Raleigh Hous. Auth. v. Winston

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: March 12, 2021
• Docket: 385PA19
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-16

No. 385PA19

Filed 12 March 2021

RALEIGH HOUSING AUTHORITY

v. PATRICIA WINSTON

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision

of the Court of Appeals, 267 N.C. App. 419 (2019), affirming an order entered on

26 June 2018 by Judge Michael Denning in District Court, Wake County. Heard in

the Supreme Court on 12 January 2021.

The Francis Law Firm, PLLC, by Ruth Sheehan and Charles T. Francis and Alan D. Woodlief, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.

Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by Erik R. Zimmerman and Ethan R. White; and Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc., by Andrew Cogdell, Celia Pistolis, Darren Chester, Daniel J. Dore, and Thomas Holderness, for defendant- appellant.

Jack Holtzman, Emily Turner, Elizabeth Myerholtz, Lisa Grafstein, and Lisa Nesbitt for Disability Rights North Carolina, North Carolina Justice Center, North Carolina Housing Coalition, North Carolina Coalition to End Homelessness, North Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence, amici curiae.

BARRINGER, Justice.

¶1 This case presents us with the question of whether a notice of lease termination

provided to a tenant of public housing “state[d] specific grounds for termination.” 24 RALEIGH HOUS. AUTH. V WINSTON

Opinion of the Court

C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(3)(ii) (2019).1 Plaintiff Raleigh Housing Authority (RHA) provided a

notice of lease termination to defendant Patricia Winston (Winston) that notified her

of RHA’s intent to terminate her lease due to “Inappropriate Conduct – Multiple

Complaints” and quoted provision 9(F) of the lease agreement. Because the notice of

lease termination failed to provide Winston with the factors necessary for her to be

on notice of RHA’s justification for the termination of her lease on this record, we

reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I. Background

¶2 RHA filed a complaint in summary ejectment against Winston on

13 April 2018 in District Court, Wake County. RHA’s complaint alleged that the lease

period had ended, and Winston was holding over after the end of the lease. In her

answer, Winston denied these allegations and raised as a defense that the notice of

lease termination “d[id] not state with specificity defendant’s alleged ‘Inappropriate

Conduct’ ” and “violates federal lease notice requirements” citing 24 C.F.R.

§ 966.4(l)(3)(ii). The lease agreement between Winston and RHA stated that “[t]he

notice of termination to the Resident shall state reason(s) for the termination.”

Following a summary ejectment trial in April 2018 and a hearing on RHA’s motion

1 While Winston cites court decisions from other jurisdictions addressing other regulations under Title 24, “Housing and Urban Development,” Winston has not argued that any regulation addressing written notice applies other than 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(3)(ii) (2019). RALEIGH HOUS. AUTH. V WINSTON

for eviction on 25 June 2018,2 the trial court entered an order allowing immediate

possession of the apartment to RHA. In the order allowing immediate possession, the

trial court made the following findings of fact:3

3. On April 17, 2017 [t]he Defendant entered into a renewable twelve-month lease (“Lease”) with the Plaintiff for a one-bedroom apartment (Apartment #206) at 150 Gas Light Creek Court, Raleigh, N.C. 27601.

4. Between October 2017 and November 2017, Plaintiff received three (3) written complaints from other tenants in the apartment complex about noise disturbances coming from Defendant’s apartment[.]

5. After the first written complaint[,] Plaintiff issued the Defendant a written warning indicating to the Defendant that a complaint had been filed against her for noise disturbance.

6. On or about December 1, 2017, after receiving a third written complaint from a tenant in the apartment complex, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant indicating that her lease would be terminated on December 31, 2017 as a result of violating Paragraph 9(f) of the Lease.

7. Violating Paragraph 9(f) is a material breach of the Lease.

8. After issuing the lease termination notice, Plaintiff had an informal meeting with the Defendant to discuss why her lease was being terminated.

2 The trial court’s order allowing immediate possession indicates that the trial court

is addressing RHA’s motion for eviction. However, the trial court stated at the hearing that the trial court was hearing an appeal of a summary ejectment. 3 Winston has not challenged any of the trial court’s findings of fact on appeal to this

Court. The trial court’s findings of fact are therefore binding on appeal. See, e.g., Mussa v. Palmer-Mussa, 366 N.C. 185, 191 (2012). RALEIGH HOUS. AUTH. V WINSTON

9. Plaintiff rescinded the lease termination letter after the informal meeting, as the Defendant made the Plaintiff aware that Defendant had been a victim of domestic violence.

10. The [c]ourt takes judicial notice of the North Carolina Court Information System Electronic-Filing for Domestic violence complaints and notes that on December 5th, 2017, after RHA had hand delivered and sent via Certified mail return receipt requested the first notice of Lease Termination to the Defendant, Defendant file[d] for an Ex-Parte Domestic Violence Protective Order (DVPO) against [another individual].

