Ramirez v. Acevedo

2021 IL App (1st) 200799-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: September 28, 2021
• Docket: 1-20-0799
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2021 IL App (1st) 200799-U No. 1-20-0799 Second Division September 28, 2021

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________

) Appeal from the MARIA RAMIREZ, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 2018 L 002161 ) ANA ACEVEDO, ) ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Bridget Hughes ) Judge, presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s judgment is affirmed where the court properly allowed the submission of a negligence claim, permitted opinion testimony on the obligation to have a deck inspected, denied defendant’s motion for new trial for violation of a motion in limine, and allowed the submission of both Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 60.01 as to violation of ordinances and the total amount of plaintiff’s medical bills.

¶2 Plaintiff-appellee, Maria Ramirez, filed suit against defendant-appellant, Ana Acevedo, for

injuries she sustained as a result of a deck collapse at defendant’s home. The jury found in favor No. 1-20-0799

of plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment against defendant and denied her motion for directed

verdict and posttrial motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur, and a new

trial. On appeal, defendant argues that this court should reverse the trial court’s judgment where

plaintiff was allowed to submit a negligence case when the evidence went towards a premises

liability case because it centered on a defective condition on defendant’s property. Alternatively,

defendant argues that we should remand the case for a new trial because the trial court erred in

allowing: (1) opinion testimony on the obligation to have the deck inspected; (2) submission of

Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 60.01 (2000) (hereinafter IPI Civil (2000) No. 60.01)

as to violation of ordinances; (3) plaintiff’s attorney mention of defendant’s insurance carrier

during cross-examination; and (4) submission of the total amount of plaintiff’s medical bills

without proper foundation. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On March 6, 2016, defendant invited family and friends to her home in Melrose Park,

Illinois. At the time defendant moved into the home in 2001, a wooden deck was attached to the

back of the house. Defendant could not recall whether, when she moved in, a home inspection was

conducted. Neither defendant nor her husband had hired anyone to inspect the deck since then.

About 40 people were present at the March 6, 2016 gathering. During the gathering, the deck

collapsed while supporting a table, grill, chairs, and a group of approximately 18 to 20 people.

Plaintiff was standing on the corner of the deck that collapsed first, causing several other people

to fall on top of her during the incident. Plaintiff was transported by ambulance to Gottlieb Hospital

(Gottlieb), where she was treated for a broken ankle.

¶5 A. Amended Complaint

-2- No. 1-20-0799

¶6 On December 20, 2019, plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that it was

defendant’s duty “to exercise ordinary care in the ownership, maintenance, management and

control of the residence *** and, specifically, of the porch/deck.” Plaintiff alleged that defendant

breached that duty of care by carelessly and negligently: (1) failing to “maintain proper structural

support and integrity of the porch/deck in violation of applicable building codes”; (2) failing to

install joist hangers “at the east end of the porch, in violation of applicable building codes”; (3)

allowing “more persons and weight to congregate upon the porch/deck than it could reasonably be

expected to support”; (4) failing to inspect the porch/deck; (5) failing to warn plaintiff of the

dangerous condition of the porch/deck; (6) failing to repair the porch/deck when plaintiff knew or

should have known repairs were necessary; and (7) failing to discover the defective condition of

the porch or deck. Plaintiff further alleged that “[a]s a direct and proximate result [of] one or more

of the aforesaid careless and/or negligent acts or omissions of the defendant, *** the porch/deck

collapsed” and caused her injuries.

¶7 B. Motions in Limine

¶8 Prior to jury trial, defendant filed two motions in limine. In the first motion, defendant

sought to exclude any references to: (1) the “character or type of the law firm that represents

[d]efendant”; (2) the fact that at the time the alleged incident occurred, defendant was “afforded

insurance coverage”; and (3) the fact that “any portion of any judgment entered against the

[d]efendant *** will be paid in total or in part by an insurance company.” Additionally, defendant

sought, inter alia, to exclude any references that would “create an inference that the defendant is

being afforded insurance or that the defense herein is being provided by an insurance company or

any person and/or entity other than the defendant.”

-3- No. 1-20-0799

¶9 The second motion sought to exclude expert testimony of Scott Leopold as to what a

reasonable person would do or not do and specifically, that a reasonable person, prior to the date

of the incident, would have had an inspection performed or that a reasonable person would have

anticipated the porch collapsing.

¶ 10 The court granted defendant’s first motion in limine, with respect to the law firm and

insurance coverage, without objection, but denied defendant’s second motion as to Leopold’s

testimony.

¶ 11 C. Jury Trial

¶ 12 The case proceeded to a three-day jury trial beginning on March 4, 2020. The witness

testimony, relevant to this appeal, is as follows.

¶ 13 Plaintiff’s expert, Leopold, a licensed structural engineer, testified about his experience

working with building codes, reviewing designs of exterior structures, as well as designing repairs

for wooden decks. His experience also included inspections of porch and deck collapses. He noted

that the applicable building codes, International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC) and Council

of American Building Officials Code (CABO), were both adopted by Melrose Park and when a

municipality adopts a building code, it becomes law. Leopold testified that there are unique

requirements in IPMC specific to exterior structures. For instance, IPMC “requires that the exterior

of a structure shall be maintained structurally sound for safety.” Because exterior wooden

structures are prone to decay and have a service life of about 10 years, Leopold opined that “the

only way to assure compliance with the code is to look at it” and have an inspection conducted by

“someone who’s familiar with inspection of decks like a home inspector or construction of decks

like a deck builder.” He opined that after about 10 years, wooden decks should be inspected

annually.

-4- No. 1-20-0799

¶ 14 Leopold further testified that CABO required “approved framing anchors,” which is the

same as joist hangers for decks and could be purchased at a Home Depot or Lowe’s. Leopold

identified the lack of joist hangers on the east end of plaintiff’s deck to be one of the causes for

collapse in the instant case. He testified that the deck “connections that were there [at that time]

were overloaded.” Leopold opined that had the deck in question been inspected by a deck builder

or a home inspector with knowledge of deck construction, the absence of the joist hangers would

have been discovered. When asked whether plaintiff should have inspected the deck despite having

“never noticed a problem with the deck,” Leopold responded “[w]ithout a doubt” because a

wooden deck “needs to be inspected initially,” such as when the property is purchased, and

inspection is also needed when the deck is about 10 years old. Aside from the lack of joist hangers,

Leopold also attributed the deck collapse to the number of people on the deck. Based on his review

of discovery responses and depositions in the case, Leopold believed that there were approximately

18 to 25 people on the deck at the time of the collapse. He opined that the deck was “overcrowded

to support the weight” and had there “been joist hangers on that outside beam the way it was

required by code, the deck would not have collapsed with 20 or 25 people on it.” He noted, based

on defendant’s deposition testimony, that defendant did not “have any basis to believe that the

deck could support a crowd of people. She was not aware of any inspections having ever been

done during the time she owned the house.”

