Ramiro Cruz Espinoza v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

45 F.3d 308
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 7, 1995
Docket94-70094
StatusPublished
Cited by260 cases

This text of 45 F.3d 308 (Ramiro Cruz Espinoza v. Immigration & Naturalization Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Ramiro Cruz Espinoza v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 45 F.3d 308 (9th Cir. 1995).

Opinion

FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Ramiro Cruz Espinoza seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”’s') dismissal of his appeal of an immigration judge’s deportation order. Cruz Espinoza claims that the BIA erred in holding that an Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) form prepared by border agents who apprehended him was admissible at his deportation hearing and constituted clear and convincing evidence that he was deportable. We have jurisdiction under- 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), and we affirm.

I

On July 10, 1992, the INS apprehended Cruz Espinoza in California and issued an Order to Show Cause alleging that Cruz Espinoza was a. Mexican citizen who had entered the United States illegally in 1989. Cruz Espinoza was charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B), which prohibits entering the country without inspection.

At deportation hearings on August 25 and September 24, 1992, Cruz Espinoza’s attorney denied the charge. Id. at 104. After stating his name, Cruz Espinoza invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to answer further questions. The only evidence offered by the INS was a copy of an INS Form 1-21.3, Record of a Deportable Alien. The form, which border agents routinely complete after interviewing aliens, 1 stated that Cruz Espinoza was from Mexico and had entered the U.S. in February 1989. Attached to the Form I-213 was a signed statement by the INS district director for Los Angeles, certifying that the form was a copy of a document in Cruz Espinoza’s INS file.

Cruz Espinoza’s attorney objected that the form had not been properly authenticated, was hearsay, and was not reliable. He contended that Cruz Espinoza could not have provided all of the information on the form. As an example, he noted a reference to a citation of a California statute under which Cruz Espinoza had been convicted of an unrelated crime. The immigration judge admitted the Form 1-213 and denied Cruz Espinoza’s request to cross-examine the form’s preparer.

The judge then ruled that Cruz Espinoza was deportable, and granted voluntary departure. Cruz Espinoza appealed to the BIA, renewing his claims that the Form I-213 was not properly authenticated and was unreliable hearsay, and asserting that he had been improperly denied a chance to cross-examine the preparer. He also claimed that the immigration judge had abused his discretion in denying him a continuance.

The BIA dismissed the appeal. It held that the Form 1-213 was properly authenticated; and that such forms are presumed inherently reliable if authenticated, and are presumed to contain information from the respondent unless the respondent presents evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, the BIA said that Cruz Espinoza’s Form 1-213 was highly probative, and that its admission was fair because there was no evidence that any information had been obtained through coercion. The BIA found that the errors that Cruz Espinoza claimed appeared on the form were irrelevant to the- purpose for which the form was admitted, which was to demonstrate alienage.

The BIA held that the immigration judge was not obligated to permit Cruz Espinoza to cross-examine the preparer. Because Cruz Espinoza had presented no testimony to counter the INS’s charge of illegal entry, the BIA found that the INS had proved deporta-bility by clear and convincing evidence. The BIA also rejected the claim that the judge had improperly denied a continuance.

In this petition, Cruz Espinoza seeks review only of the dismissal of his claims concerning evidence of deportability.

II

Cruz Espinoza first contends that the Form 1-213 should not have been admitted because it was not properly authenticated. Authentication serves to establish a chain of custody for government records. The Ninth Circuit requires only that immigration forms be authenticated through some recognized procedure, such as those required by INS regulations or by the Federal Rules of Civil *310 Procedure. Iran v. INS, 656 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir.1981).

Cruz Espinoza’s Form 1-213 was certified by the INS’s Los Angeles district director. This conformed to Fed.R.Civ.P. 44, which states that official records “may be evidenced by ... the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by the officer’s deputy, and accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the custody,” and to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(a), which contains virtually identical language. The certification process satisfies Iran.

In arguing that more is required, Cruz Espinoza cites two Ninth Circuit eases upholding the admission of Form I-213’s accompanied by affidavits or testimony of the preparer. However, neither case held that such additional validation is required. Trias-Hernandez, 528 F.2d at 369; Tejeda-Mat a v. INS, 626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982).

Cruz Espinoza also cites two cases in which the Ninth Circuit found documents not properly authenticated. However, neither is on point. In Iran, the INS “failed to introduce any proof of authenticity, or any proof from which the immigration judge could infer that the form was a true document,” Iran, 656 F.2d at 473. In addition, the challenged evidence was the affidavit of a non-government witness. In Baliza v. INS, 709 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir.1983), an alien challenged the admission of an application that he had purportedly submitted to the INS. Once again,, the application was not prepared by the government, as is a Form 1-213.

Cruz Espinoza next contends that the BIA violated due process by admitting the Form 1-213 because the form was hearsay. However, a deportation hearing is an administrative proceeding not bound by strict rules of evidence; nonetheless, aliens must be accorded due process. Baliza, 709 F.2d at 1233; De Hernandez v. INS, 498 F.2d 919, 921 (9th Cir.1974). The sole test for admission of evidence is whether the evidence is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair. Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir.1975).

In Trias-Hernandez, 528 F.2d at 369, we held that a Form 1-213 is probative on the issue of entry, and its admission is fair absent evidence of coercion or that the statements are not those of the petitioner.

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