NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 29 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAJPREET SINGH, No. 18-72275
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-793-092
v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 29, 2025**
Before: GOULD, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Rajpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from an
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Because the BIA adopted and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). affirmed the IJ’s decision citing Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994),
we review both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. See Cruz v. Bondi, 146 F.4th 730, 737
(9th Cir. 2025). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the
petition.
We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the
standards governing adverse credibility determinations under the REAL ID Act. See
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2010). “[T]he REAL ID Act
requires that credibility determinations be made on the basis of the ‘totality of the
circumstances, and all relevant factors.’” Id. at 1040 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The Act “permits IJs to consider factors such as demeanor,
candor, responsiveness, plausibility, inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and falsehoods to
form the basis of an adverse credibility determination.” Barseghyan v. Garland, 39
F.4th 1138, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2022). And “only the most extraordinary
circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility determination.”
Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041 (quoting Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2005)).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.
Before the IJ, Singh admitted he fabricated certain events that he had described in
his asylum application. In particular, Singh retracted earlier statements regarding
the events and harms he claimed to experience in 2011 and 2012. Singh testified
2 that he lied to the Asylum Officer because he was under “a lot of pressure” and the
people he was living with advised that “when you file a case like this, that’s the way
you have to tell the story.” To corroborate the false information, Singh also
instructed his father to include false information in the letter his father submitted to
the agency. And Singh conceded that he told the truth only after he was confronted
with government records revealing his lies.
Singh nevertheless maintains that police arrested and beat him on November
23, 2010, due to his political activities in India. At the hearing before the IJ, Singh
reaffirmed that what he told the Asylum Officer about this event was truthful. Singh
urges on appeal that because he testified credibly about this November 2010
incident, the agency erred in finding that his fabrication of other parts of his claim
made him ineligible for asylum. But even Singh’s description of the November 2010
incident to the IJ was inconsistent with what he previously told the Asylum Officer.
“An asylum applicant who lies to immigration authorities casts doubt on his
credibility and the rest of his story.” Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir.
2011). And “[t]he law of this circuit,” we have explained, “permits the use of the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus in the immigration context.” Enying Li v.
Holder, 738 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2013). The inconsistencies in the record and
Singh’s admission of fabricating parts of his initial asylum claim support an adverse
credibility finding. See Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010)
3 (“[A]ny inaccuracies, omissions of detail, or inconsistencies found by the IJ,
regardless of whether they go to the ‘heart’ of a petitioner’s claim, may support an
adverse credibility finding.”); Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir.
2020).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that Singh’s
documentary evidence did not independently establish eligibility for relief. Singh
submitted a country conditions report, a psychological report, and medical evidence
of his injuries—including the statement of a doctor who examined Singh in 2015
and found his injuries to be consistent with beating or torture. But the agency
reasonably afforded limited weight to the expert reports because they were based on
the false factual narrative that Singh provided. And the medical evidence does not
compel the conclusion that Singh received his injuries as a result of torture in India.
See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen a petitioner
contends that the IJ’s findings are erroneous, the petitioner ‘must establish that the
evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.’” (quoting Singh v. INS,
134 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1998))). Without credible testimony or sufficient
corroborating evidence, the agency properly concluded that Singh failed to establish
eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. See Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at
927.
“An adverse credibility determination is not necessarily a death knell to CAT
4 protection.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048. For a petitioner to succeed when found not
credible, the remaining evidence alone must compel the conclusion that he is “more
likely than not” to be tortured upon removal. Id. at 1048–49. But the documentary
evidence does not meet the high threshold of establishing that it is more likely than
not that Singh will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official. See Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 662–63 (9th Cir. 2019); Tzompantzi-
Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 706–07 (9th Cir. 2022) (recognizing “the
extremely high threshold of future torture required by statute” and holding that
petitioner failed to meet it). The government acknowledges that the record reflects
detainees have been tortured in India, but these reports do not demonstrate that Singh
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 29 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAJPREET SINGH, No. 18-72275
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-793-092
v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 29, 2025**
Before: GOULD, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Rajpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from an
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Because the BIA adopted and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). affirmed the IJ’s decision citing Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994),
we review both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. See Cruz v. Bondi, 146 F.4th 730, 737
(9th Cir. 2025). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the
petition.
