Case: 18-10385 Date Filed: 08/23/2019 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-10385 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:15-cv-00278-WTH-EMT
RAMON DELSOL HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner–Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent–Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(August 23, 2019)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-10385 Date Filed: 08/23/2019 Page: 2 of 6
Ramon Hernandez, proceeding pro se on appeal, appeals the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. Following that denial, a single judge of
this Court issued a certificate of appealability (“COA”) only on the issue of
“[w]hether a language barrier rendered Hernandez’s plea of no contest to sexual
battery on a person less than 12 years of age and to lewd and lascivious
molestation invalid.” Hernandez argues that the district court erred in denying his
claim because his rights to due process, equal protection, and effective counsel
were violated. Specifically, Hernandez argues that he, a native Cuban who speaks
minimal English, did not fully understand the charges against him and the
consequences of his decision not to proceed to trial when he entered his plea,
which fundamentally prejudiced him and rendered his pleas involuntary.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition. Maharaj
v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 304 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002). A state
prisoner’s § 2254 petition shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the adjudication of that claim
either (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme
Court, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state court.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
2 Case: 18-10385 Date Filed: 08/23/2019 Page: 3 of 6
When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives a number of constitutional rights,
and thus, “the Constitution insists, among other things, that the defendant enter a
guilty plea that is ‘voluntary’ and that the defendant must make related waivers
knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,
628–29 (2002) (brackets and quotation marks omitted). The standard for the
validity of a plea is whether it “represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among
the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, a § 2254
petitioner must show that there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny
his federal claim. Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1216 (11th Cir. 2011).
Where a petitioner presented his federal claim to the state court and was denied
relief without an explanation, a presumption arises that the state court adjudicated
the claim on its merits. Id. The petitioner bears the burden of overcoming that
presumption and may do so by showing that there is reason to think that some
other explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely. Id. “Under
§ 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or,
. . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it
is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are
3 Case: 18-10385 Date Filed: 08/23/2019 Page: 4 of 6
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of” the U.S. Supreme Court.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). We must deny a § 2254 petition if
any fairminded jurist could agree with the state court’s ruling. Meders v. Warden,
Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d 1335, 1351 (11th Cir. 2019).
The district court did not err in denying Hernandez’s § 2254 petition because
fairminded jurists could agree with the Florida Court of Appeal’s decision, in light
of evidence from Hernandez’s community-control revocation hearing that he
understood English well enough to understand the nature and consequences of his
pleas. First, Hernandez cannot show that the state-court adjudication was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Florida Court of Appeal could
have determined that Hernandez could understand English because he testified that
he had no problem understanding Daniel’s instructions regarding the conditions of
his community control, which were the direct consequences of his plea. 1 That
assertion is corroborated by probation officer Daniel’s testimony that she had no
problem communicating with him during their hour-long meeting. Similarly,
1 Although the evidence on which the Florida court could have relied occurred—not at the challenged change of plea colloquy—but at the subsequent revocation of community control hearing, that testimony provided ample basis for the Florida court to conclude that Hernandez did understand English at the challenged plea hearing. Hernandez’s testimony revealed that he readily understood English in his communications with his probation officer, Daniel, on two occasions approximately three months and nine months after the challenged plea hearing. Moreover, at the community control revocation hearing, Judge Register noted on the record that Hernandez understood in English what the judge was saying in English. Judge Register was the same judge who presided at the challenged plea hearing. 4 Case: 18-10385 Date Filed: 08/23/2019 Page: 5 of 6
Daniel’s supervisor’s testimony that Hernandez had continuously denied the things
that she and Daniel told him indicates that he understood the nature of the things
that he had been denying. Finally, the sentencing transcript suggests that
Hernandez understood the consequences of his sentence despite the fact that it was
pronounced in English and had not been translated to him, because the state court
stated that Hernandez’s reaction indicated that he had understood what the court
had said, and Hernandez expressly confirmed that he had understood the court
despite his need for people to speak slowly when speaking English. Therefore,
Hernandez cannot show that the Florida Court of Appeal’s decision was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts because his testimony from the
sentencing, along with Daniel’s and the supervisor’s testimony, suggested that he
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Case: 18-10385 Date Filed: 08/23/2019 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-10385 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:15-cv-00278-WTH-EMT
RAMON DELSOL HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner–Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent–Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(August 23, 2019)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-10385 Date Filed: 08/23/2019 Page: 2 of 6
Ramon Hernandez, proceeding pro se on appeal, appeals the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. Following that denial, a single judge of
this Court issued a certificate of appealability (“COA”) only on the issue of
“[w]hether a language barrier rendered Hernandez’s plea of no contest to sexual
battery on a person less than 12 years of age and to lewd and lascivious
molestation invalid.” Hernandez argues that the district court erred in denying his
claim because his rights to due process, equal protection, and effective counsel
were violated. Specifically, Hernandez argues that he, a native Cuban who speaks
minimal English, did not fully understand the charges against him and the
consequences of his decision not to proceed to trial when he entered his plea,
which fundamentally prejudiced him and rendered his pleas involuntary.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition. Maharaj
v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 304 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002). A state
prisoner’s § 2254 petition shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the adjudication of that claim
either (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme
Court, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state court.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
2 Case: 18-10385 Date Filed: 08/23/2019 Page: 3 of 6
When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives a number of constitutional rights,
and thus, “the Constitution insists, among other things, that the defendant enter a
guilty plea that is ‘voluntary’ and that the defendant must make related waivers
knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,
628–29 (2002) (brackets and quotation marks omitted). The standard for the
validity of a plea is whether it “represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among
the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, a § 2254
petitioner must show that there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny
his federal claim. Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1216 (11th Cir. 2011).