¶ 15 Defendant’s expert, Shaun Pergande, had worked as a forensic engineer up until four or

five years before the trial. As a forensic engineer, Pergande “applied the principles of mechanical

engineering, studies of forces, mechanics, [and] strength of materials to basically understand the

root causes of an accident,” including accidents involving porch and deck collapse. According to

Pergande, Melrose Park did not have any ordinance requiring inspections of decks, but it had

-5- No. 1-20-0799

adopted the IPMC. He spoke with Melrose Park’s building inspector, Dan Adams, who advised

him that the applicable building code was BOCA. Pergande explained that in the last 50 years,

there were three building standards in the country: (1) BOCA, which was used in the Northeast

and Midwest region, (2) CABO, which “was kind of the Southeast” region, and (3) a third code,

which was used in the West Coast.

¶ 16 Pergande testified that in the instant case, the east side of the deck had collapsed and that

“there were [only] two screws into the end grain of each joist through the rim joist.” When asked

if the screws complied with the applicable code, Pergande responded that “building codes are

typically not prescriptive,” meaning that they do not state “exactly what you have to do.” Pergande

explained that BOCA, like “most standards and codes [is] more general *** [or] performance-

based.” This means that the code simply requires that the “connections [are] capable of bearing

the “load” or weight. Pergande opined that the design of the deck in this case compiled with

BOCA, but the lack of sufficient screws to connect the joists did not. He testified that had an

inspection been performed during and after the structure was completed, the “deficiency here

would have been identified.” However, he disagreed that defendant needed to inspect her deck. He

noted that the deck was well-maintained with no deterioration of the wood structure and there was

nothing that would have alerted defendant of a structural issue such as warping, crackling, or

wobbling. When asked if there was anything that plaintiff “did or failed to do regarding the care

and maintenance of this deck that was inappropriate,” Pergande responded that “[t]here was

nothing in my mind that she did wrong” because there was no evidence of significant corrosion,

loose boards, wobbling and “[a]ll the connections were tight.”

¶ 17 During cross-examination, Pergande agreed that Melrose Park adopted the One and Two

Dwelling Code which is the same as the 1995 edition of the CABO One and Two Family Dwelling

-6- No. 1-20-0799

Code. He also agreed that Melrose Park required defendant to maintain her deck in a safe condition

and that the deck as it existed on the day of the incident was not safe. When asked whether “[o]ne

of the reasons that [the deck] was not safe was because it did not have joist hangers,” Pergande

stated that “it was not safe because it did not have the capability to maintain the required load ***

[and] there’s a variety of ways of achieving that performance,” with joist hangers being one of

them. He agreed that the incident could have been prevented had joist hangers been installed.

Pergande testified that exterior wood structures become a safety issue only after existing for more

than 40 years.

¶ 18 Plaintiff’s counsel, on cross-examination, further questioned Pergande about his expert

consulting background, which referenced work for insurance companies. The following colloquy

occurred:

“Q. And many of those [cases] were referred to you or you were retained by

insurance companies?

A. I was retained by a variety of different companies. Typically, if you do a good

job, you get asked back to do more work with the same client so[.]

Q. All right. You’ve been retained by Allstate?

A. In this case, I was retained by Mr. Fabricius [defense counsel]

Q. Okay. In the past, you’ve been retained by Allstate?”

MR. FABRICIUS: Your Honor, what’s the relevance?

THE COURT: Yeah, it’s not relevant. The objection is sustained.”

¶ 19 On redirect examination, the following colloquy occurred:

-7- No. 1-20-0799

“Q. And you were asked about work you do or who hires you. You get hired by

different types of companies?

A. Absolutely.

Q. You get hired by different insurance companies?

A. Yes.

Q. Apparently, Allstate is one of them?

A. Correct.

Q. Different insurance companies?

Q. Different independent companies that have nothing to do with insurance?

A. Correct. I’ve worked for different — I’ve worked for different auto

manufacturers, material handling, heavy earth-loading equipment, lawnmower

manufacturers. I’ve worked for all sorts of different companies. I’ve worked for plaintiffs

before.

Q. And you also get hired by attorneys and law firms?

Q. And in the cases you and I have had, I hired you?

Q. I’ve been the one that hired you?

A. I think a little of both maybe.”

¶ 20 At a sidebar, the court noted that plaintiff’s counsel had violated the motion in limine

regarding insurance, but that defense counsel had addressed the issues well on redirect. The court

-8- No. 1-20-0799

asked if defense counsel would like a jury instruction read to cure the violation. Defense counsel

declined.

¶ 21 Plaintiff testified that defendant was her sister-in-law. Following the deck collapse, she

was transported to the emergency room at Gottlieb. When asked “[w]hat, just generally, did they

do for you at Gottlieb?”, plaintiff responded that she was given pain medicine and “x-ray,

elevation, ice, and two reductions.” The reductions involved aligning her right ankle because it

was dislocated. Plaintiff’s left ankle was placed in a brace for support. During her testimony,

plaintiff was shown Plaintiff’s Exhibit 25, which she identified as a summary of the medical bills

she incurred as a result of the incident. Defense counsel objected to the request to publish the

exhibit to the jury, arguing that a proper foundation had not been laid. Plaintiff’s counsel then

proceeded to ask plaintiff if the bills had been paid in full to which plaintiff responded that they

had. Plaintiff testified that the total amount of the bills she incurred was $40,362.90. Exhibit 25

was then published to the jury without objection from defense counsel.

¶ 22 Dr. Paul Prinz, plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon, testified by videotaped evidence deposition.

