In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-24-00431-CR
NO. 09-24-00432-CR
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RAMON FIGUEROA JR., Appellant V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 9th District Court Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause Nos. 22-07-08859-CR & 22-12-17309-CR
________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Montgomery County grand jury indicted Ramon Figueroa Jr. for the second-degree felony offense of online solicitation of a minor and the first-degree felony offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.02(b) (continuous sexual abuse of a child), 33.021(b), (f) (online solicitation of a minor). Figueroa pleaded guilty to the offense of online solicitation of a minor as charged. The State filed a Motion to Proceed on a Lesser Included
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Offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and Figueroa pleaded guilty to that lesser-included offense. See id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B), (e) (aggravated sexual assault of a child); see also Price v. State, 413 S.W.3d 158, 163 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013) (explaining aggravated sexual assault of a child is a lesser-included offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child), aff’d, 434 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The offenses involved two victims, “Erin” and “Ashley.” After a punishment hearing, the trial court sentenced him to twenty years for online solicitation and life for aggravated assault and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. In a single issue, Figueroa complains the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set a hearing on his Motion for New Trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgments as discussed below.
Background
Guilty Plea Figueroa signed written plea admonishments indicating he elected to have the court decide punishment. The trial court admonished him on the record of the offenses and punishment ranges. After indicating he understood the ranges, that his right to appeal would be limited, and that he wanted to waive his right to a jury trial, Figueroa pleaded guilty to the second-degree felony offense of online solicitation of a minor and aggravated sexual assault of a child. Although the trial court said that the aggravated assault of a child offense was “a reduction” from the continuous
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sexual abuse of a child offense, the State represented that it was an open plea without a cap. The trial court admonished Figueroa that “[a]s long as I stay within that punishment range that we talked about in each of these cases, really, your appellate rights are pretty limited[,]” and Figueroa indicated he understood. The trial court accepted Figueroa’s guilty plea, requested a pre-sentencing investigation report (PSI), and set the sentencing hearing for a later date. The trial court’s certification indicated that this was not a plea bargain case, and Figueroa could appeal his sentences only. Sentencing Hearing The sentencing hearing occurred on November 15, 2024. The State called two witnesses, and three witnesses testified for the defense. The State’s witnesses included a detective and Ashley’s father, while the defense witnesses included an expert and Figueroa’s parents. The State focused on the fact that Figueroa used Snapchat to contact multiple individuals between twelve and fifteen years old and lied about his age. The State asked that the trial court sentence Figueroa to life plus twenty years and that the sentences be served consecutively.
The State’s first witness was Caitlin Adams with the Conroe Police Department, who investigated this case involving Figueroa. She explained that she became involved when her supervisor called her on July 5, 2022, regarding a potential runaway. The runaway was Erin. Adams learned from Erin’s mother and
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sister that Erin had been talking to Figueroa, whom Erin referred to as her “boyfriend.” They also told Adams that Erin had run away with him.
Adams testified that through her investigation, she located Figueroa’s mother’s address the same day. Adams contacted a Houston Police Department (HPD) officer to assist with reaching out to Figueroa’s mother, Sonia. She said the HPD officer contacted Sonia at her residence and told Sonia that they were looking for Erin. Adams testified that Sonia told them that she knew where Erin was and would return Erin to Adams or to her mother, but Sonia refused to provide the address where Erin was. Adams insisted that Sonia meet her, so she “could receive the 13-year-old from her.” Adams explained that Erin was uncooperative with the investigation and ran away because she wanted to be with Figueroa.
Adams relayed that she recovered the child in Humble and took her immediately to the hospital to meet her mother and undergo a SANE exam. Although Erin did not disclose any sexual abuse during the SANE exam, DNA evidence and sperm collected from multiple places, including inside Erin’s vagina, matched Figueroa. With the permission of Erin’s mother, Adams also performed an extraction on Erin’s phone, which contained evidence of a sexual relationship between Erin and Figueroa. Adams confirmed that she detailed this evidence in her report. After Figueroa was charged with online solicitation of a minor in relation to Erin’s case,
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Adams learned that Figueroa continued communicating with Erin, which violated his bond conditions.
During her investigation, Adams obtained Snapchat records through a search warrant. The sealed Snapchat records containing child sexual abuse material were admitted into evidence without objection. Adams testified that these Snapchat records were voluminous and contained over 100,000 lines of communication. The State offered a summary of the Snapchat records, which the trial court admitted over Figueroa’s objection.
