1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 PAULA SOFIA RAMIREZ CLAVIJO, Case No. 25-cv-06248-BLF
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY 9 v. INJUNCTION
10 POLLY KAISER, et al., [Re: ECF No. 2] 11 Defendants.
12 13 Petitioner Paula Sofia Ramirez Clavijo (“Petitioner”) filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas 14 Corpus against Respondents Acting Field Office Director Polly Kaiser, Acting Director of 15 Immigration and Customs Enforcement Todd M. Lyons, Secretary of the Department of Homeland 16 Security Kristi Noem, and United States Attorney General Pam Bondi (collectively, “Respondents” 17 or “Government”) on July 25, 2025. ECF 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner simultaneously filed her Ex Parte 18 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). ECF 3 (“Mot.”). On the same day, the Court 19 issued a TRO requiring the Government to immediately release Petitioner and enjoining and 20 restraining it from re-detaining her without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral 21 decision maker. ECF 10 at 7. The Court ordered the TRO to remain in effect until August 8, 2025, 22 which was extended to August 15, 2025, by stipulation and further extended to August 22, 2025, by 23 the Court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). ECF 10 at 7; ECF 16 at 3; ECF 23. 24 On July 29, 2025, the Government notified the Court that Petitioner was released from the 25 custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement on July 25, 2025, pursuant to the 26 TRO. ECF 14. 27 Now before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Respondents filed 1 on August 15, 2025. ECF 22. At the hearing, the Court invited Petitioner to file a reply. ECF 24, 2 Hearing Tr. at 44:5-9. On August 18, 2025, Petitioner file a reply. ECF 26 (“Reply”). 3 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Motion for a Preliminary 4 Injunction. 5 I. BACKGROUND 6 Petitioner is a 33-year-old asylum seeker who is a citizen of Colombia. ECF 1, Petition for 7 Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) at ¶ 1; ECF 19-1 at 2. Petitioner is a survivor of sexual assault and 8 suffers from serious anxiety and depression. ECF 3-3, Declaration of Fredy Javier Ramirez Clavijo 9 (“Ramirez Clavijo Decl.”) ¶ 9. 10 On December 4, 2023, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection, admission or 11 parole. ECF 19, Declaration of Thomas Auer (“Auer Decl.”) ¶ 6; ECF 19-1 at 2. Department of 12 Homeland Security (“DHS”) Border Patrol encountered Petitioner approximately two miles west of 13 the San Ysidro Port of Entry, and approximately 106 yards north of the United States-Mexico 14 international boundary. ECF 19-1 at 2. Petitioner was taken into custody and transported for 15 processing. Id. During processing, Petitioner admitted that she was not in possession of any valid 16 immigration documents that would allow her to legally enter, pass through, or remain in the United 17 States. Id. at 3. Petitioner also admitted that she illegally entered the United States on December 4, 18 2023, without presenting herself to an immigration officer for inspection. Id. During inspection, 19 Petitioner “did not indicate fear of returning to Colombia, and stated that she has no immigration 20 petitions pending on her behalf.” Id. 21 On December 6, 2023, DHS issued Petitioner a Form I-862 Notice to Appear. ECF 19-2 at 22 1. The Notice of Appear stated that Petitioner was not “admitted or paroled.” ECF 19-2 at 1. The 23 Notice to Appear instructed Petitioner to appear before an immigration judge on July 24, 2025, in 24 San Francisco. Id. On the same day, Petitioner was released pending her immigration court 25 proceedings. ECF 19, Auer Decl. ¶ 9; ECF 19-1 at 4. Petitioner was released on an Order of Release 26 on Recognizance. ECF 26-2, Declaration of Jonhatan A. Aragon in Support of Petitioner’s Reply 27 Brief (“Aragon Dec.”), Ex. A, Order of Release on Recognizance. The release was pursuant to 8 1 Petitioner has lived in California for nearly two years. ECF 3-3, Ramirez Clavijo Decl. ¶ 4. 2 In February 2024, Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 3 Convention Against Torture. Id. ¶ 6. Petitioner has no criminal record. Id. ¶ 5; ECF 19-1 at 3. 4 On July 24, 2025, Petitioner appeared at the San Francisco Immigration Court for her 5 scheduled hearing before Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Patrick O’Brien. ECF 3-2, Declaration of 6 Jonathan A. Aragon (“Aragon Decl.”) ¶ 3. IJ O’Brien informed Petitioner that the Government had 7 moved to dismiss her case in order to initiate fast-track “expedited removal” proceedings. Id. ¶ 4. IJ 8 O’Brien did not immediately rule on the motion to dismiss, and instead gave Petitioner time to 9 respond and set a further hearing for August 21, 2025. Id. Immediately after the hearing, U.S. 10 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) 11 officers arrested Petitioner outside of the courtroom pursuant to a Warrant of Arrest. ECF 19 ¶¶ 11- 12 12; ECF 19-5, Warrant for Arrest of Alien. The Warrant of Arrest was issued under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 13 ECF 19-5. DHS issued Petitioner a Notice of Custody Determination also under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 14 ECF 26-3. Petitioner remained in ICE custody until she was released on July 25, 2025, pursuant to 15 the Court’s Order. ECF 19 ¶¶ 13-14. On July 25, 2025, Petitioner received a letter from ICE that 16 granted parole to Petitioner pursuant to 8 CFR § 212.5. ECF 26-4. 