Ramon Feliciano v. United States of America

First Circuit

Ramon Feliciano v. United States of America

422 F.2d 943, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10335

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit

DecidedMarch 11, 1970

Docket7388

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 422 F.2d 943 (Ramon Feliciano v. United States of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ramon Feliciano v. United States of America, 422 F.2d 943, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10335 (1st Cir. 1970).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

For the reasons stated in the thoughtful opinion of the district court, 297 F.Supp. 1356 (D.P.R. 1969), we affirm the court’s determination that the present use of the Culebra Island Naval Defensive Sea Area is within the Congressional authorization and the discretion of the President, and that such use does not constitute a taking of plaintiff’s property or freedom of movement without due process of law, the only issues raised by this appeal. We would add only a brief comment regarding the two arguments stressed on appeal.

First, appellant places great emphasis on a letter by the Secretary .of the Navy to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs expressing the need for presidential power to create defensive sea areas “in time of actual or threatened war”. S.Rep. No. 940, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1917). Appellant concludes from this single instance of pertinent legislative history that the President’s power must be exercised in compliance with the standard expressed in the letter. However, it seems clear that Congress chose to confer a broader power on the President, who was empowered to create defensive sea areas when they were “necessary in his discretion for purposes of national defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 96, re-codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2152. Such statutory standard was satisfied here.

Secondly, concerning the alleged taking or improper restriction of plaintiff’s right of travel, we note that such right may be inhibited, depending on “the extent of the governmental restriction imposed” and the “extent of the necessity for the restriction”. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1279, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965). Here there exist reasonable and frequent means of access to other islands, and the restrictions which do exist are reasonably necessary and — at least as presently administered — limited to such necessity.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

For the reasons stated in the thoughtful opinion of the district court, 297 F.Supp. 1356 (D.P.R. 1969), we affirm the court’s determination that the present use of the Culebra Island Naval Defensive Sea Area is within the Congressional authorization and the discretion of the President, and that such use does not constitute a taking of plaintiff’s property or freedom of movement without due process of law, the only issues raised by this appeal. We would add only a brief comment regarding the two arguments stressed on appeal.

First, appellant places great emphasis on a letter by the Secretary .of the Navy to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs expressing the need for presidential power to create defensive sea areas “in time of actual or threatened war”. S.Rep. No. 940, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1917). Appellant concludes from this single instance of pertinent legislative history that the President’s power must be exercised in compliance with the standard expressed in the letter. However, it seems clear that Congress chose to confer a broader power on the President, who was empowered to create defensive sea areas when they were “necessary in his discretion for purposes of national defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 96, re-codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2152. Such statutory standard was satisfied here.

Secondly, concerning the alleged taking or improper restriction of plaintiff’s right of travel, we note that such right may be inhibited, depending on “the extent of the governmental restriction imposed” and the “extent of the necessity for the restriction”. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1279, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965). Here there exist reasonable and frequent means of access to other islands, and the restrictions which do exist are reasonably necessary and — at least as presently administered — limited to such necessity.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

422 F.2d 943, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10335, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ramon-feliciano-v-united-states-of-america-ca1-1970.

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