1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 RAMON DEL FIERRO, ) Case No. CV 19-07091DDP (JCx) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 13 v. ) TO CERTIFY CLASS, WITHOUT ) PREJUDICE ) 15 Defendants. ) [Dkt. 48, 61] ) 16 17 Presently before the court is Plaintiff Ramon Del Fierro’s 18 Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. 48). Having considered the 19 submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court 20 denies the motion and adopts the following Order. 21 I. Background 22 Plaintiff worked for Defendant Dyncorp International LLC 23 (“Dyncorp) at the Point Mugu Naval Air Station (“Point Mugu”) from 24 December 2016 to July 2019. (Complaint ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges, 25 on behalf of a putative class, that Dyncorp violated California 26 Labor Code § 226 by failing to provide wage statements that 27 accurately identified the applicable rate of pay and hours worked 28 1 for certain “shift premiums.”1 (Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff now seeks 2 to certify a class comprised of “all current and former 3 California non-exempt employees of Defendant DynCorp International, 4 LLC (“Defendant”) who were paid any shift premium wages (including 5 certification premiums) at any time from August 14, 2018, through 6 the date that the class is certified.” (Notice of Motion at 3:15- 7 18.)2 8 Dyncorp points out, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that 9 although Plaintiff was employed at Point Mugu during the relevant 10 class period, fewer than 8% of the putative class members worked at 11 the same base. (Declaration of Jill Sterner ¶ 4.) The remaining 12 eighty-plus percent of the prospective class members worked at 13 several other facilities across California, including seven other 14 U.S. military bases: Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake; National 15 Training Center/Fort Irwin; Naval Air Facility El Centro; Marine 16 Corps Air Station Miramar; Naval Air Station Lemoore; Joint Forces 17 Training Base Los Alamitos; and Mather Air Force Base. (Id.)3 The 18 parties differ as to what effect, if any, this range of work 19 locations has on class certification questions. 20 II. Legal Standard 21 1 More specifically, Section 226(a)(9) requires that wage 22 statements accurately itemize “all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours 23 worked at each hourly rate by the employee . . . .” Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a)(9). 24 2 Plaintiff’s proposed class is not defined anywhere in the 25 memorandum in support of Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. 26 3 Approximately 89% of the putative class is or was employed 27 at a U.S. military base. The remaining 11% was employed at an indeterminate number of CAL FIRE facilities as pilots, mechanics, 28 and air support personnel. (Sternder Decl. ¶ 4.) 1 A party seeking class certification bears the burden of showing that each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) are met. See Hanon v. Dataprods. Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508-09 (9th Cir. 1992). Rule sets forth four preregquisites for class certification: 6 (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the 7 class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 8 representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. ° Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508. These four requirements are often referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982). In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action or will = prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). This court, therefore, considers the merits of the underlying claim to the extent that the merits overlap with the Rule 23 requirements, but will not conduct a “mini-trial” or determine at this stage whether Plaintiffs could actually prevail. et Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981, 983 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2011). 24 Rule 23(b) defines different types of classes. Leyva v. °° Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff here seeks certification pursuant to Rule 23(b) (3), which □□□□□□□□ that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
1 over individual questions . . . and that a class action is 2 superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 3 adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 4 III. Discussion 5 Certain of the Rule 23 factors, such as numerosity and 6 commonality, are not in dispute.4 The crux of the certification 7 question presently before the court, however, is whether Plaintiff 8 has satisfied the predominance, superiority, and, to a lesser 9 degree, typicality requirements, notwithstanding the fact that 10 putative class members are spread across eight separate military 11 bases. 12 The work location of a given class member is important, and 13 potentially dispositive, here because of the potential application 14 of the “federal enclave” doctrine. As discussed in further detail 15 in this Court’s Order denying Dyncorp’s Motion for Judgment on the 16 Pleadings, Congress has exclusive jurisdiction over military bases 17 acquired from state governments. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 18 “Generally, when an area in a State becomes a federal enclave, 19 ‘only the state law in effect at the time of the transfer of 20 jurisdiction continues in force’ as surrogate federal law.” 21 22 4 The Ninth Circuit has required at least fifteen members to certify a class, and classes of at least forty members are usually 23 found to have satisfied the numerosity requirement. Harik v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 326 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003); Davis v. Four 24 Seasons Hotel Ltd., 277 F.R.D. 429, 435 (D. Hawaii 2011). Dyncorp does not appear to dispute Plaintiff’s estimate that there are over 25 500 putative class members in this case. As to commonality, “[t]he requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) have been construed permissively, and 26 all questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th 27 Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Here, there is at the very least a common question as to whether each 28 class member received accurate and adequate wage statements. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1890 (2019) (quoting James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 3] 94, 100 (1940) (internal alteration omitted)}). In some cases, subsequent, relatively minor changes to existing state law may 5] also apply to federal enclaves. Paul v.