Dr. Prinz was shown Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5, which were the medical bills pertaining to plaintiff’s

surgery at Gottlieb, physical therapy at Gottlieb, and Dr. Prinz’s bills from Special Care

Orthopedics. When Dr. Prinz was asked whether the physical therapy, emergency room, and the

surgery bills from Gottlieb were reasonable, defense counsel objected on the basis that “Dr. Prinz

did not order and that he did not provide specifically the emergency room bill.” Plaintiff’s counsel

then rephrased the question and asked Dr. Prinz if he had “an opinion whether the treatment that

[plaintiff] received at Gottlieb for the physical therapy and the surgery were reasonable.” Dr. Prinz

testified that based on his 25 years of experience as an orthopedic surgeon in the Chicago area, the

-9- No. 1-20-0799

physical therapy and surgery bills from Gottlieb, as well as his own bills from Special Care

Orthopedics, were fair and reasonable.

¶ 23 At the close of plaintiff’s case in chief, defendant presented a motion for a directed verdict.

Defendant argued that plaintiff had failed to present evidence to prove the cause of action for

negligence. The court denied the motion.

¶ 24 D. Jury Instructions

¶ 25 As relevant to the issues on appeal, plaintiff submitted Jury Instructions 19 and 21. Jury

Instruction 19, which quoted CABO and incorporated IPI Civil (2000) No. 60.01, entitled

“Violation of Statute, Ordinance, or Administrative Regulation,” read as follows:

“ There was in force in the City of Melrose Park at the time of the occurrence

in question a certain ordinance which provides that:

Joist framing into the side of the wood girder shall be supported by approved

framing anchors or on ledger strips not less than nominal 2 inches by 2 inches (51

mm by 51 mm). CABO One and Two-Family Dwelling Code, 1995 Edition.

If you decide that a party violated the ordinance on the occasion in question,

then you may consider the fact together with all other facts to what extent, if any, a

party was negligent.”

¶ 26 Jury Instruction 21, which quoted IPMC and incorporated IPI Civil (2000) No. 60.01, read

as follows:

“There was in force in the City of Melrose Park at the time of the occurrence

- 10 - No. 1-20-0799

This code shall be construed to secure its expressed intent, which is to

ensure public health, safety and welfare in so far as they are affected by the

continued occupancy and maintenance of structures and premises. Existing

structures and premises that do not comply with these provisions shall be altered or

repaired to provide a minimum level of health and safety as required herein. IPMC,

2006 Edition.

If you decide that a party violated the ordinance on the occasion in question,

then you may consider the fact together with all other facts to what extent, if any, a

¶ 27 Prior to trial, defendant objected to plaintiff’s Jury Instructions 5, 6, and 7, which were

relevant to negligence claims, on the basis that the case should have been a submitted as a premises

liability claim. However, later during the jury instruction conference, defendant did not object to

instructions concerning the definitions of negligence, ordinary care, and the duty to exercise

ordinary care. Defendant did not request a premises liability instruction be submitted to the jury.

¶ 28 E. Trial Court Decision

¶ 29 The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $268,782, which included:

$25,000 for pain and suffering, $100,000 for “pain and suffering reasonably certain to be

experienced in the future as a result of the injuries,” $20,000 for the loss of normal life, $50,000

for “loss of a normal life reasonably certain to be experienced in the future,” $40,362 for

“reasonable expense of necessary medical care, treatment and services received,” $23,420 in lost

earnings, and $10,000 in disfigurement resulting from the injury. On March 20, 2020, defendant

filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remittitur. On March 26, 2020,

- 11 - No. 1-20-0799

defendant filed a motion for a new trial. On June 11, 2020, the trial court denied defendant’s

motions. This appeal followed.

¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 31 On appeal, defendant argues that this court should reverse the trial court’s judgment

because the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff to submit a negligence claim, rather than a

premises liability claim, where the issue was related to an allegedly defective condition of

defendant’s property. Alternatively, defendant argues that we should remand for a new trial

because the trial court erred in allowing (1) Leopold’s opinion testimony on the obligation to have

the deck inspected based on his interpretation of the applicable standard of care; (2) submission of

IPI Civil (2000) No. 60.01 as to violation of ordinances where there was no evidence that the

standards argued were supported by ordinances or that they had the force of law and were

applicable to the facts of the present case; (3) violation of the motion in limine by plaintiff’s

attorney who brought up defendant’s insurance carrier during cross-examination; and (4)

submission of the total amount of plaintiff’s medical bills without proper foundation as to their

reasonableness.

¶ 32 A. Negligence

¶ 33 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict or

motion for judgment n.o.v. because the “facts presented to the jury and the arguments made by

counsel pertained to a defective condition of the property.” As such, defendant maintains that the

case should have been submitted under a theory of premises liability instead of negligence. Further,

defendant concludes that the judgment must be reversed because plaintiff failed to prove a

premises liability claim where there was no evidence that defendant had notice of the defective

condition of the deck.

- 12 - No. 1-20-0799

¶ 34 As a general matter, motions for a directed verdict and motions for a judgment n.o.v.,

although made at different times, raise similar questions and are governed by the same rules of

law. Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 (1992). A directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. should

be entered only in cases where “ ‘all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to

the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors [the] movant that no contrary verdict based on the

evidence could ever stand.’ ” Hamilton v. Hastings, 2014 IL App (4th) 131021, ¶ 22

(quoting Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967)). In ruling on these

motions, a court does not weigh evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses; rather the court

only considers the evidence and any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 453. Judgment should not be entered on either motion when

“there is any evidence, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, demonstrating

a substantial factual dispute, or where the assessment of credibility of the witnesses or the

determination regarding conflicting evidence is decisive to the outcome.” Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at

454. We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for directed verdict or judgment

n.o.v. Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 37.

¶ 35 Prior to addressing defendant’s arguments, we find it imperative to note the distinction

between an ordinary negligence claim and a premises liability claim. Ordinary negligence requires

proof of: (1) the existence of a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) an injury proximately caused

by the breach. Guvenoz v. Target Corp., 2015 IL App (1st) 133940, ¶ 89. Whether a duty exists is

a legal question of law for the court to decide, whereas the question of “whether a defendant

breached the duty and whether that breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries are

factual matters for the jury to decide, provided there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding

those issues.” Greenhill v. REIT Management & Research, LLC, 2019 IL App (1st) 181164, ¶ 47

- 13 - No. 1-20-0799

(2019). Violation of a statute or code designed to protect human life is prima facie evidence of

negligence. Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Companies Inc., 144 Ill. 2d 425, 434 (1991). “A party

injured by such a violation may recover only by showing that the violation proximately caused his

injury[,] and the statute or ordinance was intended to protect a class of persons to which he belongs

from the kind of injury that he suffered.” Id. “The violation does not constitute negligence per

se, however, and therefore the defendant may prevail by showing that he acted reasonably under

the circumstances.” Id.