17 On August 14, 2025, IJ O’Brien granted without prejudice the Government’s motion to 18 dismiss. ECF 26-5. On August 18, 2025, Petitioner appealed the Immigration Court’s order granting 19 the Government’s motion to dismiss to the Board of Immigration Appeals. ECF 26-6. 20 II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may 22 only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat Res. 23 Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). A plaintiff seeking preliminary 24 injunctive relief must establish “[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to 25 suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in 26 his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. “If a plaintiff can only show 27 that there are serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on 1 the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. 2 Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal alterations and citations omitted). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 A. Petitioner Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits. 5 The first Winter factor asks whether the Plaintiff is “likely to succeed on the merits” of his 6 claims. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. 7 Petitioner argues that her detention violates substantive due process because she is neither a 8 flight risk nor a danger to the community. Mot. at 7-9. Petitioner argues that her procedural due 9 process rights would be violated if she is deprived the opportunity to contest her detention before a 10 neutral decisionmaker. Mot. at 9-12. 11 In response, Respondents argue that Petitioner cannot show a likelihood of success on her 12 claim that she is entitled to a custody hearing before a neutral decisionmaker because her detention 13 is mandatory under the statute. Opp. at 7-8. Respondents argue that the three-part test established in 14 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) does not apply. Id. at 9-10. Respondents argue that, in 15 enacting the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), 16 Congress did not intend to treat individuals like Petitioner who entered the United States unlawfully 17 better than aliens who appear at a port of entry. Id. at 10-11. Respondents further argue that 18 Petitioner cannot obtain an injunction prohibiting her transfer because the Attorney General has 19 discretion to determine the appropriate place of detention. Id. at 11. 20 The Court addresses the Parties’ arguments in turn. 21 1. Petitioner Has Shown that She Has Been Conferred a Protected Liberty 22 Interest through the Government’s Actions. 23 Petitioner argues that she has a protected liberty interest because she was placed in full 24 removal proceedings and released from immigration custody by the affirmative act of the 25 Government. Mot. at 9-10; Reply at 2-5. 26 In response, Respondents argue that Petitioner is a noncitizen subject to expedited removal 27 because she was neither “admitted or paroled” into the United States nor was she “physically present 1 determination of inadmissibility.” Opp. at 7 (citing ECF 19 ¶¶ 8-9). Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C. 2 § 1225 (“§ 1225”) mandates Petitioner’s detention because she is a noncitizen subject to expedited 3 removal. Opp. at 7-8. 4 8 U.S.C. § 1225 provides that an alien who “arrives in the United States,” or “[is] present” 5 in this country but “has not been admitted,” is “an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). 6 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) provides that “[i]f an immigration officer determines that an alien . . . who 7 is arriving in the United States . . . is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this 8 title, the officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or 9 review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this 10 title or a fear of persecution.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). § 1225(b)(1) applies to an alien who “has 11 been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to 12 the date of the determination of inadmissibility.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). 8 U.S.C. § 13 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “[subject to scenarios do not apply here], in the case of an alien who is 14 an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking 15 admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a 16 proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” While “U.S. immigration law authorizes the 17 Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 18 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” “[i]t also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the 19 country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Jennings v. 20 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”), for an alien who is 21 “arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United 22 States,” the Attorney General “may continue to detain the arrested alien,” “may release the alien” 23 on “bond,” or “may release the alien” on “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)(1)-(2). 