Adams testified that information contained in the records and reflected in the summary led her to other potential victims, including Ashley. Adams described how she identified Ashley through the Snapchat records and learned that Ashley was twelve years old. A photograph of Figueroa with Ashley was also admitted into evidence. Adams explained that in November 2022, she contacted Ashley’s family, and specifically, Ashley’s sisters were helpful, as Ashley does not communicate verbally much. Adams said that Ashley’s father relayed that Ashley is autistic with difficulty communicating verbally, which became severe in February 2022, when Ashley refused to communicate with anyone but her sister, “Mae.” Adams testified that she learned that was the same month Figueroa sexually assaulted Ashley. According to Adams, during the investigation, Mae provided some information, but at the forensic interview, Ashley wrote out her answers to the interview questions
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and disclosed sexual abuse. Ashley underwent a SANE exam where she reported that Figueroa penetrated her vaginally and anally, as well as strangled her with a sex toy.
Adams discussed the summary of the Snapchat records, which sorted the information by: the age of the victims; which ones Figueroa requested child sexual abuse material from; the ones where he admitted knowing the contact was illegal; those with whom he had sexually explicit conversations; and those whom he solicited meetings with. Adams testified that she identified eight other victims with whom Figueroa had communications that constituted online solicitation of a minor, but she could not identify those victims. Adams testified that Figueroa consistently lied about his age and claimed he was eighteen or nineteen, although he was twenty- one; he also asked for the victims’ ages. Adams explained that the Snapchat summary included only individuals under the age of seventeen, and the youngest was twelve that he communicated with. According to Adams, Figueroa also bragged to the minors that he could provide marijuana or alcohol, which meant he lied in the PSI if he denied marijuana use.
Father testified that Mae and Ashley are his daughters. Father testified that Ashley has “selective mutism” and autism. Although she had accidents in the past, Father noted that it became worse in February 2022, Ashley began having frequent accidents where she soiled herself. He also described other problems Ashley had
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after the sexual assault, which resulted in their withdrawing her from school. Father described how the assault impacted their family, including Ashley’s having to wear diapers now. Although Ashley had challenges before this happened, they became worse after the assault. Father outlined the problems that Ashley still has, including a tear in her anus from the assault, shaking in front of people, not wanting to go into stores, not speaking to people, and not wanting to eat in front of people.
Joseph Brown, a licensed clinical social worker and licensed sex offender treatment provider testified for the defense. Brown testified that Figueroa contacted him seeking sex offender treatment, and Brown performed an assessment on him then enrolled him in a treatment program. Brown described the screenings he performed on Figueroa, which included a Static-99. He testified that Figueroa was a low to moderate risk level. Brown noted that Figueroa had completed thirty hours of treatment, but he recommended 250 to 300 hours. Brown said that he made sure Figueroa “was admitting” the offense. He also explained that although Figueroa has shown remorse, it is more about what has happened to him, and “he should have developed a lot more empathy than he has[.]”
Brown described the differences between the treatment received in prison versus being on probation. He testified that if treatment was a good fit, it was the best environment to treat them while they are on probation. Brown said that the first 200 hours of Figueroa’s treatment needed to be “intense weekly” sessions. He also
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felt that Figueroa would be a “very good candidate” for probation. That said, on cross-examination Brown testified that Figueroa has “many of the diagnostic criteria” for pedophilia. On redirect, he clarified that he did not believe Figueroa had pedophilia but had impulsive behavior and a past “predatory behavior” that he developed. Brown testified that with treatment, the re-offense rate “goes way down.”
Appellant’s uncle, Manuel, testified that Figueroa works for him. Manuel owns a transportation company and said that Figueroa has worked for him for at least two or three years and described his job duties. Manuel described Figueroa as a reliable and enthusiastic employee. He added that Figueroa knows what he did was serious, and he regrets it. Manuel relayed that Figueroa has close family connections and is accepting responsibility for what happened. He explained that he would continue to employ Figueroa if he were given probation.
Figueroa’s mother, Sonia, also testified. Sonia testified that Figueroa lives with them, and she helps him with his bond conditions. Sonia said that Figueroa has become a better person and described how he helped around the home. She also provided examples of how he helped in the community. Sonia denied that Figueroa was a danger to the community and said that “he has learned.” She testified that Figueroa has shown remorse and regrets everything that happened. She also claimed that she told HPD where Erin was. Sonia testified that Figueroa should get probation, because he was never in trouble before, he is her only son, and “he has dreams.”
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The trial court took judicial notice of the PSI and all the attachments, including Adams’s report, which the defense did not object to. At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the State initially asked that the trial court sentence Figueroa to life plus twenty years and that the sentences be served consecutively. Later, following a recess, the State revised that request after being reminded that the parties agreed the sentences would run concurrently. The prosecutor said that “based on the information I have before me, I believe that was our agreement, and that the State would only seek concurrent time and not consecutive time.” The trial court then noted, “I think I have to treat that [] as a cap kind of agreement, so that’s how I’m going to handle it.”