¶ 36 A claim for premises liability, on the other hand, requires proof of the three elements of

ordinary negligence along with proof that: (1) there was a condition on the property that presented

an unreasonable risk of harm, (2) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the

condition and the risk, and (3) the defendant could reasonably have expected people on the

property would not realize, would not discover, or would fail to protect themselves from the

danger. Hope v. Hope, 398 Ill. App. 3d 216, 219 (2010).

¶ 37 Defendant contends that this case should have been submitted under a theory of premises

liability instead of a theory of negligence because there is “no evidence or allegation that

[defendant] caused the dangerous condition” and instead, the evidence and arguments presented

in the case were based on the dangerous condition of the premises. As such, defendant asserts that

plaintiff had the burden to prove that “[defendant] had actual or constructive notice of the

condition.” Generally, a plaintiff is “entitled to elect the legal theory upon which to proceed.”

Smart v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 120901, ¶ 45. When a plaintiff is injured on a

landowner’s property, “a plaintiff may elect to pursue a negligence claim, a premises liability

claim, or both.” Id. ¶ 54. This is because “ ‘plaintiffs are masters of their complaint and are entitled

- 14 - No. 1-20-0799

to proceed under whichever theory they decide, so long as the evidence supports such a theory.’ ”

Id. (quoting Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, 298 Ill. App. 3d 712, 717 (1998)).

¶ 38 In Smart, the plaintiff was injured while riding his bicycle on the city’s bicycle path which

was in the process of being resurfaced by the city. 2013 IL App (1st) 120901, ¶ 1. The plaintiff

filed a one-count negligence complaint against the city, alleging that the city failed to maintain its

property in a reasonably safe condition. Id. ¶ 14. The plaintiff tendered a negligence instruction,

and the city tendered a premise liability instruction. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. The trial court accepted the

plaintiff’s instruction and denied the city’s instruction. Id. ¶ 22. The jury returned a verdict in favor

of the plaintiff and the city filed a posttrial motion, which the court denied. Id. ¶¶ 22-24. On appeal,

the city argued that the court erroneously rejected its proffered premises liability instruction

because it was not engaged in any “activity” on the date that the plaintiff was injured and therefore,

it could not be said that any activity conducted on the premises proximately caused the plaintiff’s

injuries. Id. ¶ 50. This court rejected the city’s argument. Id. The court noted that plaintiff chose

to pursue a negligence claim and his complaint “sounded in negligence, and not premises liability.”

Id. ¶ 47. The court further reasoned that the city’s conduct created the hazard that caused the

plaintiff’s injuries because the city’s activity in resurfacing the intersection was ongoing and

“altered the otherwise safe bicycle path,” which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

Id. ¶ 55.

¶ 39 Here, plaintiff’s complaint outlined a theory of negligence rather than premises liability.

Like Smart, plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant failed to maintain the deck in a

reasonably safe condition. Specifically, in her complaint, plaintiff asserted that it was defendant’s

duty “to exercise ordinary care in the ownership, maintenance, management and control of the

residence *** and, specifically, of the porch/deck.” Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that defendant

- 15 - No. 1-20-0799

breached that duty of care by carelessly and negligently failing to inspect and maintain the

premises pursuant to the building codes and allowing “more persons and weight to congregate

upon the porch/deck than it could reasonably be expected to support.” Plaintiff further alleged that

“[a]s a direct and proximate result [of] one or more *** careless and/or negligent acts or omissions

of the defendant, *** the porch/deck collapsed” and caused her injuries. The complaint clearly

pled negligence on behalf of defendant and was not centered on the defective condition of property.

Like Smart, plaintiff here chose to pursue a negligence claim and her complaint “sounded in

negligence.” Additionally, the evidence in this case, supported the finding that defendant’s failure

to inspect and maintain the premises pursuant to the applicable codes and allowing “more persons

and weight to congregate upon the porch/deck” created the hazard that caused the plaintiff’s

injuries. The evidence, based on the codes and testimony, showed that defendant had an ongoing

duty to maintain and inspect her premises. Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing the case

to be submitted under a theory of negligence.

¶ 40 In Reed, an earlier case, the plaintiffs (husband and wife) went to the garden area of a Wal-

Mart Store. 298 Ill. App. 3d at 712-13. The wife stepped on a rusty nail protruding from a board

situated in the middle of the garden area. Id. The plaintiffs sued Wal-Mart for negligence, alleging

that Wal-Mart caused an unreasonably dangerous condition to exist on the premises, allowed the

condition to exist (although it knew or should have known of its existence), failed to remove the

condition, and failed to have an inspection system in effect. Id. The plaintiffs submitted

instructions on negligence and Wal-Mart submitted an instruction that required the plaintiffs to

prove that it had actual and constructive notice of the dangerous condition on the property. Id. at

714. The trial court submitted Wal-Mart’s instruction and the jury returned a verdict for Wal-Mart.

Id. at 715. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in submitting Wal-Mart’s

- 16 - No. 1-20-0799

instruction of actual or constructive notice where the facts showed that the dangerous condition

was caused by the actions of Wal-Mart or its employees. Id. Wal-Mart, on other hand, argued that

the jury was properly instructed on notice because the plaintiffs’ complaint sought to recover under

a premises liability theory, and not ordinary negligence. Id. at 717. The Fourth District reversed,

finding that the plaintiffs submitted “more than ‘slight’ ” evidence to show that the board was

placed in the pathway by Wal-Mart. Id. at 716. The Fourth District also found that because the

plaintiffs’ complaint alleged both an ordinary negligence cause of action (Wal-Mart caused the

dangerous condition) and a premises liability cause of action (Wal-Mart maintained a dangerous

condition), the plaintiffs’ alleged active negligence and did not confine their cause of action to

premises liability. Id. at 717.