24 The record unequivocally shows that the Government affirmatively placed Petitioner in full 25 removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and released her under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b). See 26 ECF 19-2 Auer Decl., Ex. 2, Notice to Appear; ECF 26-2, Aragon Decl., Ex. A, Order of Release 27 on Recognizance. This evidence clearly shows that Respondents have consistently treated Petitioner 1 11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *1 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) (“Section 1226(a) establishes a 2 discretionary detention framework.”). The Government’s election to place Petitioner in full removal 3 proceedings under § 1229a and releasing Petitioner under § 1226(a) provided Petitioner a liberty 4 interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Ortega v. Bonner, 415 F. Supp. 3d 5 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Just as people on preparole, parole, and probation status have a liberty 6 interest, so too does [noncitizen] have a liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”); 7 Pinchi v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) 8 (“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal 9 proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in 10 remaining out of custody.”); Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *2 (N.D. 11 Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[I]ndividuals released from immigration custody on bond have a protectable 12 liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”). 13 The Court is not persuaded by Respondents’ argument that DHS may elect to pursue 14 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) at any time. Opp. at 8. Here, the record clearly shows 15 that the Government has consistently treated Petitioner pursuant to the framework under § 1226(a), 16 and that DHS most recently detained Petitioner on July 24, 2025, by a warrant pursuant to that 17 statute. See ECF 26-2, Aragon Decl. Ex. A, Order of Release on Recognizance on December 6, 2023 18 (stating Petitioner “ha[s] been arrested and placed in removal proceedings. In accordance with 19 Section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [§ 1226],” Petitioner was “released on [her] 20 own recognizance.”); ECF 19-5, Auer Decl. Ex. 5, Warrant for Arrest of Alien under § 1226(a); 21 ECF 26-3, Aragon Decl. Ex. B. Notice of Custody Determination dated July 24, 2025 (stating 22 Petitioner was detained “[p]ursuant to the authority contained in section 236 of the Immigration and 23 Nationality Act [§ 1226] and part 236 of title 8, Code of Federal Regulations”). The Court notes 24 that none of the documents from DHS referenced § 1225(b). Accordingly, the Court cannot credit 25 Respondents’ argument that § 1225(b) can serve as a new basis for Petitioner’s detention, which 26 Respondents raised post hoc and introduced for the first time in this litigation. See Gomes v. Hyde, 27 No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *1 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) (“Because Gomes was 1 governed by Section 1226(a)’s discretionary framework.”). Having elected to proceed with full 2 removal proceedings under § 1226, Respondents cannot now reverse course and institute § 1225 3 expedited removal proceedings. Respondents have cited no authority supporting their argument. 4 Further, the Court finds persuasive the reasoning in Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 CIV. 5937 5 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025) holding that a person placed in full 6 removal proceedings under § 1226 cannot thereafter be detained under § 1225. Accord Gomes v. 7 Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *1 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025). 8 The Court is not persuaded by Respondents’ reliance on Department of Homeland Security 9 v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020). Opp. at 9-10. In Thuraissigiam, the noncitizen crossed the 10 southern boarder without inspection or any entry document, was apprehended by a Border Patrol 11 agent within 25 yards of the border, was never released from custody, and was placed in expedited 12 removal proceedings pursuant to § 1225(b). See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 114. After an asylum 13 officer denied the noncitizen’s asylum request, the noncitizen filed a federal habeas petition, 14 requesting “a writ of habeas corpus, an injunction, or a writ of mandamus directing the Department 15 to provide him a new opportunity to apply for asylum and other applicable forms of relief.” Id. at 16 114-15 (cleaned up). The