The trial court found Figueroa guilty of both offenses and sentenced him to life in cause number 22-12-17309-CR and to twenty years in cause number 22-07- 08859-CR to run concurrently. At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated, “Mr. Figueroa, this is not a plea bargain case which means you do have the right to appeal. I’ve already instructed my coordinator to evaluate you for a court appointed attorney for your appeal, which they will do at the jail over the next couple of days.” Motion for New Trial Figueroa timely filed an identical Motion for New Trial in each cause number and provided a declaration in support of the Motion. The Motion for New Trial complained of ineffective assistance of counsel, which fell into two categories.
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First, the Motion alleged that Figueroa received incorrect advice with respect to his decision to plead guilty without an agreed recommendation. The Motion asserted that the State offered thirty or thirty-five years, but trial counsel told Figueroa that if he pleaded guilty “the judge would be lenient.” He complained that despite being informed of the punishment, he “was never told the likelihood of a life sentence with the possibility of parole.” Figueroa contended that “[t]he promise of leniency by the judge provided the basis for his decision to enter a plea.” The Motion for New Trial cited cases about the requisites of an involuntary-guilty-plea claim, but Figueroa did not directly assert that his guilty pleas were involuntary or request that he be allowed to withdraw them.
Second, the Motion alleged that trial counsel failed to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence at the punishment hearing. The Motion attached affidavits and letters from various family members and friends about his character, work ethic, temperament, and willingness to help others, among other things.
The trial court signed acknowledgments in each cause that the Motion for New Trial was presented timely, and the trial court denied the Motion in each cause without a hearing.
Initial Matter: Jurisdiction The State argues that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal, because it is a plea bargain case, in that the reduced charge for aggravated sexual assault instead
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of continuous sexual abuse of a child effectively capped punishment. It also contends the record does not show that Figueroa obtained the trial court’s permission to appeal.
There are two basic kinds of plea-bargaining: charge-bargaining and sentencing-bargaining. See Shankle v. State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc).
Charge-bargaining involves questions of whether a defendant will plead guilty to the offense that has been alleged or to a lesser or related offense, and of whether the prosecutor will dismiss, or refrain from bringing, other charges. Sentence-bargaining may be for binding or non-binding recommendations to the court on sentences, including a recommended “cap” on sentencing and a recommendation for deferredadjudication probation.
Id. (citations omitted); Alvarado v. State, No. 09-17-00093-CR, 2019 WL 138380, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “[T]he State’s agreement to forgo prosecution for a pending charge in exchange for a defendant’s plea to a lesser offense effectively places a cap on the possible punishment.” See Thomas v. State, 516 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Kennedy v. State, 297 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Shankle, 119 S.W.3d at 813–14). “The law concerning the effect of a plea bargain based on sentence bargaining also applies to plea bargains based on charge- bargaining.” Alvarado, 2019 WL 138380, at *1 (citing Thomas, 516 S.W.3d at 502). Even though sentences may be “identical on their faces[,]” charge bargains can also impact punishment in other ways, like earlier parole eligibility or the minimum
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required sentence. See Shankle, 119 S.W.3d at 813–14. When a defendant pleads guilty and elects to have the court assess punishment and the punishment does not exceed the prosecutor’s recommended punishment that the defendant agreed to, he must have the trial court’s permission to appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; see also Tex. R. App. P. 25.2.
This case involved a charge bargain where the parties agreed that Figueroa would plead guilty to the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child instead of the State’s proceeding with the continuous sexual abuse of a child charge, and both offenses were first-degree felonies with a maximum punishment of life. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32; 21.02(b)(1)(2)(A), (h); 22.021(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B). That said, continuous sexual abuse of a child requires imprisonment for a minimum term of twenty-five years. See id. § 21.02(h). In contrast, aggravated sexual assault of a child only requires a minimum sentence of twenty-five years in certain circumstances not applicable here. See id. § 22.021(f). Despite acknowledging the “reduction” in the charge at the initial plea hearing and noting that the agreement not to request consecutive sentences acted as a “cap,” the trial court thereafter told Figueroa he would have the right to appeal and arranged for appointment of appellate counsel. From this, we conclude the trial court recognized the charge bargain but granted Figueroa permission to appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The trial court’s unconventional
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certification of the right to appeal also supports this, as it allowed Figueroa to appeal “punishment only.”
We reject the State’s argument and determine this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal based on the trial court’s giving Figueroa permission to appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).
