauperis.” Fletcher v. President of Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., No. 15-CV-24355, 2016 WL 11547296, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2016), R. & R. approved, No. 15-CV-24355, 2016 WL 11547297 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2016); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 (1989) (noting “Congress’ over-arching goal in enacting the in forma pauperis statute” was “to assure equality of consideration for all litigants” (quotation marks omitted)); Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding no error in the district court’s dismissal of a non-prisoner’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Reasonable access to the courts is provided to indigent claimants by the in forma pauperis (IFP) statute, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1915 et seq., which allows commencement of suits without payment of fees and court costs by a person who makes an affidavit that he is unable to pay the costs.”). (1962). “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001). Applying those standards here, the Court finds that the IFP Motion should be denied. First, Plaintiff’s affidavit demonstrates his “inability to pay or to give security for fees and

costs.” See ECF No. [82] at 2–5; Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(A). Plaintiff avers that his average monthly earnings during the past 12 months were $125 from self-employment and that he does not know whether he expects to earn the same amount next month. See ECF No. [82] at 2. He avers he has about $0.25 in a sole bank account, and does not have any other accounts, assets of value, or people who owe him money. See ECF No. [82] at 3. He avers he has no current employer, no employment history over the last two years, no spouse, and no dependents. See ECF No. [82] at 2–5. He claims total monthly expenses of $525. See ECF No. [82] at 5. Plaintiff states that “[a]lthough he is optimistic [his] independent contractor jobs will produc[sic] soon, [he] has not been able to product more than $1,500.00 in the last 12 months.” See ECF No. [82] at 5. He also states that he has been denied housing due to a separate pending matter. See ECF No. [82] at 5.

To assess an applicant’s poverty, the Court looks to the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) poverty guidelines. See, e.g., Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 n.5 (11th Cir. 2004) (comparing IFP applicant’s affidavit to the HHS guidelines to determine he was above the poverty line and not absolutely destitute); Sanchez v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 20- CV-20017, 2020 WL 13401700, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2020); Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 90 Fed. Reg. 5917, 5917–18 (Jan. 17, 2025). The § 1915 analysis also requires the Court to compare “the applicant’s assets and liabilities in order to determine whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Jud. Cir., 574 F.

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Related

Bilal v. Driver
251 F.3d 1346 (Eleventh Circuit, 2001)
Bryant S. Troville v. Greg Venz
303 F.3d 1256 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)
Evelyn Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc.
364 F.3d 1305 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
David Richard Moon v. Lanson Newsome, Warden
863 F.2d 835 (Eleventh Circuit, 1989)
James R. Thomas, Jr. v. Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit
574 F. App'x 916 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)

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