Supreme Court found the noncitizen’s claim for habeas corpus seeking 17 additional review of his asylum claim was beyond the scope established for habeas corpus under the 18 Suspension Clause. Id. at 127. Unlike Thuraissigiam, here, Petitioner was placed in full removal 19 proceedings and DHS affirmatively released Petitioner under the discretionary framework pursuant 20 to § 1226(a). See ECF 19-2; ECF 26-2. Thus, because the Government decided to proceed with 21 Petitioner’s immigration case under § 1226(a) and released Petitioner on her own recognizance 22 Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, and the Due Process Clause protects her from unlawful 23 detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“But once an alien enters the country, 24 the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United 25 States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 26 permanent.”). 27 // 1 2. Petitioner Has Shown that She Faces a Substantial Risk of Erroneous 2 Deprivation of Her Liberty Interest. 3 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no 4 person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. 5 amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 6 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 7 678, 690 (2001) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). Courts have previously found 8 that individuals released from immigration custody on bond have a protectable liberty interest in 9 remaining out of custody on bond. See Ortiz Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv5785, 2020 WL 5074312, 10 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Just 11 as people on preparole, parole, and probation status have a liberty interest, so too does Ortega have 12 a liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”); Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01434, 13 2021 WL 783561, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021). 14 a. Substantive Due Process 15 As an initial matter, Petitioner brings a substantive due process challenge to her detention. 16 Mot. at 7-9. Petitioner argues that there is no credible argument that she is a danger to the 17 community, or that she has a flight risk. See Mot. at 8-9. The Court notes that Respondents do not 18 make any arguments to the contrary. See generally Opp. 19 The Court need not address Petitioner’s substantive due process claim at this stage because 20 granting a preliminary injunction enjoining Respondents from detaining Petitioner without a notice 21 and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker averts “the threat of any imminent 22 deprivation of her substantive due process rights.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-05632-PCP, 2025 23 WL 2084921, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). 24 b. Procedural Due Process 25 Petitioner argues that Respondents violated her procedural due process rights by depriving 26 her of the opportunity to contest her arrest and detention before a neutral decisionmaker. Mot. at 9- 27 13. Petitioner argues that she has “established a protected liberty interest,” and that under the three- 1 granting her the sought-after injunctive relief. Mot. at 10-12. 2 In response, Respondents argue that the Mathews factors do not apply because the Supreme 3 Court has never applied them “in addressing due process claims raised by noncitizens held in civil 4 immigration detention.” Opp. at 9 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) and 5 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022)). Respondents further argue that 6 Petitioner is subject to expedited removal and she “cannot assert a protected property or liberty 7 interest in additional procedures not provided by the statute.” Opp. at 10. 8 In Mathews, the Supreme Court explained that “[p]rocedural due process imposes 9 constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests 10 within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews, 11 424 U.S. at 332. The Supreme Court set out three factors relevant to the due process inquiry—“the 12 private interest that will be affected by the official action,” “the risk of an erroneous deprivation . . 13 . and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and “the 14 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 15 that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail,” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 16 In Rodriguez Diaz, the Ninth Circuit applied the Mathews factors to a procedural due process 17 challenge to immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”). Rodriguez Diaz v. 18 Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207-10 (9th Cir. 2022). The Ninth Circuit explained that 19 “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest 20 in the immigration detention context.” Id. at 1206. While the Ninth Circuit “assume[d] without 21 deciding” that the Mathews factors applied, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless explained that “other 22 circuits (reaching conflicting outcomes) have applied the Mathews test” in due process challenges 23 to § 