11. Defendant’s request for an Ex-Parte DVPO was DENIED on December 5th, 2017, and, notable her reasons for requesting the order were:

He deserve [sic] my neighbor my landlord was going to put me out because she didn’t want here and I didn’t want he there but if he keep coming I we have to leave.

12. Defendant did not obtain a DVPO against [the other individual] until the return hearing on December 18th, at that hearing [the other individual] was not present and the Defendant’s allegations had changed substantially:

defendant repeatedly screams profanity at plaintiff and threatens to assault her; repeatedly verbal abuse for 17 years has caused her substantial emotional distress[.]

13. At the time of the first warning Defendant indicated to Plaintiff that she intended to get a no trespass order against [the other individual].

14. On or about February 5, 2018, the Plaintiff received another noise complaint against the Defendant. RALEIGH HOUS. AUTH. V WINSTON

15. On or about February 13, 2018, the Plaintiff issued a second notice of lease termination to the [Defendant].

16. On or about February 17, 2018, the Defendant wrote a memo to the Plaintiff acknowledging the noise disturbances and alleging that the disturbances were a result of [the other individual’s] three friends.

17. Just after receiving the 2nd notice to terminate her lease, Defendant sent a letter to the RHA indicating she intended to get a no trespass order for the other three friends of [the other individual]. Defendant has neither received a no trespass order for any of the individuals nor has she made any affirmative efforts to do so.

18. Per the Defendant’s rights, she had a grievance hearing on or about March 6, 2018 with an independent third party. The grievance hearing affirmed the Plaintiff’s decision to terminate the Defendant’s lease.

¶3 From these facts, the trial court concluded that “[d]efendant has . . . been given

adequate notice of her violations of Paragraph 9(f) of the Lease.”

¶4 The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err by reaching this

conclusion. Raleigh Hous. Auth. v. Winston, 267 N.C. App. 419, 424 (2019). The Court

of Appeals held that “the Notice of Lease Termination to Defendant was in compliance

with the governing federal regulation” because it “identified—and quoted—the

specific provision serving as the basis for Defendant’s lease termination.” Id.

¶5 Winston sought discretionary review in this Court, asking this Court to

consider “[w]hether a reference to a provision of a lease alone satisfies a public

housing authority’s obligation under federal law to ‘state specific grounds’ for

terminating the lease.” Winston also sought discretionary review concerning the RALEIGH HOUS. AUTH. V WINSTON

business records exception to hearsay. This Court allowed the petition for

discretionary review on both issues presented. We reverse the decision of the Court

of Appeals on the first issue presented and remand to the trial court for dismissal.

Accordingly, we decline to address the evidentiary issue concerning the business

records exception and express no opinion concerning the manner in which the Court

of Appeals resolved that issue.

II. Standard of Review

¶6 “In federally subsidized housing cases, the court decides whether applicable

rules and regulations have been followed, and whether termination of the lease is

permissible.” E. Carolina Reg’l Hous. Auth. v. Lofton, 238 N.C. App. 42, 46 (2014)

(quoting Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Patterson, 120 N.C. App. 552, 555 (1995)), aff’d as

modified, 369 N.C. 8 (2016). The construction of an administrative regulation is a

question of law. United States v. Moriello, 980 F.3d 924, 930 (4th Cir. 2020). “On

appeal, ‘[c]onclusions of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are

reviewable de novo.’ ” In re Estate of Skinner, 370 N.C. 126, 140 (2017) (alteration in

original) (quoting In re Foreclosure of Bass, 366 N.C. 464, 467 (2013)); see also

Moriello, 980 F.3d at 930.

III. Analysis

¶7 At issue in this case is the construction of the term “specific grounds” in 24

C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(3)(ii). Section 966.4 of Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations RALEIGH HOUS. AUTH. V WINSTON

states:

§ 966.4 Lease requirements.

A lease shall be entered into between the PHA and each tenant of a dwelling unit which shall contain the provisions described hereinafter.

....

(l) Termination of tenancy and eviction—

(3) Lease termination notice.

(ii) The notice of lease termination to the tenant shall state specific grounds for termination, and shall inform the tenant of the tenant’s right to make such reply as the tenant may wish. The notice shall also inform the tenant of the right (pursuant to § 966.4(m)) to examine PHA documents directly relevant to the termination or eviction. When the PHA is required to afford the tenant the opportunity for a grievance hearing, the notice shall also inform the tenant of the tenant’s right to request a hearing in accordance with the PHA’s grievance procedure.