¶ 41 Reed is similar to the present case in that both cases alleged “active” negligence. Even if

we were to agree with defendant that plaintiff’s complaint included allegations that went towards

a cause of action for premise liability, we cannot overlook the fact that plaintiff’s complaint

established an underlying cause of action for negligence. Plaintiff’s complaint did not solely allege

that defendant breached the duty of care by negligently maintaining the premises pursuant to the

codes but also that defendant failed to inspect and permitted “more persons and weight to

congregate upon the porch/deck,” which caused the deck to collapse and resulted in plaintiff’s

injuries. Although the lack of “joist hangers” or “screws” could have been attributed to someone

other than defendant, there was evidence to suggest that it was also defendant’s actions that created

the dangerous condition at issue. The record consists of testimony that showed deck inspections

are required to ensure decks are in sound condition. Here, defendant retained control of the

premises for 15 years, failed to inspect her deck during those years, and allowed a group of people

to gather on the deck. Plaintiff’s expert testified that defendant did not have any basis to believe

- 17 - No. 1-20-0799

that the deck could support a crowd of people without having conducted an inspection. As such,

plaintiff presented testimony and evidence that was “more than slight” to show that defendant’s

actions, or lack thereof, created a condition that caused plaintiff’s injuries. Therefore, the trial court

did not err in submitting the case under the theory of negligence.

¶ 42 Defendant argues that the present case is more like Carey v. J.R. Lazzara, Inc., 277 Ill.

App. 3d 902 (1996) because defendant’s liability was “predicated on the dangerous condition of

the premises of the deck failing to have joist hangers installed that caused it to collapse.”

In Carey, the plaintiff was injured on the defendant’s premises when she fell down a staircase that

lacked center handrails, in violation of various safety codes that required center handrails for

staircases more than 88 inches in width. Id. at 905. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that

defendant was negligent for: (1) failing to provide (a) a center handrail and (b) adequate lighting;

and (2) providing (a) a winding stairway with narrow steps, (b) one means of exiting the luncheon,

and (c) handrails that were not easily grasped. Id. at 909. This court held that the jury instruction

on notice was appropriate because liability was predicated on the dangerous condition existing on

the defendant’s premises, and not on the defendant’s negligent activities. Id.

¶ 43 Carey is distinguishable from the present case. As previously discussed, plaintiff alleged,

inter alia, the defendant carelessly and negligently maintained the premises pursuant to the

building codes, failed to inspect, and permitted “more persons and weight to congregate upon the

porch/deck” which caused the deck collapse. As such, plaintiff’s claims were predicated on

defendant’s negligent activity rather than solely on the dangerous condition existing on

defendant’s premises.

¶ 44 We briefly note that defendant’s reliance on Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456,

468 (1976) is misplaced. Defendant cites Genaust for the proposition that “Illinois law requires

- 18 - No. 1-20-0799

that the facts of this case be submitted as a premises liability case” and “[a]llowing plaintiff to

circumvent the requirement of proving notice in a premises liability case simply by stating she

wants to submit her case as negligence runs directly contrary to [Genaust].”

¶ 45 In Genaust, the plaintiff was installing a galvanized steel tower and antenna on defendant’s

property, when the tower and antenna came into close proximity to uninsulated overhead power

lines. 62 Ill. 2d at 460-61. Electric current arced from the power lines to the antenna and severely

injured the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff filed a six-count complaint predicated upon negligence and

strict liability in tort. Id. at 461-62. The circuit court dismissed five counts of the plaintiff's

complaint, thus forming the basis for the appeal. Id. Count VI of the complaint alleged that the

defendant knew or should have known in the exercise of reasonable care, that the power wires that

passed through its property were not properly insulated, failed to warn him that the wires were

dangerous, and failed to provide him with a safe place to work. Id. at 462. Our supreme court held

that count VI failed to state a cause of action in negligence because the defendant “could not have

discovered the danger of electrical arcing that existed by the presence of the power wires [w]hich

were neither on its property nor under its control.” Id.

¶ 46 Contrary to defendant’s assertion, Genaust does not stand for the proposition that the facts

of this case require that it be submitted as a premises liability case. Further, Genaust is factually

distinguishable because unlike here, the “dangerous condition” in Genaust was not on the

defendant’s property or under his control. As such, Genaust does not control our disposition.

¶ 47 Having found that the court properly submitted the case on the theory of negligence, the

question then becomes whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff,

sufficiently supported her claim of negligence such that the verdict in her favor may stand.

Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff satisfied all elements for a negligence cause of action.

- 19 - No. 1-20-0799

Instead, as plaintiff notes, defendant asserts that plaintiff cannot prevail because defendant neither

created the dangerous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.

Because we hold that plaintiff’s claim was properly brought on a negligence theory, defendant’s

argument as to notice fails.

¶ 48 We reiterate. To maintain a cause of action for negligence, plaintiff must establish that

defendant (1) owed a duty of care, (2) breached that duty, and (3) an injury was caused by

that breach.” Gutstein v. City of Evanston, 402 Ill. App. 3d 610, 616 (2010). A cause of action for

negligence does not require notice. Here, defendant owed plaintiff a duty to maintain her deck in

a safe condition. Further, the evidence presented at trial showed that IPMC and CABO were

adopted by Melrose Park, pertained to exterior structures such as decks, were created for safety

reasons, and were intended to protect persons like plaintiff. Plaintiff’s expert opined that the deck

could have been maintained in a safe condition through inspection. The jury heard testimony that

an inspection was not conducted and neither defendant nor her husband had hired anyone to inspect

the deck in the 15 years they resided in the home. This served as the basis of plaintiff’s claim, that

defendant was negligent because defendant took no action to ensure the safety of the deck. The

jury further heard testimony, although conflicting, as to whether defendant failed to maintain the

deck in a safe condition by failing to inspect the premises. The jury also heard evidence as to the

causes of the collapse which resulted in plaintiff’s injuries. As such, plaintiff made a prima facie

case for negligence.

¶ 49 In sum, the trial court did not err in allowing the plaintiff to proceed on a negligence theory

where the evidence supported such a claim.

¶ 50 B. Expert Testimony

- 20 - No. 1-20-0799

¶ 51 Defendant next argues that the court erred in allowing Leopold to testify that defendant

had “a duty to maintain her property and, as a reasonable person, would have had the deck

inspected.” Defendant contends that Leopold “failed to cite directly to any code or ordinance that

required [defendant] to inspect her deck.” Instead, defendant asserts that Leopold’s testimony went

to his interpretation of the applicable standard of care which should have been left to the jury to

determine.