1226(a). Id. at 1206-07 (citing Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2022), 24 Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2021) and Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 25 842, 851 (2d. Cir. 2020)). The Court notes that other courts in this Circuit regularly apply Mathews 26 to due process challenges in immigration context. See, e.g., Pinchi v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-05632- 27 PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025); Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801- 1 No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025). Here, on December 2 6, 2023, the Government placed Petitioner in full removal proceedings under § 1229a and released 3 her on her own recognizance pursuant to § 1226(a). See ECF 19-2; ECF 26-2. Petitioner was also 4 arrested on July 24, 2025, by ICE pursuant to a Warrant for Arrest (Form I-200) under § 1226(a). 5 ECF 19, Auer Decl. ¶¶ 11–12; ECF 19-4 at 4; ECF 19-5. Thus, the Court joins other courts in the 6 Ninth Circuit and applies the Mathews factors to determine the constitutionally sufficient procedures 7 to protect Petitioner’s liberty interest. Although Respondents choose to ignore their own election to 8 place Petitioner into full removal proceedings, including all of the rights obtained under § 1226, this 9 Court finds that § 1225 simply does not apply in this case based on the Respondents’ own actions. 10 As to the first Mathews factor, the Court finds that Petitioner has a substantial private interest 11 in remaining out of immigration custody because she has been released pending civil removal 12 proceedings. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). Petitioner, who has serious 13 medical conditions, has an interest in remaining in her home, being with her family members, and 14 monitoring her medical conditions out of immigration custody. See Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV- 15 05071, 2025 WL 1676854 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (cleaned up) (holding that petitioner had a 16 substantial private interest in remaining out of immigration custody for him to work, live at home, 17 and be with family and friends to “form the enduring attachments of normal life”). 18 As to the second Mathews factor, the Court finds that there is a risk of erroneous deprivation 19 that the additional procedural safeguard of a pre-detention hearing would help protect against. Here, 20 neither Petitioner nor Respondents had an opportunity to determine whether any valid basis exists 21 for her detention because Petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing. See Singh v. 22 Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801, 2025 WL 1918679 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025). Additionally, because 23 Petitioner’s substantial liberty interest is at stake, due process also requires Respondents to prove 24 “by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is a flight risk or danger to the community” 25 before depriving her of that liberty. Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 26 WL 1918679, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025). Here, Respondents have not shown any evidence that 27 Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Indeed, after Petitioner was released from 1 Francisco Immigration Court 18 months later in July 2025. See ECF 19-1 at 4; ECF 19-2; ECF 3-1, 2 Meyer Decl. ¶ 4. Thus, the Court finds that this factor favors Petitioner. 3 As to the third Mathews factor, Petitioner has no criminal record and has diligently attended 4 the required hearing in immigration court after DHS released her on her own recognizance in 5 December 2023. See ECF 3-3 ¶ 5; ECF 19-1 at 4; ECF 19-2; ECF 3-1, Meyer Decl. ¶ 4. Since 6 December 2023, Petitioner has lived with her brother in Sunnyvale, California and has worked to 7 build a stable life in the San Francisco Bay Area. ECF 3-3, ¶ 4. The Court notes that Respondents 8 do not claim any change in material circumstances that would warrant reassessment of Petitioner’s 9 fight risk or danger to the community. Thus, the Court finds that Respondents’ interest in detaining 10 Plaintiff without a hearing is low. 11 For the above reasons, the Court finds that each of the Mathews factors favors Petitioner. 12 Petitioner thus has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that she is entitled to a 13 pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker prior to any re-arrest or detention under the 14 Due Process Clause. 15 3. Petitioner can obtain an injunction prohibiting her transfer to another 16 district. 17 Petitioner seeks an injunction that “prohibits the government from transferring her out of 18 this District . . . until these habeas proceedings have concluded.” Mot. at 21. Respondents argue that 19 Petitioner cannot obtain an injunction prohibiting her transfer because “[t]he Attorney General has 20 discretion to determine the appropriate place of detention.” Opp. at 11. Respondents contend that 21 Petitioner has not shown “any transfer would interfere with the ability to present her case or access 22 counsel more than any other similarly situated detainee.” Id. 23 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes the exercise of federal court jurisdiction “to review . 