24 C.F.R. § 966.4.

¶8 “In resolving issues of statutory construction, we look first to the language of

the statute itself.” Walker v. Bd. of Trs. of the N.C. Loc. Gov’tal Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 348

N.C. 63, 65 (1998) (quoting Hieb v. Lowery, 344 N.C. 403, 409 (1996)); see also

Radford, 734 F.3d at 293 (citing Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 204

(2011)). When the term in the statute is unambiguous, the term “should be RALEIGH HOUS. AUTH. V WINSTON

understood in accordance with its plain meaning.” Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue,

370 N.C. 10, 20 (2017); see also Moriello, 980 F.3d at 934 (“If the language of the

regulation ‘has a plain and ordinary meaning, courts need look no further and should

apply the regulation as it is written.’ ” (quoting Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC,

678 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2012)). To determine the plain meaning, this Court has

looked to dictionaries as a guide. Midrex Techs., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 369

N.C. 250, 258 (2016).

¶9 In 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(3)(ii), the adjective “specific” modifies the noun

“grounds.” “Grounds” is defined as “factors forming a basis for action or the

justification for a belief.” Grounds, New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010);

see also Ground, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2007) (defining

“ground” as “a basis for belief, action, or argument”); Ground, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019) (defining “ground” as “[t]he reason or point that something (as a legal

claim or argument) relies on for validity”). Meanwhile, “specific” is defined as “clearly

defined or identified.” Specific, New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010); see

also Specific, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2007) (defining

“specific” as “free from ambiguity”).

¶ 10 The plain meaning of “specific grounds” therefore requires RHA to clearly

identify the factors forming the basis for termination of the lease. Applying the

unambiguous plain meaning of “specific grounds” leads us to conclude that RHA RALEIGH HOUS. AUTH. V WINSTON

failed to comply with 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(3)(ii).

¶ 11 The relevant portion of the notice of termination states:

¶ 12 As evidenced above, the notice of termination identifies provision 9(F) of the

lease agreement, providing the contractual basis for termination of the lease.

However, the notice of termination lacks any reference to specific conduct by Winston.

RHA contends the “language [in the notice of termination] put . . . Winston on notice

that her alleged lease violation was based on disturbing her neighbors.” Yet, a

tenant’s disturbance of her neighbors encompasses a broad range of conduct, may

involve the tenant or other persons on the premises, and, as relevant to this case,

may include conduct for which the landlord may not evict the tenant as a matter of

law. Specifically, as part of the Violence Against Women Act, ch. 322, 108 Stat. 1902

(1994), Congress has prohibited covered housing programs from terminating

participation in or evicting a tenant from housing “on the basis that the . . . tenant is

or has been a victim of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking,”

34 U.S.C. § 12491(b)(1), and mandates that

[a]n incident of actual or threatened domestic violence, RALEIGH HOUS. AUTH. V WINSTON

dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking shall not be construed as—

(A) a serious or repeated violation of a lease for housing assisted under a covered housing program by the victim or threatened victim of such incident; or

(B) good cause for terminating the assistance, tenancy, or occupancy rights to housing assisted under a covered housing program of the victim or threatened victim of such incident.

34 U.S.C. § 12491(b)(2); see also N.C.G.S. § 42-42.2 (2019) (prohibiting termination of

tenancy or “retaliat[ion] in the rental of a dwelling based substantially on: (i) the

tenant, applicant, or a household member’s status as a victim of domestic violence,

sexual assault, or stalking”). The additional statement in the notice of termination—

“Inappropriate Conduct – Multiple Complaints”—is similarly broad and vague and

subject to the same concerns as provision 9(F) of the lease agreement.

¶ 13 As a whole, the notice of termination is indeterminate. Winston cannot

determine from the notice of termination how RHA contends she breached provision

9(F) of the lease agreement, and none of the trial court’s factual findings support a

conclusion otherwise. In the notice of termination, RHA failed to clearly identify the

factors forming the basis for termination of the lease—the specific grounds for

termination. Winston lacked adequate notice of the basis for the termination of lease.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 14 We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. In this case, the identification

and quotation of the specific provision serving as the basis for the landlord’s lease RALEIGH HOUS. AUTH. V WINSTON

termination does not comply with 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(3)(ii) because the factors

forming the basis for termination of the lease cannot be discerned. While a quotation

of the violated lease provisions in certain factual circumstances may provide “specific

grounds for termination,” cf. Roanoke Chowan Reg’l Hous. Auth. v. Vaughan, 81 N.C.

App. 354, 358 (1986) (holding that the notice of termination provided the specific

grounds for termination even though it incorrectly cited Section 7 of the lease

agreement because the statement—“by allowing individuals not named on the lease

to reside in your apartment”—“put defendants on notice regarding the specific lease

provision deemed to have been violated”), this issue and such a notice is not before

us. We hold that on this record, the notice of termination was fatally deficient.

Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision concerning compliance with 24

C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(3)(ii) and remand to the Court of Appeals for remand to the trial

court for dismissal consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.