¶ 52 Generally, expert testimony is admissible “when the expert has knowledge or experience

not common to a layperson and that knowledge or experience would aid the trier of fact in

determining the facts at issue.” Martin v. Sally, 341 Ill. App. 3d 308, 315 (2003). The test is not

whether the expert’s explanation is necessary to the fact finder’s understanding of the evidence,

but whether the expert can help the trier of fact. Miller v. Pillsbury Company, 33 Ill. 2d 514, 516-

17 (1965). “It is proper for a qualified expert to testify regarding a standard of care which is beyond

the knowledge of the average person.” Sohaey v. Van Cura, 240 Ill. App. 3d 266, 283 (1992).

However, an expert witness is not competent to give testimony which amounts to statutory

interpretation. Id. The admission of expert testimony is within the discretion of the trial court and

will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Martin v. Sally, 341 Ill. App. 3d 308, 315 (2003).

A trial court abuses its discretion when “no reasonable person would take the position adopted by

the trial court.” Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 313 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1070

(2000).

¶ 53 Here, Leopold testified regarding the applicable building codes. Both parties’ experts were

allowed to testify to assist the jury in understanding the applicable codes, when a deck needs to be

inspected, as well as the fact that the codes require the decks to be maintained in a safe condition.

Pergande noted that the “building codes are typically not prescriptive,” meaning that they do not

- 21 - No. 1-20-0799

state “exactly what you have to do.” As such, what is required under the codes to satisfy the

maintenance requirement is not obvious and an expert’s opinion would be necessary regarding the

standard of care and what maintenance entails. Therefore, the testimonies were admissible because

they aided the trier of fact in determining whether inspection was required and whether defendant

maintained the deck in a safe condition.

¶ 54 The issue of whether defendant should have inspected the deck was in dispute, with experts

on either side having different opinions. Leopold testified that a deck should be inspected when it

is 10 years old, whereas Pergande testified that inspection is required only when it becomes

apparent that something needed to be inspected. As such, the expert testimony as to what was

required by the building code went to the jury’s valuation of the weight to be given to the testimony

and the trial court did not err in allowing its admission. See Gateway-Walden, LLC v. Pappas,

2018 IL App (1st) 162714, ¶ 65 (“[A] party’s objection to the testimony of an opposing expert on

the basis that the expert’s testimony includes improper elements or adopts a different theory of

valuation goes to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of that testimony.”) (Internal quotation

marks omitted.).

¶ 55 Defendant cites Sohaey v. Van Cura, 240 Ill. App. 3d 266 (1992) and LID Associates v.

Dolan, 324 Ill. App. 3d 1047 (2001) in support of her argument that admission of the experts’

testimony was improper. The court in Sohaey noted that experts cannot give testimony that

“amounts to statutory interpretation,” offer “legal conclusions” that a jury could make on its own,

or “testify regarding what legal research shows with respect to a key legal term” that should be

defined by the court. (Internal citations omitted.) Sohaey, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 283. Similarly, this

court in LID Associates stated that an expert witness cannot give testimony “amounting to

statutory interpretation” or regarding “legal conclusions” and opinions based on the “interpretation

- 22 - No. 1-20-0799

of case law.” (Internal citations omitted.) LID Associates, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 1058. As discussed,

we find that the allegations and facts of this case required plaintiff to present expert testimony as

to the standard of care and did not amount to any of the prohibited forms of testimony. In sum, the

trial court did not err in admitting the expert testimony.

¶ 56 C. Jury Instructions

¶ 57 Defendant contends that the submission of Jury Instructions 19 and 21 was improper where

(1) the trial record contained insufficient evidence to support that the codes cited in the instructions

were validly adopted by Melrose Park or had the force of law; and (2) the codes were inapplicable

to the facts and issues of the case. Because the submission of the jury instructions was improper,

defendant argues that this court should reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for

a new trial omitting Jury Instructions 19 and 21.

¶ 58 “The function of jury instructions is to convey to the jury the correct principles of law

applicable to the submitted evidence.” (Emphasis omitted.) Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill.

2d 483, 507 (2002). Jury instructions may quote portions of statutes and ordinances when the jury

has heard evidence that the quoted portions of the statute or ordinance have been violated and the

plaintiff offering the instruction alleges the violation constituted a breach of a duty owed by

defendant. Mayol v. Summers, Watson & Kimpel, 223 Ill. App. 3d 794, 810 (1992). “Generally, a

trial court’s decision to grant or deny an instruction is reviewed for [an] abuse of discretion.” Studt

v. Sherman Health Systems, 2011 IL 108182, ¶ 13. A trial court does not abuse its discretion

regarding the tender of jury instructions if the instructions in their entirety “fairly, fully, and

comprehensively apprised the jury of the relevant legal principles.” Schultz v. Northeast Illinois

Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 260, 273 (2002).

- 23 - No. 1-20-0799

¶ 59 In the present case, defendant takes issue with Jury Instructions 19 and 21. Jury Instruction

19 quoted CABO, which provides that “[j]oist framing into the side of the wood girder shall be

supported by approved framing anchors or on ledger strips not less than nominal 2 inches by 2

inches (51 mm by 51 mm).” Jury Instruction 21 quoted IPMC which provides that the “code shall

be construed to secure its express intent, which is to ensure public health, safety and welfare in so

far as they are affected by the continued occupancy and maintenance of structures and premises.”

The quoted IPMC language further provides that “[e]xisting structures and premises that do not

comply with these provisions shall be altered or repaired to provide a minimum level of health and

safety as required herein.” Both instructions state that “[t]here was in force in the City of Melrose

Park at the time of the occurrence in question a certain ordinance” which quoted the CABO and

IPMC language.

¶ 60 We first address defendant’s argument that there is insufficient evidence to support that the

codes cited in the instructions were validly adopted by Melrose Park or had the force of law. Here,

both parties’ experts testified that the IPMC and COBA sections were adopted by Melrose Park.

Although Pergande testified that BOCA was applicable, he stated during cross-examination that

Melrose Park adopted the “One and Two Dwelling Code which is the same as the 1995 edition of

the CABO One and Two Dwelling Code.” Further, at the jury instruction conference, defense

counsel agreed that Melrose Park had adopted these code sections. As such, defendant cannot now

complain of the error to which defendant consented. See McMath v. Katholi, 191 Ill. 2d 251, 255

(2000) (stating that a party cannot raise an error on appeal where doing so would be inconsistent

with the position taken by that party in an earlier court proceeding). Defendant states that the

instructions merely cite and quote the codes without citing or quoting any Melrose Park ordinances

adopting the code. However, as defendant points out, plaintiff introduced Melrose Park Ordinance

- 24 - No. 1-20-0799

No. 329 as an exhibit, which contained these codes. 1 Absent evidence to the contrary, we cannot

assume that the codes were not adopted.