24 . . any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the 25 authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General 26 or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g) (“§ 1231(g)”) provides that “[t]he 27 Attorney General shall arrange for appropriate places of detention for aliens detained pending 1 address transfers of noncitizen detainees at all,’ and it surely does not ‘explicitly grant the Attorney 2 General or the Secretary of Homeland Security discretion with respect to transfers.’ ” Ozturk v. 3 Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 396 (2d Cir. 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting Reyna as next friend of J.F.G. v. 4 Hott, 921 F.3d 204, 209 (4th Cir. 2019)); see Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't Div. of Dep't 5 of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2007) (§ 1231(g) “fails to ‘specify’ that individualized 6 transfer decisions are in the Attorney General’s discretion.”). Thus, the Court finds that the statute 7 does not specifically provide the Attorney General the discretion to decide Petitioner’s place of 8 detention. 9 The Court has “ ‘inherent authority to protect its proceedings,’ and to ‘meet new situations 10 which demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to correct the particular 11 injustices involved in these situations.’ ” Ozturk, 136 F.4th at 394-95 (cleaned up) (quoting Degen 12 v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) and Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 13 U.S. 238, 248 (1944)). Here, the Court finds that equities strongly favor Petitioner remaining in this 14 District pending the resolution of this matter because this will expedite resolution of this matter, 15 provide Petitioner ready access to medical and legal services, and address concerns about the 16 conditions of her detention. See Ozturk v. Trump, 779 F. Supp. 3d 462, 496 (D. Vt.), amended sub 17 nom. Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382 (2d Cir. 2025). Thus, pursuant to the Court’s inherent power, 18 the Court orders that in the event of re-detention, Respondents shall not remove Petitioner from this 19 District pending the resolution of this matter. 20 B. Petitioner Has Shown Irreparable Harm. 21 Petitioner argues that she will suffer immense irreparable injury if she is in ICE detention. 22 Mot. at 13. Petitioner argues that “the unlawful deprivation of physical liberty is the quintessential 23 irreparable harm.” Id. Petitioner argues that her arrest and detention will “substantially exacerbate[]” 24 her “serious medical conditions.” Id. 25 In response, Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of establishing 26 that she will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. Opp. at 11. Respondents argue 27 that Petitioner’s assertion of “serious medical conditions” is conclusory and is contradicted by the 1 of physical liberty” is “essentially inherent in detention.” Id. (quoting Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar, No 2 18-cv-07429-SK, 2018 WL 7474861 at *10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2018)). 3 The Court finds that Petitioner has shown that she is likely to suffer immediate and 4 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit has recognized 5 the “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention,” including “subpar 6 medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities, the economic burdens imposed on detainees 7 and their families as a result of detention, and the collateral harms to children of detainees whose 8 parents are detained.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, Petitioner 9 has serious medical conditions that are likely to be exacerbated in detention. Petitioner is a survivor 10 of sexual assault and suffers from serious anxiety and depression. ECF 3-3, Ramirez Clavijo Decl. 11 ¶ 9. Petitioner wears a wig to manage the anxiety caused by her alopecia, and ICE has indicated that 12 her wig would be taken away in detention. ECF 3-2, Aragon Decl. ¶ 9. Thus, Petitioner has 13 demonstrated that the consequences of her re-detention would be serious and irreparable. 14 Further, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably 15 constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994-95 (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 16 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)). “When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, 17 most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Warsoldier v. 18 Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). As discussed, if Petitioner is re- 19 detained without a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the deprivation of liberty 20 that Petitioner faces is likely unconstitutional and is an immediate and irreparable harm. Hernandez, 21 872 F.3d at 995 (holding Plaintiffs have met their burden to show irreparable harm that they “will 22 likely be deprived of their physical liberty unconstitutionally in the absence of the injunction”). 