Ramon Del Fierro v. Dyncorp International LLC

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: November 3, 2022
• Docket: 2:19-cv-07091
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

Case 2:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC Document 108 Filed 11/03/22 Page 1 of 10 Page ID #:2893

1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAMON DEL FIERRO, ) Case No. CV 19-07091 DDP (JCx) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. ) RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS ) CERTIFICATION 14 DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL LLC, ) ) [Dkt. 92] 15 Defendants. ) ___________________________ ) 16 17 Presently before the court is Plaintiff Ramon Del Fierro’s 18 renewed Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. 92). Having 19 considered the submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, 20 the court grants the motion and adopts the following Order. 21 I. Background 22 As recounted in this Court’s earlier Orders, Plaintiff worked 23 for Defendant Dyncorp International LLC (“Dyncorp) at the Point 24 Mugu Naval Air Station (“Point Mugu”) from December 2016 to July 25 2019. (Complaint ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges, on behalf of a putative 26 class, that Dyncorp violated California Labor Code § 226 by failing 27 to provide wage statements that accurately identified the 28 Case 2:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC Document 108 Filed 11/03/22 Page 2 of 10 Page ID #:2894

1 applicable rate of pay and hours worked for certain “shift 2 premiums.”1 (Compl. ¶ 30.) 3 Plaintiff previously moved to certify a class comprised of 4 “all current and former California non-exempt employees of 5 Defendant DynCorp International, LLC (“Defendant”) who were paid 6 any shift premium wages (including certification premiums) at any 7 time from August 14, 2018, through the date that the class is 8 certified.” (Dkt. 48) Many putative class members, however, were 9 employed by Dyncorp at other California locations, including 10 military bases other than Point Mugu. These varying work locations 11 potentially implicated the “federal enclave” doctrine, which 12 generally provides that “when an area in a State becomes a federal 13 enclave, ‘only the state law in effect at the time of the transfer 14 of jurisdiction continues in force’ as surrogate federal law.” 15 Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1890 16 (2019) (quoting James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94, 100 17 (1940) (internal alteration omitted)). Subsequent, relatively 18 minor changes to existing state law may also apply to federal 19 enclaves. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 269 (1963). 20 This Court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to show that 21 the federal enclave doctrine would apply uniformly to all the 22 locations at which putative class members worked, and that 23 Plaintiff had thus failed to demonstrate that the class 24 certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 25 26 1 More specifically, Section 226(a)(9) requires that wage statements accurately itemize “all applicable hourly rates in 27 effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee . . . .” Cal. Lab. Code 28 § 226(a)(9). 2 Case 2:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC Document 108 Filed 11/03/22 Page 3 of 10 Page ID #:2895

1 were met. In other words, because the various work locations 2 became federal enclaves at different times, Section 226 might apply 3 to some Dyncorp employees, but not others, and individual questions 4 might thus predominate. Accordingly, the court denied Plaintiff’s 5 Motion for Class Certification, without prejudice. 6 Plaintiff now brings a renewed Motion for Class Certification. 7 Plaintiff’s renewed motion seeks certification of a different 8 class, comprised of “All current and former non-exempt employees of 9 [Dyncorp] who were paid any shift premiums . . . and did not work 10 at a property that became a federal enclave before 1943 . . . .” 11 (Renewed Mot. at 2.) 12 II. Legal Standard 13 A party seeking class certification bears the burden of 14 showing that each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at 15 least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) are met. See Hanon v. 16 Dataprods. Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508-09 (9th Cir. 1992). Rule 23(a) 17 sets forth four prerequisites for class certification: 18 (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the 19 class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 20 representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508. These 22 four requirements are often referred to as numerosity, 23 commonality, typicality, and adequacy. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. 24 Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982). 25 In determining the propriety of a class action, the question 26 is not whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action or will 27 prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 28 3 Case 2:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC Document 108 Filed 11/03/22 Page 4 of 10 Page ID #:2896

1 23 are met. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 2 (1974). This court, therefore, considers the merits of the 3 underlying claim to the extent that the merits overlap with the 4 Rule 23 requirements, but will not conduct a “mini-trial” or 5 determine at this stage whether Plaintiffs could actually prevail. 6 Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981, 983 n.8 (9th 7 Cir. 2011); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 8 350-51 (2011). 9 Rule 23(b) defines different types of classes. Leyva v. 10 Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff 11 here seeks certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which requires 12 that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate 13 over individual questions . . . and that a class action is 14 superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 15 adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 16 III. Discussion 17 As with Plaintiff’s initial motion for class certification, 18 several of the Rule 23 factors are not in dispute. Dyncorp 19 appears to concede, for example, that the putative class includes 20 approximately 300 members, if not more.2 (Opposition at 7.) And, 21 as before, there is at the very least a common question as to 22 whether each class member received accurate and adequate wage 23 statements. See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 24 981 (9th Cir.2011) (“The requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) have been 25 26 2 The Ninth Circuit has required at least fifteen members to certify a class, and classes of at least forty members are usually 27 found to have satisfied the numerosity requirement. Harik v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 326 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003); Davis v. Four 28 Seasons Hotel Ltd., 277 F.R.D. 429, 435 (D. Hawaii 2011). 4 Case 2:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC Document 108 Filed 11/03/22 Page 5 of 10 Page ID #:2897

