Ralph W. Fullerton Co. v. United States

381 F. Supp. 1353, 34 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5313, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8272
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedMay 31, 1974
DocketCiv. No. 73-583
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 381 F. Supp. 1353 (Ralph W. Fullerton Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ralph W. Fullerton Co. v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 1353, 34 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5313, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8272 (D. Or. 1974).

Opinion

OPINION

BELLONI, Chief Judge:

The Ralph W. Fullerton Insurance Agency brought this action for the recovery of $13,888.50, in federal income taxes plus interest alleged to have been overpaid by plaintiff for its 1969 and 1970 calendar years. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).

Plaintiff is an incorporated general insurance agency located in Portland, Oregon. In August, 1968, plaintiff purchased all of the capital stock of James A. Rossman Company, another Portland insurance agency. Plaintiff paid Ross-man $111,100 for certain accounts, files, and dailies; $8,900 for goodwill; and $5,000 for all other assets. Neither the portion of the purchase price paid for the goodwill nor the consideration paid for the other assets is involved in this case.

The individual accounts, files,- and dailies purchased by plaintiff are generally referred to in the insurance business as insurance expirations. Basically, insurancé expirations are customer lists containing all pertinent information [1354]*1354regarding insurance policies held by customers of an insurance agency. Knowledge of this information enables the insurance agent to solicit renewal of the policy.

Plaintiff argues that, in purchasing the stock of Rossman, the accounts, files, and dailies of Rossman were individually priced for each insured. Mr. Grootendorst, an officer of plaintiff, testified that he examined the Rossman expirations prior to the purchase and first eliminated several that he felt were of no value. With one exception, he then valued the remaining accounts at two times annual commissions.

On its 1969 and 1970 federal income tax returns, plaintiff claimed as loss deductions amounts representing the total value assigned by plaintiff to the insurance customers acquired from Rossman who failed to renew insurance policies in those two years. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the amounts claimed as losses were not properly deductible. As a result, deficiencies in tax and interest were assessed against and paid by plaintiff. Timely claims for refund were filed by plaintiff for the deficiencies. After dis-allowance of plaintiff’s refund claims, plaintiff timely brought the present action.

Plaintiff makes two arguments in support of its claim. First, it contends that the accounts, files, and dailies were individually valued so that it suffered an actual monetary loss each time one of the Rossman customers failed to renew an account with plaintiff. In the alternative, plaintiff contends that it was entitled to depreciate the amounts paid for the Rossman accounts, files, and dailies.

The government contends that the insurance expiration list acquired by plaintiff constitutes a single mass asset in the nature of goodwill. Therefore, the government maintains that the failure of a particular customer to renew his policy is not an event which can be construed as either a deductible tax loss or as a basis on which the expiration list can be depreciated.

THE LOSS DEDUCTIONS

As a general rule, there shall be allowed as a deduction any loss suffered by a taxpayer through the destruction, worthlessness, or abandonment of an asset sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. 26 U.S.C. § 165.

The regulations issued by the Commissioner under Section 165 provide in part:

Nature of loss allowable. To be allowed as a deduction under section 165(a), a loss must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions, fixed by identifiable events, and, actually sustained during the taxable year. Only a bona fide loss is allowable. Substance and not mere form shall govern in determining a deductible loss.
[26 C.F.R. 1.165-1 (b)]

Plaintiff contends that it assessed the quality of the individual customer accounts and valued each according to the previously mentioned formula.

The government contends that the expiration list acquired by plaintiff from Rossman constituted a mass or indivisible asset which could not be fragmented for loss deduction purposes. It argues that plaintiff not only acquired the specific customers of Rossman, but it also acquired the customer structure of Ross-man. In other words, the government asserts that plaintiff obtained not merely a flow of additional income from the particular customers who previously dealt with Rossman, but also, and more important, a new level of operation and an opportunity to make inroads into markets which have already been opened by the acquired business.

The indivisible asset rule does not apply where the purchase price was derived by appraising the value of each individual asset separately. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seaboard [1355]*1355Finance Corp., 367 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1966); Super Food Services v. United States, 416 F.2d 1236 (7th Cir. 1969).

As I stated in finding for the taxpayer in Sunset Fuel Co. v. United States, 375 F.Supp. 1011 (D.Or. filed March 1, 1974), “the question whether a purchaser of a customer list is acquiring a single mass asset or a group of separate individual assets is frequently a factual question which will depend on the method used to evaluate the acquisition in light of the nature of the business being acquired.”

While the actual valuation formula used by plaintiff in this case is similar to the formula used by the taxpayer in Sunset Fuel Co., there are essential factual distinctions between the two cases which require a different result in this case.

The nature of the business being acquired in the present case is insurance not fuel oil. Defendant does not assert that insurance expirations are non-deductible or non-depreciable as a matter of law. However, the parties have not cited nor have I been able to find any case holding that a taxpayer is entitled to a loss deduction upon the failure of an insured on an insurance expiration list to renew his policy. While it is probable that most taxpayers have claimed their deductions under Section 167 relating to depreciation rather than Section 165 relating to losses, I have found no appellate decision which has allowed a taxpayer to depreciate an insurance expiration list. See, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Salome v. United States. 395 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1968); Blaine v. United States, 441 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Marsh & McLennan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 420 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1969); Potts, Davis & Co. v.

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Bluebook (online)
381 F. Supp. 1353, 34 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5313, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8272, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ralph-w-fullerton-co-v-united-states-ord-1974.