23 C. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Favor an Injunction. 24 The third Winter factor considers whether “the balance of equities tips” in the movant’s 25 favor. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The fourth Winter factor considers whether an injunction is in the 26 public interest. Id. When the government is the nonmoving party, “the last two Winter factors 27 merge.” Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted). 1 injury in the form of threat to her health and life, ongoing constitutional violations and continued 2 additional suffering” if she is re-detained by DHS. Mot. at 13-14. Petitioner further argues that there 3 is a strong interest to protect against unlawful detention and to prevent the violation of her 4 constitutional rights. Id. at 14. In response, Respondents argue that the Government has a compelling 5 interest in the steady enforcement of its immigration laws. Opp. at 12-13. 6 The Court finds that the balance of equities tips heavily in Petitioner’s favor, and public 7 interest favors an injunction. The public has an interest in the orderly and efficient administration 8 of this country’s immigration laws “but also has a strong interest ‘in upholding procedural 9 protections against unlawful detention.’ ” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 10 WL 1983677, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (quoting Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-CV-5785-PJH, 11 2020 WL 5074312, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020)). “[T]the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 12 costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-CV- 13 01434-JST, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting Hernandez, 872 14 F.3d at 996); see also Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Generally, public 15 interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been violated, because all citizens 16 have a stake in upholding the Constitution.”). 17 Here, the Court finds that the potential harm to Petitioner is significant, while the potential 18 harm to Respondents is minimal. As discussed, without the requested preliminary injunctive relief, 19 detention poses a significant threat to Petitioner’s health and liberty interest. Respondents risk only 20 a short delay in detaining Petitioner if Respondents ultimately show that detention is warranted. 21 Further, “the government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been 22 determined not to be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future immigration 23 proceedings can be reasonably ensured by a lesser bond or alternative conditions.” Hernandez, 872 24 F.3d at 994 (“any detention incidental to removal must bear a reasonable relation to its purpose.”) 25 (cleaned up). 26 “Faced with a choice ‘between minimally costly procedures and preventable human 27 suffering,’ . . . the Court concludes ‘that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in petitioner’s 1 * * * 2 For the above reasons, all four Winter factors favor issuing Petitioner’s requested injunction 3 preventing Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing 4 before a neutral decisionmaker. 5 D. Security 6 “The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the 7 movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages 8 sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 9 The Ninth Circuit has “recognized that Rule 65(c) invests the district court with discretion as to the 10 amount of security required, if any.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003) 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The district court may dispense with the filing of 12 a bond when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from enjoining his 13 or her conduct.” Id. Because the Court perceives no prejudice to Respondents resulting from the 14 preliminary injunction, the Court finds it appropriate to issue the preliminary injunction without 15 requiring security. 16 // 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // IV. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 (1) The Court GRANTS a Preliminary Injunction. 3 (2) Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner without 4 notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where the 5 Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that changed 6 circumstance render her a danger to the community or a flight risk, and that no conditions 4 other than her detention would be sufficient to prevent such harms. 8 (3) Respondents are ENJOINED from transferring Petitioner out of this district or deporting 9 her pending these habeas proceedings. 10 (4) This Preliminary Injunction SHALL remain in force throughout the pendency of this 11 action unless earlier modified by the Court. 12
13 Dated: August 21, 2025 faplnfaccnen
15 TH LABSON FREEMAN 2 United States District Judge Q 16
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