¶ 61 Citing Bulger v. Chicago Transit Authority, 345 Ill. App. 3d 119 (2003), defendant asserts

that even if this court were to find that the codes had been validly adopted by Melrose Park, the

codes still lack the force of law as they were merely “aspirational guidelines for safety.” In Bulger,

the plaintiff sued defendants for personal injuries he sustained after being struck by a bus driver

employed by the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA). 345 Ill. App. 3d at 105. The plaintiff submitted

IPI Civil (2000) No. 60.01 that quoted CTA administrative rules. Id. at 117. Defendants argued

that the CTA’s internal rules lacked the force of law and therefore, violation of the rules should

not have been incorporated into the jury instructions as evidence of negligence. Id. On appeal, this

court found that the CTA rules lacked the force of law, and therefore, the instructions were

improperly submitted to the jury. Id. This court reasoned the CTA rules were internal rules and

standards and the record does not reflect those rules and standards were adopted by any city, state,

or federal regulatory agency that oversees CTA operations. Id. at 120. Further, we held that the

fact that the section of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act granted CTA all powers necessary

or convenient to operate its transportation system did not mean that section conferred the force of

law to the Authority’s internal rules and standards. Id.

¶ 62 In contrast, the codes here were adopted by Melrose Park through an ordinance. Because

the codes were adopted by the city of Melrose Park through an ordinance and municipal ordinances

operate as a law, we find that the codes were standards with a force of law in that community. See

City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 511 (1998) (“[a] municipal ordinance has the force of

1 The record does not include Melrose Park Ordinance No. 329 that was introduced as an exhibit.

- 25 - No. 1-20-0799

law over the community in which it is adopted and, within the corporate limits, operates as

effectively as a law passed by the legislature.”). Unlike Bulger¸ where the Metropolitan Transit

Act simply granted CTA all powers necessary or convenient to operate its transportation system

and did not confer the force of law to the authority’s internal rule and regulations, the Melrose

Park Ordinance No. 329 specifically adopted the codes. As such, contrary to defendant’s assertion,

by enacting the ordinance, the city did not just adopt and incorporate some of the language of the

codes but adopted it in its entirety.

¶ 63 Next, defendant argues the codes were inapplicable to the facts and issues of the case. With

respect to Jury Instruction 19, which cited to a section of CABO regarding regulations for the

proper construction of a deck, defendant contends that she could not have violated the section

where there was no evidence that defendant was responsible for the construction of the deck.

Essentially, defendant argues that the instruction was improper because a third-party constructed

the deck and defendant should not be found negligent for a third-party’s negligence. The “Notes

on Use” accompanying IPI Civil (2000) No. 60.01 provides that this instruction “may be used in

a case where there is evidence tending to show that a violation of a statute by a non-party third

person may have been a proximate cause of the occurrence.” IPI Civil (2000) No. 60.01. In cases

involving third-party’s negligence, the party maintaining the property still has a duty to safely

maintain the property, so long as the statute or ordinance imposes such a duty. Robert v. City of

Chicago, 105 Ill. App. 3d 383, 385 (1982). As such, defendant still has the duty to maintain the

deck in a safe condition regardless of whether defendant constructed the deck. Therefore,

submission of Jury Instruction 19 was proper.

¶ 64 With respect to Jury Instruction 21, which cited IPMC and pertained to the maintenance

and repair to existing structures, defendant contends that there was no evidence to indicate that

- 26 - No. 1-20-0799

defendant had notice that the deck was in need of repair or that the deck did not comply with the

code. Further, defendant argues that the quoted language in Jury Instruction 21 failed to identify a

specific duty or action which was allegedly violated. Defendant asserts that the instruction is

ambiguous as it simply quotes that the existing structures and premises are to be altered to comply

with “these provisions” without specifying the provisions and further, does not state what

constitutes “a minimum level of health and safety as required herein.”

¶ 65 We first note that defendant’s lack of knowledge of her violation of IPMC does not absolve

her of liability. See McCarthy v. Kunicki, 355 Ill. App. 3d 957, 974 (2005) (“in establishing

defendants’ negligence based on an ordinance violation, plaintiff is not required to show

defendants’ awareness of the violation since the violation itself is prima facie evidence of

negligence.”). As such, the fact that defendant did not have notice that the deck needed repair or

failed to comply with the code is irrelevant. Additionally, we find defendant’s argument that the

instruction was ambiguous to be without merit. The quoted IPMC language clearly states that the

general purpose of IPMC is to “ensure public health, safety and welfare in so far as they are

affected by the continued occupancy and maintenance of structures and premises.” Any “existing

structures and premises that do not comply with these [IPMC] provisions shall be altered or

repaired to provide a minimum level of health and safety as required.” The quoted language clearly

provides that IPMC and all its provisions are implicated where the matter concerns public health

and safety which is affected by the maintenance of structures. The language also states that

structures that do not meet this safety goal shall be repaired or altered. Here, the evidence presented

showed that defendant owned a home with an attached deck that collapsed and resulted in

plaintiff’s injuries. The IPMC is implicated as its goal of safety is affected by plaintiff’s

- 27 - No. 1-20-0799

maintenance of the deck. As such, Jury Instruction 21 was clear and applicable to the facts and

issues of the case. Therefore, the submission of Jury Instruction 21was proper.

¶ 66 D. Motion in limine

¶ 67 Defendant argues that violation of the motion in limine by plaintiff’s attorney who raised

the issue of defendant’s insurance carrier during cross-examination warrants a new trial. “Violation

of a motion in limine is not per se reversible error. Improper comments generally do not constitute

reversible error unless the party has been substantially prejudiced.” Magna Trust Company v.

Illinois Central Railroad, 313 Ill. App. 3d 375, 395 (2000). “Any prejudicial impact of an error

may be cured if the trial judge sustains an objection and instructs the jury to disregard the

objectionable testimony.” Nickon v. City of Princeton, 376 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1103 (2007). A trial

court’s ruling addressing the violation of a motion in limine is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Watson v. West Suburban Medical Center, 2018 IL App (1st) 162707, ¶ 177.