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1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 RAMON DEL FIERRO, ) Case No. CV 19-07091DDP (JCx) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 13 v. ) TO CERTIFY CLASS, WITHOUT ) PREJUDICE ) 15 Defendants. ) [Dkt. 48, 61] ) 16 17 Presently before the court is Plaintiff Ramon Del Fierro’s 18 Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. 48). Having considered the 19 submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court 20 denies the motion and adopts the following Order. 21 I. Background 22 Plaintiff worked for Defendant Dyncorp International LLC 23 (“Dyncorp) at the Point Mugu Naval Air Station (“Point Mugu”) from 24 December 2016 to July 2019. (Complaint ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges, 25 on behalf of a putative class, that Dyncorp violated California 26 Labor Code § 226 by failing to provide wage statements that 27 accurately identified the applicable rate of pay and hours worked 28 1 for certain “shift premiums.”1 (Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff now seeks 2 to certify a class comprised of “all current and former 3 California non-exempt employees of Defendant DynCorp International, 4 LLC (“Defendant”) who were paid any shift premium wages (including 5 certification premiums) at any time from August 14, 2018, through 6 the date that the class is certified.” (Notice of Motion at 3:15- 7 18.)2 8 Dyncorp points out, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that 9 although Plaintiff was employed at Point Mugu during the relevant 10 class period, fewer than 8% of the putative class members worked at 11 the same base. (Declaration of Jill Sterner ¶ 4.) The remaining 12 eighty-plus percent of the prospective class members worked at 13 several other facilities across California, including seven other 14 U.S. military bases: Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake; National 15 Training Center/Fort Irwin; Naval Air Facility El Centro; Marine 16 Corps Air Station Miramar; Naval Air Station Lemoore; Joint Forces 17 Training Base Los Alamitos; and Mather Air Force Base. (Id.)3 The 18 parties differ as to what effect, if any, this range of work 19 locations has on class certification questions. 20 II. Legal Standard 21 1 More specifically, Section 226(a)(9) requires that wage 22 statements accurately itemize “all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours 23 worked at each hourly rate by the employee . . . .” Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a)(9). 24 2 Plaintiff’s proposed class is not defined anywhere in the 25 memorandum in support of Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. 26 3 Approximately 89% of the putative class is or was employed 27 at a U.S. military base. The remaining 11% was employed at an indeterminate number of CAL FIRE facilities as pilots, mechanics, 28 and air support personnel. (Sternder Decl. ¶ 4.) 1 A party seeking class certification bears the burden of showing that each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) are met. See Hanon v. Dataprods. Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508-09 (9th Cir. 1992). Rule sets forth four preregquisites for class certification: 6 (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the 7 class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 8 representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. ° Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508. These four requirements are often referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982). In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action or will = prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). This court, therefore, considers the merits of the underlying claim to the extent that the merits overlap with the Rule 23 requirements, but will not conduct a “mini-trial” or determine at this stage whether Plaintiffs could actually prevail. et Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981, 983 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2011). 24 Rule 23(b) defines different types of classes. Leyva v. °° Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff here seeks certification pursuant to Rule 23(b) (3), which □□□□□□□□ that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
1 over individual questions . . . and that a class action is 2 superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 3 adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 4 III. Discussion 5 Certain of the Rule 23 factors, such as numerosity and 6 commonality, are not in dispute.4 The crux of the certification 7 question presently before the court, however, is whether Plaintiff 8 has satisfied the predominance, superiority, and, to a lesser 9 degree, typicality requirements, notwithstanding the fact that 10 putative class members are spread across eight separate military 11 bases. 12 The work location of a given class member is important, and 13 potentially dispositive, here because of the potential application 14 of the “federal enclave” doctrine. As discussed in further detail 15 in this Court’s Order denying Dyncorp’s Motion for Judgment on the 16 Pleadings, Congress has exclusive jurisdiction over military bases 17 acquired from state governments. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 18 “Generally, when an area in a State becomes a federal enclave, 19 ‘only the state law in effect at the time of the transfer of 20 jurisdiction continues in force’ as surrogate federal law.” 21 22 4 The Ninth Circuit has required at least fifteen members to certify a class, and classes of at least forty members are usually 23 found to have satisfied the numerosity requirement. Harik v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 326 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003); Davis v. Four 24 Seasons Hotel Ltd., 277 F.R.D. 429, 435 (D. Hawaii 2011). Dyncorp does not appear to dispute Plaintiff’s estimate that there are over 25 500 putative class members in this case. As to commonality, “[t]he requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) have been construed permissively, and 26 all questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th 27 Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Here, there is at the very least a common question as to whether each 28 class member received accurate and adequate wage statements. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1890 (2019) (quoting James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 3] 94, 100 (1940) (internal alteration omitted)}). In some cases, subsequent, relatively minor changes to existing state law may 5] also apply to federal enclaves. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 269 (1963). 7 Plaintiff alleges, on behalf of the putative class, violations of California Labor Code § 226(a)(9).° That state law provision, however, only applies within a federal enclave if (1) 10] the enclave was established after the enactment of Section 226(a) (9) or (2) Section 226(a) (9) represents only a minor change to the “basic state law” in effect at the time the enclave was established. Paul, 371 U.S. at 269; see also Allison v. Boeing Laser Tech. Servs., 689 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2012). Thus, as Plaintiff appears to concede, it will be necessary in this case to determine (1) whether each of the bases at issue here is a federal enclave, (2) when that workplace became a federal enclave, 18] (3) what state law was in force at the time the enclave was established, and (4) the extent to which Section 226(a) (9) alters 20] that pre-existing state law. 21 Plaintiff nevertheless contends that these questions are 22\| irrelevant at this stage of proceedings. (Reply at 8.) Indeed, Rule 23(b) (3) only “requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.” Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut 26 Section 226 (a) (9) requires that wage statements accurately itemize “all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay 28 period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee ... .” Cal. Lab. Code §$ 226(a) (9).
Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 469 (2013). As an initial 2\| matter, however, questions as to the applicability of the federal 3H enclave doctrine are not “merits” questions in the traditional sense, and speak less to Dyncorp’s actions or liability than to 5} Plaintiff’s and class members’ standing to bring state law claims in the first instance. Although courts do, in the exercise of 7 discretion, sometimes defer questions of standing until after class certification, courts typically do so only where certification is “logically antecedent” to questions of standing, such as in cases involving application of multiple states’ laws, where certification would cure any lack of standing. See Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 114 F. Supp. 3d 906, 921-25 13] (N.D. Cal. 2015); In re Carrier 19, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 14] 1068-75 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Blyden v. Navient Corp., No. EDCV1402456JGBKKX, 2015 WL 4508069, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2015). This is not such a case. Certification of the proposed class would not resolve any questions related to standing, which 18] depend instead on federal enclave analyses. 19 Furthermore, to the extent standing issues qualify as “merits” issues, this Court cannot simply ignore those issues at this stage, as Plaintiff would suggest. To the contrary, this 221 Court “is required to examine the merits of the underlying claim” to the extent necessary to determine whether common questions exist. Ellis, 657 F.3d at 983 n.8 (emphasis added). Nor would an analysis of the federal enclave issues require a “mini-trial” 26|| here, where all of the facts regarding the establishment of an enclave would appear to be matters of public record beyond dispute. Having made virtually no attempt to show whether the
1 federal enclave doctrine applies uniformly to the putative class 2 members, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate 3 that questions common to the class predominate or that a class 4 action is the most efficient way to resolve class members’ claims. 5 For similar reasons, Plaintiff has not established that his claims 6 are typical of those of absent class members. 7 This is not to say however, that the mere existence of 8 federal enclave questions necessitates the conclusion, as Dyncorp 9 suggests, that individual questions predominate in this case. 10 First, even though resolution of the remaining federal enclave 11 questions may require a separate analysis for each of the seven 12 remaining military bases, these analyses would not require an 13 individualized inquiry as to the status of each or any particular 14 class member. Furthermore, Plaintiff “need only show that common 15 questions ‘predominate’ over individual questions, not that common 16 questions exist to the complete exclusion of individual 17 questions.” Nash v. Horizon Freight Sys., Inc., No. 18 19-CV-01883-VC, 2020 WL 7640878, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2020). 19 To the extent that base-specific, as opposed to class member- 20 specific, inquiries qualify as “individual” questions, the court 21 cannot determine on the current briefing whether such questions 22 are sufficiently complex to predominate over the common questions 23 in this case. It may be, for example, that there is a relatively 24 straightforward answer to the question whether some or all of the 25 bases at issues here are federal enclaves, and/or whether Section 26 27 28 226(a) (9) applies to those enclaves. As stated above, however, Plaintiff has made no attempt to make such a showing.°® IV. Conclusion 4 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify 5]| Class is DENIED, without prejudice.’ 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 Dated: September 24, 2021 DEAN D. PREGERSON 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 ° Dyncorp, for its part, does argue that the answers to the 19 federal enclave questions are not straightforward with respect to at least one base, Fort Irwin. Indeed, courts within this district 20 have come to differing conclusions as to whether Fort Irwin is a federal enclave at all. Compare Hillman v. Leixcon Consulting, Inc., No. LA-16-CV-001186, 2016 WL 10988766, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2016) (“The Court concludes that, as a matter of law, Fort 29 Irwin is not a federal enclave.”) with Jackson v. Mission Essential Pers., LLC, No. CV 11-1444-R, 2012 WL 13015000, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 23 Apr. 13, 2012) (“It is clear that Fort Irwin became a federal enclave no later than 1944.”); see also Graupner v. Lewis Ltd. DA Consultants, LLC., No. EDCV121388JFWOPX, 2012 WL 12895714, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2012) (“[T]he Court concludes that Fort Irwin 25 is not a federal enclave over which the federal government has acquired exclusive jurisdiction.”). 26 ’ Dyncorp also moves for review of the Magistrate Judge’s 27 order requiring Dyncorp to provide Plaintiff with a class list. (Dkt. 61). That motion is DENIED. The Magistrate Judge did not 28 clearly err in concluding that the filing of Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Class did not obviate his need for a class list.