Ramesh Mirchumal Sadarangani v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 21, 2006
• Docket: 02-04-00498-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

                                      COURT OF APPEALS

                                       SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                                   FORT WORTH

                                        NO.  2-04-498-CR

RAMESH MIRCHUMAL SADARANGANI                                   APPELLANT

                                                   V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                                STATE

                                              ------------

        FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 5 OF TARRANT COUNTY

                 MEMORANDUM OPINION^[1] ON APPELLANT=S

                 PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

After reviewing Appellant=s petition for discretionary review, we modify our opinion and judgment in this appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 50.  We withdraw our April 20, 2006 opinion and judgment and substitute the following.

                                            Introduction

Appellant Ramesh Mirchumal Sadarangani appeals from his conviction for violating a protective order.  In five points, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain extraneous-offense evidence.  We affirm.

                                            Background

Appellant and Geeta Sadarangani were married in 1992, had two sons, and divorced in 2001.  On October 30, 2001, the 231st District Court of Tarrant County granted Geeta a protective order of two years= duration that prohibited Appellant from, among other things, going within 200 yards of Geeta=s residence except to pick up or drop off the children for visitation.

Geeta testified that on June 19, 2003, she was dropping one of her sons off at a neighbor=s house within 200 yards of her own home when she saw Appellant drive slowly past.  She reported the violation of the protective order to police later that day.  Police arrested Appellant, and he was charged by information with violating the protective order. 

During its rebuttal case at trial, the State called Arlington Police Investigator Esperanza Buckle.  Investigator Buckle testified, among other things, about how the Police Department investigates complaints.  On cross-examination, Appellant offered into evidence the arrest warrant affidavit sworn by Investigator Buckle and cross-examined her about inconsistencies between the recitations in the affidavit and Geeta=s testimony at trial.  The affidavit also stated that A[Appellant=s] criminal history shows he has been arrested twice for Violation of Protective Order,@ though Appellant did not question Investigator Buckle about that statement.

When the State took Investigator Buckle on redirect, it requested the trial court=s permission to question Investigator Buckle about Appellant=s prior violations, arguing that Appellant had Aopened the door@ to such evidence by offering the arrest warrant affidavit.  Appellant objected that the State waived its right to examine Investigator Buckle about the prior offenses when it failed to object to the admission of the affidavit and that Investigator Buckle=s testimony about his prior violations was speculative and inflammatory.  The trial court ruled that Appellant had opened the door to the prior violations and allowed the State to examine Investigator Buckle concerning the two violations she knew about.  After questioning Investigator Buckle about those violations, the State recalled Geeta to the stand.  Geeta testified that Appellant violated the protective order on three prior occasions and was arrested twice.  Appellant made relevance objections to her testimony, and the trial court overruled his objections.  Appellant then called his brother and questioned him about the prior violations and Appellant=s subsequent guilty pleas and jail time.

                                             Discussion

In his first point, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Appellant had opened the door to Investigator Buckle=s testimony concerning prior violations of the protective order.  In his third point, he argues that the admission of Investigator Buckle=s testimony violated Rules 403, 404(b), and 906 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.

To preserve error, a party must continue to object each time the objectionable evidence is offered.  Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 273 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1026 (1999); Ethington v. State, 819 S.W.2d 854, 858-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).  A trial court=s erroneous admission of evidence will not require reversal when other such evidence was received without objection, either before or after the complained-of ruling.  Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).  A party must object each time inadmissible evidence is offered or obtain a running objection.  Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).  An error in the admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection.  Id.

When the State announced its intention to question Investigator Buckle  about her arrest warrant affidavit=s reference to Appellant=s prior violations of the protective order, Appellant objected to her testimony as speculative and inflammatory.  But Appellant made no such objections when Geeta testified about the same violations,^[2] and Appellant himself questioned his brother about the prior violations.  Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Investigator Buckle to testify about the prior violations, we hold that the error was cured when Geeta and Appellant=s brother testified without objection about the same violations.  We overrule Appellant=s first and third points.

In his second point, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the prior-offense evidence because the State did not deliver its notice of intent to offer such evidence until the day of trial.  Rule 404(b) provides that extraneous-offense evidence is admissible under certain circumstances Aprovided that upon timely request by the accused in a criminal case, reasonable notice is given in advance of trial of intent to introduce in the State=s case-in-chief such evidence[.]@  Tex. R. Evid. 404(b) (emphasis added).

Appellant did not make a request for notice by the State as required by Rule 404(b).  Instead, he argues that his motion in limine was sufficient to constitute a Rule 404(b) request to trigger the State=s notice obligation.  Although the trial court ruled on Appellant=s motion in limine, the motion itself requested only Aan order instructing the State . . . not to mention . . . any extraneous offense[] . . . in the presence of the jury@ and a hearing outside the jury=s presence regarding the admissibility of any such extraneous offense evidence.  The motion did not request an order instructing the State to provide notice of intent to introduce of any extraneous offense.  Moreover, the motion was addressed to the court, rather than the State, and was thus insufficient to constitute the request required by Rule 404(b).  See Simpson v. State, 991 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding defendant=s motion seeking order from court to require State to provide notice of intent to offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts insufficient to trigger notice requirement under Rule 404(b)); Mitchell v. State, 982 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding motion seeking order requiring notice from State insufficient under code of criminal procedure art. 37.07); see also Ewing v. State, 157 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2005, no pet.).  Thus, the State had no obligation to provide such notice.  See Ewing, 157 S.W.3d at 867.  We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence, and we overrule Appellant=s second point.

In his fourth point, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present rebuttal evidence because there was nothing to rebut.  When the State called Investigator Buckle at the beginning of its rebuttal case, Appellant moved to take her on voir dire to Aask outside the presence of the jury what exactly the rebuttal is [that is] going to be heard.@ The trial court denied his request.  Appellant made no objections to the State=s case in rebuttal generally and did not raise the complaint that forms the basis of his fourth point on appeal.  We therefore hold that Appellant has forfeited this complaint and overrule his fourth point.  See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1).

In his fifth point, Appellant argues that the errors alleged in his first four points were harmful.  Because we have overruled Appellant=s other points, we need not address his fifth point.  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

                                             Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant=s first four points and declined to address his fifth point, we affirm the trial court=s judgment.

ANNE GARDNER

JUSTICE

PANEL B:   LIVINGSTON, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED:  June 21, 2006

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^[1]See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

^[2]After Geeta testified without objection that Appellant had violated the protective order before, Appellant made relevancy objections to her testimony about the details of those violations.  The trial court permitted the State to ask Geeta about the dates of the violations but no other details.