Where a petitioner presented his federal claim to the state court and was denied
relief without an explanation, a presumption arises that the state court adjudicated
the claim on its merits. Id. The petitioner bears the burden of overcoming that
presumption and may do so by showing that there is reason to think that some
other explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely. Id. “Under
§ 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or,
. . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it
is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are
3 Case: 18-10385 Date Filed: 08/23/2019 Page: 4 of 6
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of” the U.S. Supreme Court.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). We must deny a § 2254 petition if
any fairminded jurist could agree with the state court’s ruling. Meders v. Warden,
Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d 1335, 1351 (11th Cir. 2019).
The district court did not err in denying Hernandez’s § 2254 petition because
fairminded jurists could agree with the Florida Court of Appeal’s decision, in light
of evidence from Hernandez’s community-control revocation hearing that he
understood English well enough to understand the nature and consequences of his
pleas. First, Hernandez cannot show that the state-court adjudication was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Florida Court of Appeal could
have determined that Hernandez could understand English because he testified that
he had no problem understanding Daniel’s instructions regarding the conditions of
his community control, which were the direct consequences of his plea. 1 That
assertion is corroborated by probation officer Daniel’s testimony that she had no
problem communicating with him during their hour-long meeting. Similarly,
1 Although the evidence on which the Florida court could have relied occurred—not at the challenged change of plea colloquy—but at the subsequent revocation of community control hearing, that testimony provided ample basis for the Florida court to conclude that Hernandez did understand English at the challenged plea hearing. Hernandez’s testimony revealed that he readily understood English in his communications with his probation officer, Daniel, on two occasions approximately three months and nine months after the challenged plea hearing. Moreover, at the community control revocation hearing, Judge Register noted on the record that Hernandez understood in English what the judge was saying in English. Judge Register was the same judge who presided at the challenged plea hearing. 4 Case: 18-10385 Date Filed: 08/23/2019 Page: 5 of 6
Daniel’s supervisor’s testimony that Hernandez had continuously denied the things
that she and Daniel told him indicates that he understood the nature of the things
that he had been denying. Finally, the sentencing transcript suggests that
Hernandez understood the consequences of his sentence despite the fact that it was
pronounced in English and had not been translated to him, because the state court
stated that Hernandez’s reaction indicated that he had understood what the court
had said, and Hernandez expressly confirmed that he had understood the court
despite his need for people to speak slowly when speaking English. Therefore,
Hernandez cannot show that the Florida Court of Appeal’s decision was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts because his testimony from the
sentencing, along with Daniel’s and the supervisor’s testimony, suggested that he
spoke English well enough to understand the nature of charges against him and the
consequences of entering his plea.
Because fairminded jurists could conclude that the Florida Court of Appeal’s
decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, Hernandez is
entitled to habeas relief only if he can show that the Florida Court of Appeal’s
decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1). However, Hernandez’s testimony indicates that he actually
understood the consequences of his guilty plea, because his dispute with Daniel
5 Case: 18-10385 Date Filed: 08/23/2019 Page: 6 of 6
centered on his efforts to comply with the terms of his community-control, and
nothing from the sentencing hearing suggests that his failure to comply was due to
his inability to understand the obligations imposed as a result of his pleas. While
Hernandez argues that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known that he
would not have been released that same day, he has not shown that his subverted
expectations were due to his inability to speak English, rather than his
misunderstanding as to his legal status in an unrelated case at the time he entered
his plea.2
In light of the foregoing, Hernandez has failed to show that the Florida Court
of Appeal’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law because fairminded jurists could conclude that he
entered his pleas knowingly and voluntarily, given the evidence from which one
could reasonably find that he was sufficiently familiar with English to understand
the charges against him and the consequences of entering his pleas. Meders, 911
F.3d at 1351; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, the district court did not err in
denying his § 2254 petition.
AFFIRMED.
2 Apparently Hernandez was not released after the plea as he had expected, because a detainer had been placed on him by another county. 6