Ramirez v. State

303 Ga. 232

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: March 5, 2018
• Docket: S17A1662
• Status: Published

Opinion

303 Ga. 232 FINAL COPY

S17A1662. RAMIREZ v. THE STATE.

GRANT, Justice.

Orlando Ramirez appeals his convictions for malice murder, attempted

murder, and other crimes associated with a shooting in which Bruno Rodriguez

was killed and Daniel Maldonado-Flores was injured. In his sole enumeration

of error, Ramirez argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of other

incidents of criminal activity at the bar where the shooting took place. We

disagree, and therefore affirm.1

1 The shootings occurred on March 23, 2014. On May 29, 2014, Ramirez was indicted by a Whitfield County grand jury for malice murder of Rodriguez (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault of Rodriguez (Count 2), aggravated assault by shooting Rodriguez with a gun (Count 3), attempted murder of Flores (Count 4), aggravated assault by shooting Flores with a gun (Count 5), and two counts of possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime (Counts 6-7). At the conclusion of a jury trial held December 15-19, 2014, Ramirez was found guilty on all seven counts. The trial court sentenced Ramirez to imprisonment for life without parole for Count 1; 30 years consecutive for Count 4; 5 years for Count 6, to be served consecutively to the sentence for Count 1 and concurrent with Count 4; and 5 years for Count 7 consecutive to Count 4. The remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. See Green v. State, 283 Ga. 126, 130 (657 SE2d 221) (2008). On March 5, 2015, Ramirez filed a motion for new trial, which he amended on June 6, 2016, after the appearance of new counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial on August 30, 2016. Ramirez filed a timely I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence admitted

at trial showed that in the early morning hours of March 23, 2014, Ramirez

arrived at Las Delicias bar with his friend Fernando Resendiz and two others.

Resendiz stayed in the car texting while Ramirez took Resendiz’s .380 pistol

from the console and attempted to enter the bar. Flores, who was working as

a security guard checking identification at the door, blocked Ramirez’s entry

and asked for his identification. Ramirez first showed Flores a picture of Santa

Muerte (Holy Death) and said in Spanish, “it’s death.” Flores again asked for

Ramirez’s identification, which Ramirez then produced, showing that he was

20 years old. Flores refused Ramirez entry into the bar for being underage.

Ramirez began shouting at Flores, took a step back, pulled out a gun, and

pressed it against Flores’s chest. Flores grabbed Ramirez’s hand and the two

men wrestled for the gun, which discharged into Flores’s leg. The struggle for

the gun continued into the parking lot and the gun discharged a second time,

striking no one. Flores fell to the ground and another security guard,

Rodriguez, rushed toward Ramirez. Rodriguez tried to get the gun from

notice of appeal on September 29, 2016, and the case was docketed in this Court to the August 2017 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. Ramirez, but Ramirez shot him; Rodriguez immediately collapsed. Ramirez

then shot Rodriguez a second time, killing him. After shooting Rodriguez,

Ramirez walked toward Flores, who was on his knees in the parking lot.

Ramirez nonetheless shot him in the back. Flores managed to get up and run

away, but Ramirez briefly chased him around a truck while pointing his gun at

him. Ramirez then gave up the chase and attempted (unsuccessfully) to enter

the front door of the bar before leaving the property on foot. Security cameras

at the bar captured all but the initial interaction between Ramirez and Flores,

which was blocked from view by the open door of the bar. The recording from

the security cameras was played for the jury at trial.

Resendiz, who had driven away when the gunfire began, returned to the

bar and picked up Ramirez. Two other passengers in the car testified that

Ramirez seemed excited, exclaimed that he wished he had had more bullets,

threatened the passengers’ families if they told police, and said that he was

happy about what happened because the security guard “deserved it.” Ramirez

said that his brother had been “jumped” at Las Delicias and a security guard

had left him lying there.2

2 As noted below, trial testimony showed that Ramirez’s brother had been badly beaten by other bar patrons during a fight at Las Delicias the month before the shooting in this case. Ramirez testified at trial and claimed that he shot Flores and Rodriguez

in self-defense. Ramirez testified that when Flores initially approached him,

Flores was in an aggressive posture and seemed angry already. Ramirez started

to back away, he said, but felt threatened by the crowd of people around him,

who were purportedly holding bottles and moving toward him. Ramirez

claimed that he moved back in the direction of Flores, who raised his hands

“like he was going to come at” Ramirez and then rushed toward Ramirez and

grabbed his left arm. Ramirez pulled out the .380 “almost without thinking,”

and Flores immediately grabbed his hand. Ramirez testified that Flores, rather

than trying to secure the gun, was pushing it against Ramirez’s chest and

saying, “You are going to see.” Ramirez claimed that he was just trying to get

away from Flores, but accidentally fired the first shot while trying to pull free.

He admitted to shooting Flores a second time, but claimed that it was because

Flores was still attacking. Ramirez also admitted that he shot Rodriguez twice,

saying that his first shot was instinctive when Rodriguez appeared as a “black

shadow” rushing toward him. According to Ramirez’s testimony, the second

shot occurred either after Rodriguez “crashed into” him, or alternatively, while

Rodriguez “was in mid-air.” Although Ramirez does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions, it is our practice in murder cases to review the

record and determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient under the

standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d

560) (1979). We have done so, and we conclude that the evidence introduced

at trial and summarized above was legally sufficient to authorize a rational trier

of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ramirez was guilty of the crimes

for which he was convicted. See id. at 319.