Standard of Review and Applicable Law We now turn to the merits of Figueroa’s complaint. We review a trial court’s denial of a hearing on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We will reverse only if the trial court’s decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See id. (citation omitted). “The purposes of a new trial hearing are (1) to determine whether the case should be retried or (2) to complete the record for presenting issues on appeal.” Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 338). A hearing on a motion for new trial “is not an absolute right.” Id.; Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 338. A trial judge abuses his discretion in not holding a hearing if the motion and supporting affidavits “(1) raise matters which are not determinable from the record and (2) establish reasonable grounds showing that the defendant could potentially be entitled to relief.” Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199 (citation omitted). A motion for new trial must be supported by an affidavit setting out the factual basis
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for the claim. Id. If the affidavit is conclusory, unsupported by facts, or fails to provide requisite notice of the basis for the relief claimed, no hearing is required. Id.
Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant complaining that counsel was ineffective must establish counsel’s performance was (1) deficient, and (2) prejudiced his defense. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 340. “To show deficiency ‘the appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation objectively fell below the standard of professional norms.’” Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 340 (quoting Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). To establish prejudice, “the appellant ‘must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Thus, to be entitled to a hearing on a motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must allege sufficient facts from which a trial court could reasonably conclude both that: (1) counsel failed to act as a reasonably competent attorney; and (2) but for counsel’s failure, there is a reasonable likelihood the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. at 340–41.
Analysis
In his sole issue, Figueroa complains the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing on his Motion for New Trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In connection with this issue, he focuses only on the allegations that
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counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and provide additional mitigating evidence.1 In sum, we examine whether the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on his ineffective assistance claim based on the failure to investigate.
In this case, the trial court decided punishment as part of a normative process and had the unfettered discretion to assess punishment within the applicable range. See id. at 344 (explaining setting confinement within a prescribed range is a “normative judgment” and the sentencer’s discretion to impose punishment within the range is “essentially unfettered”). Figueroa cannot show deficient performance or prejudice in this case, as he cannot show that but for counsel’s conduct, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See id. at 341.
Here, the record does not show that counsel’s conduct was deficient by falling below an objectively reasonable standard of professional norms. See id. at 340; Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642. The defense offered testimony from two family members and an expert specializing in sex offender treatment in this case as mitigation evidence. Figueroa’s mother and uncle discussed Figueroa’s character, testified that he worked hard, helped others, was remorseful, and that he deserved probation. The letters and affidavits from other character witnesses provided much
1 Since he does not argue the ineffectiveness claims based on an involuntary plea that were also raised in his Motion for New Trial, we do not address them in this opinion. We likewise do not address any arguments in support of this issue that were not raised in his Motion for New Trial, since they were not preserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
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of the same, and counsel could have reasonably believed that putting them on would be cumulative. The expert opined that Figueroa was a good candidate for probation, treatment would be better if he was on probation, and he admitted the offense. The defense had a cogent strategy that included expert testimony and character witnesses testifying that Figueroa deserved probation, was remorseful, and had positive character attributes. We cannot say that this performance was deficient nor do the affidavits in support of the Motion for New Trial establish deficiency or offer any indication that live testimony at a hearing would be beneficial for that purpose.
Nor did Figueroa meet the prejudice prong that but for counsel’s acts the outcome would have been different. See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 340. The trial court could have reasonably determined that the witnesses’ testimony referenced in the affidavits and letters would have been cumulative and not supported a lesser punishment, given the egregious facts of this case and that such testimony “would not have influenced his normative judgment.” See id. at 345. Although Figueroa’s affidavit mentions he “never knew anything about the possibility of hiring an expert for trial[,]” the record shows that in fact, his attorney called Brown as an expert on his behalf. Although Brown offered testimony that Figueroa was a good candidate for supervision, he also testified that Figueroa demonstrated character traits of pedophilia and should have more empathy for others. Testimony at trial established that Figueroa (1) contacted many children between the ages of twelve and seventeen,
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(2) admitted he knew in some instances that the conduct was illegal, (3) lied about his age, and (4) he continued to contact Erin in violation of his bond conditions. Ashley’s father offered testimony about the serious negative impacts the assault had on his daughter and the rest of their family.
Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a hearing on a Motion for New Trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel where the Motion did not establish both Strickland prongs of counsel’s deficient performance and prejudice. See Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 200; Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 345. The Motion for New Trial and accompanying affidavits did not establish reasonable grounds showing that Figueroa could potentially be entitled to relief. See Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199. We overrule Figueroa’s sole issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Figueroa’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
AFFIRMED.
W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice
Submitted on January 2, 2026 Opinion Delivered August 19, 2026 Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.