We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the
standards governing adverse credibility determinations under the REAL ID Act. See
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2010). “[T]he REAL ID Act
requires that credibility determinations be made on the basis of the ‘totality of the
circumstances, and all relevant factors.’” Id. at 1040 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The Act “permits IJs to consider factors such as demeanor,
candor, responsiveness, plausibility, inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and falsehoods to
form the basis of an adverse credibility determination.” Barseghyan v. Garland, 39
F.4th 1138, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2022). And “only the most extraordinary
circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility determination.”
Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041 (quoting Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2005)).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.
Before the IJ, Singh admitted he fabricated certain events that he had described in
his asylum application. In particular, Singh retracted earlier statements regarding
the events and harms he claimed to experience in 2011 and 2012. Singh testified
2 that he lied to the Asylum Officer because he was under “a lot of pressure” and the
people he was living with advised that “when you file a case like this, that’s the way
you have to tell the story.” To corroborate the false information, Singh also
instructed his father to include false information in the letter his father submitted to
the agency. And Singh conceded that he told the truth only after he was confronted
with government records revealing his lies.
Singh nevertheless maintains that police arrested and beat him on November
23, 2010, due to his political activities in India. At the hearing before the IJ, Singh
reaffirmed that what he told the Asylum Officer about this event was truthful. Singh
urges on appeal that because he testified credibly about this November 2010
incident, the agency erred in finding that his fabrication of other parts of his claim
made him ineligible for asylum. But even Singh’s description of the November 2010
incident to the IJ was inconsistent with what he previously told the Asylum Officer.
“An asylum applicant who lies to immigration authorities casts doubt on his
credibility and the rest of his story.” Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir.
2011). And “[t]he law of this circuit,” we have explained, “permits the use of the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus in the immigration context.” Enying Li v.
Holder, 738 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2013). The inconsistencies in the record and
Singh’s admission of fabricating parts of his initial asylum claim support an adverse
credibility finding. See Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010)
3 (“[A]ny inaccuracies, omissions of detail, or inconsistencies found by the IJ,
regardless of whether they go to the ‘heart’ of a petitioner’s claim, may support an
adverse credibility finding.”); Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir.
2020).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that Singh’s
documentary evidence did not independently establish eligibility for relief. Singh
submitted a country conditions report, a psychological report, and medical evidence
of his injuries—including the statement of a doctor who examined Singh in 2015
and found his injuries to be consistent with beating or torture. But the agency
reasonably afforded limited weight to the expert reports because they were based on
the false factual narrative that Singh provided. And the medical evidence does not
compel the conclusion that Singh received his injuries as a result of torture in India.
See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen a petitioner
contends that the IJ’s findings are erroneous, the petitioner ‘must establish that the
evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.’” (quoting Singh v. INS,
134 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1998))). Without credible testimony or sufficient
corroborating evidence, the agency properly concluded that Singh failed to establish
eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. See Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at
927.
“An adverse credibility determination is not necessarily a death knell to CAT
4 protection.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048. For a petitioner to succeed when found not
credible, the remaining evidence alone must compel the conclusion that he is “more
likely than not” to be tortured upon removal. Id. at 1048–49. But the documentary
evidence does not meet the high threshold of establishing that it is more likely than
not that Singh will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official. See Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 662–63 (9th Cir. 2019); Tzompantzi-
Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 706–07 (9th Cir. 2022) (recognizing “the
extremely high threshold of future torture required by statute” and holding that
petitioner failed to meet it). The government acknowledges that the record reflects
detainees have been tortured in India, but these reports do not demonstrate that Singh
will face torture if he returns. This is particularly so given Singh’s contention that
he was previously detained and beaten in India is the same claim “‘that the BIA
determined to be not credible’ in the asylum context.” Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861
F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Singh v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir.
2015)). No objective evidence in the record compels us to conclude otherwise as to
Singh’s CAT claim.
The agency did not need to separately consider Singh’s eligibility for
humanitarian asylum because the adverse credibility finding controls, and Singh
failed to demonstrate past persecution or that there is a reasonable possibility he may
suffer other serious harm. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii); INS v. Bagamasbad,
5 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“[A]gencies are not required to make findings
on issues . . . unnecessary to the results they reach.”). For the same reason, the
agency did not need to separately consider internal relocation.
Finally, Singh’s due process rights were not violated during the agency’s
proceedings. When an IJ finds a petitioner’s testimony “not credible, the IJ [is] not
required to give [] notice and an opportunity to provide additional corroborating
evidence.” Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927.
PETITION DENIED.