II.

Ramirez claims error in the trial court’s ruling excluding evidence of

other incidents of criminal activity at Las Delicias bar. He sought to introduce

police testimony about ten incidents at Las Delicias between November 2010

and April 2014, including one case of cocaine possession; several bar fights,

including instances in which other bar security guards—not Flores or

Rodriguez—tased or pepper sprayed fractious patrons; a robbery in the bar’s

restroom; a shot fired (without injury) in the parking lot after hours; and one

occasion in which Rodriguez was cited for admitting an individual into the bar

without first checking his identification. We find no error in the trial court’s

exclusion of the proffered evidence. Ramirez argues that the evidence at issue is relevant and that it should

be assessed under the framework of cases governing Terry3 stops, in which the

fact that an area is known to have a high crime rate may be relevant in

determining whether police reasonably suspected that the defendant was

engaged in criminal activity. That contention is plainly incorrect. The

reasonableness of a police officer’s suspicion of criminal activity is a wholly

different matter from a defendant’s belief that he is in danger of being killed

or severely injured unless he uses deadly force to defend himself. The State,

for its part, counters that to the extent the violent “character” of the bar is

relevant to Ramirez’s self-defense claim, evidence of that character should be

limited to general reputation or opinion evidence under the rules governing the

admissibility of a victim’s reputation for violence in a self-defense case. See

OCGA §§ 24-4-404 (a) (2), 24-4-405 (a). The State’s analysis also fails to

provide a useful comparison. To begin, a place cannot be a victim. And the

reputation of a place is not “character evidence” subject to the same rules as

evidence of a witness’s character or propensity for violence.

3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (88 SCt 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968). Instead, as with many evidentiary decisions under Georgia’s current

Evidence Code, determining the admissibility of the evidence of other

incidents Ramirez sets out involves the familiar process of weighing its

probative value against the prejudice, confusion, or waste of time likely to

result from admission. As a general rule, “[a]ll relevant evidence [is]

admissible.” OCGA § 24-4-402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency

to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401. Even relevant evidence may be excluded,

however, “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of

cumulative evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403. We review the trial court’s ruling

on the admissibility of evidence for a clear abuse of discretion. Davis v. State,

301 Ga. 397, 399 (801 SE2d 897) (2017).

Ramirez sought to show that the dangerous, violent environment at Las

Delicias influenced his state of mind and made his extreme reaction to

perceived threats from Flores and Rodriguez reasonable under the

circumstances. See OCGA § 16-3-21 (deadly force justified only if a person “reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great

bodily injury to himself”). Ramirez does not contend that he knew about any

of the proffered occurrences at the time of the shooting; nevertheless, he argues

that the specific instances of criminal activity at the bar should have been

admitted to show the jury that his perception of danger at the bar was

reasonable. It is difficult to see, however, how the occurrence of events of

which Ramirez had no knowledge could be relevant to his state of mind on the

night of the shooting, or how they could have influenced his sense of

immediate danger from a bar employee checking identification at the front

door. Only three of the incidents involved either of the security guard victims,

Flores or Rodriguez: in addition to the citation for failure to check

identification, Rodriguez assisted in evicting an individual who was harassing

two bar employees on one occasion, and on another occasion, a bar customer

hit Flores on the head with a bottle. But none of the incidents shows a

propensity for violence in either of the victims. Nor do they tend to make it

more likely that Ramirez reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary

to defend himself against Flores or Rodriguez. The probative value of this

evidence would be remarkably small even if Ramirez had alleged that he was

aware of the incidents at the time of the murder. But without such an allegation, the evidence fails to clear even the low hurdle of relevance under

Rule 401.

Moreover, to the extent that the bar’s reputation for violent incidents

influenced Ramirez’s state of mind, that reputation and its effect on Ramirez

was well established through other evidence admitted at trial. Ramirez testified

that although he had never been to Las Delicias before the night of the shooting,

he had heard that the bar was a violent place, and that gang fights, drug use,

and corrupt security guards were commonplace there. Ramirez was a member

of the Surenos gang, and he testified that he was aware that a rival gang, the

Tiny Winos, often went to Las Delicias and liked to “pick fights.” None of the

other witnesses who addressed the issue denied that the bar was a violent place,

such that evidence of specific instances of violence could be relevant for

impeachment purposes. To the contrary, Flores testified that bar fights and

patrons throwing or hitting others with bottles were frequent events. One

police detective testified that members of the Surenos and the Tiny Winos

gangs were often present at Las Delicias, and another detective testified that

Ramirez’s brother had been hospitalized after being badly beaten at the bar the

month before the shooting. Thus, even if the proffered incidents had some

marginal relevance to Ramirez’s self-defense claim, any slight probative value was “substantially outweighed by . . . considerations of . . . waste of time [] or

needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” and the trial court acted within

its discretion in excluding the evidence. OCGA § 24-4-403.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Melton, P.J., and

Blackwell, J., who concur in judgment only in Division 2. Decided March 5, 2018.

Murder. Whitfield Superior Court. Before Judge Boyett.

Micah J. Gates, for appellant.

Herbert M. Poston, Jr., District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney

General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.

Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew D. O’Brien, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.