¶ 68 Here, the motion in limine at issue prohibited any comments that would create an inference

that defendant was insured or that defense was being provided by an insurance company. During

cross-examination, plaintiffs’ counsel inquired as to Pergande’s consulting background. The

questions did not necessarily create an inference that defendant was insured in the instant case

because they pertained to Pergande’s work with insurers in the past and different types of

companies. Even assuming, arguendo, that the questioning violated the motion in limine, it was

not substantially prejudicial. Defendant concedes that the trial court sustained defendant’s

objection to plaintiff’s questioning as to insurance and ultimately instructed the jury to disregard

the question. As such, any prejudicial impact was cured by the court.

¶ 69 Nevertheless, defendant argues that the court’s “instruction to jury was clearly insufficient

to cure the prejudicial impact as, evidenced by the jury submitting multiple questions throughout

- 28 - No. 1-20-0799

the trial regarding defendant having insurance coverage.” However, the record in this case belies

defendant’s contention because the subsequent questions from the jury did not involve insurance.

We also note that defendant seized the opportunity to cure the violation by questioning its witness

during redirect examination as to insurance. Additionally, defendant was presented with the

opportunity to cure by the court via further jury instruction, which the defendant refused. After

reviewing the record, we do not find that defendant was substantially prejudiced by the questioning

of plaintiff’s counsel. Therefore, any violation of the motion in limine, although error, was not

reversible error.

¶ 70 E. Medical Bills

¶ 71 Finally, defendant argues, in her opening brief, that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff

to submit the entire amount of her medical bills without a proper foundation that all such bills were

reasonable and had been paid in full. Generally, “[i]n order to recover for medical expenses, the

plaintiff must prove that he or she has paid or will become liable to pay a medical bill, that he or

she necessarily incurred the medical expenses because of injuries resulting from the defendant’s

negligence, and that the charges were reasonable for services of that nature.” Arthur v. Catour,

216 Ill. 2d 72, 81-82 (2005). In Illinois, “the plaintiff may place the entire billed amount into

evidence, provided that the plaintiff establishes the proper foundational requirements to show the

bill’s reasonableness.” Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill. 2d 393, 414 (2008) (citing Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 81-

83 (2005)). “When evidence is admitted, through testimony or otherwise, that a medical bill was

for treatment rendered and that the bill has been paid, the bill is prima facie reasonable.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 82. If the bill is unpaid, plaintiff can establish

reasonableness (1) by introducing the testimony of a witness having knowledge of the services

rendered and the usual and customary charges for such services, and (2) that witness testifies that

- 29 - No. 1-20-0799

the bills are fair and reasonable. Id. “The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of

the trial court and we will not reverse the court’s decision ‘unless that discretion was clearly

abused.’ [Citation.]” McHale v. W.D. Trucking, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132625, ¶ 28.

¶ 72 As an initial matter, we note that defendant waived her argument as to the medical bills by

failing to object at the time of plaintiff’s testimony. “The purpose of an objection is not only to

preserve an issue for appeal, but to bring the potential error to the trial court’s attention so that it

may be contemporaneously addressed.” Pister v. Matrix Service Industrial Contractors,

Inc., 2013 IL App (4th) 120781, ¶ 78. Here, plaintiff was shown a summary of the medical bills,

which she testified were the bills she incurred as a result of the incident. Defense counsel objected

to the request to publish the summary as an exhibit, arguing that a proper foundation had not been

laid. Plaintiff’s counsel then proceeded to lay a foundation by asking plaintiff if the bills were paid

in full. Plaintiff testified that the bills had been paid. Defense counsel did not object at that time

and the exhibit was published. By failing to timely object to plaintiff’s testimony that the bills were

paid in full, defendant did not bring the alleged error to the trial court’s attention so that it could

be contemporaneously addressed. The fact that defendant had initially objected to the admission

of the medical bills or that “ ‘other objections were made at the time [plaintiff’s] testimony was

offered does not satisfy the requirement of a timely objection.’ ” Russo v. Corey Steel Company,

2018 IL App (1st) 180467, ¶ 40 (2018) (quoting Johnson v. Hoover Water Well Service, Inc., 108

Ill. App. 3d 994, 1006-07 (1982)). “ ‘An objection to evidence based upon a specific ground is a

waiver of objection on all grounds not specified.’ ” Id.; see also Stapleton v. Moore, 403 Ill. App.

3d 147, 156 (2010) (“A party is required to make specific objections to evidence, based on

particular grounds, and the failure to do so results in a waiver of objections as to all other grounds

not specified or relied on.”). In the instant case, defendant initially objected to admission of the

- 30 - No. 1-20-0799

medical bills on the ground that no proper foundation had been laid through plaintiff’s testimony.

Defendant, however, did not object or provide a ground for objection to plaintiff’s subsequent

testimony regarding payment of the medical bills. Therefore, defendant has waived her argument

as to the medical bills.

¶ 73 Waiver aside, we find that defendant’s argument lacks merit. Defendant does not point to

the exact unpaid bill charges. Defendant simply asserts, without more, that plaintiff “should have

only been allowed to testify that the amount of her medical bills that had been paid were reasonable

and necessary” and that plaintiff “needed to prove the reasonableness of the remaining amount of

the bills through other means, such as an expert witness in the medical field familiar with the

charges.” The record shows that plaintiff incurred a total of $40,362.90 in medical bills. Plaintiff

states, and defendant does not dispute, that this amount included Gottlieb’s bill in the amount of

$33,121.19, Special Care Orthopedics’ bill in the amount of $6,289, and the remaining $952.71

included the ambulance bill, “home medical expenses” for a wheelchair and commode, and

prescriptions. Plaintiff testified, without objection, that all the bills submitted were for bills she

incurred as a result of the incident and were paid in full. As such, the bills are prima facie

reasonable because plaintiff’s testimony established that they were for treatment rendered and that

they had been paid. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the bills were unpaid. Further,

Dr. Prinz testified that he had personal knowledge with respect to the treatment and surgery that

plaintiff received at Gottlieb and that those bills were fair and reasonable based on his decades of

experience and the customary charges of those services. He also testified that his own bills from

Special Care Orthopedics were reasonable. As such, a proper foundation was laid through

testimonies of both plaintiff and Dr. Prinz. Therefore, the court did not err in allowing plaintiff to

submit the entire amount of her medical bills.

- 31 - No. 1-20-0799

¶ 74 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 75 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 76 Affirmed.

- 32 -