1 construed permissively, and all questions of fact and law need not 2 be common to satisfy the rule.”) (internal quotation marks and 3 brackets omitted). 4 Indeed, of the Rule 23 factors, Dyncorp’s opposition mentions 5 only two: typicality and predominance. (Opp. at 5.) The 6 substantive basis of Dyncorp’s opposition, however, is not 7 entirely clear. Dyncorp correctly observes that this Court 8 rejected Plaintiff’s theory that the only question relevant to a 9 federal enclave analysis is whether a particular statute existed, 10 in any form, at the time a federal enclave came into being. As 11 the court explained, “[b]y Plaintiff’s logic, a state could impose 12 an entirely novel legal regime upon a federal enclave simply by 13 amending a pre-existing statute to include new, completely 14 unrelated provisions.” (Dkt. 59 at 5.) Quoting this conclusion, 15 Dyncorp asserts that Plaintiff has again failed to show that the 16 federal enclave doctrine applies uniformly to the proposed class, 17 thus implicating the predominance and typicality factors. (Opp. 18 at 8.) 19 Plaintiff’s earlier mischaracterization of the federal 20 enclave doctrine, however, is not repeated in Plaintiff’s current 21 motion, and appears to have little bearing on the uniformity of 22 the revised proposed class. Section 226 took effect in June 1943. 23 Plaintiff’s proposed class does not include any Dyncorp employees 24 who worked on bases that became federal enclaves prior to that 25 date. Nor does the class include any Dyncorp employees who worked 26 on bases that became federal enclaves after 1961.3 Thus, it 27 3 Dyncorp contends that Section 226 underwent a significant 28 (continued...) 5 Case 2:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC Document 108 Filed 11/03/22 Page 6 of 10 Page ID #:2898

1 appears that Section 226 will apply equally to all putative class 2 members, either directly or by way of the federal enclave 3 doctrine, that common issues therefore predominate, and that 4 Plaintiff is an adequate class representative. 5 The bulk of Dyncorp’s opposition makes clear that Dyncorp 6 does not oppose class certification so much as it seeks 7 reconsideration of this Court’s order denying Dyncorp’s motion for 8 judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. 59.) Indeed, Dyncorp’s 9 opposition to Plaintiff’s class certification repeatedly and 10 explicitly urges this Court to “reconsider its ruling that § 11 226(a)(9) may be applied on Pt. Mugu.” (Opp. at 9.) In its 12 motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dyncorp contended that, 13 because Point Mugu became a federal enclave after the enactment of 14 Section 229 but before the addition of Section 226(a)(9), only the 15 former’s requirements apply to Plaintiff’s wage statements. This 16 Court disagreed, recognizing that courts have applied an exception 17 to the federal enclave doctrine and applied state law to federal 18 enclaves “where minor regulatory changes modify 19 laws existing at the time of cession.” Allison v. Boeing Laser 20 Tech. Servs., 689 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Paul, 21 371 U.S. at 269). As the court explained, 22 “[f]or as long as Point Mugu has existed as a federal enclave, on-base employers have had to comply with 23 California law regulating wage statements. Although the requirement under Section 226(a)(9) that wage statements 24 include all applicable hourly rates paid is undoubtedly a post-handover change, the mandated addition of a 25 26 3(...continued) transformation in 1976. (Opp. at 11.) Even if Dyncorp were 27 correct, any associated defense would apply equally to all military bases at issue here, all of which were federal enclaves prior to 28 1976. 6 Case 2:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC Document 108 Filed 11/03/22 Page 7 of 10 Page ID #:2899

1 single line item is no more than an incremental change to an existing regulatory regime . . . . The federal 2 enclave doctrine does not, therefore, bar Plaintiff’s sole claim under [§ 226].” 3 (Dkt. 59 at 7). 4 At no point, however, has Dyncorp filed a motion seeking 5 reconsideration of the court’s prior order, let alone filed such a 6 motion within the proper time period. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-18 7 (“Absent good cause shown, any motion for reconsideration must be 8 filed no later than 14 days after entry of the Order that is the 9 subject of the motion or application.”). Courts have routinely 10 observed that motions for reconsideration in the guise of 11 oppositions are improper. See, e.g., Hershewe v. JOYY Inc., No. 12 2:20-CV-10611-SB-AFM, 2022 WL 1123208, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 13 2022); Sweeney v. Chang, No. 216CV07240CASRAOX, 2019 WL 1431583, 14 at *3 n.5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019); Stafford v. Brink's, Inc., 15 No. CV1401352MWFPLAX, 2016 WL 6306037, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 16 2016); Gray v. Ocwen Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 18-CV-01864-JD, 17 2020 WL 1503688, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020); Victorino v. FCA 18 US LLC, No. 16CV1617-GPC(JLB), 2018 WL 2149223, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 19 May 10, 2018); Gill v. Dep't of Just., No. 14-CV-03120-RS, 2015 WL 20 13466143, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015); 625 3rd St. 21 Assocs., LP v. Alliant Credit Union, No. C 09-00564 WHA, 2009 WL 22 3517608, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009). Furthermore, Dyncorp 23 has identified no “material difference in fact or law from that 24 presented to the Court that, in the exercise of reasonable 25 diligence, could not have been known” earlier, or any “manifest 26 27 28 7 Case 2:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC Document 108 Filed 11/03/22 Page 8 of 10 Page ID #:2900

1 showing of failure to consider material facts presented to the 2 Court.”4 C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-18. 3 Defendant’s supplemental opposition appears to suggest that 4 reconsideration is warranted because a California Court of Appeal 5 decision disagreeing with this Court’s “minor change” conclusion 6 constitutes a change in fact or law, and that the Court of 7 Appeal’s decision must be given preclusive effect. (Second 8 Supplemental Opposition at 2.) Even putting aside the procedural 9 impropriety of Defendant’s argument, the court is not persuaded. 10 As an initial matter, Defendant underpins its argument with a 11 citation that is disingenuous at best. Quoting AmerisourceBergen 12 Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2007), Defendant 13 argues that “whichever court rules first will, via the doctrines 14 of res judicata and collateral estoppel, preclude the other from 15 deciding that claim or issue.” (Supplemental Opposition at 6). 16 The full quote, however, reads, “Indeed, the Supreme Court has 17 rejected the notion that federal courts should abstain whenever a 18 suit involves claims or issues simultaneously being litigated in 19 state court merely because whichever court rules first will, via 20 the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, preclude 21 the other from deciding that claim or issue. Amerisource, 495 22 F.3d at 1151 (emphasis added). 23 Although Defendant does not now urge, and has not previously 24 asked, this Court to abstain, neither does Amerisource support 25 Defendant’s suggestion that collateral estoppel somehow 26 4 The court sees no reason, for example, why Defendant’s 27 contention that the creation of a private right of action constituted a “major change” could not have been raised earlier. 28 (Opp. at 11.). 8 Case 2:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC Document 108 Filed 11/03/22 Page 9 of 10 Page ID #:2901

1 automatically applies whenever a state court rules on an issue 2 first. In general, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars 3 re-litigation of an identical issue in a separate action when the 4 issue was (1) actually litigated, (2) to a final judgment on the 5 merits, (3) by or against the same party or its privies, after (4) 6 a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Kendall v. VISA U.S.A., 7 Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008). Where parallel state 8 and federal proceedings are involved, however, Amerisource 9 explained that, as a general rule, “each court is free to proceed 10 in its own way and in its own time, without reference to the 11 proceedings in the other court. Whenever a judgment is rendered 12 in one of the courts . . ., the effect of that judgment is to be 13 determined by the application of the principles of res judicata 14 and collateral estoppel by the court in which the action is still 15 pending in the orderly exercise of its jurisdiction, as it would 16 determine any other question of fact or law arising in the 17 progress of the case.” Amerisource, 495 F.3d at 1152 (internal 18 alterations omitted). 19 “Under collateral estoppel, once an issue is actually and 20 necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that 21 determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a 22 different cause of action involving a party to the prior 23 litigation.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) 24 (emphasis added). Even then, however, exceptions may apply. Id. 25 at 155. Here, the instant action was filed in this court prior to 26 the state court action, and this court concluded that the Paul 27 minor change exception allows the application of Section 226 28 within Point Mugu before the state court ever reached the opposite 9 Case #:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC Document 108 Filed 11/03/22 Page 10o0f10 Page ID #:2902

conclusion. Defendant does not cite to, nor is the court aware 2|| of, any case in which preclusive effect has been granted to a later-decided decision in a later-filed case simply because the 4!) later-filed case proceeds to final judgment first. Furthermore, 5]} Defendant does not dispute that the extent of federal jurisdiction 6]}/ over a federal enclave presents a federal question, nor that state 7! court determinations regarding such questions are not binding on 8]} federal courts. See Paul, 371 U.S. at 267 (quoting Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm’n of State of Washington, 302 U.S. 186, 197 10} (1937)). Under these circumstances, this Court will not sua 11})/ sponte revisit its earlier decision regarding the applicability of 12] Section 226. 13]/ IV. Conclusion 14 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify □□□ Class is GRANTED. 16 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 221) Dated: November 3, 2022 DEAN D. PREGERSON 23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28 10